The past week has been particularly difficult for Ukraine. Amid relentless Russian strikes, it stopped receiving U.S. warnings about ballistic missile launches, which the U.S. administration blamed on weather conditions. Ukraine also faced restrictions on Starshield satellite connectivity, which appear to remain in place, and neither Musk nor Trump has taken responsibility for them. This episode showed how vulnerable any country’s military capabilities and civilian protection become when they depend on external actors pursuing their own agendas.

In this edition:

• Ukraine Faces New Starlink Restrictions amid Ceasefire Pressure;

• Ukraine Seeks to Paralyze Moscow Airports;

• How Russia Continues to Reinvent the One-Way Attack Drone (CSIS Podcast);

• additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

As much as I love long and detailed reports, I’ve decided to save you reading time and make my newsletter more concise. Each issue will now take no more than 15 minutes to read. Let me know what you think of this new version.

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Ukraine Faces New Starlink Restrictions amid Ceasefire Pressure

Last week, Ukraine faced major disruptions, including restrictions on Starlink/Starshield connectivity and pauses in U.S. intelligence sharing. These developments followed a renewed ceasefire request by the U.S. administration, which Ukraine accepted by temporarily suspending strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, while Russia decided not to reciprocate.

On October 14, several units and Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence confirmed that they had begun facing new restrictions on the use of Starlink. The restriction applies to SpaceX’s Starshield military service package and is set at 100 mph, or about 161 km/h. It is limited to Ukrainian territory; European countries are not subject to it.

When an unmanned system exceeds the speed threshold, its terminal loses connectivity. The speed at which the connection is lost varies across platforms and military units, ranging from approximately 72 to 161 km/h. During UAV flights, the connection could be lost for 10-20 seconds. The drones keep moving, but these interruptions make them harder to control. Ukraine’s defence forces had not been warned in advance about the restriction. As a result, several combat missions have been disrupted.

This significantly affects Ukraine’s capabilities, particularly in operating mid-range drones at the tactical-operational level, which have created serious difficulties for Russian forces at the front throughout 2026. This year, Ukraine has launched several mid-range strike campaigns targeting Russian logistics, energy hubs, and missile launchers in Russian-occupied territories. Read my report: How Middle-Strike Drones Are Destroying Russian Logistics.

Another capability affected by the current restrictions is Ukraine’s interceptor drones, which use Starlink to counter jet-powered and conventional Geran drones. Adviser to President Zelenskyy, Serhii FLASH, said that “by taking these steps, our partners are depriving us of one of the few options we have for defending the country against jet-powered Shaheds”.

Ukraine has used Starlink only for defensive and counter-offensive purposes, as the service does not work over Russian territory. This new round of restrictions, following similar patterns throughout the war, underscores the vulnerability of relying on commercial services for strategic capabilities, especially as such dependencies could be used to pressure Ukraine into a ceasefire or peace deal with Russia.

Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski called on SpaceX CEO Musk to refrain from using his company’s products as a tool of political pressure. Poland allocates approximately $50 million annually to cover Starlink subscription fees for Ukraine. Other countries, such as Germany and the UK, also sponsor this service.

The European Commission plans to connect Ukraine to its secure satellite communications system, GOVSATCOM. However, it remains unclear whether this solution can match the capabilities of Starshield before Europe’s planned IRIS² constellation of around 300 satellites becomes operational in 2029.

Musk said the U.S. military and President Trump control access to Starshield, while Trump said he had not ordered the restriction on Ukraine.

Ukraine’s MoD has been actively engaging with SpaceX and the Pentagon to lift Starlink restrictions.

Ukraine’s need for its own independently controlled satellite communications system is evident. The country already has such a project—UASAT LEO, developed by Ukrainian company STETMAN in partnership with Denmark’s GomSpace. However, the project’s status remains unclear. The CEO of the Ukrainian Council of Defence Industry, Ihor Fedirko, revealed that he had personally participated in negotiations with German partners last year concerning the development of such a system; however, the negotiations unexpectedly collapsed for unclear reasons.

My earlier reports on Starlink in Ukraine and Russia:

• Global Starlink Outage: How Important This Is for Ukraine;

• Ukraine Works with SpaceX to Limit Russian Use of Starlink;

• Integration of Starlink Terminals into Russian Molniya UAVs.

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Ukraine Seeks to Paralyze Moscow Airports

In recent weeks, Ukraine has focused on targeting Russian dual-use infrastructure affecting the daily lives of Russian citizens, who have remained largely unaffected by the war for years. Strikes on data centers have continued, while Ukraine is now intensifying its operation codenamed M&Ms, aimed at disrupting civilian air traffic, particularly in Moscow.

While President Trump has focused on halting Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy facilities, he has not objected to attacks on other targets deep inside Russia. According to Russian sources, 2,730 Ukrainian UAVs flew toward the Moscow region between October 10 and 17, most of which were intercepted by Russian air defences before reaching their targets.

Moscow’s four airports were closed for a combined 101 hours during the first 14 days of October, compared with just 46 hours throughout September. On the evening of October 16 and overnight into October 17, renewed restrictions resulted in more than 350 delayed or cancelled flights, with Sheremetyevo airport particularly affected. Putin and his entourage were reportedly unable to land in Moscow after returning from Turkmenistan due to flight restrictions imposed at Moscow airports under the so-called “Carpet” emergency protocol in response to drone threats.

The airport disruptions are only the beginning of Ukraine’s operation codenamed M&Ms, The Atlantic reports. A more ambitious phase is expected to involve the deployment of AI-enabled drones capable of autonomously evading Russian air defences and directly striking airports. These drones are designed to operate without relying on U.S. intelligence support, with plans to scale up production in the near future.

Discussions concerning these capabilities have been ongoing since summer but were disrupted following the dismissal of Defence Minister Fedorov.

These strikes show the various ways Ukraine can increase economic pressure on Russia. Persistent disruptions to flight schedules at Moscow’s airports have far-reaching consequences for air travel across Russia, as Moscow remains the country’s largest aviation hub.

Read this article on Ukrainian strikes on Yandex data centers with my comments: Data Center Warfare: Ukraine’s Retaliatory Strategy Hits Russian Tech Hubs.

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How Russia Continues to Reinvent the One-Way Attack Drone (CSIS podcast)

Russia continues to improve and adapt one of its key capabilities—the Geran long-range attack drone, considered among the world’s best systems in its category. Since 2022, major improvements have included enhanced EW resilience, onboard communication capabilities, and increased lethality. The latest variant, the Geran-5, represents a significant leap in speed, leaving Ukraine with limited options to counter this evolving threat.

Main argument of the CSIS podcast: what makes the Geran drone dangerous is how fast Russia changes it.

Russia acquired the design for the Geran family from Iran in August 2022 and deployed it a month later. Here is how Russia has transformed this platform throughout the years:

• EW resilience: July 2023: Russia began fitting Gerans with Kometa-M, a homegrown controlled reception pattern antenna (CRPA). Its multiple antenna elements neutralize jamming from several directions, and Russia keeps adding more elements to filter out more jamming and spoofing.

• Onboard communication capabilities: early Gerans had none (they operated on fire-and-forget logic).

  • November 2023: Geran deployed with a 4G modem and a Ukrainian SIM card. It works as a tracker and can transmit its location throughout the flight.

  • February 2024: It contained a Raspberry Pi mini-computer and two 3G modems; this is still present in the Geran today.

  • It works on Ukraine’s cell network, and every drone becomes a data point. For Ukraine, its own air defence infrastructure becomes an exposure - the Gerans record and transmit data on how Ukraine’s air defence disables them.

• Next shift, summer 2025: airborne communication networks. Drones are equipped with mesh radio modules that turn a drone into a signal repeater for other drones flying nearby. This allows the formation of an airborne communication network in which drones flying next to one another relay data as a chain of nodes. The network is very robust to disruption: if one node is shot down, the group can regroup and relay through the remaining nodes.

• Another aspect is lethality, which can be seen in the development of warheads. There were several 50 kg alternatives, but Russia is moving to heavier approaches (90 kg). Also, Russia crams two 50 kg warheads into the fuselage for a combined explosive weight.

• Geran becomes a multi-purpose platform. Russia is experimenting with alternative payloads: mid-flight release of two PTM-3 anti-tank mines, or a Soviet-era R-60 air-to-air missile strapped to the fuselage to target approaching helicopters mid-flight. FPV drones: two were mounted on top of each wing for mid-flight release.

• The most recent version is the Geran-5: Russia developed a new airframe that looks more like a cruise missile and is twice as big as previous versions. It can develop speeds of 600 km/h – well beyond the reach of Ukraine’s interceptor drones that currently fly at 300 km/h. The interception rate was over 85% for the Geran-2; with the Geran-5, it fell to 65%.

• According to analysts, by replacing the original Iranian-designed Shahed piston engine with a small jet engine, Russia has produced a drone that is faster, harder to shoot down, and still much cheaper than a cruise missile. This allows Russia to carry out sustained long-range attacks without relying exclusively on expensive missiles, keeping those for the most heavily defended or strategically important targets.

Military Support to Ukraine

• Ukraine has run out of missiles for the U.S. Patriot air defence system, a CNN source reports. This information should be seen critically, as it is not possible to verify it, although Ukraine has been facing an interceptor missile shortage for months. According to Zelenskyy, Ukraine needs roughly 300 interceptors to survive this winter.

