The past week has been particularly difficult for Ukraine. Amid relentless Russian strikes, it stopped receiving U.S. warnings about ballistic missile launches, which the U.S. administration blamed on weather conditions. Ukraine also faced restrictions on Starshield satellite connectivity, which appear to remain in place, and neither Musk nor Trump has taken responsibility for them. This episode showed how vulnerable any country’s military capabilities and civilian protection become when they depend on external actors pursuing their own agendas.

In this edition:

• Ukraine Faces New Starlink Restrictions amid Ceasefire Pressure;

• Ukraine Seeks to Paralyze Moscow Airports;

• How Russia Continues to Reinvent the One-Way Attack Drone (CSIS Podcast);

• additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

As much as I love long and detailed reports, I’ve decided to save you reading time and make my newsletter more concise. Each issue will now take no more than 15 minutes to read. Let me know what you think of this new version.

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Ukraine Faces New Starlink Restrictions amid Ceasefire Pressure

Last week, Ukraine faced major disruptions, including restrictions on Starlink/Starshield connectivity and pauses in U.S. intelligence sharing. These developments followed a renewed ceasefire request by the U.S. administration, which Ukraine accepted by temporarily suspending strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, while Russia decided not to reciprocate.

On October 14, several units and Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence confirmed that they had begun facing new restrictions on the use of Starlink. The restriction applies to SpaceX’s Starshield military service package and is set at 100 mph, or about 161 km/h. It is limited to Ukrainian territory; European countries are not subject to it.

When an unmanned system exceeds the speed threshold, its terminal loses connectivity. The speed at which the connection is lost varies across platforms and military units, ranging from approximately 72 to 161 km/h. During UAV flights, the connection could be lost for 10-20 seconds. The drones keep moving, but these interruptions make them harder to control. Ukraine’s defence forces had not been warned in advance about the restriction. As a result, several combat missions have been disrupted.

This significantly affects Ukraine’s capabilities, particularly in operating mid-range drones at the tactical-operational level, which have created serious difficulties for Russian forces at the front throughout 2026. This year, Ukraine has launched several mid-range strike campaigns targeting Russian logistics, energy hubs, and missile launchers in Russian-occupied territories. Read my report: How Middle-Strike Drones Are Destroying Russian Logistics.

Another capability affected by the current restrictions is Ukraine’s interceptor drones, which use Starlink to counter jet-powered and conventional Geran drones. Adviser to President Zelenskyy, Serhii FLASH, said that “by taking these steps, our partners are depriving us of one of the few options we have for defending the country against jet-powered Shaheds”.

Ukraine has used Starlink only for defensive and counter-offensive purposes, as the service does not work over Russian territory. This new round of restrictions, following similar patterns throughout the war, underscores the vulnerability of relying on commercial services for strategic capabilities, especially as such dependencies could be used to pressure Ukraine into a ceasefire or peace deal with Russia.

Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski called on SpaceX CEO Musk to refrain from using his company’s products as a tool of political pressure. Poland allocates approximately $50 million annually to cover Starlink subscription fees for Ukraine. Other countries, such as Germany and the UK, also sponsor this service.

The European Commission plans to connect Ukraine to its secure satellite communications system, GOVSATCOM. However, it remains unclear whether this solution can match the capabilities of Starshield before Europe’s planned IRIS² constellation of around 300 satellites becomes operational in 2029.

Musk said the U.S. military and President Trump control access to Starshield, while Trump said he had not ordered the restriction on Ukraine.

Ukraine’s MoD has been actively engaging with SpaceX and the Pentagon to lift Starlink restrictions.

Ukraine’s need for its own independently controlled satellite communications system is evident. The country already has such a project—UASAT LEO, developed by Ukrainian company STETMAN in partnership with Denmark’s GomSpace. However, the project’s status remains unclear. The CEO of the Ukrainian Council of Defence Industry, Ihor Fedirko, revealed that he had personally participated in negotiations with German partners last year concerning the development of such a system; however, the negotiations unexpectedly collapsed for unclear reasons.

My earlier reports on Starlink in Ukraine and Russia:

• Global Starlink Outage: How Important This Is for Ukraine;

• Ukraine Works with SpaceX to Limit Russian Use of Starlink;

• Integration of Starlink Terminals into Russian Molniya UAVs.

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Ukraine Seeks to Paralyze Moscow Airports

In recent weeks, Ukraine has focused on targeting Russian dual-use infrastructure affecting the daily lives of Russian citizens, who have remained largely unaffected by the war for years. Strikes on data centers have continued, while Ukraine is now intensifying its operation codenamed M&Ms, aimed at disrupting civilian air traffic, particularly in Moscow.

While President Trump has focused on halting Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy facilities, he has not objected to attacks on other targets deep inside Russia. According to Russian sources, 2,730 Ukrainian UAVs flew toward the Moscow region between October 10 and 17, most of which were intercepted by Russian air defences before reaching their targets.

Moscow’s four airports were closed for a combined 101 hours during the first 14 days of October, compared with just 46 hours throughout September. On the evening of October 16 and overnight into October 17, renewed restrictions resulted in more than 350 delayed or cancelled flights, with Sheremetyevo airport particularly affected. Putin and his entourage were reportedly unable to land in Moscow after returning from Turkmenistan due to flight restrictions imposed at Moscow airports under the so-called “Carpet” emergency protocol in response to drone threats.

The airport disruptions are only the beginning of Ukraine’s operation codenamed M&Ms, The Atlantic reports. A more ambitious phase is expected to involve the deployment of AI-enabled drones capable of autonomously evading Russian air defences and directly striking airports. These drones are designed to operate without relying on U.S. intelligence support, with plans to scale up production in the near future.

Discussions concerning these capabilities have been ongoing since summer but were disrupted following the dismissal of Defence Minister Fedorov.

These strikes show the various ways Ukraine can increase economic pressure on Russia. Persistent disruptions to flight schedules at Moscow’s airports have far-reaching consequences for air travel across Russia, as Moscow remains the country’s largest aviation hub.

Read this article on Ukrainian strikes on Yandex data centers with my comments: Data Center Warfare: Ukraine’s Retaliatory Strategy Hits Russian Tech Hubs.

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How Russia Continues to Reinvent the One-Way Attack Drone (CSIS podcast)

Russia continues to improve and adapt one of its key capabilities—the Geran long-range attack drone, considered among the world’s best systems in its category. Since 2022, major improvements have included enhanced EW resilience, onboard communication capabilities, and increased lethality. The latest variant, the Geran-5, represents a significant leap in speed, leaving Ukraine with limited options to counter this evolving threat.

Main argument of the CSIS podcast: what makes the Geran drone dangerous is how fast Russia changes it.

Russia acquired the design for the Geran family from Iran in August 2022 and deployed it a month later. Here is how Russia has transformed this platform throughout the years:

• EW resilience: July 2023: Russia began fitting Gerans with Kometa-M, a homegrown controlled reception pattern antenna (CRPA). Its multiple antenna elements neutralize jamming from several directions, and Russia keeps adding more elements to filter out more jamming and spoofing.

• Onboard communication capabilities: early Gerans had none (they operated on fire-and-forget logic).

  • November 2023: Geran deployed with a 4G modem and a Ukrainian SIM card. It works as a tracker and can transmit its location throughout the flight.

  • February 2024: It contained a Raspberry Pi mini-computer and two 3G modems; this is still present in the Geran today.

  • It works on Ukraine’s cell network, and every drone becomes a data point. For Ukraine, its own air defence infrastructure becomes an exposure - the Gerans record and transmit data on how Ukraine’s air defence disables them.

• Next shift, summer 2025: airborne communication networks. Drones are equipped with mesh radio modules that turn a drone into a signal repeater for other drones flying nearby. This allows the formation of an airborne communication network in which drones flying next to one another relay data as a chain of nodes. The network is very robust to disruption: if one node is shot down, the group can regroup and relay through the remaining nodes.

• Another aspect is lethality, which can be seen in the development of warheads. There were several 50 kg alternatives, but Russia is moving to heavier approaches (90 kg). Also, Russia crams two 50 kg warheads into the fuselage for a combined explosive weight.

• Geran becomes a multi-purpose platform. Russia is experimenting with alternative payloads: mid-flight release of two PTM-3 anti-tank mines, or a Soviet-era R-60 air-to-air missile strapped to the fuselage to target approaching helicopters mid-flight. FPV drones: two were mounted on top of each wing for mid-flight release.

• The most recent version is the Geran-5: Russia developed a new airframe that looks more like a cruise missile and is twice as big as previous versions. It can develop speeds of 600 km/h – well beyond the reach of Ukraine’s interceptor drones that currently fly at 300 km/h. The interception rate was over 85% for the Geran-2; with the Geran-5, it fell to 65%.

• According to analysts, by replacing the original Iranian-designed Shahed piston engine with a small jet engine, Russia has produced a drone that is faster, harder to shoot down, and still much cheaper than a cruise missile. This allows Russia to carry out sustained long-range attacks without relying exclusively on expensive missiles, keeping those for the most heavily defended or strategically important targets.

Military Support to Ukraine

• Ukraine has run out of missiles for the U.S. Patriot air defence system, a CNN source reports. This information should be seen critically, as it is not possible to verify it, although Ukraine has been facing an interceptor missile shortage for months. According to Zelenskyy, Ukraine needs roughly 300 interceptors to survive this winter.

• President Trump accused Ukraine of selling U.S.-supplied weapons, including Tomahawk missiles, despite no confirmed deliveries of Tomahawks to Kyiv.

  In response, Ukraine’s Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO) revealed that the Trump administration had terminated funding for its project to monitor U.S. military aid, declaring it no longer in the U.S. national interest.

• On October 15, President Zelenskyy said that Ukraine had lost access to U.S. early-warning intelligence on ballistic missile launches. According to him, the United States is its only source of information about ballistic missile launches.

  France’s Foreign Ministry stated that European partners provide two-thirds of the intelligence Ukraine receives.

  On October 18, it was announced that the U.S. resumed intelligence sharing with Ukraine.

• The UK will be sending Ukraine more long-range Storm Shadow missiles. Also, the UK will accelerate deliveries of British Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMMs), which have proven effective against jet-powered drones.

Defence Innovation in Ukraine

• Six Ukrainian companies are mass-producing miniature turbojet engines, while a total of 11 companies in Ukraine are involved in their development. Expanding domestic production of these engines is a key step toward scaling up the manufacturing of new interceptor drones against Russian jet-powered threats.

• Ukraine and NATO created innovative AI-based military models for predicting enemy drone deployment near the contact line. One of them is a tool capable of forecasting adversary UAV usage based on an analysis of historical data, weather conditions, and the current battlefield situation. The other module, supporting the decision-making, tests the capability for the automated generation of artillery operation plans.

Russia and Allies

• Belarus is deploying a new secure military communications system for its MoD, designed to support the deployment and movement of Russian forces toward NATO countries’ borders.

• According to a report by Der Spiegel, the Turkish organized crime group known as the Daltons may have been behind an arson attack on a Starlink satellite communications station in Poland, allegedly acting on orders from Russian intelligence services.

Developments on the Frontline

• Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps has completed the fourth and final phase of its counteroffensive operation Vivaldi, which began in late May. According to Ukraine, Russian forces suffered approximately 8,000 killed and wounded during the operation. Ukrainian forces regained control of 277 sq. km of territory and liberated 16 settlements. My earlier report: Vivaldi: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Operation.

• NATO has estimated that Russia suffered more than 50,000 casualties in its war against Ukraine in September, of whom 28,000 were killed. According to Bloomberg sources, Ukraine suffered 5,000 casualties in September.

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Ukraine has significantly increased its use of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) this year. In 2026 alone, UGVs have carried out more than 100,000 evacuation and logistics missions. They are also increasingly being used for strike operations.

This time, I’ve highlighted the UGV section of my newsletter, which also features six other sections covering the latest developments in drone warfare.

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Ground Drones (UGVs)

• During Operation Vivaldi, a Ukrainian UGV equipped with a machine gun positioned itself between two tree lines occupied by Russian troops. The UGV opened fire on one Russian position and then the other. Believing they were being attacked by Ukrainian forces from opposite directions, the Russian soldiers began firing at each other.

• A Ukrainian defence startup has developed an amphibious UGV, Toni. It is designed for logistics, evacuation, and special missions on both land and water. Toni can carry payloads of up to 380 kg on land and 280 kg on water. It reaches a maximum speed of 13 km/h on land and 2–4 km/h on water. It has an operational range of up to 50 km on land and 5 km on water at 50% battery charge. The development team is working to increase both speed and range.

• Ukrainian company ARMOLAB tested its Robonoshi UGV with a 170 kg load, successfully transporting a man weighing 170 kg. Robonoshi is designed for medical evacuation, replacing the manual carrying of wounded personnel, and can also support missions.