• President Trump accused Ukraine of selling U.S.-supplied weapons, including Tomahawk missiles, despite no confirmed deliveries of Tomahawks to Kyiv.

  In response, Ukraine’s Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO) revealed that the Trump administration had terminated funding for its project to monitor U.S. military aid, declaring it no longer in the U.S. national interest.

• On October 15, President Zelenskyy said that Ukraine had lost access to U.S. early-warning intelligence on ballistic missile launches. According to him, the United States is its only source of information about ballistic missile launches.

  France’s Foreign Ministry stated that European partners provide two-thirds of the intelligence Ukraine receives.

  On October 18, it was announced that the U.S. resumed intelligence sharing with Ukraine.

• The UK will be sending Ukraine more long-range Storm Shadow missiles. Also, the UK will accelerate deliveries of British Lightweight Multirole Missiles (LMMs), which have proven effective against jet-powered drones.

Defence Innovation in Ukraine

• Six Ukrainian companies are mass-producing miniature turbojet engines, while a total of 11 companies in Ukraine are involved in their development. Expanding domestic production of these engines is a key step toward scaling up the manufacturing of new interceptor drones against Russian jet-powered threats.

• Ukraine and NATO created innovative AI-based military models for predicting enemy drone deployment near the contact line. One of them is a tool capable of forecasting adversary UAV usage based on an analysis of historical data, weather conditions, and the current battlefield situation. The other module, supporting the decision-making, tests the capability for the automated generation of artillery operation plans.

Russia and Allies

• Belarus is deploying a new secure military communications system for its MoD, designed to support the deployment and movement of Russian forces toward NATO countries’ borders.

• According to a report by Der Spiegel, the Turkish organized crime group known as the Daltons may have been behind an arson attack on a Starlink satellite communications station in Poland, allegedly acting on orders from Russian intelligence services.

Developments on the Frontline

• Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps has completed the fourth and final phase of its counteroffensive operation Vivaldi, which began in late May. According to Ukraine, Russian forces suffered approximately 8,000 killed and wounded during the operation. Ukrainian forces regained control of 277 sq. km of territory and liberated 16 settlements. My earlier report: Vivaldi: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Operation.

• NATO has estimated that Russia suffered more than 50,000 casualties in its war against Ukraine in September, of whom 28,000 were killed. According to Bloomberg sources, Ukraine suffered 5,000 casualties in September.

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While the army of humanoid robots isn't here yet, humans already successfully operate unmanned ground vehicles in some of the most challenging missions, including logistics, medical evacuation, and strike operations. The result? Ukraine has not only liberated its territory but has also done so while minimizing human losses. The use of UGVs reportedly helped save approximately 2,500 soldiers’ lives during Ukraine’s counteroffensive Operation Vivaldi.

In this edition:

• Gryphon Tactics: Innovative Combat Applications of UGVs in Operation Vivaldi;

• “The Development of Autonomy Can No Longer Be Stopped”: The Fourth Law;

• Trends in Ukraine’s Drone Industry;

• 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

As my work now involves frequent travel and public engagements, I’ve decided to occasionally combine my Arms Trends in Ukraine and Drone Warfare in Ukraine newsletters. This means that some Monday editions will cover both topics, including traditional and emerging military capabilities.

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Gryphon Tactics: Innovative Combat Applications of UGVs in Operation Vivaldi

As time passes, more details about Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi are emerging. Unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) have been playing a particularly important role in this operation, saving the lives of thousands of soldiers and carrying out a wide range of logistical and strike missions.

We are witnessing a gradual transformation in the role of unmanned technologies: they are increasingly being deployed to perform some of the most complex and dangerous tasks, allowing human soldiers to take on more specialized roles and enter combat at later stages of operations.

Yet humans remain at the heart of this evolution.

The NC-13 Strike UGV Unit of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade has demonstrated that innovation is not just about developing new systems, but also about how these systems are employed, combined, and integrated into new tactics. This is something that cannot simply be stamped “battlefield-tested” and sold abroad. It underscores the critical importance of human capital, operational experience, and the ability to innovate on the battlefield.

The unit performs strike UGV missions exclusively: sabotage, assault, and defensive operations. Sabotage missions include operations that the unit carries out at a depth of more than 8 km into enemy territory. The unit relies exclusively on Ukrainian drones.

In his interview with Defender Media, the commander of the unit said that during Operation Vivaldi, UGVs carried out 94 assault and sabotage missions without risk to Ukrainian troops, and their deployment saved the lives of about 2,500 people.

UGVs supported deception operations, reinforced selected sectors, targeted command posts and ammunition or supply sites, and engaged Russian assault groups along logistical routes.

One of the most notable applications of UGVs during Vivaldi was the “Gryphon” tactic, in which strike UGVs were transported by heavy aerial drones and deployed deep behind Russian lines.

The ground robots, sometimes equipped with disposable grenade launchers, could be dropped as far as 10 kilometres into the Russian rear and then continue moving independently toward their targets.

Some UGVs carried two Bullspike grenade launchers. They approached Russian positions and fired on them before continuing toward enemy shelters, where the vehicles were then detonated.

The tactic was designed to create uncertainty about where and how Ukrainian robotic systems could appear behind Russian positions. Such missions were used to target Russian UAV operators, including personnel associated with the Rubikon unit, as well as company-level and higher command posts and troops moving along logistical routes.

In one reported case, the deployment of a UGV behind Russian lines contributed to the cancellation of a planned mechanized assault. Russian forces interpreted the presence of the robot as evidence that a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group was waiting to ambush the advancing column.

The “Gryphon” tactic was named in honour of NC-13 servicemember Hryhorii Bach, callsign “Gryphon,” who went missing near Andriivka in the Bakhmut sector in 2023.

During the third phase of Operation Vivaldi in northern Donetsk Oblast, Ukrainian forces also repurposed Soviet-era BTR-60 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) as kamikaze UGVs to strike Russian strongpoints.

Footage released by the unit indicated that the vehicles were packed with explosive material, including what appeared to be anti-tank mines, likely TM-62s. Then the vehicles were remotely driven toward fortified Russian positions. The adapted APCs were used as an improvised means of breaching key enemy strongpoints.

The use of converted BTR-60s illustrates another dimension of the operation’s ground-robotics approach: adapting legacy armoured vehicles into remotely controlled, expendable strike platforms for attacking fortified positions.

ISW wrote that it is notable that Ukrainian forces were able to field and drive APCs up to heavy Russian fortifications without coming under Russian drone strikes. Analysts indicated that Ukrainian forces neutralized or otherwise negated Russian drone defenses. Ukrainian forces conducted extensive shaping operations and an intermediate-range strike campaign to mitigate the threat from Russian drones and EW systems and achieve tactical drone overmatch, aiding Ukrainian mechanized advances in the Lyman direction.

ISW analysts concluded that Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction has completely disrupted Russia’s plans to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, forcing the Russian military to rebuild its forces and likely rethink its strategy.

Currently, there is no basis for assuming Russia could capture the rest of Donetsk Oblast in the near future, as Putin continues to claim.

Read my earlier report: Vivaldi: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Operation.

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“The Development of Autonomy Can No Longer Be Stopped”: The Fourth Law

“Drone autonomy could become the Manhattan Project of the 21st century. Like nuclear weapons, it could become a major deterrent: countries possessing the most advanced autonomous technologies may enjoy a significant security advantage. If a country’s technology is far ahead of its adversary’s, the adversary may be less inclined to attack,” said Maksym Savanevskyi, Communications Director at The Fourth Law, a Ukrainian company developing autonomous drone technologies, in his interview with LB.ua.
Here are some key points:

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The future seems to be arriving faster than expected, with Ukraine’s former defence minister announcing a new “Army of Robots” initiative. While Ukrainian developers and military personnel have met the idea with scepticism, other countries have been experimenting with humanoid and other robotic systems for military applications for some time.

In this edition:

• Trends on the Battlefield and Current Priorities;

• Army of Humanoid Robots;

• Defence Tech Is the New Agriculture: General Cherry on Drone Production;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

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Trends on the Battlefield and Current Priorities

With the arrival of autumn and changes in vegetation cover, battlefield activity is changing in intensity and character. According to Ruslan Leviev’s analysis, the pace of Russian advances declined by roughly 20% in September. At the same time, assessing the actual rate of territorial change has become increasingly difficult, as both sides sometimes publish older footage as if it were recent.

Operation Vivaldi illustrates this particularly well. Much of the information being released now concerns achievements from earlier. As Robert “Madyar” Brovdi, Commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, has noted in his interview with The Telegraph, operations of this kind depend heavily on secrecy. Maintaining operational silence is increasingly difficult in today’s highly transparent information environment and OSINT capabilities; it remains essential — including in communications with allies.

This makes real-time assessments of battlefield momentum especially difficult. Official statements frequently lag behind battlefield developments or present events selectively. In Ukraine’s case, some gains became public only considerably later. Russia, meanwhile, continues to make highly inflated claims about its territorial advances.

Putin claimed that Russian forces had captured 1,301 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory in September 2026. ISW, however, assessed that Russian forces instead suffered a net territorial loss of 80.81 square kilometers in September 2026.

Operation Vivaldi appears to have been more successful than public reporting initially suggested. Ukrainian forces succeeded in cutting off the Shandryholove salient, while some assessments indicate that Ukrainian troops may already be crossing the Zherebets River and pushing deeper into Russian positions.

Another notable development last week was the adaptation of battle tanks to modern warfare. The 475th Assault Regiment, operating with limited infantry resources, used heavily protected tanks together with several types of drones while clearing Russian sabotage groups in Kharkiv Oblast, roughly nine kilometres from the Russian border.

The group combined two heavily protected tanks with FPV drones, a Vampire drone, and a Mavic reconnaissance drone. The Mavic served as the “eyes” of the tanks, providing situational awareness and helping guide their movement.

Russia, meanwhile, continues to expand its armed forces. Following elections to the State Duma, Russian authorities moved toward another round of hidden mobilization. A new decree increased the authorized strength of the Russian Armed Forces by approximately 15,500 personnel. This followed another increase of around 27,000 positions in late July, bringing the total increase over two months to more than 40,000.

According to Brovdi, rapidly mobilized Russian personnel often receive insufficient training before deployment. Nevertheless, the additional manpower continues to pose a serious challenge for Ukrainian forces and should not be interpreted as making Russia’s offensive operations easy to counter.

For Ukraine, one of the principal responses is therefore the continued expansion of unmanned systems. Ukraine cannot compete with Russia primarily through manpower and must preserve its human resources.

Both sides continue to achieve limited tactical successes on different sectors of the front, although recent gains appear more pronounced on the Ukrainian side. The overall tempo of operations is expected to slow further in October for both sides.

Read more about Operation Vivaldi here.

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Army of Humanoid Robots

Ukraine’s Former Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced the launch of the “Army of Robots”, an ecosystem of robotic technologies for the military. The promotional video showed humanoid robots carrying weapons, operating in trenches, and assembled in large formations.

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The wave of non-stop Russian attacks against Ukraine continues. This time the enemy targets data centres and network infrastructure in an effort to disrupt Ukrainians’ access to information, including alerts about ongoing missile and drone attacks.

In this edition:

• Russia Targets Data Centers and Network Facilities of Ukraine;

• Autonomous Weapons: The Ukrainian Perspective;

• Ukraine’s Defence-Industrial Partnerships and Their Limitations: KSE Report;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

This week I’m celebrating my birthday, so if you’d like to congratulate me or thank me for my work, please consider donating to my drone fundraiser.

Everyone who donates at least $150 (Canadian dollars) will receive a complimentary one-year subscription to all my newsletters, including the Ukraine Drone Brief, which is currently available only to VIP subscribers. It is a great chance to get discounted access to this newsletter and support a good cause: PayPal.

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Russia Targets Data Centers and Network Facilities of Ukraine

Previously, the main risks to Ukrainian data centres were cyberattacks and power outages; now, Russian attackers are directly targeting the facilities, including buildings, servers, and communications links.

On September 23, Russian strikes on Ukraine’s digital infrastructure intensified. Russians focused on facilities in Kyiv and Odesa Oblast. According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation, around 100,000 households in Kyiv and the surrounding region experienced internet disruptions. The attacks continued the following day. On September 27, Russia hit the headquarters of Kyivstar, Ukraine's largest mobile service provider.

In Ukraine, data centres are conventional above-ground buildings that were never designed to withstand missile or drone strikes. Ukrainian experts said the strikes hit key data centres handling a significant share of Ukraine’s domestic internet traffic. Two major operators reportedly went offline for several hours because their network cores were located at the affected sites.

Despite the scale of the strikes on data centres, experts agree that Ukraine is unlikely to lose internet access entirely. One reason is the highly decentralized structure of the sector. Ukraine never had a heavily regulated internet market requiring expensive licences, which made entry relatively easy and allowed thousands of providers to operate. As a result, the country developed a highly distributed internet infrastructure.

Advisor to the President, Serhii FLASH Beskrestnov wrote that while local outages are possible, Ukraine’s highly distributed internet infrastructure makes a nationwide blackout unlikely. Providers are expected to restore damaged connections, although service costs could rise as companies absorb repair expenses.

Ukrainian digital technology expert Hlushchenko recommends that people in Ukraine use two SIM cards from different mobile operators if they move around frequently, and two fixed-line internet connections if reliable home access is critical. He advises prioritizing providers that use xPON technology and maintaining an independent backup power source. Starlink, he says, is a useful last line of connectivity, but it should not be seen as a universal replacement for terrestrial internet.

However, the campaign to disrupt access to information for Ukraine’s population extends beyond Ukraine. Last week, Polish authorities reported that a Starlink satellite station in central Poland serving Ukraine had been set on fire. The attack was “deliberately designed to disable the station”, disrupting internet access for a number of institutions, including the Ukrainian military.

Another Starlink ground station is located in Lithuania. However, Russian analyst Ruslan Leviev argues that even if both stations were completely destroyed, this would not necessarily disrupt Starlink service in Ukraine. SpaceX satellites can relay data between one another, allowing Ukrainian terminals to connect through ground stations located elsewhere.

Ukraine has pursued a similar logic in attacks on Russian space-related facilities in Moscow and Vladimir regions this summer, seeking to disrupt infrastructure linked to Russia’s Starlink analogue, Rassvet.

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Autonomous Weapons: The Ukrainian Perspective

In early September, the 128 states parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons agreed on a non-binding document addressing autonomous weapons systems. The framework regulates or prohibits weapons considered to be indiscriminate or to cause excessive injury.

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Last week brought positive news from Ukraine. The Third Army Corps, together with other military formations, completed another phase of the counteroffensive Operation Vivaldi, regaining control of 125 square kilometres of Ukrainian territory and destroying thousands of Russian targets in one of the hottest areas of the frontline.

In this edition:

• Vivaldi: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Operation;

• Assault Soldier on the Experience in Operation Vivaldi;

• Russia’s “Dark Plant” for Automated Containerized FPV Drone Production;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

If you don’t want to just wait for Ukraine’s successes but want to help, consider donating to my fundraiser. I’m trying to raise C$5,000 for a drone (or perhaps two, if we’re lucky) for the unit in the Ukrainian Armed Forces where my friend serves.

He is not with one of the elite formations that receive a lot of media attention and often attract more support from the state and volunteers. For units like his, donations can make a real difference.

This is already my sixth fundraiser for my friend’s unit, and I’ve already purchased six Mavic 3T drones: PayPal.

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Vivaldi: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Operation

Operation Vivaldi is a Ukrainian counteroffensive in northern Donetsk Oblast. It is a joint operation involving several Ukrainian formations. Commander of the 3rd Army Corps Andrii Biletskyi publicly announced the operation on September 15, although its first phase, or “season,” as the Corps calls it, began in May–June under strict information silence. The second season has now also been completed, although further details are likely to emerge later.

Overall, Ukrainian forces regained control of 125 square kilometres of territory during Operation Vivaldi, including 50 square kilometres liberated from Russian occupation, according to the commander.

At the first stage of the operation, Ukrainian forces reported Russian losses of around 1,500 personnel, more than 12,000 drones, and hundreds of armoured vehicles, artillery systems, and other vehicles. Ukrainian units also disrupted Russian logistics and forced Russian forces to move fuel supply points farther from the frontline. Russia’s elite Rubikon drone unit was also withdrawn from the Lyman–Borova sector after suffering heavy losses.

Current Russian losses from the operation are estimated at around 3,000 personnel.

Some of its key components include:

• Blinding the enemy: degrading Russian drone reconnaissance capabilities;

• Establishing a protective “dome”: clearing the low-altitude airspace;

• Targeting enemy logistics with medium-range strike drones;

• Employing “iron soldiers”: replacing some infantry tasks with UGVs.

Blinding the enemy: degrading Russian drone reconnaissance capabilities

According to ISW, Ukrainian forces targeted Russian drone operators and launch sites, established dedicated air-defence and electronic-warfare coverage, and disrupted Russian logistics before the counteroffensive.

Russian air defence has become more numerous, professional, and effective, the Third Corps says. The main objective — to systematically destroy Russian reconnaissance drones — was achieved, helping ensure the safer advance of Ukrainian assault groups. As a result, Russian forces lost situational awareness and up-to-date information about developments along the line of contact, while personnel became disoriented, reducing their overall effectiveness.

ISW argues that Operation Vivaldi illustrates progress toward restoring tactical manoeuvre on a battlefield dominated by drones. It had previously assessed that larger-scale manoeuvre would require neutralizing Russia’s tactical reconnaissance-strike complex — the network of reconnaissance and strike drones, artillery and layered defences that makes concentrations of forces highly vulnerable.

Establishing a protective “dome”: clearing the low-altitude airspace

As Russia has doubled its use of strike drones since the beginning of the year, the Corps combined the capabilities of its electronic-warfare units, equipped UGVs with EW systems, and created what it described as a protective “dome” over the area of operations. According to the Corps, its EW forces disrupted more than 20,000 Russian drone missions during Operation Vivaldi.

The protective “dome” relies on a unified network of EW personnel — from operators deployed in the field to those working at command centres. The system is built around people, horizontal coordination, and rapid information-sharing.