• The Tencore Ecosystem, a system of UGVs and related technologies, has been unveiled in Ukraine. It consists of four classes of robotic platforms and an AI-powered autonomous navigation module. The Tencore Ecosystem includes the tracked TerMIT UGV, equipped with modules for logistics, medical evacuation, mine-laying, and combat missions. It also features the TOR 4×4 wheeled UGV with armoured wheels, the MAT1LDA 8×8 amphibious unmanned platform capable of crossing water obstacles, and the TRAX UTILITY firefighting and rescue robot.

• In Ukraine, a heavy-lift drone transported a UGV-kamikaze behind Russian positions. The UGV was able to cross a route littered with mines and unexploded ordnance and reach a shelter occupied by Russian troops.

  The mission was successful: the shelter was destroyed along with the Russian personnel inside.

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Aerial Drones

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While the army of humanoid robots isn't here yet, humans already successfully operate unmanned ground vehicles in some of the most challenging missions, including logistics, medical evacuation, and strike operations. The result? Ukraine has not only liberated its territory but has also done so while minimizing human losses. The use of UGVs reportedly helped save approximately 2,500 soldiers’ lives during Ukraine’s counteroffensive Operation Vivaldi.

In this edition:

• Gryphon Tactics: Innovative Combat Applications of UGVs in Operation Vivaldi;

• “The Development of Autonomy Can No Longer Be Stopped”: The Fourth Law;

• Trends in Ukraine’s Drone Industry;

• 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

As my work now involves frequent travel and public engagements, I’ve decided to occasionally combine my Arms Trends in Ukraine and Drone Warfare in Ukraine newsletters. This means that some Monday editions will cover both topics, including traditional and emerging military capabilities.

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Gryphon Tactics: Innovative Combat Applications of UGVs in Operation Vivaldi

As time passes, more details about Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi are emerging. Unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) have been playing a particularly important role in this operation, saving the lives of thousands of soldiers and carrying out a wide range of logistical and strike missions.

We are witnessing a gradual transformation in the role of unmanned technologies: they are increasingly being deployed to perform some of the most complex and dangerous tasks, allowing human soldiers to take on more specialized roles and enter combat at later stages of operations.

Yet humans remain at the heart of this evolution.

The NC-13 Strike UGV Unit of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade has demonstrated that innovation is not just about developing new systems, but also about how these systems are employed, combined, and integrated into new tactics. This is something that cannot simply be stamped “battlefield-tested” and sold abroad. It underscores the critical importance of human capital, operational experience, and the ability to innovate on the battlefield.

The unit performs strike UGV missions exclusively: sabotage, assault, and defensive operations. Sabotage missions include operations that the unit carries out at a depth of more than 8 km into enemy territory. The unit relies exclusively on Ukrainian drones.

In his interview with Defender Media, the commander of the unit said that during Operation Vivaldi, UGVs carried out 94 assault and sabotage missions without risk to Ukrainian troops, and their deployment saved the lives of about 2,500 people.

UGVs supported deception operations, reinforced selected sectors, targeted command posts and ammunition or supply sites, and engaged Russian assault groups along logistical routes.

One of the most notable applications of UGVs during Vivaldi was the “Gryphon” tactic, in which strike UGVs were transported by heavy aerial drones and deployed deep behind Russian lines.

The ground robots, sometimes equipped with disposable grenade launchers, could be dropped as far as 10 kilometres into the Russian rear and then continue moving independently toward their targets.

Some UGVs carried two Bullspike grenade launchers. They approached Russian positions and fired on them before continuing toward enemy shelters, where the vehicles were then detonated.

The tactic was designed to create uncertainty about where and how Ukrainian robotic systems could appear behind Russian positions. Such missions were used to target Russian UAV operators, including personnel associated with the Rubikon unit, as well as company-level and higher command posts and troops moving along logistical routes.

In one reported case, the deployment of a UGV behind Russian lines contributed to the cancellation of a planned mechanized assault. Russian forces interpreted the presence of the robot as evidence that a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group was waiting to ambush the advancing column.

The “Gryphon” tactic was named in honour of NC-13 servicemember Hryhorii Bach, callsign “Gryphon,” who went missing near Andriivka in the Bakhmut sector in 2023.

During the third phase of Operation Vivaldi in northern Donetsk Oblast, Ukrainian forces also repurposed Soviet-era BTR-60 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) as kamikaze UGVs to strike Russian strongpoints.

Footage released by the unit indicated that the vehicles were packed with explosive material, including what appeared to be anti-tank mines, likely TM-62s. Then the vehicles were remotely driven toward fortified Russian positions. The adapted APCs were used as an improvised means of breaching key enemy strongpoints.

The use of converted BTR-60s illustrates another dimension of the operation’s ground-robotics approach: adapting legacy armoured vehicles into remotely controlled, expendable strike platforms for attacking fortified positions.

ISW wrote that it is notable that Ukrainian forces were able to field and drive APCs up to heavy Russian fortifications without coming under Russian drone strikes. Analysts indicated that Ukrainian forces neutralized or otherwise negated Russian drone defenses. Ukrainian forces conducted extensive shaping operations and an intermediate-range strike campaign to mitigate the threat from Russian drones and EW systems and achieve tactical drone overmatch, aiding Ukrainian mechanized advances in the Lyman direction.

ISW analysts concluded that Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction has completely disrupted Russia’s plans to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, forcing the Russian military to rebuild its forces and likely rethink its strategy.

Currently, there is no basis for assuming Russia could capture the rest of Donetsk Oblast in the near future, as Putin continues to claim.

Read my earlier report: Vivaldi: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Operation.

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“The Development of Autonomy Can No Longer Be Stopped”: The Fourth Law

“Drone autonomy could become the Manhattan Project of the 21st century. Like nuclear weapons, it could become a major deterrent: countries possessing the most advanced autonomous technologies may enjoy a significant security advantage. If a country’s technology is far ahead of its adversary’s, the adversary may be less inclined to attack,” said Maksym Savanevskyi, Communications Director at The Fourth Law, a Ukrainian company developing autonomous drone technologies, in his interview with LB.ua.
Here are some key points:

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In 2026, Ukraine has been approving two to three new UAV models every day. Not all of them are innovative technologies, but the size and variety of the market speak for themselves. Russia, meanwhile, has pursued a different strategy: selecting the most effective solutions and scaling up their production.

The latest edition of Ukraine Drone Brief is out, packed with recent drone-related developments in Ukraine and Russia. It is available to VIP subscribers.

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Aerial Drones

• President Zelenskyy said Ukraine would intensify strikes on Russian oil refineries in response to Moscow’s renewed air campaign aimed at forcing residents to flee Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities.

• Russia updated its jet-powered Geran-4. The new version features an additional autonomous navigation system, a magnetometer to increase the accuracy of the inertial system, and a new warhead designed to destroy specific infrastructure elements. The Chinese Telefly turbojet engine has been replaced by a Russian equivalent produced in Alabuga.

• Russia has begun deploying a new variant of the Geran-5 attack drone, designated Geran-5 K5. It features a redesigned fuselage and a DSMAC electro-optical navigation system that uses reference images of terrain, similar to the Kh-101 cruise missile.

• SIM cards from Polish mobile operators were found in some Russian Gerbera drones that violated Polish airspace in September 2025. Mobile connectivity is a valid way to control drones remotely.

• Unusual whisker-like protrusions have been spotted on Russian Geran drones. Ukrainian expert Serhii FLASH suggested they function as mechanical impact fuzes. Volunteer Sternenko similarly suggested they are designed to trigger the warhead upon contact with small targets, such as power lines.

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The future seems to be arriving faster than expected, with Ukraine’s former defence minister announcing a new “Army of Robots” initiative. While Ukrainian developers and military personnel have met the idea with scepticism, other countries have been experimenting with humanoid and other robotic systems for military applications for some time.

In this edition:

• Trends on the Battlefield and Current Priorities;

• Army of Humanoid Robots;

• Defence Tech Is the New Agriculture: General Cherry on Drone Production;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

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Trends on the Battlefield and Current Priorities

With the arrival of autumn and changes in vegetation cover, battlefield activity is changing in intensity and character. According to Ruslan Leviev’s analysis, the pace of Russian advances declined by roughly 20% in September. At the same time, assessing the actual rate of territorial change has become increasingly difficult, as both sides sometimes publish older footage as if it were recent.

Operation Vivaldi illustrates this particularly well. Much of the information being released now concerns achievements from earlier. As Robert “Madyar” Brovdi, Commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, has noted in his interview with The Telegraph, operations of this kind depend heavily on secrecy. Maintaining operational silence is increasingly difficult in today’s highly transparent information environment and OSINT capabilities; it remains essential — including in communications with allies.

This makes real-time assessments of battlefield momentum especially difficult. Official statements frequently lag behind battlefield developments or present events selectively. In Ukraine’s case, some gains became public only considerably later. Russia, meanwhile, continues to make highly inflated claims about its territorial advances.

Putin claimed that Russian forces had captured 1,301 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory in September 2026. ISW, however, assessed that Russian forces instead suffered a net territorial loss of 80.81 square kilometers in September 2026.

Operation Vivaldi appears to have been more successful than public reporting initially suggested. Ukrainian forces succeeded in cutting off the Shandryholove salient, while some assessments indicate that Ukrainian troops may already be crossing the Zherebets River and pushing deeper into Russian positions.

Another notable development last week was the adaptation of battle tanks to modern warfare. The 475th Assault Regiment, operating with limited infantry resources, used heavily protected tanks together with several types of drones while clearing Russian sabotage groups in Kharkiv Oblast, roughly nine kilometres from the Russian border.

The group combined two heavily protected tanks with FPV drones, a Vampire drone, and a Mavic reconnaissance drone. The Mavic served as the “eyes” of the tanks, providing situational awareness and helping guide their movement.

Russia, meanwhile, continues to expand its armed forces. Following elections to the State Duma, Russian authorities moved toward another round of hidden mobilization. A new decree increased the authorized strength of the Russian Armed Forces by approximately 15,500 personnel. This followed another increase of around 27,000 positions in late July, bringing the total increase over two months to more than 40,000.

According to Brovdi, rapidly mobilized Russian personnel often receive insufficient training before deployment. Nevertheless, the additional manpower continues to pose a serious challenge for Ukrainian forces and should not be interpreted as making Russia’s offensive operations easy to counter.

For Ukraine, one of the principal responses is therefore the continued expansion of unmanned systems. Ukraine cannot compete with Russia primarily through manpower and must preserve its human resources.

Both sides continue to achieve limited tactical successes on different sectors of the front, although recent gains appear more pronounced on the Ukrainian side. The overall tempo of operations is expected to slow further in October for both sides.

Read more about Operation Vivaldi here.

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Army of Humanoid Robots

Ukraine’s Former Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced the launch of the “Army of Robots”, an ecosystem of robotic technologies for the military. The promotional video showed humanoid robots carrying weapons, operating in trenches, and assembled in large formations.

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Russia’s non-stop drone and missile attacks against Ukraine’s civilian population continue, now targeting bridges and energy infrastructure. Russia is not preparing to stop its war against Ukraine; instead, it plans to spend $12 billion next year solely on the production of jet-powered drones and loitering munitions.

This edition of the Ukraine Drone Brief is particularly rich in developments. As always, one edition each month is free for all subscribers and followers. Subscribe so you don’t miss the next editions.

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Aerial Drones

• For the first time, Russia used a specialized cumulative-cutting warhead, known as KRSN, on a jet-powered UAV. The warhead was reportedly designed specifically to damage high-voltage transmission towers and steel bridge structures. The KRSN consists of a 40 kg main warhead and four additional effect modules. Russia may be planning attacks against critical high-voltage power transmission lines.

  In the first two days of October, Russia has targeted two bridges over the Dnipro River in Kyiv.

• According to Ukraine, Russian forces are increasing the resolution of cameras on their drones and using higher-quality materials in their construction. This lets them get a more detailed view of the situation on the ground and use the UAV for different missions. A single platform could serve multiple roles: reconnaissance, strike, and communications relay.

• Long-range weapons remain the leading cause of civilian casualties in Ukraine, accounting for 47% of the total (194 killed; 1,077 injured). Most casualties from these weapons occurred far from the frontline in urban centres. Short-range drones were the main cause of civilian casualties near the frontline (91 killed; 727 injured), accounting for 30% of all civilian casualties in August.

• Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi underscored the importance of fuel in sustaining drone and counter-drone operations, as well as the strategic vulnerabilities associated with fuel dependence. The operation’s success was facilitated by Ukraine’s intermediate-range drone strike campaign targeting Russian fuel supplies, which reduced the availability of diesel needed to power generators supporting Russian electronic warfare systems. At the same time, Ukrainian electronic warfare systems reportedly neutralized around 20,000 Russian drones.

• President Zelenskyy said that Ukraine has approved long-range operations for October.

• Ukrainian Vyriy Industries unveiled its new Slavic reconnaissance drone, pitching the aircraft as an alternative to Chinese commercial drones (DJI Mavic) amid domestic efforts to reduce dependence on Chinese technology.

• Russia is promoting an export version of the Garpiya-A1 strike UAV, designated Garpiya-A1E, to international customers. The drone reportedly has a range of up to 1,000 km. The export variant is expected to be showcased to potential foreign buyers at defence exhibitions in Vietnam and China.