During Operation Vivaldi, this network prevented Russian forces from detecting Ukrainian units in time, while Ukrainian EW operators identified enemy systems and quickly passed targeting information to other elements of the Corps, including air-defence units.

As a result, protection of the low-altitude airspace became a layered system combining large radars and even EW equipment mounted on UGVs. The Corps says most attempts to strike these UGVs have failed.

Radar, visual, acoustic, and electronic intelligence are all integrated at the air-defence command post, providing a comprehensive picture of hostile UAV activity in the airspace. A unified radar picture also supplies brigades with situational awareness and targeting data for effective engagements.

The 3rd Army Corps has introduced the role of a “battle captain” within its air-defence system. The battle captain manages engagements in real time, allowing unit commanders to focus on planning subsequent operations rather than directly controlling each engagement.

The Corps has placed significant emphasis on developing its own defence solutions. While the cycle from identifying a problem to fielding a solution can take years in Western countries, this process takes months or even weeks in Ukraine. More than 90% of the equipment used by the Third Army Corps is Ukrainian-made.

Targeting enemy logistics with medium-range strike drones

During Operation Vivaldi, unmanned systems units of the 3rd Army Corps carried out 36,000 strike missions targeting Russian logistics. Drones isolated the battlefield to a depth of up to 50 km and later expanded the strike zone to as far as 120 km.

This created significant problems for the Russian logistics system, with frontline units experiencing disruptions in the supply of fuel, ammunition, and provisions.

At the same time, 3rd Army Corps drones targeted command posts, communications nodes, and supply vehicles, further complicating Russian logistics and forcing Russian forces to reorganize their supply routes.

“Modern warfare is fundamentally about energy. UAV batteries require power, and electronic-warfare systems require power as well. When we systematically target the energy component, the capabilities of enemy forces in critical areas decline sharply.

Drone operators become less effective, fuel shortages emerge, and units can no longer reliably run diesel generators. Without power, they lose the ability to charge and operate many of their systems,” said commander Biletskii.

Employing “iron soldiers”: replacing some infantry tasks with UGVs

The 3rd Army Corps began a new phase of the operation by deploying UGVs behind Russian lines, with heavy bomber drones carrying kamikaze ground robots into the enemy rear - 10 km behind the line of contact.

As the Corps put it, infantry still wins wars, but Ukrainian forces aim to preserve their soldiers by sending robots forward first.

“In Ukraine, a service member is priceless. First come drones and artillery, then maximum analysis, efforts to exhaust the enemy, and only after full confidence is established does the advance begin”, said one of the commanders.

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Assault Soldier on the Experience in Operation Vivaldi

A Ukrainian assault soldier serving with Artan, the special unit of Ukraine’s Military Intelligence (HUR), described his experience during Operation Vivaldi in northern Donetsk Oblast.

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Last week Russia struck Ukraine’s railway infrastructure near the Polish border. Travelling to Ukraine has obviously never been completely safe during the years of the full-scale invasion. But the latest attacks suggest that Russia is increasingly targeting trains and related infrastructure farther west, including routes that are critical for Ukraine’s connections with Europe.

In this edition:

• Russian Strikes Aim to Undermine Ukraine’s Internal and International Connectivity;

• Ukraine Is Developing Its National Air-Defence School;

• Missile Production and the “Valley of Death”;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

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With your help, I’ve already fundraised for and delivered six Mavic 3T drones to the military unit where my university friend Vasyl serves.

My birthday is approaching, and like all Ukrainians, my biggest wish is for the war to end and for Ukraine to win. So I decided to fundraise for one more drone - here is my PayPal fundraiser. Please help me raise this amount. Every donation matters!

You can also watch this thank-you video the unit recorded for the two drones delivered through the previous fundraiser.

Russian Strikes Aim to Undermine Ukraine’s Internal and International Connectivity

The Kyiv–Warsaw railway route became one of the most popular ways to travel to and from Ukraine. Many who have visited Ukraine during the years of the full-scale invasion likely used this route. Last week, it came under attack by Russian jet-powered drones.

On September 13, Russian attack drones struck the Yahodyn international border crossing, the largest crossing on the Polish border by throughput capacity. A train travelling from Kyiv to Warsaw was also hit.

According to Der Spiegel, a special train carrying European politicians and officials had been at the station shortly before the strike. Among them were Günter Sautter, an adviser to German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson. At the time of the attack, another train carrying former CIA Director David Petraeus was reportedly in the area.

The railway company said it was “entirely possible” that the diplomatic train had been the intended target. The train had departed the station earlier than originally scheduled because timetables had been adjusted amid the continuing threat of Russian strikes.

Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railway) said its Central Monitoring Group detected the approaching drone and ordered passengers to evacuate approximately 15 minutes before the locomotive was hit.

In April, it was reported that Ukrzaliznytsia’s dispatch service had gained access to military airspace-monitoring systems and was continuously tracking the threat posed by Russian attack drones.

According to Serhii FLASH Beskrestnov, an adviser to the president, passengers are evacuated from trains when there is a direct threat to their lives. When the risk is less immediate, authorities can use other measures, including adjusting train schedules.

Beskrestnov also warned that a drone strike on a passenger carriage could have catastrophic consequences and advised passengers, when evacuation is ordered, to move at least 100 metres away from the train.

After leaving the train, passengers are advised not to gather in groups nearby, as the train itself may remain a potential target. Instead, they should disperse while keeping the conductor in a high-visibility vest within sight. If there are nearby explosions, passengers should immediately lie face down on the ground with their mouths open.

There have also been cases in which manually controlled Russian drones changed targets during flight after spotting moving trains.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russian attacks on Ukrainian Railways infrastructure have increased significantly. Nearly 1,200 attacks were recorded last year alone — more than in 2023 and 2024 combined.

In recent days, Russian forces have also significantly intensified attacks on fuel stations, including in Kyiv and along major international highways.

On September 10–11, Russian forces carried out their first large-scale attacks on gas stations in Kyiv. At least three facilities were destroyed or damaged by jet-powered drones. Three people were killed in the attacks, while at least nine others were injured.

Previously, fuel stations in frontline regions had been the main targets. The strikes have now expanded to central and northern Ukraine, including Zhytomyr, Poltava, Chernihiv, and Kyiv regions.

The Ukrainian government is preparing a package of measures to strengthen fuel station security. These include automatic alerts warning operators about approaching Russian drones, additional protection for above-ground infrastructure, the construction of shelters, and simplified customs procedures for fuel tanker trucks.

One measure being tested is software that tracks the direction of incoming drones and provides early warnings. The system would automatically alert fuel stations when Russian drones are approaching, giving personnel additional time to respond to the threat. If testing at fuel stations proves successful, the system is expected to be expanded to other businesses and facilities.

As of August, Russia was producing around 3,000 jet-powered Geran-4/5 drones per month, already exceeding monthly production of the conventional gasoline-powered Geran-2, estimated at around 2,800 units.

Check out some of my recent drone-related reports:

• Why Drone Producers Should Invest in Training Operators;

• Approaches to Countering Jet-Powered Drones;

• and the weekly Ukraine Drone Brief.

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Ukraine Is Developing Its National Air-Defence School

Ukraine already has at least two domestically developed air-defence systems that were showcased at the MSPO international defence exhibition in Poland, while another system is being developed at an accelerated pace.

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Russia continued missile and drone strikes on Ukraine despite reports of a possible pause in Ukrainian attacks during visits by U.S. negotiators. President Zelensky described the past several days in Ukraine as “horrific,” particularly because of the intensity of Russian attacks. “The strikes continue from morning until night,” he said.

As Ukraine faces shortages of both air-defence systems and air-to-air missiles for fighter jets, the country is particularly vulnerable at this stage of the war.

In this edition:

• Can Ukraine Expect Taurus Deliveries from Germany?

• Air-to-Air Missile Shortages in Ukraine;

• Ukraine’s Bohdana Artillery System;

• The Current State of Drone Autonomy on the Battlefield;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

For more drone-related news, check out my weekly Ukraine Drone Brief. The latest edition includes additional details on opportunities to work with Ukrainian innovators.

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Can Ukraine Expect Taurus Deliveries from Germany?

There is some hope in Ukraine that the rise in so-called “hybrid” attacks linked to Russia will prompt Germany to reconsider supplying Taurus missiles, which Ukraine has long requested.

On September 1, the German government said that it held Russia "responsible" for an attempted drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport on August 4. However, authorities insist that Germany is “not at war” but that it is “a daily target of hybrid warfare.” Therefore, Germany would respond to the hybrid attack in Leipzig in a “proportionate and measured, yet resolute manner.”

Andreas Umland, a Policy Fellow at the European Policy Institute in Kyiv, told Liga.net that Russia’s hybrid war against Germany is already approaching the threshold of conventional military action. “Explosives and drones... To what extent can this still be considered hybrid warfare? It is already on the verge of military action,” Umland said.

He noted that Germany has so far responded to Russian actions mainly with symbolic measures, including the closure of the Russian consulate in Bonn and the Russian House in Berlin.

In response, Putin accused Germany of planting evidence to blame Moscow for the attempted drone attack at Leipzig airport.

Wolfgang Kubicki from Germany’s Free Democratic Party (FDP) said that Germany should threaten Russia with the transfer of long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine if the Kremlin does not stop its hybrid attacks on German infrastructure.