Ground Drones (UGVs)

• Ukraine has conducted its first logistics mission using an amphibious UGV. The platform covered more than 40 km during the mission. On land, it retained the mobility of a conventional UGV; upon reaching water, it switched to amphibious mode within seconds and continued moving. The system delivered ammunition and supplies to frontline positions. Water obstacles remain a major challenge for frontline logistics.

  Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence and Brave1 are continuing to develop amphibious UGV capabilities and support the scaling of such solutions.

• Demand from foreign businesses for Ukrainian UGVs has grown significantly over the past year, although a fully developed market has yet to emerge. The strongest interest has come from Germany, France, Norway, and Northern European countries more broadly.

• The Italian Army tested the Ukrainian Droid TW 7.62 and Droid TW 12.7 combat UGVs developed by DevDroid. Ukrainian UGVs operated alongside the Italian ULISSE platform developed by ABET HTS. They supported infantry assaults on enemy positions, evacuated wounded personnel, and facilitated further advances. The exercise also included coordination with artillery and the simultaneous employment of multiple unmanned platforms within a single tactical scenario.

• Ukrainian Frontline Robotics unveiled the versatile six-wheeled Frodo UGV designed for logistics, strike, and evacuation missions. The robot can carry up to 400 kg in total, including up to 200 kg of payload. Its maximum speed is 40 km/h, with an operational range of up to 150 km.

Naval Drones

• Ukrainian-British UFORCE participated in NATO’s international REPMUS 26 exercise in Portugal. This year, UFORCE significantly increased its participation, deploying 11 unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and 8 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

AI

• “Drones are the plague of the third millennium,” says Robert “Madyar” Brovdi, Commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces.

  In his view, AI is becoming a kind of digital panopticon capable of influencing nearly every aspect of modern life. Combined with the rapid development of unmanned systems, AI could give humanity access to increasingly difficult-to-control weapons—not only as instruments of warfare, but also as tools that can shape the future of society. For now, AI-enabled drone technologies are primarily being developed in support of military objectives. What comes next is much harder to predict.

  His broader concern is that humanity may gradually be losing control over the technologies it is creating.

• British-Ukrainian Occam Industries has raised €3.8 million to develop autonomous drone-control software.

• Ukraine is developing SPECTR, an AI-powered system for analyzing battlefield data and supporting operational planning. The system is being developed by the A1 Artificial Intelligence Center under Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence. Several combat units are already testing it.

C-UAS

• Zelenskyy said that Ukraine is currently neutralizing around 70% of drones overall, while the interception rate for jet-powered drones stands at 57%.

• Zelenskyy said that Ukraine would have 400 interceptors for jet-powered drones in October. However, their effectiveness remains inconsistent: on some days, it reaches around 70%, while on others it can fall to 30%. Currently, F-16 fighter jets destroy about 50–60% of jet-powered drones.

• The Ukrainian P1-SUN JetKiller interceptor drone, produced by SkyFall, destroyed a Russian Geran-5 small cruise missile for the second time.

Components and Software

• In 2026, the estimated initial budget for building an FPV drone ranges from approximately USD 445 for a basic setup to around USD 1,560 for a more complete setup with a digital system. The most expensive components are typically the set of four motors, the electronic speed controller (ESC), the flight controller, and the video transmission system (VTX/Air Unit).

Drones and Humans

• The Drone Warfare Applications Course (DWAC) at the International Peacekeeping and Security Centre has received NATO Selected status.

  The program was developed by Ukrainian officer-instructors from the Partnership for Peace Training Centre, drawing on the combat experience of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In 2026, the course was piloted with the participation of officers from more than ten countries.

• Beginning on September 1, 2026, Russia introduced a unified basic course on unmanned transport systems across its network of transport universities, making drone-related instruction mandatory for students at 19 universities and their affiliated campuses.

  Ukraine’s military leadership has tracked the growth of Russia’s Unmanned Systems Forces, formally established in mid-November 2025, from roughly 80,000 personnel in January 2026 to an estimated 114,000 by early May. Moscow’s own targets call for 165,000 by the end of 2026 and 210,000 across 277 units by 2030.

• Ukrainian soldiers are developing a condition described as “drone phobia,” linked to the constant threat and sound of drones on the battlefield. Ukrainian and U.S. researchers are now examining whether the condition is distinct from conventional PTSD and could eventually warrant separate clinical recognition.

• The Guardian reported on Chinese volunteers working in a drone workshop within a Ukrainian military unit focused on reconnaissance.

  One volunteer was primarily responsible for repairing drones. In a single week, he reportedly repaired around 10 Mavic drones and 15 first-person-view (FPV) drones.

Cooperation Deals

• Lithuania is testing SkyFortress, a Ukrainian-developed airspace monitoring system designed to detect low-flying drones and other threats by analysing acoustic and radio signals. It uses AI to detect and track low-flying drones and cruise missiles based on acoustic or electromagnetic signatures.

• The Danish Ministry of Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organization (DALO) has purchased nine Dropla 4×4 UGVs by Danish-Ukrainian defense startup Dropla Tech to train conscript operators at the Danish Defence Drone Center.

• Japanese corporation Terra Drone Corporation, through its European structure Terra Defense Europe, has acquired a 50% stake in Ukrainian company Kurin Technologies. The acquisition was worth approximately $3.5 million. Kurin Technologies is a manufacturer of FPV multirotor interceptors designed to counter Russian UAVs in the combat zone.

• Ukrainian TAF Industries and Luxembourg-based LUXUAV have signed an MoU to jointly develop new unmanned solutions and establish industrial-scale production in the Benelux countries.

Related Global Developments

• Hero drones developed by Israel’s UVision will be manufactured in the United States for the U.S. military and equipped with advanced autonomy technologies from Estonia’s Lendurai, which also operates in Ukraine. The Estonian company maintains a presence in Ukraine, where it can test and validate its technologies, including its Neocortex autonomy system. The system provides unmanned platforms with navigation capabilities, as well as target detection, acquisition, tracking, and engagement in environments affected by electronic warfare and jamming.

• The Defense Ministry plans to introduce a new contract system to support startups in developing UAVs and other products. The ministry will examine participating companies at each stage, such as development planning and demonstration, making payments for necessary expenses at each step.

Work with Ukraine

• Ukrainian company RVN CLAW is developing a system for intercepting analog signals from drones. It is a passive system operating in the 1080–8260 MHz frequency range. The company is currently exploring international cooperation in several areas, including integration with C-UAS and C2 systems, GEOINT and visual geolocation, technology and manufacturing partnerships, and strategic investment to scale production and support further product development. Contact them here.

Other Updates

• Russia has offered a US$20 million reward through post-Soviet criminal networks for information that could help locate Robert "Magyar" Brovdi, commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces.

• Ukrainian units have ordered more than 590,000 drones through Brave1 Market in the first nine months of 2026.

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Read other relevant reports:

• Drones for Humanitarian Missions: Delivery to Occupied Oleshky;

• Autonomous Weapons: The Ukrainian Perspective;

• Vivaldi: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Operation;

• Russia’s “Dark Plant” for Automated Containerized FPV Drone Production.

We often discuss how civilian technologies are adapted for combat use, but last week we saw the reverse. The delivery of four tons of provisions to the occupied Ukrainian city of Oleshky demonstrated how drones used for strikes can also be repurposed for humanitarian missions—delivering aid while operating under active countermeasures by enemy forces seeking to prevent such operations.

The challenges Ukraine’s Defence Forces had to overcome, including direct Russian fire and electronic warfare countermeasures, show that under conditions of active interference, missions like this would be nearly impossible for humanitarian organizations to conduct on their own.

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Oleshky is a Ukrainian city just nine kilometres from Kherson. Russian forces occupied it in the first days of the full-scale invasion. According to the Kherson Regional Military Administration, after all these years, about 2,000 people remain in the city, including nearly 50 children. They live without electricity or gas supplies, with little or no access to medical care and medicines, and face acute shortages of food and drinking water. The city is under near-total military and information isolation, with movement severely restricted and reliable information about conditions inside Oleshky extremely difficult to obtain.

All roads and approaches to the city are mined. Oleshky lies only a few kilometres from Ukrainian-controlled territory within the range of drones operated by both sides. As a result, the skies over the city have become a constant battlespace, with drones hunting other drones and targeting virtually anything moving on the ground.

Commercial drivers who attempted to bring food into the city by road during the summer came under heavy fire and were forced to turn back.

Ukraine has appealed to both the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and international partners to help organize civilian evacuations. However, these efforts have produced no result: Russia has not agreed to establish a humanitarian corridor.

Earlier, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Ukraine was allegedly obstructing the delivery of humanitarian aid to Oleshky.

Last week, several units of Ukraine’s Defence Forces carried out a unique operation that successfully delivered around 4 tons of food, drinking water, medicines, hygiene products, and other essential supplies to 100 designated locations in Russian-occupied Oleshky across the Dnipro River. According to the Ukrainian OSINT channel DroneBomber, each package weighed 38 kg. Several Vampire drones were reportedly used in the operation along with other UAV types.

The operation involved several Defence Forces units, including the Bolharychi unit of the 11th Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine and the 34th National Guard Regiment.

Ruslan Muzychuk, press secretary of the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU), wrote on his LinkedIn that this case illustrates an important evolution in how we think about unmanned systems: “The same technology used to protect troops and positions on the frontline can also help reach civilians in areas where traditional humanitarian access is impossible. And this is not a risk-free mission. Russian forces have attempted to disrupt the deliveries by shooting down drones carrying supplies”.

The National Guard of Ukraine’s Commander, Maj. Gen. Oleksandr Pivnenko told Ukraine’s Arms Monitor that ground transport cannot reach the city because it is located on the other side of the Dnipro River, and access to it is controlled by the occupying forces. A drone, however, can cross the river, reach a designated point, and drop a payload without putting a driver, volunteer, or service member at risk on a mined road under constant fire.
The drone deliveries cannot replace a full-fledged humanitarian corridor, which Russia has refused to open. But until that happens, unmanned systems remain the only practical means of delivering assistance.

Drones have long been used in rescue operations and to deliver supplies to remote or hard-to-reach areas. What makes this case particularly unusual is that these humanitarian drones are operating in an active battlespace. The National Guard told me that “Russian forces actively attempt to shoot down all of our drones, using electronic intelligence and electronic warfare systems, as well as interceptor drones. But what matters most is that the mission achieved its objective: approximately four tonnes of food supplies were delivered to the city”.

Most of the platforms used in this operation were multirotor drones; however, the NGU did not disclose specific models, payload capacities, or flight profiles, as the Russian side closely monitors how Ukraine conducts such operations and uses every detail to improve its ability to shoot down the drones.

Organizing such a mission required accounting for several challenges. The enemy can destroy drones in flight, hit the packages being dropped, or target the people who come to collect them. That is why the operation required extensive preparation, taking into account everything that could be anticipated — from routes to the choice of timing and drop-off points. Distributing the cargo across multiple locations reduces the risk that a single strike could destroy the entire delivery or disrupt the operation.

According to an interview with a drone operator from the 34th Separate Marine Brigade “Borysfen,” recorded in spring 2026, delivery routes have to be planned very carefully because Russian forces actively hunt the drones and may also target civilians receiving the supplies. “Every flight carried out for a delivery mission can become a one-way mission,” he said. Even when a drone returns to its launch point, the mission can remain dangerous because Russian forces may track its flight path and use that information to identify the launch area.

Some of the drones were reportedly lost in this operation. “As for drone losses, it would be unrealistic to claim that a mission like this can be carried out without them,” the National Guard told me.

The second challenge was coordination. This joint effort involved numerous units of Ukraine’s Defense Forces, so all participants had to synchronize their actions within a very limited timeframe.

The National Guard of Ukraine is highly experienced in these types of tasks. It has carried out logistical missions along the frontline for a long time, and each mission provides data on the enemy’s response. Modern electronic warfare and the rapid pace of change on the battlefield mean that methods that work today have to be updated every few months.

Russia uses occupied Ukrainian territories to deploy its forces and to establish drone launch sites closer to Ukrainian areas. In May, the Ukrainian Air Force identified a site in Oleshky used by Russian drone operators who had regularly targeted the Ukrainian-controlled right bank of the Dnipro River, including attacks on civilians described by Ukrainian authorities as a “human safari.” Russian forces had established the position in a former sanitary and epidemiological station and set up a battalion-level command post there.

There are fresh reports on social media that Russian personnel have been searching the homes of Oleshky residents for packages delivered by drones and confiscating them. “They immediately start asking questions if the food is not Russian-made: ‘Where did you get it?’ And they say, ‘If the Ukrainian Armed Forces are dropping food supplies to you, then you are cooperating with them,’ Tetiana Hasanenko, head of the Oleshky City Military Administration, told Ukrinform. Following this mission, Russian governmental and non-governmental sources intensified their campaign blaming Ukraine for the blockade of the city.