Germany’s Free Democratic Party had long been one of the strongest advocates of providing Ukraine with long-range weapons. However, following the most recent parliamentary election, the party did not enter the Bundestag.

In July 2026, Germany's parliament rejected a proposal by the Green parliamentary group calling for the transfer of Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, expanded production of Patriot PAC-2 missiles, and increased military and humanitarian aid.

Earlier, in an interview with Bild, the German Defense Minister said he saw no need to supply Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, arguing that Ukrainian forces were already effectively striking Russian infrastructure.

Taurus missiles, with a range of more than 500 km, could reach targets in Crimea, Donbas, and several Russian border regions. The Taurus is designed to strike hardened targets, including command posts, airfields and runways, and could also be used against major concrete infrastructure such as the Crimean Bridge.

The missile is equipped with a warhead featuring a PIMPF fuze, allowing it to strike hardened, multilayered structures such as bridges and bunkers. This capability has earned the Taurus the nickname “bridge killer.”

Taurus missiles were featured repeatedly in Friedrich Merz’s statements during the election campaign and after he became chancellor. He said that Ukraine should be given the capability to destroy the Kerch Bridge, also known as the Crimean Bridge, in order to disrupt a key Russian military logistics route. Taurus missiles are among the systems capable of inflicting significant damage on such hardened infrastructure.

Russian commentators are indeed concerned about the possibility of such deliveries. Russian military analyst Dmitry Kornev told Izvestia that there is no guaranteed protection against the Taurus, just as there is no complete protection against the British Storm Shadow or the French SCALP missiles. If used as part of operations intended to suppress or penetrate air defences, some Taurus missiles could still get through.

Russian Ambassador-at-Large Konstantin Dolgov commented that Germany had so far refrained from supplying Taurus missiles to Ukraine, but that such a move could not be ruled out. “They are supplying quite a lot of weapons to Kyiv, and their motives are also clear. They continue to proceed from the need to inflict a defeat on Russia. This is a disastrous course for Europe and for Germany,” Dolgov said. He added that Russia would view any potential delivery of Taurus missiles by Germany to Ukraine as an additional factor of escalation and as another hostile act by Berlin.

Despite Taurus missiles having been part of the debate since 2023, Germany has taken no concrete action to supply them to Ukraine. Over the same period, Ukraine has continued to expand its domestic long-range strike capabilities, including long-range drones, missile-drone systems, jet-powered drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. These capabilities have already produced meaningful results against Russian military and energy infrastructure.

At the same time, partner-supplied long-range weapons remain an important component of Ukraine’s strike capability because of their technological sophistication, accuracy, and ability to engage hardened or high-value targets.

In February 2026, Ukrainian Armed Forces targeted a Russian command facility near Novopetrivka in the Donetsk region with the U.S.-made ATACMS ballistic missiles. And in August 2026, Ukraine decided to buy 70 M39 ATACMS from Turkey.

The most recent verified Ukrainian strike using British Storm Shadow cruise missiles took place in August 2026. Just two days earlier, on Ukraine’s Independence Day, the British government authorized defence manufacturer MBDA to disclose classified information needed to support Ukraine and France in establishing local production of Storm Shadow/SCALP long-range cruise missiles.

However, for now the prospects of Ukraine getting German Taurus missiles seem pretty low.

In a separate conversation with me, Andreas Umland said that German public opinion remains opposed to supplying Taurus missiles to Ukraine because many Germans fear Russian retaliation. He described this, in part, as a success of Russian and pro-Russian propaganda. “As long as public opinion does not change, the government is unlikely to satisfy Ukraine’s request,” he added.

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Check out other relevant reports:

• “Ukrainian Housewives with 3D Printers”: CEO of Rheinmetall on Ukraine’s Drone Producers;

• Flamingo Missiles Got Intercepted Again.

Air-to-Air Missile Shortages in Ukraine

The War Zone reported that Ukrainian F-16 pilots are facing such a severe shortage of air-to-air missiles that, on some daytime sorties, they have had to rely solely on the fighters’ internal guns to engage Russian aerial threats.

According to a separate interview with Anatolii Khrapchynskyi, Ukrainian aviation expert and a reserve Air Force officer, the shortage is partly due to the intensive use of F-16s against these faster drones.

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In this new phase of the war, major Ukrainian cities are taking the hardest hits. Russian forces are continuously striking civilian and commercial sites, including food and water storage facilities, book and clothing warehouses, and small cargo depots.

While the world is focused on AI-powered drones, one hundred thousand drone pilots on the other side of the frontline are still manually guiding drones toward these targets.

In this edition:

• Russia’s New Strike Tactics: Small and Continuous Waves;

• Gamification of War: How Ukrainian Drone Pilots Earn Points for Successful Strikes;

• What’s Wrong with Ukraine’s Arms Exports?

• Ukraine’s New Defence Minister and His Vision;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

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Russia’s New Strike Tactics: Small and Continuous Waves

Russia has shifted to a new air terror tactic in recent days – hitting Kyiv and other cities in small drone waves every 30–60 minutes around the clock. On August 27, Kyiv saw 13 air raid alerts totaling 14 hours.

August 30 became the fourth consecutive calendar day during which Kyiv has been subjected to aerial attacks, according to the Russian pro-war Telegram channel Dva Mayora. The series began overnight on August 27 and has continued with only brief interruptions.

Instead of relying exclusively on large-scale nighttime raids, Russia is employing smaller repeated groups, including high-speed jet-powered UAVs, with strikes occurring both during the day and at night. This approach forces Ukrainian air-defence units, mobile fire groups, emergency responders and municipal services to operate almost continuously.

Ukrainian military expert Oleh Zhdanov, analyzing drones’ flight trajectories over Kyiv, concluded that they are being guided by human operators rather than relying solely on automated navigation. Human control could explain the drones’ erratic maneuvers over Kyiv. Such flight patterns may also exert psychological pressure on civilians by creating panic and uncertainty. Intercepting such targets over highly populated areas remains extremely difficult for Ukrainian forces.

Jet-powered drones such as Shaheds and Banderol missile/drones are taking over roles previously performed by air-launched cruise missiles from strategic bombers or sea-launched Kalibr missiles. President Zelensky said that Russia used over 1500 drones in these 4 days, 800 of which were jet-powered.

According to Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, adviser to the president on the development of defence technology, the number of jet-powered Shahed drones Russia uses has increased by at least 67% in a single month, from approximately 1,500 to more than 2,500. Beskrestnov also said that the jet-powered Shaheds are being launched against Ukraine “practically straight from the factory.”

Prolonged air-raid alerts affect not only people’s safety but also the operation of businesses, logistics, transport, schools, kindergartens, and other areas of daily life. Russia is attempting to paralyze economic activity in the capital and other major cities, so Ukraine’s response procedures also need to change. The Ukrainian authorities plan to review approaches to the curfew and civilians’ access to more timely information about aerial threats, wrote Ukraine’s Prime Minister, Serhii Koretsky.

Recent Russian airstrikes have severely disrupted Ukraine’s commercial supply network, destroying roughly 90% of food logistics capacity used by major retailers. Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov urged Ukrainians not to give in to rumours, disinformation, or panic. He said manufacturers and retailers are already restructuring their supply chains. According to Beskrestnov, Russia is not targeting “food” as such, but rather large businesses that generate tax revenue and provide jobs.

Russian milbloggers wrote that many observers are linking these developments to the recent visit of the CIA Director to Moscow and speculation surrounding possible peace negotiations. They conclude with the usual call for Ukraine’s destruction, showing that there is no real readiness in Russia for de-escalation: “We think the best backdrop for negotiations is the enemy’s capital burning. We need to keep destroying the enemy while it is experiencing a shortage of surface-to-air missiles and while we are increasing production of jet-powered Geran drones.”

Check out my recent reports:

• The Challenge of Jet-Powered Shaheds;

• What Is Russia’s Banderol Missile/Drone?

• Licence for Patriot Interceptor Missile Production: Trump Changes His Mind.

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Gamification of War: How Ukrainian Drone Pilots Earn Points for Successful Strikes

Journalist Simon Ostrovsky interviewed Andrii, a verification analyst at Brave1, about Ukraine’s e-Points system, which awards military units points for verified battlefield results. Those points can then be spent through the Brave1 Market on drones, EW systems, and other equipment.

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Today is Ukraine’s 35th Independence Day! 🇺🇦 For more than a third of those 35 years, Ukraine has been defending itself against aggression from its neighbour, Russia. All that time and resources could have been spent on economic development, education, and culture. Instead, Ukraine has already been at war for 12 years and is now spending 40% of its GDP on defence while losing its youngest and brightest people.

Ukraine, which entered this war essentially disarmed, has transformed into a global security provider, helping allies and partners around the world defend themselves against dictatorial regimes seeking greater global dominance.

On this 35th Independence Day, we should thank everyone serving in Ukraine’s Defence Forces, everyone working in the Ukrainian defence industry and civil society, and all Ukrainians who contribute to the country’s resilience and keep it a stronghold of democracy.

We should also value a society that remains vocal, that disagrees and protests, that is not afraid to criticize, and that continues to ask for the support it needs to carry out a mission that is not only about Ukraine’s future, but about the future of all democracies.

Glory to Ukraine! Glory to Heroes!

For the occasion of Ukraine’s Independence Day, this edition of my newsletter is free.

In this edition:

• Ukraine Aims to Secure Additional Air Defence Missiles Ahead of Winter;

• Ukraine Advances Development and Production of Domestic KABs;

• How the Helicopter War Is Changing in Ukraine;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work and Ukraine!

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Ukraine Aims to Secure Additional Air Defence Missiles Ahead of Winter

CNN was recently granted access to a Patriot system operating in Ukraine, allowing Ukrainian officials to highlight the severity of the country’s interceptor shortage. The launcher showed clear signs of frequent use across all 16 launch tubes. However, the system’s chief engineer in Ukraine said he had not seen the Patriot fire in six weeks.

According to Ukraine’s data, Russia has the potential to produce up to 1,300 ballistic missiles a year, and currently has around 600-630 such missiles at its disposal. Additionally, Russia has been positioning North Korean ballistic missiles within striking range of seven Ukrainian regions, including Kyiv. Ukrainian intelligence and the Institute for the Study of War wrote that six launchers have been deployed in Russia’s Voronezh region, while North Korea has supplied Moscow with around 50 KN-series ballistic missiles.

Following a call with President Zelensky, French President Macron has pledged to expand military support for Ukraine. Macron said France would continue working through the Anti-Missile Coalition established in Paris in July.

The Anti-Missile Coalition is a 10-member European initiative aimed at developing a more affordable European alternative to countering ballistic missile threats, rather than relying solely on US-made Patriot systems. At the coalition’s launch, Macron also said France planned to accelerate deliveries of the new SAMP/T system to Ukraine and provide licences enabling Ukrainian production of interceptor missiles, SCALP long-range cruise missiles, and other munitions. Ukraine is expected to receive one SAMP/T air-defence system and new air-defence radars from France this autumn.

Also, President Zelensky met former US presidential envoy Keith Kellogg in Kyiv on August 22. The president underscored the importance of securing additional Patriot interceptor missiles ahead of winter. “Ukraine is ready to buy them, and any efforts in this direction are important,” he said.

Euronews reported that, according to a European Commission official familiar with discussions over the EU’s €90 billion loan for Ukraine, Kyiv has proposed using part of the next defence funding package to procure anti-ballistic missile systems, alongside other priority capabilities.

Oleh Katkov, editor-in-chief of Defense Express, told Radio NV that we should not expect the situation with the Patriot anti-ballistic interceptors to improve dramatically in the near future — and that even the United States faces serious limitations in that regard.

According to Katkov, citing multiple reports, the U.S. inventory of PAC-3 MSE interceptors is only slightly above 800. With roughly 60 Patriot systems in U.S. service, this would be enough to fully load only about two launchers per system at most.

Russia is already producing more ballistic missiles than the United States produces PAC-3 MSE interceptors. Russia currently produces around 110 weapons per month that require Patriot-class interception, while Lockheed Martin manufactures only about 60 PAC-3 MSE missiles per month.

Alternative foreign suppliers are extremely limited. Katkov argued that Israel, for instance, should be excluded as an option, as it has blocked even the re-export of Israeli-made weapons to Ukraine.

Ukraine’s domestic systems will also take time. According to the latest estimates he cited, testing of an interceptor missile for the Ukrainian Freyja air-defence system may begin only in summer 2027. A considerable period would then still be required to complete trials, begin low-rate production, scale up serial manufacturing, and deliver meaningful quantities to the military.

Raytheon can reportedly produce around 220 GEM-T/PAC-2 missiles per year. These can be used against ballistic targets, but unlike PAC-3 MSE, they generally do not destroy the incoming missile through hit-to-kill interception. Instead, they may damage or deflect it, meaning the missile and its warhead can still fall and explode elsewhere.

Even if Ukraine receives a larger share of available Patriot missiles, the global supply remains far below the scale of the threat.

Without waiting for additional interceptors, Ukraine is also pursuing an alternative approach to reduce the threat posed by ballistic missile attacks. Earlier, citing a podcast with Ukrainian aviation expert Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi, I reported that Russia was seeking to increase the number of missile launchers available for its strikes and that one of Ukraine’s priorities would be to target those launchers.

Last week, Zelensky said Ukraine had launched a new operation aimed at Russian ballistic missile launchers near the border. Ukrainian forces had struck an Iskander ballistic missile launcher.

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Ukraine Advances Development and Production of Domestic KABs

Russian guided aerial bombs, or KABs, remain one of the most serious threats to Ukraine’s Armed Forces, which still lack a dedicated countermeasure against them. In 2026, Ukraine has increasingly focused on developing its own capabilities in this category.

Ukraine’s Leveler or Equalizer (“Vyrivniuvach”) guided aerial bomb has completed the required testing, been codified for use by the Armed Forces, and is now officially being procured for the military. DW reports on this and other innovations:

• Leveler, developed by Brave1 participant DG Industry, is a glide-and-correction module that converts a conventional 250 kg aerial bomb into a precision-guided weapon. Its stated range is 10 to 130 km, and it is designed to strike targets at operational depth.

• Leveler is made up of roughly 90% Ukrainian and Western components.

  Nearly all of its key elements have been developed in Ukraine, from the wing assembly to the flight-control software. The main exceptions are certain chips and microelectronic components.

• Unlike the French AASM guided bomb, Leveler does not have its own propulsion system.

• Integrating the bomb with Western aircraft such as the F-16 and Mirage 2000 would require certification from the aircraft manufacturers. Brave1 says, however, that the weapon is technically compatible with both platforms.

• According to Ukrainian authorities, it is only one of roughly ten Ukrainian guided-bomb projects currently under development. These systems are at different stages of testing, with some undergoing more advanced trials and others broader evaluation.

• Developers are also working on modules for bombs of different sizes, not only 250 kg weapons. Among the systems under development is a version with a 500 kg warhead, twice the weight of the model already being procured.

• All of the systems are Ukrainian-made. Ukrainian designs are significantly cheaper than foreign equivalents, making it easier to scale up production. The cost of Leveler is estimated to be about three times lower than that of the U.S.-made JDAM-ER kit.

• Guided aerial bombs remain among the most difficult targets for Ukrainian air defences, largely because of the way they are employed. Russian aircraft climb to the required altitude and speed before releasing the bombs from outside the engagement range of Ukrainian air-defence systems. The munition then accelerates and uses its own guidance systems to reach the target.

• Ukrainian forces can intercept guided aerial bombs, but far less frequently than drones. Electronic warfare systems that are effective against UAVs have only a limited impact on KABs.

• This is one reason Russia uses KABs in areas where artillery is less effective or unavailable, including sectors where Ukrainian forces hold an advantage or where Ukrainian EW is actively disrupting Russian drones.

• The intensity of Russian guided-bomb strikes has increased significantly. Russia used an average of around 180 KABs per day in 2025, while the current rate has risen to more than 300 per day.

Military Transfers to Ukraine and Defence Cooperation

• 🇩🇪 According to the draft budget, the German government plans to increase military aid to Ukraine to a record level in 2027. The budget line covering assistance to countries affected by aggression will total €11.612 billion, with around €9.05 billion allocated specifically to support Ukraine.

• 🇳🇴 Norway plans to maintain its support for Ukraine at NOK 85 billion ($9.15 billion) in 2027, with the majority of the funding expected to be allocated to military assistance.

• 🇮🇹 Italian defence giant Leonardo has set up a subsidiary in Ukraine. Leonardo Ukraine will focus on scientific and engineering R&D spanning communications and navigation systems, software, IT services, and electronic and optical technologies.

• 🇺🇸 The U.S. Army is seeking companies capable of supplying scarce and obsolete components for M2A2 ODS-SA Bradley infantry fighting vehicles intended for military assistance to Ukraine.

  Following repairs, the vehicles are expected to be fully operational and ready for transfer to Ukraine, and their subsequent maintenance must be supported without delays due to spare-parts shortages.

• 🇸🇪 🇫🇷 Contracts for the supply of foreign-made Gripen and Rafale fighter jets to the Ukrainian Air Force include provisions for the localization of production and maintenance in Ukraine.

• 🇫🇷 The Ukrainian Khyzhak anti-drone turret was tested in the Mediterranean aboard the French Navy frigate La Fayette. This marks the first known test of a Ukrainian military system by the French Navy.

Defence Production and Innovation in Ukraine

• Around 80% of the artillery shells ordered for Ukraine’s Defence Forces are now produced domestically. Most of them are long-range 155 mm rounds.

• Construction of a solid rocket fuel plant in Denmark, planned by the Ukrainian missile manufacturer Fire Point, has been delayed until the end of 2027, while projected costs have more than tripled. Danish authorities have removed more than 20 legal and regulatory barriers to allow Fire Point to establish a production site in the country for fuel used in its Flamingo cruise missiles. However, the company now needs to build a new facility after determining that the building it initially acquired was unsuitable for solid rocket fuel production.

• Ukraine’s Defence Ministry’s Center for Innovation and Development of Defense Technologies is expanding its team after the number of DELTA users tripled over the past year. The center is recruiting specialists from the civilian IT sector to work on digital products designed for frontline use.