While this successfully coordinated and executed mission deserves recognition, it is unfortunately not enough to resolve the humanitarian crisis in Oleshky. Stronger international pressure is needed to compel Russia to open a humanitarian corridor.

In response to the humanitarian catastrophe in Oleshky, Ukraine initiated an urgent discussion of the situation at the OSCE.

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Read other relevant reports:

• “Baba Yaga” Drones in Ukraine: Key Trends;

• The Vampire: a drone that terrifies Russians;

• Heavy Bombers: A Pilot of “Vampire” Tells About His Daily Operations;

• Drones Against Civilians: How Russia Uses UAVs to Kill and Terrorize.

The wave of non-stop Russian attacks against Ukraine continues. This time the enemy targets data centres and network infrastructure in an effort to disrupt Ukrainians’ access to information, including alerts about ongoing missile and drone attacks.

In this edition:

• Russia Targets Data Centers and Network Facilities of Ukraine;

• Autonomous Weapons: The Ukrainian Perspective;

• Ukraine’s Defence-Industrial Partnerships and Their Limitations: KSE Report;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

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Russia Targets Data Centers and Network Facilities of Ukraine

Previously, the main risks to Ukrainian data centres were cyberattacks and power outages; now, Russian attackers are directly targeting the facilities, including buildings, servers, and communications links.

On September 23, Russian strikes on Ukraine’s digital infrastructure intensified. Russians focused on facilities in Kyiv and Odesa Oblast. According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation, around 100,000 households in Kyiv and the surrounding region experienced internet disruptions. The attacks continued the following day. On September 27, Russia hit the headquarters of Kyivstar, Ukraine's largest mobile service provider.

In Ukraine, data centres are conventional above-ground buildings that were never designed to withstand missile or drone strikes. Ukrainian experts said the strikes hit key data centres handling a significant share of Ukraine’s domestic internet traffic. Two major operators reportedly went offline for several hours because their network cores were located at the affected sites.

Despite the scale of the strikes on data centres, experts agree that Ukraine is unlikely to lose internet access entirely. One reason is the highly decentralized structure of the sector. Ukraine never had a heavily regulated internet market requiring expensive licences, which made entry relatively easy and allowed thousands of providers to operate. As a result, the country developed a highly distributed internet infrastructure.

Advisor to the President, Serhii FLASH Beskrestnov wrote that while local outages are possible, Ukraine’s highly distributed internet infrastructure makes a nationwide blackout unlikely. Providers are expected to restore damaged connections, although service costs could rise as companies absorb repair expenses.

Ukrainian digital technology expert Hlushchenko recommends that people in Ukraine use two SIM cards from different mobile operators if they move around frequently, and two fixed-line internet connections if reliable home access is critical. He advises prioritizing providers that use xPON technology and maintaining an independent backup power source. Starlink, he says, is a useful last line of connectivity, but it should not be seen as a universal replacement for terrestrial internet.

However, the campaign to disrupt access to information for Ukraine’s population extends beyond Ukraine. Last week, Polish authorities reported that a Starlink satellite station in central Poland serving Ukraine had been set on fire. The attack was “deliberately designed to disable the station”, disrupting internet access for a number of institutions, including the Ukrainian military.

Another Starlink ground station is located in Lithuania. However, Russian analyst Ruslan Leviev argues that even if both stations were completely destroyed, this would not necessarily disrupt Starlink service in Ukraine. SpaceX satellites can relay data between one another, allowing Ukrainian terminals to connect through ground stations located elsewhere.

Ukraine has pursued a similar logic in attacks on Russian space-related facilities in Moscow and Vladimir regions this summer, seeking to disrupt infrastructure linked to Russia’s Starlink analogue, Rassvet.

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Autonomous Weapons: The Ukrainian Perspective

In early September, the 128 states parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons agreed on a non-binding document addressing autonomous weapons systems. The framework regulates or prohibits weapons considered to be indiscriminate or to cause excessive injury.

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Ukraine has few equals in defence innovation, but now it remains vulnerable in one particular area: countering jet-powered threats, some of which no longer resemble conventional drones.

This weekly digest covers more than 30 developments in drone and counter-drone technologies in Ukraine and Russia.

Check out earlier free editions: August 22-28; July 25-31; July 11-17.

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Naval Drones

• According to the Ukrainian Navy, none of the maritime drones that Russia has deployed this season reached their intended targets; all were destroyed at sea. Russia, in turn, is using a range of measures to counter Ukrainian maritime drones, such as boom barriers, aviation, and observation posts.

  Russia has already lost about 30% of its Black Sea Fleet, while its capacity to employ Kalibr cruise missiles has fallen by roughly half.

• Ukrainian-British UFORCE has begun recruiting Formula 1 engineers on a large scale to help develop its drone systems. They have exactly the expertise needed: strong experience with composites and carbon fiber used in race cars, deep knowledge of sensors, and the ability to optimize both electric and conventional engines. Another advantage of Formula 1 engineers is their ability to reduce structural weight without compromising reliability.

  UFORCE systems, including the MAGURA maritime drone, have carried out more than 150,000 combat missions.

Aerial Drones

• On September 25, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with 162 strike drones of various types, including 76 jet-powered UAVs. Ukrainian air defenses shot down or suppressed 127 targets.

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Last week brought positive news from Ukraine. The Third Army Corps, together with other military formations, completed another phase of the counteroffensive Operation Vivaldi, regaining control of 125 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory and destroying thousands of Russian targets in one of the hottest areas of the frontline.

In this edition:

• Vivaldi: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Operation;

• Assault Soldier on the Experience in Operation Vivaldi;

• Russia’s “Dark Plant” for Automated Containerized FPV Drone Production;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

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Vivaldi: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Operation

Operation Vivaldi is a Ukrainian counteroffensive in northern Donetsk Oblast. It is a joint operation involving several Ukrainian formations. Commander of the 3rd Army Corps Andrii Biletskyi publicly announced the operation on September 15, although its first phase, or “season,” as the Corps calls it, began in May–June under strict information silence. The second season has now also been completed, although further details are likely to emerge later.

Overall, Ukrainian forces regained control of 125 square kilometres of territory during Operation Vivaldi, including 50 square kilometres liberated from Russian occupation, according to the commander.

At the first stage of the operation, Ukrainian forces reported Russian losses of around 1,500 personnel, more than 12,000 drones, and hundreds of armoured vehicles, artillery systems, and other vehicles. Ukrainian units also disrupted Russian logistics and forced Russian forces to move fuel supply points farther from the frontline. Russia’s elite Rubikon drone unit was also withdrawn from the Lyman–Borova sector after suffering heavy losses.

Current Russian losses from the operation are estimated at around 3,000 personnel.

Some of its key components include:

• Blinding the enemy: degrading Russian drone reconnaissance capabilities;

• Establishing a protective “dome”: clearing the low-altitude airspace;

• Targeting enemy logistics with medium-range strike drones;

• Employing “iron soldiers”: replacing some infantry tasks with UGVs.

Blinding the enemy: degrading Russian drone reconnaissance capabilities

According to ISW, Ukrainian forces targeted Russian drone operators and launch sites, established dedicated air-defence and electronic-warfare coverage, and disrupted Russian logistics before the counteroffensive.

Russian air defence has become more numerous, professional, and effective, the Third Corps says. The main objective — to systematically destroy Russian reconnaissance drones — was achieved, helping ensure the safer advance of Ukrainian assault groups. As a result, Russian forces lost situational awareness and up-to-date information about developments along the line of contact, while personnel became disoriented, reducing their overall effectiveness.

ISW argues that Operation Vivaldi illustrates progress toward restoring tactical manoeuvre on a battlefield dominated by drones. It had previously assessed that larger-scale manoeuvre would require neutralizing Russia’s tactical reconnaissance-strike complex — the network of reconnaissance and strike drones, artillery and layered defences that makes concentrations of forces highly vulnerable.

Establishing a protective “dome”: clearing the low-altitude airspace

As Russia has doubled its use of strike drones since the beginning of the year, the Corps combined the capabilities of its electronic-warfare units, equipped UGVs with EW systems, and created what it described as a protective “dome” over the area of operations. According to the Corps, its EW forces disrupted more than 20,000 Russian drone missions during Operation Vivaldi.

The protective “dome” relies on a unified network of EW personnel — from operators deployed in the field to those working at command centres. The system is built around people, horizontal coordination, and rapid information-sharing.

During Operation Vivaldi, this network prevented Russian forces from detecting Ukrainian units in time, while Ukrainian EW operators identified enemy systems and quickly passed targeting information to other elements of the Corps, including air-defence units.

As a result, protection of the low-altitude airspace became a layered system combining large radars and even EW equipment mounted on UGVs. The Corps says most attempts to strike these UGVs have failed.

Radar, visual, acoustic, and electronic intelligence are all integrated at the air-defence command post, providing a comprehensive picture of hostile UAV activity in the airspace. A unified radar picture also supplies brigades with situational awareness and targeting data for effective engagements.

The 3rd Army Corps has introduced the role of a “battle captain” within its air-defence system. The battle captain manages engagements in real time, allowing unit commanders to focus on planning subsequent operations rather than directly controlling each engagement.

The Corps has placed significant emphasis on developing its own defence solutions. While the cycle from identifying a problem to fielding a solution can take years in Western countries, this process takes months or even weeks in Ukraine. More than 90% of the equipment used by the Third Army Corps is Ukrainian-made.

Targeting enemy logistics with medium-range strike drones

During Operation Vivaldi, unmanned systems units of the 3rd Army Corps carried out 36,000 strike missions targeting Russian logistics. Drones isolated the battlefield to a depth of up to 50 km and later expanded the strike zone to as far as 120 km.

This created significant problems for the Russian logistics system, with frontline units experiencing disruptions in the supply of fuel, ammunition, and provisions.

At the same time, 3rd Army Corps drones targeted command posts, communications nodes, and supply vehicles, further complicating Russian logistics and forcing Russian forces to reorganize their supply routes.

“Modern warfare is fundamentally about energy. UAV batteries require power, and electronic-warfare systems require power as well. When we systematically target the energy component, the capabilities of enemy forces in critical areas decline sharply.

Drone operators become less effective, fuel shortages emerge, and units can no longer reliably run diesel generators. Without power, they lose the ability to charge and operate many of their systems,” said commander Biletskii.

Employing “iron soldiers”: replacing some infantry tasks with UGVs

The 3rd Army Corps began a new phase of the operation by deploying UGVs behind Russian lines, with heavy bomber drones carrying kamikaze ground robots into the enemy rear - 10 km behind the line of contact.

As the Corps put it, infantry still wins wars, but Ukrainian forces aim to preserve their soldiers by sending robots forward first.

“In Ukraine, a service member is priceless. First come drones and artillery, then maximum analysis, efforts to exhaust the enemy, and only after full confidence is established does the advance begin”, said one of the commanders.

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Assault Soldier on the Experience in Operation Vivaldi

A Ukrainian assault soldier serving with Artan, the special unit of Ukraine’s Military Intelligence (HUR), described his experience during Operation Vivaldi in northern Donetsk Oblast.

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Ukraine Drone Brief is turning into a global brief, as hybrid attacks involving drones have become a new reality across European countries, while even a Russian jet-powered UAV has crashed in a neighboring state.

Ukraine Drone Brief covers more than 30 weekly developments in drone warfare.

VIP subscribers can access the full newsletter. Sometimes I publish free editions.

Also, check out my long-form reports:

• Drone warfare in Ukraine: medium-range UAVs and jet-powered threats;

• Arms Trends in Ukraine: 07 September - 13 September, 2026.

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Aerial Drones

• Ukraine has established production of more than 2,000 Bars jet-powered drones per month. They are being used in special operations.

• Russia is experimenting with deploying FPV drones from Shahed-type attack UAVs, although there is currently no evidence of this tactic being used on a large scale.

• Ukraine’s Military Intelligence (HUR) has published data on the foreign-made equipment used in the production of Geran drones at Alabuga. The equipment includes a Chinese SMTCL VMC 1000Q vertical machining centre, a Japanese JUKI RS-1R automated component-placement machine, and a German Festo mechatronics production line equipped with a Mitsubishi Melfa industrial robot from Japan.

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Last week, President Zelensky visited Canada and signed the Ukraine–Canada Declaration for a 100-Year Partnership. It is Ukraine’s second 100-year partnership framework, after the agreement signed with the UK in 2025.

Important note: for now, it exists only at the level of a declaration, and the formal agreement is expected to be signed in December 2026.

In this brief overview, I try to place the Canada–Ukraine cooperation in the context of the revival of Canada’s defence industrial base, as well as its reforms and initiatives in the drone sector.

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This partnership doesn't really come as a surprise because Canada has historically been one of Ukraine’s most reliable allies, especially in this war against Russia. Throughout years of Russia’s aggression, Canada’s support for Ukraine has remained consistent. There were no major policy swings like those in the US that directly affected the situation on the battlefield. Nor have there been major disappointments like those Ukraine experienced with some European partners that either refused to provide key weapons systems, or delayed their delivery for so long that those delays had negative consequences for Ukraine.

This can be partly explained by the fact that Canada has not been a major producer of many of the defence capabilities Ukraine urgently needed. Nevertheless, it has provided important equipment, including armoured vehicles and drones. Canada has also led the way in imposing sanctions on Russia. It seized a Russian-registered Antonov aircraft grounded in Toronto and has been one of the first and strongest advocates for using frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine.

The new 100-year partnership framework creates much broader opportunities for both Ukraine and Canada.

Canada now has a rapidly growing defence and security ecosystem comprising more than 585 companies nationwide.

For decades, its defence industry has been deeply integrated with the United States. Canadian companies often found it easier to access the US defence market than to sell to their own government. But during these two years of the Trump administration, Canada has changed.

I have lived in Canada since August 2024, and I have seen how dramatically Trump’s annexation threats and economic pressure have shaped the country’s political debate.

The current revitalization of Canada’s defence can only partly be explained by the threat from Russia. A much more immediate factor has been uncertainty surrounding Canada’s most important ally. Although nobody seriously (at least publicly) talks about the prospect of US military action against Canada, the realization that Canada might not be able to rely on its closest partner has been something of a cold shower.

In 2026 we’ve seen a remarkable number of new defence initiatives, institutions, investments, and reforms announced. The most important policy development was the launch of Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy. The document places much greater emphasis on building sovereign defence capabilities and supporting domestic producers. It identifies ten “key sovereign defence capabilities” that will receive particular attention under the new approach.

At the same time, Canada is clearly trying to diversify its defence partnerships. The strategy calls for deeper cooperation with European partners, the United Kingdom, and countries in the Indo-Pacific. We also need to be realistic: Canada is highly unlikely to become completely militarily self-sufficient or independent from the United States in the foreseeable future. Nor would that be desirable. The two countries remain closely connected through NATO, NORAD, integrated supply chains, and decades of military cooperation. In the event of a major common threat, they would still have to respond together, making interoperability between their armed forces and military capabilities essential.

Interestingly, the Defence Industrial Strategy does not specifically mention Ukraine as a priority partner. Yet that has not prevented the two countries from deepening their partnership.

All types of drones across the land, air, surface, and underwater domains are now officially recognized as one of Canada’s ten key sovereign defence capabilities. Canada has also launched an unusually large number of initiatives in this area over a relatively short period. Compared with many other countries, even those facing immediate threats, Canada appears to be making a particularly significant push in the drone sector.

The list of these initiatives includes:

• MINERVA — a Canadian Army initiative focused on accelerating the integration of larger numbers of uncrewed aerial, ground, and littoral systems into Army operations and strengthening regular engagement with industry.

• Uncrewed Systems Defence Innovation Secure Hub (UxS DISH) — a secure innovation hub bringing together government, industry, academia, and the military to develop, test, and commercialize uncrewed technologies.

• Defence Drone Initiative (DDI) — a broader effort to accelerate the development, testing, adaptation, procurement, and domestic production of uncrewed and autonomous systems.

• Defence Drone Initiative Marketplace (DDIM) — modelled on Ukraine’s Brave1 Marketplace and designed to give the Canadian Armed Forces and Coast Guard faster access to drone and counter-drone technologies.

• RED COBALT Uncrewed Systems Accelerator — a Canadian Joint Forces Command initiative bringing together operators, government agencies, and industry to test aerial, ground, and maritime drones, as well as other emerging uncrewed capabilities, in realistic conditions.

The Canadian Armed Forces currently have only around 2,000 drones of various types in their inventory. Ottawa has now awarded contracts worth up to C$50 million, expected to expand this fleet roughly tenfold. The first procurement phase focuses on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance drones, as well as uncrewed ground vehicles, and includes six companies.

During President Zelensky’s visit, Canada and Ukraine signed a Joint Declaration on enhanced defence and security cooperation, which the Ukrainian presidency described as the first step toward a bilateral Drone Deal expected to be finalized at the end of September.

Ukraine has already signed Drone Deals with 10 partner countries. These arrangements include mutually beneficial cooperation formats, including joint production, localization, technology transfer, financing, cyber cooperation, and access to new markets, with the precise model tailored to the partner country.

Currently, Canada and Ukraine cooperate within the Build with Ukraine framework for joint drone production. The first is a joint venture partnership between Ukrainian Airlogix and Canadian Sentinel Research & Development, announced in May, focused on producing Ukrainian reconnaissance-drone technologies in Canada. The second, announced during Zelensky’s latest visit, is a partnership between General Dynamics Mission Systems–Canada and the Ukrainian company Green Tech Harvest.

Additional partnerships are currently under negotiation, most likely including two Ukrainian companies, Ratel Robotics and Skyfall.

The Ukrainian delegation organized an event in Calgary to showcase their technologies. The Ukrainian side was represented by JK Land Vehicles LLC, Airlogix, AIDRONESUA, GreenTech Harvest LLC, UFORCE, Skyfall, and Quantropi. More than 30 Canadian companies also took part, including both current and potential partners of Ukraine’s defence industry.

From the Canadian side, according to social media posts, North Vector Dynamics, which describes itself as Canada’s only domestically owned and controlled missile company, met with President Zelensky. UAS producer Volatus Aerospace was also present at the meeting. Sentinel R&D, which has already established a joint venture with Ukrainian Airlogix, participated as well.

Setting drones aside, Canada also announced more than $2 billion in new support for Ukraine, including over $1 billion in defence assistance. Canada will allocate approximately C$350 million (around US$253 million) to procure urgently needed air-defence capabilities for Ukraine through the JUMPSTART program. JUMPSTART is a US mechanism that allows allies and partners to finance the procurement of American-made weapons for Ukraine through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system.

Canada is also ready to contribute technology to the pan-European FREYJA anti-ballistic missile programme and to prepare new sanctions against Russia, including measures aimed at making it more difficult for Russia to produce ballistic missiles.

President Zelensky also visited the International Test Pilots School in Canada, where Ukrainian pilots are being trained to operate F-16 and Gripen fighter jets.

Earlier, Operation UNIFIER, under which Canadian instructors have trained more than 49,000 Ukrainian military personnel, has been extended until 2029.

The 100-year partnership with Canada was received largely positively in Ukraine, although some observers were sceptical about the broad and relatively general nature of the declaration. According to the former Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States Valeriy Chalyi, there has been real progress in some areas, particularly defence and security, while cooperation in others, including trade, economic relations, and visa-free travel, has largely remained stagnant. In some areas, such as space cooperation, there is little substance.

At the same time, Chalyi stressed that the partnership still has room to grow. He hoped the future Agreement would be more concrete, include clear and detailed commitments, and go beyond simply restating previously agreed positions.

On the Drone Deal partnership, Ukrainian military officer and founder of the Kruk drone training centre Viktor Taran said the Canadian prime minister had described the proposed model quite openly: combining Ukraine’s battlefield experience with Canadian manufacturing capacity, software, and artificial intelligence.

At the same time, Taran cautioned that the key question is not simply how many drones will be produced, but who will own the design documentation, where localization will take place, and whether Ukraine will remain a supplier of complete solutions rather than becoming merely a source of data and combat protocols for foreign production lines.

Protection of intellectual property is an important issue for Ukrainian defence producers and has become a point of discussion in partnerships with Greece and the United States.

Canadian stakeholders also welcomed partnership with Ukraine and pointed to other areas where Canada could play a more active role in supporting Ukraine in its war of survival.

Human rights and disinformation expert Marcus Kolga wrote that “it’s good news for Canadians: we stand to benefit enormously from Ukraine’s hard-won expertise in drone technology.” At the same time, he stressed the importance of helping Ukraine fight the war now: “Ukraine needs weapons now to defend its people from Putin’s escalating nightly bombardment and campaign of terror.”

Kolga argued that Canada should press allies such as South Korea to adjust their policies and allow the immediate sale of surface-to-air missiles to Ukraine, noting that thousands of Ukrainian lives are at stake.

He also called on Canada to designate Russia a state sponsor of terrorism and begin expelling Russian intelligence operatives working under diplomatic cover. Europe has already faced suspected Russian sabotage and terror operations, while Canada has not been immune either. Incendiary devices placed on DHL aircraft in Germany were reportedly intended for flights to Canada.

In his view, supporting Ukraine means helping it defend its skies now, while also strengthening Canada’s own defences against Russia’s expanding campaign of hybrid warfare.

According to national security expert Wesley Wark, “there is one unique capacity that Canada has been mysteriously reluctant to supply. The capacity is imagery from the latest set of radar satellites that the Government of Canada operates—called the Radarsat constellation mission (RCM)”.

Canada had authorized MDA to provide Ukraine with synthetic aperture radar satellite imagery capable of operating through cloud cover and in all weather conditions. The imagery was combined with other commercial satellite data to produce near-real-time intelligence for Ukrainian authorities.

Wark notes, however, that the Canadian RADARSAT support reportedly lasted only about a year before being quietly discontinued, with no public explanation. The capability had been highly valuable for tracking Russian military movements, targeting weapons systems, and supporting Ukraine’s battlefield defence.

Speaking from my personal experience, what I admire about Canadians is their modesty and willingness to learn. Unlike some others, they are not convinced that their innovations are automatically the best or that there is nothing to improve. They understand their shortcomings, are openly critical of them, and are ready to change.

That said, it remains to be seen how many of the initiatives described above will survive and develop in the coming years, because defence is a long game. We also have to understand that for Ukrainian or European companies coming to Canada, the sense of urgency probably won’t be the same as on NATO’s Eastern Flank.

The coming months will likely bring further updates on Ukraine–Canada defence cooperation, as well as new partnerships between Canadian and European companies, which are developing quickly. Stay tuned!

During my Postdoctoral Fellowship in Defence Innovation at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, which ends next month, I have written several pieces on Canada:

• Lessons and Warnings for Canada's Defence Investment Agency;

• MINERVA Initiative and Drone Integration in Canadian Army Land Operations;

• The Potential for Canada-EU Cooperation on Counter-UAS Capabilities;

• The Defence Industrial Strategy, Sovereign Capabilities, and Defence.

For the NATO Association of Canada, I also wrote two short analyses examining the nature of Canada’s military assistance to Ukraine in 2024 and 2025:

• Canada’s Military Assistance to Ukraine in 2024: Key Trends;

• Canada’s Military Assistance to Ukraine in 2025: Key Trends.

Also, here are my other articles about Canada, Ukraine, and drones:

• Drones Define the Battlefield - Is Canada Ready?

• Why Canada and Ukraine Must Team Up on Defense Innovation.

And, finally, my conversation with the Canadian journalist and top Substacker Paul Wells: The Q&A: “The human may not be able to make decisions at the speed modern war requires.”

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Thank you for reading and supporting my work! Here I publish weekly newsletters Arms Trends in Ukraine and Ukraine Drone Brief.

Also, there is an occasional newsletter Drone warfare in Ukraine.

Last week Russia struck Ukraine’s railway infrastructure near the Polish border. Travelling to Ukraine has obviously never been completely safe during the years of the full-scale invasion. But the latest attacks suggest that Russia is increasingly targeting trains and related infrastructure farther west, including routes that are critical for Ukraine’s connections with Europe.

In this edition:

• Russian Strikes Aim to Undermine Ukraine’s Internal and International Connectivity;

• Ukraine Is Developing Its National Air-Defence School;

• Missile Production and the “Valley of Death”;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

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With your help, I’ve already fundraised for and delivered six Mavic 3T drones to the military unit where my university friend Vasyl serves.

My birthday is approaching, and like all Ukrainians, my biggest wish is for the war to end and for Ukraine to win. So I decided to fundraise for one more drone - here is my PayPal fundraiser. Please help me raise this amount. Every donation matters!

You can also watch this thank-you video the unit recorded for the two drones delivered through the previous fundraiser.

Russian Strikes Aim to Undermine Ukraine’s Internal and International Connectivity

The Kyiv–Warsaw railway route became one of the most popular ways to travel to and from Ukraine. Many who have visited Ukraine during the years of the full-scale invasion likely used this route. Last week, it came under attack by Russian jet-powered drones.

On September 13, Russian attack drones struck the Yahodyn international border crossing, the largest crossing on the Polish border by throughput capacity. A train travelling from Kyiv to Warsaw was also hit.

According to Der Spiegel, a special train carrying European politicians and officials had been at the station shortly before the strike. Among them were Günter Sautter, an adviser to German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson. At the time of the attack, another train carrying former CIA Director David Petraeus was reportedly in the area.

The railway company said it was “entirely possible” that the diplomatic train had been the intended target. The train had departed the station earlier than originally scheduled because timetables had been adjusted amid the continuing threat of Russian strikes.

Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railway) said its Central Monitoring Group detected the approaching drone and ordered passengers to evacuate approximately 15 minutes before the locomotive was hit.

In April, it was reported that Ukrzaliznytsia’s dispatch service had gained access to military airspace-monitoring systems and was continuously tracking the threat posed by Russian attack drones.

According to Serhii FLASH Beskrestnov, an adviser to the president, passengers are evacuated from trains when there is a direct threat to their lives. When the risk is less immediate, authorities can use other measures, including adjusting train schedules.