How Ukraine’s Helicopter War Is Changing

Russia’s full-scale invasion has significantly changed the role of both attack and multirole helicopters in Ukraine, writes Arkadii Dotsenko for Oboronka.

Attack helicopters, originally designed to provide close support to ground forces and operate directly over the battlefield, are now forced to remain farther from the front because of dense air defences, electronic warfare, and the growing threat from drones.

Multirole helicopters still transport personnel and cargo and evacuate the wounded, but they have also taken on new missions, including the interception of long-range strike drones deep behind the front.

• As the airspace over the battlefield became increasingly dangerous, a new niche emerged for helicopters in the Ukrainian rear: hunting Shahed-type drones.

• The Shahed-136 travels at roughly 180 km/h, while helicopters such as the Mi-8 have enough speed to catch up with the target, match its course, and give an onboard gunner time to engage it.

• The full architecture of these interceptions is not publicly disclosed, but the general principle is clear: air-defence command receives information from radar stations, acoustic sensors, and observation posts and guides the helicopter crew toward the target area. Once there, the crew searches for the drone visually or with thermal imaging equipment, approaches it from the side or rear, and engages it over an area where falling debris poses a limited risk.

• Ukraine’s distributed network of acoustic sensors, sometimes referred to as Sky Fortress, is particularly important because it can provide early targeting information to both mobile fire teams and aviation. In this role, the helicopter becomes an airborne mobile fire group.

• In July 2026, it was disclosed that Soviet-made helicopters were being upgraded with modern communications, navigation, reconnaissance, and targeting systems. These upgrades are intended not only to make it easier to find drones, but also to integrate helicopter crews into Ukraine’s broader air-defence network, allowing them to receive targeting data in time, maintain situational awareness, and coordinate with ground-based air-defence systems.

• Ukrainian Mi-8 helicopters have also been equipped with thermal sights and high-rate-of-fire machine guns, including six-barrel M134 Miniguns. In March 2026, the Ukrainian Navy published footage showing one crew destroying 12 Shahed drones within three hours.

According to Brigadier General Pavlo Bardakov, Commander of the Ukrainian Army Aviation, this capability was not developed overnight. “We have been working on this for more than a year. A lot of research was done to understand how to search for and destroy Shaheds in the most effective way, because nobody in the world had really done this before,” he said.

The task is especially difficult at night because finding a black target is extremely challenging, particularly when there is no moonlight and complete cloud cover.

At the same time, he stressed that Russia continues to adapt: “The situation has changed now. The antenna environment is different, and the tactics of UAV employment are different as well.”

Russia has already begun experimenting with ways to protect its drones from helicopter interception. In December 2025, Ukraine documented for the first time a Shahed-136 carrying a Soviet R-60 air-to-air missile, a weapon originally designed to engage aircraft and helicopters.

The threat also works in the opposite direction. Attack helicopters have themselves become targets for small FPV drones.

In August 2024, operators from the Security Service of Ukraine’s Special Operations Center “A” struck a Russian Mi-28 helicopter in flight over Russia’s Kursk region with an FPV drone. The drone hit the area around the tail rotor, damage to which can cause a helicopter to lose control.

These developments may eventually require helicopters to carry their own dedicated counter-drone protection, including optical, thermal, acoustic, or compact radar sensors, electronic warfare systems, and potentially kinetic counter-UAS systems.

Ukraine’s current helicopter force has been shaped not only by the war with Russia but also by decades of operational experience abroad.

Bardakov recalled that Ukrainian Army Aviation went through a difficult period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, when there were chronic shortages of fuel, personnel, and spare parts.

The recovery began around 2002–2003, when Ukrainian helicopter crews started participating extensively in United Nations missions in countries including Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Côte d’Ivoire.

Those deployments became an important training ground for a generation of Ukrainian pilots. According to him, Africa played a very significant role in developing highly experienced pilots and in forming many of Ukraine’s helicopter aces. “A young pilot could return after a mission with around 300 flight hours and a level of training that allowed him to conduct independent flights. For us, that was an enormous contribution in terms of ready crews.”

Operating in Africa also pushed crews to understand the limits of their aircraft: “High temperatures, mountains, difficult weather conditions — you had to really feel the helicopter and calculate every takeoff and landing very carefully. Africa does not forgive mistakes.”

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine withdrew its aviation personnel and assets from overseas missions.

Despite extensive modernization, Ukraine’s current helicopter fleet faces a structural problem: much of it is Soviet-designed, and many of the necessary spare parts were historically produced in Russia.

Bardakov said Ukraine has already modified some of its helicopters to use Western weapons, navigation systems, and other equipment, but modernization can only extend the life of the existing fleet for so long.

“Aviation is always expensive. Helicopters are expensive, pilot training is expensive, maintenance is expensive, and aviation weapons are expensive.”

The problem is particularly acute because Soviet-era helicopters cannot remain in service indefinitely: “Most of the spare parts for the helicopters we currently operate were produced in Russia. Sooner or later, the service life of these helicopters will come to an end, and there will be nothing to replace them with.”

For that reason, Ukraine expects that in the medium term it will have to transition to Western helicopters — not necessarily newly manufactured aircraft, but potentially modernized platforms obtained from partner countries.

For Army Aviation, Bardakov said the UH-60 Black Hawk is currently seen as one of the strongest candidates for a future core platform.

“The main helicopter we see is the UH-60 Black Hawk — a universal aircraft for both combat and transport missions. It has proven itself in many operations and, in our view, offers an optimal balance of capability, price, and effectiveness.”

Defence Express has also reported that Ukrainian Army Aviation wants the UH-60 to become the foundation of its future helicopter fleet, although separate discussions are ongoing with Bell regarding possible localization of the UH-1Y Venom and AH-1Z Viper in Ukraine.

Bardakov cautioned, however, that not every Western helicopter is suitable for the realities of the current war. Ukraine requires aircraft that can remain stored outdoors, be maintained to a significant degree by their own crews, and work with appropriate avionics and weapons without requiring an excessively fragile support structure.

“Very delicate and very expensive machines do not necessarily correspond to the conditions of modern war. We have to approach this from a practical point of view.”

According to Bardakov, teaching experienced Ukrainian pilots to physically fly a Western helicopter is not the hardest part. “If you put an experienced pilot into the cockpit of almost any Western helicopter, after a few hours he can understand the basics, because the principles of flight control are largely the same.”

The bigger challenge is the entire technical ecosystem around the aircraft.

Maintenance manuals, technical documentation, instructor training, and operating procedures are generally in English. That means the transition to Western platforms will require not only aircraft and spare parts, but also a long-term training and support infrastructure.

Bardakov described Russian helicopter crews as performing many of the same missions as Ukrainian Army Aviation, but with an advantage in the age and technical sophistication of their aircraft. “Their equipment is newer and more modern. From a purely technical perspective, they are significantly ahead.”

Yet the technological competition continues to evolve rapidly.

Defence Express recently published footage of a Russian Ka-52 helicopter attempting to intercept a Ukrainian FP-1 long-range strike drone. The helicopter reportedly launched an air-to-air missile at the UAV, but the missile missed its target.

Drones have not made helicopters obsolete. Helicopters remain essential for transporting troops and cargo, evacuating wounded personnel, inserting small groups, and operating from areas without prepared airfields. But the war in Ukraine is forcing Army Aviation to change its tactics, equipment, and even its understanding of what a helicopter is supposed to do.

Updates in Russia

• Some Russian forces in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts are disbanding tank units to prioritize drone and assault operations amid broader military reorganizations to optimize for positional warfare.

• According to Ukraine’s Military Intelligence (HUR), Russia has built a secret military biolaboratory complex in the Tver region, where experiments involving dangerous pathogens are being conducted under the cover of veterinary research.

• Russia may free up to 20,000 combat-ready troops stationed in border regions to reinforce the most intense frontline sectors in Ukraine by replacing them with North Korean personnel.

• The Kremlin is recruiting local gang members in NATO countries to sabotage defence manufacturers to test NATO’s resolve. The attacks appear carefully calculated to fall just short of triggering Article 5, Nato’s mutual defence clause, intelligence officials believe.

  Recently, a building belonging to Milrem Robotics, a Tallinn-based firm that supplies weapons to Ukraine, was set ablaze.

Developments on the Battlefield and Beyond

• On the night of August 20, Russia launched a large-scale attack on Ukraine using several types of missiles and 168 drones.

  At dawn, one of Ukraine’s mobile border-guard fire teams detected an incoming Russian cruise missile in its sector and shot it down with a machine gun, which is an extremely difficult task.

• Ukraine’s Parliament approved President Zelensky’s nomination of Yevhenii Khmara as Ukraine’s new Defence Minister. Khmara replaces Mykhailo Fedorov, who headed the ministry for six months, from January 14 to July 16, 2026.

  Khmara is an SBU major general and career special operations officer. He served for more than 15 years in the Security Service of Ukraine’s Special Operations Center “A” (“Alpha”).

• French OSINT analyst Clement Molin reported that while it's hard to get precise statistics, it's established that around 10 to 20% of Russian drones are not shot down during strikes on Ukraine. When Kyiv strikes Russia, we're talking about a maximum of 2 to 5% hitting their target. “Nevertheless, many less defended targets are within range of the drones, particularly in the border regions,” he added.