Beskrestnov also warned that a drone strike on a passenger carriage could have catastrophic consequences and advised passengers, when evacuation is ordered, to move at least 100 metres away from the train.

After leaving the train, passengers are advised not to gather in groups nearby, as the train itself may remain a potential target. Instead, they should disperse while keeping the conductor in a high-visibility vest within sight. If there are nearby explosions, passengers should immediately lie face down on the ground with their mouths open.

There have also been cases in which manually controlled Russian drones changed targets during flight after spotting moving trains.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russian attacks on Ukrainian Railways infrastructure have increased significantly. Nearly 1,200 attacks were recorded last year alone — more than in 2023 and 2024 combined.

In recent days, Russian forces have also significantly intensified attacks on fuel stations, including in Kyiv and along major international highways.

On September 10–11, Russian forces carried out their first large-scale attacks on gas stations in Kyiv. At least three facilities were destroyed or damaged by jet-powered drones. Three people were killed in the attacks, while at least nine others were injured.

Previously, fuel stations in frontline regions had been the main targets. The strikes have now expanded to central and northern Ukraine, including Zhytomyr, Poltava, Chernihiv, and Kyiv regions.

The Ukrainian government is preparing a package of measures to strengthen fuel station security. These include automatic alerts warning operators about approaching Russian drones, additional protection for above-ground infrastructure, the construction of shelters, and simplified customs procedures for fuel tanker trucks.

One measure being tested is software that tracks the direction of incoming drones and provides early warnings. The system would automatically alert fuel stations when Russian drones are approaching, giving personnel additional time to respond to the threat. If testing at fuel stations proves successful, the system is expected to be expanded to other businesses and facilities.

As of August, Russia was producing around 3,000 jet-powered Geran-4/5 drones per month, already exceeding monthly production of the conventional gasoline-powered Geran-2, estimated at around 2,800 units.

Check out some of my recent drone-related reports:

• Why Drone Producers Should Invest in Training Operators;

• Approaches to Countering Jet-Powered Drones;

• and the weekly Ukraine Drone Brief.

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Ukraine Is Developing Its National Air-Defence School

Ukraine already has at least two domestically developed air-defence systems that were showcased at the MSPO international defence exhibition in Poland, while another system is being developed at an accelerated pace.

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This week has been particularly productive for new cooperation deals. Ukraine reached a major agreement with Canada; new drone partnerships were announced, and Ukraine will help Germany better protect its critical infrastructure from Russian drones.

Read about these and other developments in my Ukraine Drone Brief, which features over 30 weekly updates.

Also, check out my recent open-access article in the Ukrainian outlet Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, where I discuss opportunities for Ukraine–Colombia cooperation on drones. I’m always excited about exploring new partnerships for the Ukrainian defence industry.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

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Aerial Drones

• On September 9, Ukraine’s deep strike units carried out their longest-range strike on Russian territory, covering approximately 3,200 km (almost 2,000 miles). Ukrainian drone manufacturer Fire Point confirmed that its FP-1 drones were used in the operation.

• Ukraine’s Bars jet-powered drone has been upgraded to a range of up to 1,000 km, a warhead weighing up to 60 kg, and a speed of more than 700 km/h. The upgraded version also reportedly features online control during the final stage of flight.

• Over the first eight months of 2026, Ukraine’s MoD approved over 1,500 types of equipment for supply to the Defence Forces. Nearly 91% were domestically produced in Ukraine. The list includes: 565 Ukrainian UAVs; 256 types of munitions; 139 communications systems; 86 UGVs; 64 electronic warfare/electronic intelligence systems; 52 vehicles; 48 types of armoured vehicles and specialized armoured vehicles; 37 types of optical equipment.

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Just as Ukraine was getting closer to managing waves of conventional Shaheds, the threat changed again. Russia began employing larger numbers of jet-powered systems, creating a new challenge for Ukraine’s air-defence architecture.

The existing system has not adapted easily to these faster and higher-flying threats, forcing Ukraine to adjust once again. Several countermeasures are now being explored, ranging widely in cost and effectiveness, and work on new solutions is ongoing.

In this edition:

• Middle-Strike Drones Remain a Key Battlefield Capability;

• Approaches to Countering Jet-Powered Drones;

• Why Drone Carriers Have Faded Away in Ukraine.

For the list of weekly drone-related updates, check my Ukraine Drone Brief.

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Middle-Strike Drones Remain a Key Battlefield Capability

While our attention has shifted in recent months away from medium-range strike drones, also known as “middle-strikes,” they remain an effective combat capability on some of the most intense sections of the battlefield.

The Sloviansk direction currently is one of the hottest sectors of the front. Unable to overcome Ukrainian engineering fortifications, Russian forces intensified their offensive operations and focused on creating a kill zone extending roughly 40 km from the line of contact.

The systematic use of middle-strike drones over recent months has helped Ukrainian forces expand their own kill zone along the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk direction. In practice, this means protecting the first line of defence by establishing fire control over the enemy’s operational rear.

Using this approach, the Apache Unmanned Systems Battalion of the 81st Brigade acts proactively by destroying Russian offensive potential before it reaches the frontline.

Operators can launch and fly medium-range drones from protected bunkers or concealed positions using computer terminals. The operator can remain at a distance from the launch site. Even if EW completely disrupts the satellite signal as the drone approaches the target, some middle-strike systems can switch to an automatic target-acquisition mode, allowing them to identify and engage the designated object independently.

“The more logistics we cut, the more problems they have on the frontline: shortages of ammunition, drones, fuel, lubricants, and food. Morale also matters. Now they will think several times before deciding to move anywhere,” told the servicemen from the Apache Battalion in an interview with Censor.Net.

Medium-range strike capability is one of the focus areas for the British-Ukrainian company Trypillian. Trypillian told me that the medium-range segment today serves as a critical connective layer in the overall architecture of warfare, bridging the tactical battlefield at the line of contact with the strategic depth targeted by long-range strike systems.

Middle-strike operations cover an operational zone extending from approximately 30 to 200 km and beyond, where the enemy concentrates key logistical assets, including ammunition and POL depots, command posts, supply routes, heavy equipment, and repair facilities.

Trypillian’s flagship platform in the middle-strike segment, ATOM can perform both reconnaissance and strike missions. The drone carries a 2.5 kg warhead and has a stated range of around 70 km, while newer versions of the platform are being developed for greater operational depth.

Medium-range systems apply systematic, continuous pressure on enemy logistics, so the enemy loses the ability to plan predictable resupply, while supply routes become slower, more expensive, and less reliable.

In an interview with Radio Khartia, Trypillian's Commercial Director, Viktoriia Kulchytska, said that Ukraine’s UAV industry is developing ahead of current requirements, with pilot and military-engineer demands changing about every two to three months.

Trypillian’s first middle-strike platforms had a range of around 50 km, which at the time was beyond the reach of conventional FPV drones. That range gradually increased to around 70 km and is now expanding toward 100-200 km, and in some configurations even 300 km.

“When we received the first feedback from the military about our ATOM, which was flying 50-70 km, we understood that we needed to develop a second version. And that is not as simple as it may seem. It might look as though building an aircraft for 50 km and one for 150 km is essentially the same thing — just make the aircraft larger, and it will fly farther. That is a misconception. From an engineering perspective, the aircraft has to be redesigned in a fundamentally different way. When we change payload and range, we do not simply change the size of the aircraft; we change the aerodynamics and the way it flies. This takes months of work,” Kulchytska explained.

Speaking to me about trends in the middle-strike segment, Kulchytska highlighted three factors that she believes will define its evolution: expanded mass production, greater autonomy, and continuous improvements in electronic-warfare resilience.

According to Trypillian, market scaling is already underway. In the first months of this year, the Ukrainian government contracted approximately five times more middle-strike systems than during all of last year, which the company sees as evidence that the industry is moving toward more predictable mass production.

At the same time, one of the most important challenges for the company’s technology roadmap remains the “de-Chinafication” of its supply chain. Trypillian says it has reached an approximately 80% localization rate and argues that replacing Chinese components with Ukrainian and Western alternatives is essential to build long-term defence partnerships with allies and combine Ukraine’s development speed with Western financial and industrial scale.

In June 2026, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence launched its first large-scale competitive tender for middle-strike UAVs. The acquisition was expected to cover “tens of thousands” of standard attack and reconnaissance-strike drones from multiple suppliers.

One of the best-known drones in this sector is the American Hornet. Recently, Janes reported that over the past three months, the Armed Forces of Ukraine deployed more than 10,000 Hornets with a 200 km operational range.

Read my report about the Hornet here.

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Approaches to Countering Jet-Powered Threats

Jet-powered drones, rather than conventional drones, could become the next major threat for countries worldwide. This is one of the most widely discussed topics in Ukraine, and a significant share of the latest weekly developments focuses specifically on this threat.

Ukrainian experts identify four main approaches to countering jet-powered drones:

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Russia continued missile and drone strikes on Ukraine despite reports of a possible pause in Ukrainian attacks during visits by U.S. negotiators. President Zelensky described the past several days in Ukraine as “horrific,” particularly because of the intensity of Russian attacks. “The strikes continue from morning until night,” he said.

As Ukraine faces shortages of both air-defence systems and air-to-air missiles for fighter jets, the country is particularly vulnerable at this stage of the war.

In this edition:

• Can Ukraine Expect Taurus Deliveries from Germany?

• Air-to-Air Missile Shortages in Ukraine;

• Ukraine’s Bohdana Artillery System;

• The Current State of Drone Autonomy on the Battlefield;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

For more drone-related news, check out my weekly Ukraine Drone Brief. The latest edition includes additional details on opportunities to work with Ukrainian innovators.

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Can Ukraine Expect Taurus Deliveries from Germany?

There is some hope in Ukraine that the rise in so-called “hybrid” attacks linked to Russia will prompt Germany to reconsider supplying Taurus missiles, which Ukraine has long requested.

On September 1, the German government said that it held Russia "responsible" for an attempted drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport on August 4. However, authorities insist that Germany is “not at war” but that it is “a daily target of hybrid warfare.” Therefore, Germany would respond to the hybrid attack in Leipzig in a “proportionate and measured, yet resolute manner.”

Andreas Umland, a Policy Fellow at the European Policy Institute in Kyiv, told Liga.net that Russia’s hybrid war against Germany is already approaching the threshold of conventional military action. “Explosives and drones... To what extent can this still be considered hybrid warfare? It is already on the verge of military action,” Umland said.

He noted that Germany has so far responded to Russian actions mainly with symbolic measures, including the closure of the Russian consulate in Bonn and the Russian House in Berlin.

In response, Putin accused Germany of planting evidence to blame Moscow for the attempted drone attack at Leipzig airport.

Wolfgang Kubicki from Germany’s Free Democratic Party (FDP) said that Germany should threaten Russia with the transfer of long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine if the Kremlin does not stop its hybrid attacks on German infrastructure.

Germany’s Free Democratic Party had long been one of the strongest advocates of providing Ukraine with long-range weapons. However, following the most recent parliamentary election, the party did not enter the Bundestag.

In July 2026, Germany's parliament rejected a proposal by the Green parliamentary group calling for the transfer of Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, expanded production of Patriot PAC-2 missiles, and increased military and humanitarian aid.

Earlier, in an interview with Bild, the German Defense Minister said he saw no need to supply Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, arguing that Ukrainian forces were already effectively striking Russian infrastructure.

Taurus missiles, with a range of more than 500 km, could reach targets in Crimea, Donbas, and several Russian border regions. The Taurus is designed to strike hardened targets, including command posts, airfields and runways, and could also be used against major concrete infrastructure such as the Crimean Bridge.

The missile is equipped with a warhead featuring a PIMPF fuze, allowing it to strike hardened, multilayered structures such as bridges and bunkers. This capability has earned the Taurus the nickname “bridge killer.”

Taurus missiles were featured repeatedly in Friedrich Merz’s statements during the election campaign and after he became chancellor. He said that Ukraine should be given the capability to destroy the Kerch Bridge, also known as the Crimean Bridge, in order to disrupt a key Russian military logistics route. Taurus missiles are among the systems capable of inflicting significant damage on such hardened infrastructure.

Russian commentators are indeed concerned about the possibility of such deliveries. Russian military analyst Dmitry Kornev told Izvestia that there is no guaranteed protection against the Taurus, just as there is no complete protection against the British Storm Shadow or the French SCALP missiles. If used as part of operations intended to suppress or penetrate air defences, some Taurus missiles could still get through.

Russian Ambassador-at-Large Konstantin Dolgov commented that Germany had so far refrained from supplying Taurus missiles to Ukraine, but that such a move could not be ruled out. “They are supplying quite a lot of weapons to Kyiv, and their motives are also clear. They continue to proceed from the need to inflict a defeat on Russia. This is a disastrous course for Europe and for Germany,” Dolgov said. He added that Russia would view any potential delivery of Taurus missiles by Germany to Ukraine as an additional factor of escalation and as another hostile act by Berlin.

Despite Taurus missiles having been part of the debate since 2023, Germany has taken no concrete action to supply them to Ukraine. Over the same period, Ukraine has continued to expand its domestic long-range strike capabilities, including long-range drones, missile-drone systems, jet-powered drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. These capabilities have already produced meaningful results against Russian military and energy infrastructure.

At the same time, partner-supplied long-range weapons remain an important component of Ukraine’s strike capability because of their technological sophistication, accuracy, and ability to engage hardened or high-value targets.

In February 2026, Ukrainian Armed Forces targeted a Russian command facility near Novopetrivka in the Donetsk region with the U.S.-made ATACMS ballistic missiles. And in August 2026, Ukraine decided to buy 70 M39 ATACMS from Turkey.

The most recent verified Ukrainian strike using British Storm Shadow cruise missiles took place in August 2026. Just two days earlier, on Ukraine’s Independence Day, the British government authorized defence manufacturer MBDA to disclose classified information needed to support Ukraine and France in establishing local production of Storm Shadow/SCALP long-range cruise missiles.

However, for now the prospects of Ukraine getting German Taurus missiles seem pretty low.

In a separate conversation with me, Andreas Umland said that German public opinion remains opposed to supplying Taurus missiles to Ukraine because many Germans fear Russian retaliation. He described this, in part, as a success of Russian and pro-Russian propaganda. “As long as public opinion does not change, the government is unlikely to satisfy Ukraine’s request,” he added.

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Check out other relevant reports:

• “Ukrainian Housewives with 3D Printers”: CEO of Rheinmetall on Ukraine’s Drone Producers;

• Flamingo Missiles Got Intercepted Again.

Air-to-Air Missile Shortages in Ukraine

The War Zone reported that Ukrainian F-16 pilots are facing such a severe shortage of air-to-air missiles that, on some daytime sorties, they have had to rely solely on the fighters’ internal guns to engage Russian aerial threats.

According to a separate interview with Anatolii Khrapchynskyi, Ukrainian aviation expert and a reserve Air Force officer, the shortage is partly due to the intensive use of F-16s against these faster drones.

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Russian Shahed/Geran drones with online control are already reaching some of Ukraine’s most heavily defended facilities, including the headquarters of the Security Service of Ukraine. China remains a key enabler of these attacks, as both the MESH modems used for online control and the jet engines powering some of these drones are of Chinese origin.

While I usually start my newsletter with the UAV section, this time I decided to begin with listing several opportunities to work with promising Ukrainian companies.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work, which is entirely independent and not sponsored.

This newsletter is available in full to VIP subscribers. Sometimes I publish free editions, so you can explore them first and decide whether this type of reporting is useful to you on a regular basis.

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Work with Ukraine

• Ukrainian-made AI platform Mantis Analytics combines AI-assisted OSINT collection with regional analysts’ and local-source knowledge to produce assessments of contested information environments. It has applied its approach in environments ranging from Ukraine and the Baltic states to Haiti, Syria, and Southeast Asia. The company is open to international research collaborations and strategic partnerships focused on advancing intelligence capabilities.

• AIDronesUA is a Ukrainian defence-tech company developing UGVs for high-risk missions. Its flagship platform, MAUL, is engineered for casualty evacuation, logistics, and frontline support. The company is open to investment, joint ventures and technology integration partnerships, including AI and other systems that can strengthen the platform’s capabilities. It is particularly interested in cooperation within the Build with Ukraine framework, with a focus on the UK, Germany, Italy, France and Spain.

• Ukraine provides international researchers and manufacturers access to Russian trophy equipment and its analysis. More than 430 companies have already applied to Ukraine’s TrophyLab database. The portal provides users with data collected by the GUR, SBU, and specialized institutions to support the development of countermeasures.

Aerial Drones

• On September 4, a jet-powered Shahed drone directly targeted a building of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). According to the SBU, the drone was deliberately directed at the office of the head of SBU. He was not injured. The drone was controlled and guided online through a MESH radio relay with internet access, which a Russian agent activated nearby (up to 5 km distance) for a short period during the attack.

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Amid the wave of headlines about AI drones and “killer robots,” the reality is that most drone operations are still conducted by humans, and this is changing only gradually. That is why operator training remains critical and will continue to be so in the coming years. Ukrainian company Athlon Avia, in addition to producing drones, also invests in training operators for its platforms, recognizing that the reputation and effectiveness of a system depend to a significant extent on the people who use it.

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In the hands of skilled and well-trained personnel, even relatively simple systems can achieve exceptional results. In Ukraine, experienced operators routinely conduct FPV drone missions at ranges of 15, 20, or even 25 kilometers, while an inexperienced soldier may struggle to fly the same type of drone even a few kilometers.

Looking back at a recent example: when I first heard about the highly successful American-made Hornet drones equipped with AI technologies, what caught my attention was not only the drone itself, but the unit operating it: the Azov Corps, one of Ukraine’s most capable military formations, with highly experienced drone operators. So, the drone’s effectiveness can be attributed not only to its technical characteristics, but also to the skill of its users.

In a conversation with Serhii Mokreniuk, representative of Ukrainian company Athlon Avia, I learned about several areas of their work that are unusual for a drone manufacturer. The company trains drone operators, invests in motivating and developing pilots, and works to ensure that battlefield lessons are captured, shared, and integrated into military practice. The company believes that more industry representatives should adopt this approach.

Reconnaissance UAV Furia

The flagship product of Athlon Avia is Furia, one of the first fixed-wing reconnaissance drones used by the Ukrainian military and employed for artillery fire correction. It was first used during the liberation of Sloviansk in 2014.

The drone is designed for aerial reconnaissance by day and night. Its low radar signature, achieved through the use of composite materials, and its low-noise electric motor with a two-bladed propeller help reduce its detectability. The drone uses a combined navigation system based on inertial navigation with GPS correction. The system can determine target coordinates with high accuracy and supports automatic target tracking.

Ukrainian media Oboronka reported that the Ukrainian military had to develop tactics and operational requirements for the Furia almost from scratch. Before that, artillery firing manuals included procedures for ranging and fire correction using helicopters.

Currently, more than 100 brigades of the Ukrainian Defence Forces use Furia drones for reconnaissance and artillery fire correction. There are pilots with more than 1,000 flight hours who can operate for months without losing a single aircraft.

Today, the Furia can remain airborne for more than four hours, operate at altitudes of up to 3 km, and fly more than 50 km from its launch point. Earlier versions had an endurance of approximately two hours.

There is an expectation that the UAVs will soon move toward greater autonomy and wider use of artificial intelligence.

Russian sources describe the Furia as one of the main “workhorses” of Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance and have sought to study both its design and tactics of employment. For example, the Russian KCPN Analytical Center obtained and translated three versions of the Furia flight operations manual from 2022, 2023, and 2024, stating that comparing them could reveal how the system has evolved and the direction of Ukrainian design development.

Before the full-scale invasion, Athlon Avia produced around 25 Furia A1-SM systems per year. Since each system includes three aircraft, this amounted to roughly 75 drones annually. As of March 2025, the manufacturer was producing at least 200 Furia drones per month. The situation has now changed, and demand from the military for the product has increased significantly.

Importance of Training Operators

For Athlon Avia, increasing drone production is only one part of the challenge. The company argues that manufacturers also need to invest in the people, training systems, and mechanisms for transferring combat experience that determine how effectively their equipment is ultimately used on the battlefield.

“Any system needs a properly trained crew,” Serhii Mokreniuk explained. “A piece of equipment does not work without a person, but simply having a person is not enough either. It should be a highly trained person. A trained specialist is an extremely valuable resource.”

For this reason, the company has developed several initiatives that go beyond conventional manufacturing. One of them is recruitment. The company works both with serving military personnel who want to transfer into UAV-related positions and with civilians interested in joining the Armed Forces as drone pilots.

Potential recruits receive advice on selecting a military unit and navigating the process of entering or transferring into an appropriate position. The company then trains them to operate its systems. According to the producer, this work is largely managed by veterans and people with direct knowledge of how the Ukrainian military functions.

Training is mandatory for personnel who will operate the company’s systems. From scratch, the basic course takes at least four weeks and can take longer depending on factors such as weather conditions. The curriculum follows requirements established by Ukraine’s military aviation authorities and combines theoretical and practical flight training.

The company deliberately provides a broader theoretical foundation rather than teaching pilots only the mechanics of operating a particular drone. Students study areas such as meteorology and communications so that they understand the wider operational environment in which the UAV will be employed.

The manufacturer also operates two training schools and works with other educational institutions, such as training centres for pilots and higher military educational institutions that train commanders, including the Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi National Army Academy, the S. P. Koroliov Zhytomyr Military Institute, the National Defence University of Ukraine, the Odesa Military Academy, among others.

This is particularly important because knowledge in drone warfare becomes obsolete extremely quickly. “We are developing at such a fast pace that knowledge from 2019 is no longer relevant at all, while some knowledge from early 2026 is already outdated today,” Serhii said. “The military simply cannot always update everything quickly enough because institutional procedures are inevitably more bureaucratic.”

When the company facilitates the transfer of knowledge from experienced pilots to less experienced pilots, it also obtains high-quality data about the system itself and how it performs under specific combat conditions. This then becomes valuable input for its R&D directorate.

That is why it is important for manufacturers to develop and support the broader user community around their products. “We call ours Furia Family — an environment where everyone is constantly learning and where anyone can receive support both from the company and from fellow service members. The motto of our Furia Family community is: ‘I have a mission!’” Serhii told me.

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Turning Combat Experience into Institutional Knowledge

Another major focus of Athlon Avia is ensuring that battlefield experience does not remain confined to individual pilots or units.

The company has created a mechanism through which some of the most experienced and motivated pilots can transfer their knowledge to less experienced operators. The formats can be relatively simple. For example, when the company identifies a particular knowledge gap among crews, it may organize a webinar for 20–40 pilots and invite experienced operators to explain how they approach the problem.

“In many cases, they are essentially teaching each other,” the representative said. “We simply help them organize the process.”

The company has also experimented with much more systematic methods of capturing combat experience.

Last year, it organized a competition in which drone pilots were asked to describe one of their combat missions according to a structured template. The template was based on established approaches to analysing lessons learned and was designed to encourage pilots and crews to assess how a mission had been prepared and conducted.

The submissions were then reviewed by six judges, including instructors, university faculty members and military specialists. Each evaluator used their own criteria, producing an assessment framework that collectively included more than 120 parameters.

The purpose was not simply to select the best submission. The process allowed the company to identify recurring gaps in the pilots’ knowledge and determine what operators themselves were failing to analyse after missions.

The results eventually developed into a much greater effort. Serving military personnel were invited to jointly produce practical guidance on the employment of reconnaissance UAVs. Around 20 authors contributed to a manual covering 30 topics. The company subsequently brought instructors and service members together to develop five standardized operating procedures.

The producer says one of the most interesting outcomes was the pilots' reaction. Some participants who had helped write the documents said that the process of systematically describing and analysing their own experience had caused them to reconsider their role and place within the combat command-and-control system, as well as the approach to carrying out combat missions

Although none of this work directly changes the drone's physical characteristics, the manufacturer believes it has significantly improved the quality of its use in combat.

“This work is completely unrelated to manufacturing the product itself, but it strengthened the quality of combat missions so much that we could see the effect ourselves,” Serhii told me. “That is why we continue doing it.”

Why Drone Manufacturers Should Care About Educating Pilots

The company believes this model could and should be replicated by other defence manufacturers. Manufacturers have a direct interest in increasing the competence of the personnel operating their systems. A poorly trained crew can make an effective system appear ineffective, while experienced operators are better able to exploit the equipment’s full capabilities.

The difference between crews can already be enormous. Some operators may fly for a year without losing a single aircraft, while another crew can lose three UAVs within a week. That discrepancy cannot always be explained by the equipment itself.

There is another benefit as well: identifying, recording and “crystallizing” knowledge that would otherwise disappear when experienced personnel rotate, transfer or leave their positions.

The company says it has spoken publicly about its methodology and would be willing to share it with other manufacturers. So far, however, relatively few producers have adopted similar approaches. Some may not understand why this should be their responsibility, while others are simply overwhelmed by the immediate demands of production.

Yet the company believes even limited adoption could have a significant effect. “If even 10 percent of weapons manufacturers launched similar processes, the effectiveness of the military would increase,” the representative argued.

According to Serhii, the greatest value of Ukraine’s Defence Forces is its people, and that’s why the company invests in them. That is why Ukrainian pilots are better than Russian ones. “But we still have a problem with scaling unique combat expertise — transferring the best practices to other units, training centers, and military educational institutions,” he said.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that Ukraine offers a different model of defence production and acquisition from the traditional approach, in which manufacturers simply deliver equipment according to technical specifications set by the state authorities.

The Ukrainian model is very end-user-centric. Because military units have direct purchasing power, they assess not only equipment itself, but also the level of service that the company provides. Does the manufacturer provide a 24/7 support line? Can it quickly modify the product in response to battlefield needs? Is it ready to work directly with the unit after delivery?

Ukraine’s drone market is extremely competitive, and the strongest companies seek to distinguish themselves not only through technical characteristics, but also through the additional support they provide to military units using their products.

Some initiatives, such as the one described above, take this model a step further by introducing a broader sense of responsibility. In these cases, industry takes the lead in areas that remain underprioritized institutionally, such as capturing, systematizing, and disseminating battlefield lessons.

Some manufacturers in Ukraine invest not only in improving the effectiveness of their own products, but also in strengthening the effectiveness of the Defence Forces as a whole.

This is a model that Western industry representatives should aspire to: not simply producing equipment but taking greater responsibility for how effectively that equipment is used.

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Check out other relevant reports:

• Drone warfare in Ukraine: Hornet strike drones;

• Training Drone Operators in Wartime Ukraine: Dronarium Academy;

• Heavy Bombers: A Pilot of “Vampire” Tells About His Daily Operations.

If you are looking for concise, 2-page weekly reports on drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia, here is my Ukraine Drone Brief (available to VIP subscribers).

In this new phase of the war, major Ukrainian cities are taking the hardest hits. Russian forces are continuously striking civilian and commercial sites, including food and water storage facilities, book and clothing warehouses, and small cargo depots.

While the world is focused on AI-powered drones, one hundred thousand drone pilots on the other side of the frontline are still manually guiding drones toward these targets.

In this edition:

• Russia’s New Strike Tactics: Small and Continuous Waves;

• Gamification of War: How Ukrainian Drone Pilots Earn Points for Successful Strikes;

• What’s Wrong with Ukraine’s Arms Exports?

• Ukraine’s New Defence Minister and His Vision;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

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Russia’s New Strike Tactics: Small and Continuous Waves

Russia has shifted to a new air terror tactic in recent days – hitting Kyiv and other cities in small drone waves every 30–60 minutes around the clock. On August 27, Kyiv saw 13 air raid alerts totaling 14 hours.

August 30 became the fourth consecutive calendar day during which Kyiv has been subjected to aerial attacks, according to the Russian pro-war Telegram channel Dva Mayora. The series began overnight on August 27 and has continued with only brief interruptions.

Instead of relying exclusively on large-scale nighttime raids, Russia is employing smaller repeated groups, including high-speed jet-powered UAVs, with strikes occurring both during the day and at night. This approach forces Ukrainian air-defence units, mobile fire groups, emergency responders and municipal services to operate almost continuously.

Ukrainian military expert Oleh Zhdanov, analyzing drones’ flight trajectories over Kyiv, concluded that they are being guided by human operators rather than relying solely on automated navigation. Human control could explain the drones’ erratic maneuvers over Kyiv. Such flight patterns may also exert psychological pressure on civilians by creating panic and uncertainty. Intercepting such targets over highly populated areas remains extremely difficult for Ukrainian forces.

Jet-powered drones such as Shaheds and Banderol missile/drones are taking over roles previously performed by air-launched cruise missiles from strategic bombers or sea-launched Kalibr missiles. President Zelensky said that Russia used over 1500 drones in these 4 days, 800 of which were jet-powered.

According to Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, adviser to the president on the development of defence technology, the number of jet-powered Shahed drones Russia uses has increased by at least 67% in a single month, from approximately 1,500 to more than 2,500. Beskrestnov also said that the jet-powered Shaheds are being launched against Ukraine “practically straight from the factory.”

Prolonged air-raid alerts affect not only people’s safety but also the operation of businesses, logistics, transport, schools, kindergartens, and other areas of daily life. Russia is attempting to paralyze economic activity in the capital and other major cities, so Ukraine’s response procedures also need to change. The Ukrainian authorities plan to review approaches to the curfew and civilians’ access to more timely information about aerial threats, wrote Ukraine’s Prime Minister, Serhii Koretsky.

Recent Russian airstrikes have severely disrupted Ukraine’s commercial supply network, destroying roughly 90% of food logistics capacity used by major retailers. Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov urged Ukrainians not to give in to rumours, disinformation, or panic. He said manufacturers and retailers are already restructuring their supply chains. According to Beskrestnov, Russia is not targeting “food” as such, but rather large businesses that generate tax revenue and provide jobs.

Russian milbloggers wrote that many observers are linking these developments to the recent visit of the CIA Director to Moscow and speculation surrounding possible peace negotiations. They conclude with the usual call for Ukraine’s destruction, showing that there is no real readiness in Russia for de-escalation: “We think the best backdrop for negotiations is the enemy’s capital burning. We need to keep destroying the enemy while it is experiencing a shortage of surface-to-air missiles and while we are increasing production of jet-powered Geran drones.”

Check out my recent reports:

• The Challenge of Jet-Powered Shaheds;

• What Is Russia’s Banderol Missile/Drone?

• Licence for Patriot Interceptor Missile Production: Trump Changes His Mind.

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Gamification of War: How Ukrainian Drone Pilots Earn Points for Successful Strikes

Journalist Simon Ostrovsky interviewed Andrii, a verification analyst at Brave1, about Ukraine’s e-Points system, which awards military units points for verified battlefield results. Those points can then be spent through the Brave1 Market on drones, EW systems, and other equipment.

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Not only drones, but also counter-drone systems are evolving rapidly in Ukraine and Russia — and NATO countries should take note.

This newsletter covers more than 20 weekly developments in drone warfare, with the majority focused on counter-UxS capabilities.

Since it’s the week of Ukraine’s Independence Day, I’m celebrating it with my audience by making much of my content freely available, including this edition of Ukraine Drone Brief.

Read earlier reports:

• Free full edition of Arms Trends in Ukraine: 17 August - 23 August, 2026;

• Drone Warfare in Ukraine newsletter with a free section: Korean Company Develops Battery Packs for Ukrainian Interceptor Drones.

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Aerial Drones

• President Zelensky said Ukraine should increase the number of long-range drones used to strike targets in Russia from the current level of more than 300 to 1,000 per day.

• Russian forces attacked Ukraine with seven S8000 Banderol missile drones and 96 strike UAVs (70% of them were jet-powered) on 28 August. Most of them were targeting Kyiv.

• Russia has shifted to a new air terror tactic in recent days – hitting Kyiv and other cities in small drone waves every 30–60 minutes around the clock. On August 27, Kyiv saw 13 air raid alerts totaling 14 hours.

• On August 28, a Russian jet-powered Shahed covered a record distance of around 960 km before being shot down by Ukrainian air defenses.

• Russian attacks have destroyed around 90% of modern storage facilities for goods in Ukraine.

Ground Drones (UGVs)

• Ukrainian Defence Forces have begun combat testing UGVs armed with two Kalashnikov rifles. The project received grant funding and moved from concept to prototype in under six months. Its use of standard Kalashnikov rifles is intended to reduce costs and simplify scaling, while the four-wheel chassis, airless tires, and protected body are designed for operation in difficult terrain.

• Ukrainian Tencore is developing a flamethrower module for its TerMIT 2.0 UGV. The new combat module integrates eight RPV-16 rocket-propelled infantry flamethrowers, originally designed as portable infantry weapons, allowing the UGV to engage enemy personnel while operators remain at a safer distance.

Naval Drones

• Ukrainian Uforce has unveiled the new MV11 maritime drone. It is described as the largest platform in the Magura family and one of Europe’s largest USVs. Designed for open-sea operations, the MV11 can transport and launch other drones far from shore and is intended for reconnaissance, surveillance, maritime support missions, and carrying fuel or equipment for other unmanned systems.

AI

• A Russian drone that attacked Zaporizhzhia on July 6 was reportedly equipped with an experimental AI system capable of autonomously identifying a target for attack. Three people were killed in the strike. Analysis of debris found that the drones had onboard minicomputers, sold commercially by Nvidia, that made their targeting decisions. Ukrainian expert said that the drone was a preprogrammed tool trained in virtual reality to track specific objects, such as a gas station.

  A Ukrainian company told me that each of the technologies mentioned, including target identification and model training, has already been under development for some time.

  However, operator-controlled missions still account for the overwhelming majority of drone operations, with the human operator remaining the primary decision-maker.

• Russian state media claims that Russian forces are attacking Ukrainian units with AI-enabled drones that allegedly recognize Ukrainian military uniforms and vehicle license plates.

C-UAS

• Russia has equipped some Shahed/Geran drones with an EW system designed to disrupt interceptor drones. When a Ukrainian interceptor approaches, the Shahed’s EW receiver detects the interceptor’s video-transmission frequency and activates a jammer on the same frequency. The Shahed’s jammer reportedly transmits at roughly five times the interceptor’s power, overwhelming the video link and preventing the pilot on the ground from seeing the drone’s feed.

• Ukraine works on the “Mayachnia” project to support drone navigation and precise positioning in the Black Sea when satellite communications are unavailable. Deployment of an autonomous radio-beacon network based on the Skyline platform began late last year. The beacons operate independently, are equipped with backup power sources, and are integrated into a centralized network.

• Ukrainian forces are testing the Spys interceptor drone, developed by WIY Drones to counter jet-powered UAVs. An initial batch of 50 drones has been delivered to military units for combat testing. The interceptor has a stated operational speed of up to 450 km/h, while testing recorded a maximum speed of 600 km/h.

• Ukrainian Wild Hornets introduced an upgraded Hornet Vision VTX Pro video-transmission module for its interceptor drones. The new version more than doubles output power to 4 W, increasing video-link and control range by up to 50% under favorable conditions. It also improves the interception effectiveness against low-flying targets by more than 20% and provides greater resistance to electronic warfare and radio-frequency interference.

• Russia has begun mass production of the domestic electronic warfare system “Volna Kupol Garant,” capable of countering the Starlink satellite system.

• Russian state corporation Rostec has launched production of the SOKOL-08 mobile radar, which incorporates machine-learning algorithms. According to Russian sources, the system can track up to 100 targets simultaneously, identify small drones, and automatically filter out false detections.

• A Ukrainian Mi-8 helicopter has been integrated with interceptor drones for engaging Russian UAVs. The helicopter can carry up to six interceptors, which are likely controlled either from onboard the Mi-8 or remotely via Starlink.

• Ukrainian BlueBird Tech has launched an upgrade campaign for its Chuika 3.0 drone detectors, adding a fourth frequency band covering 6–8.8 GHz.

• Ukrainian tech startup Zvook is conducting research and development into hydrophones engineered for passive underwater acoustic monitoring.

Cooperation Deals

• Ukraine and Norway have signed a defence cooperation agreement under the Drone Deal format. This is the tenth country establishing a Drone Deal with Ukraine.

• American Palladyne AI and Ukrainian-Estonian NORDA Dynamics, a developer of a drone autonomy ecosystem, announced a collaboration to integrate Palladyne AI’s SwarmOS™ decentralized, collaborative autonomy platform with the Underdog Autonomy Module, NORDA’s autonomous terminal guidance product for next-generation unmanned swarm operations.

• Finnish Patria and Ukrainian General Cherry signed a LoI. Patria plans to initiate drone production in Finland, which would support the development of Europe’s defence capabilities

• Ukraine would receive about 90% of the drones built by Finnish companies under a planned Finland–Ukraine framework agreement. The other 10% would stay in Finland.

• Britain signed a partnership with Ukraine to jointly develop artificial intelligence tools for defence and security, ​giving British researchers access to a Ukrainian battlefield data platform ‌used to train military AI systems.

Relevant Global Developments

• Chinese drone manufacturers are focusing on low-cost interceptor drones produced using 3D printing and equipped with artificial intelligence. The technology is also being actively exported abroad, including to Russia.

• An explosive drone found near a Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig airport in early August bore the hallmarks of devices typically employed by Russia's Military Intelligence Directorate, the GRU, a U.S. intelligence source told.

• Slovak police thwarted a planned arson attack on the Ukrainian Skyeton production facility in the eastern part of the country, where unmanned systems are manufactured.

• Japan’s defense procurement agency has signed a mass-production agreement for interceptor drones, selecting the Terra B1, a rocket-launched system developed by domestic industrial giant Terra Drone. The Terra B1 is the Japan-made counterpart to the Terra A1, which was fielded on Ukrainian battlefields earlier this year.

• The UAE has built massive protective cages around fuel tanks at Dubai airport after one of those tanks was struck by an Iranian drone early in the war.

Work with Ukraine

• The Ukrainian agency Calibrated organizes Defence Tech Comms Bootcamps, a training programme designed for Ukrainian defence-tech professionals. The programme provides insights into market opportunities and potential areas of cooperation across different regions and countries. The autumn edition will focus on opportunities in Asia. Calibrated is currently open to sponsorship partnerships. Contact them here.

The Ukraine Drone Brief is usually available exclusively to VIP subscribers, while all other newsletters are available to regular paid subscribers.

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Read earlier relevant reports:

• Ukraine’s Pursuit of Drone Autonomy: NORDA Dynamics;

• The Fourth Law: Autonomy for Every Drone;

• What Is Russia’s Banderol Missile/Drone?

• Ukraine’s First Autonomous Interceptor Drones;

• Drones Against Civilians: How Russia Uses UAVs to Kill and Terrorize.