• The August 21 Russian double-tap strike against a shopping center in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, caused a 9,000 square-meter fire, killed 16 people, and injured 130, including 26 children. Putin claimed Russian strikes impact combat operations in a “positive way” and stated that Kyiv “opened a Pandora’s box” by attacking Russian economic sites.

• On August 22, Russia fired a ballistic missile towards Kyiv in the middle of the day, while the German foreign minister was visiting Ukraine’s capital.

• On the evening of August 17, a Russian Banderol missile crossed the border near Transnistria and continued toward central Moldova.

  Ukraine’s HUR previously told Militarnyi that Russia is capable of producing around 80 Banderol missiles per month. About a month ago, a new ground-based launcher developed specifically for the missile was also revealed. Previously known launch platforms for the S8000 Banderol included the Orion UAV and the Mi-28 attack helicopter.

• In Odesa Oblast, a Russian jet-powered drone struck a passenger train locomotive traveling from Zhytomyr to Odesa. All passengers and railway personnel were evacuated in time. The train was carrying 593 passengers, including 15 children.

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Ukraine’s air-defence situation is not improving. Meanwhile, Russia’s ballistic-strike capabilities are expanding amid renewed North Korean involvement and additional missile deliveries. North Korean ballistic missiles have reportedly already been used against Ukrainian cities, causing civilian casualties.

The lack of additional air-defence support for Ukraine ultimately benefits Russia, which is preparing to employ hundreds of cruise and ballistic missiles in future strikes.

In this edition:

• North Korean Ballistic Missiles Strengthen Russia’s Salvos Against Ukraine;

• Russia’s Key Task: Increase the Number of Missile Launchers;

• Ukraine Used 15 Domestic Weapons Types in Its Strike on Novorossiysk Base;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

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North Korean Ballistic Missiles Strengthen Russia’s Salvos Against Ukraine

President Zelensky reported on August 11 that Russian forces launched a North Korean-supplied KN-23 ballistic missile at Zaporizhzhia. During the combined missile and drone strike on the night of August 10–11, Russia also used Iskander-M ballistic missiles and Zirkon missiles, heavily targeting civilian and industrial infrastructure in Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia.

Earlier reports of Russia’s use of North Korean ballistic missiles emerged after the July 30 strike on Kryvyi Rih, when a missile that Ukrainian authorities identified as North Korean reportedly deviated from its intended target by around 15 km, struck a residential building, and killed a family of six.

The Institute for the Study of War assessed that Russia is likely using small numbers of North Korean-supplied KN-23 missiles in its nightly strike packages to battle-test the systems and improve their accuracy. ISW continues to assess that the addition of more North Korean missiles to Russia’s arsenal will allow Russia to intensify its ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine in the near future without having to dip into its S-400 and Zirkon missile stocks.

Ukrainian sources previously reported that Pyongyang had supplied Moscow with a new batch of 40 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles. Russia is expected to receive up to 120 such missiles and six launchers in total.

According to Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces commander Robert “Madyar” Brovdi, Russia can currently launch a simultaneous salvo of up to 77 ballistic and cruise missiles against Ukraine and plans to increase that number to 200.

Ukrainian intelligence estimates that North Korea has supplied Russia with around 150 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles since late 2023.

Russia began using North Korean KN-23 missiles against Ukraine in late 2023, and they have since been repeatedly employed in strikes on Ukrainian cities and other populated areas.

The KN-23 and KN-24 have longer ranges and larger warheads than Russia’s Iskander missiles, although they are generally less accurate. This combination of range and destructive power makes North Korean ballistic missiles a significant threat to Ukraine.

ISW referred to a South Korean outlet, EToday, which obtained documents from Russia’s Voronezh regional government indicating that construction of a Rosgvardia training facility is expected to be completed by the end of 2026. The outlet suggested the site could potentially host North Korean personnel, pointing to recent Ukrainian reports that Russia may station a North Korean missile unit in Voronezh Oblast.

Zelensky again called on South Korea to provide air-defence missiles in exchange for Ukraine’s combat experience and expanded drone cooperation.

South Korea operates U.S.-made Patriot systems and their interceptors, although any transfer would require U.S. approval. Seoul also has domestically developed ballistic-missile defence systems, such as Cheongung-II, which Ukraine would welcome. Such a transfer, however, would be more complex because it would likely require launchers and supporting infrastructure, not just interceptor missiles.

Following Zelensky’s request, South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed its existing stance of not providing lethal weapons to Ukraine, stating, "The provision of defense materials to various countries has been carried out while complying with relevant domestic laws and policies." South Korea's legislation prohibits supplies of lethal weapons to countries in a state of war.

In 2024, Putin warned South Korea, saying that it would be making "a big mistake" if it arms Ukraine.

Following South Korea’s recent rejection of Ukraine’s request for air-defence capabilities, the Russian pro-government outlet Rybar claimed that Kyiv had failed to provide Seoul with sufficient evidence of North Korean military support for Russia.

Russia therefore benefits from South Korea withholding weapons from Ukraine, but also portrays Seoul’s decision as a rejection of Ukrainian intelligence on North Korean involvement.

“If Seoul becomes a direct military supplier to Ukraine, Russia could respond by deepening its military cooperation with Pyongyang or providing North Korea with capabilities that would make the security environment on the peninsula even more dangerous,” writes The Korea Times in a recent column. Russia’s cooperation with North Korea has already contributed to improvements in the accuracy of North Korean ballistic missiles, exposed North Korean troops to drone warfare tactics, and encouraged Pyongyang to start mass production of one-way attack drones. RUSI reports that Russia’s partnership with North Korea could advance Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programme through technical aid and proliferation financing.

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said this week that Russia no longer supports calls for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and fully backs North Korean leader’s efforts to strengthen the country’s sovereignty and defence capabilities. Against this backdrop, on August 16, President Trump ordered the Pentagon to substantially scale back planned joint military exercises with South Korea. He cited his “very good relationship” with Kim Jong Un, and also expressed frustration that South Korea had declined to support U.S. efforts to denuclearize Iran. The U.S. is currently the main security partner of South Korea.

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Recently, much of my research has focused on the Ukraine-South Korea angle. Check the relevant reports on my Substack:

• Ukraine and South Korea: Underexplored Opportunities for Defence Cooperation;

• Newtype Industries: The First Korean Defence Startup Testing in Ukraine.

Also, my comments are available in this article for KoreaPro: South Korea’s drone overhaul aims to prepare its military for a new era of war.

And here is the most recent Korean-language article published by EToday with my comments.

Russia’s Key Task: Increase the Number of Missile Launchers

Russia adjusted its air-attack tactics again in July, while continuing to modernize its missiles and experiment with new weapons designed to exploit Ukraine’s air-defence constraints.

In a recent episode of the Ukrainian podcast Kliati Pytannia, aviation expert Anatolii Khrapchynskyi discussed how Russia’s missile campaign is evolving.

A few points I found particularly important:

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Defence alliances are an indispensable part of the Russia–Ukraine war. For years, we have seen Russia’s relations with some of its long-standing partners weaken for several reasons: Moscow’s increasingly unreliable behaviour as an ally, the absence of a decisive position of strength on the battlefield, and even its difficulties in protecting its own territory and critical infrastructure.

Ukraine’s ability to defend itself through domestic innovation, rapid adaptation, and a growing defence-industrial base may increasingly appear more attractive to countries looking for new security and defence partnerships.

Türkiye appears to be gradually moving closer to Ukraine on certain defence issues, Serbia has signalled interest in deeper engagement with Kyiv, and Kazakhstan’s leadership has become more outspoken in distancing itself from aspects of Russia’s war.

In this edition:

• Türkiye Sells Critical Defence Equipment to Ukraine;

• War-Related GPS Jamming Could Pose Problems for Civil Aviation in Europe;

• Ukraine’s Interceptors Against Jet-Powered Shaheds: Key Challenges;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

As I’ve repeatedly mentioned, none of the content in my newsletter is sponsored, and I produce it as an independent researcher. That is why your paid subscription would significantly support my work!

For drone-related developments, check Drone warfare in Ukraine: battlefield testing and emerging UAV trends and Ukraine Drone Brief.

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Türkiye Sells Critical Defence Equipment to Ukraine

According to the U.S. State Department, Ukraine acquired from Türkiye 70 M39 ATACMS ballistic missiles, 12 M270 multiple-launch rocket systems capable of firing GMLRS and ATACMS, and tens of thousands of cluster munitions.

The U.S. State Department has notified Congress that it is prepared to approve the transfer, saying it is consistent with U.S. security assistance objectives.

According to the documents, Türkiye wants to reduce its stocks of older weapons so it can focus on modernization and sustainment of existing systems. Ukraine, meanwhile, seeks to acquire the equipment to strengthen its offensive and defensive fire-support capabilities against Russia. The transfer is expected to begin once the congressional review period is completed.

The founder of Ukraine’s Kruk drone training center, Viktor Taran, wrote that the transfer is politically significant: Türkiye is re-exporting a U.S.-origin strike system to Ukraine with Washington’s approval, potentially creating a precedent for other countries holding American-made weapons.

According to Viktor, the 12 M270 launchers are particularly significant because each carries two rocket pods, compared with one on HIMARS, effectively doubling the salvo per vehicle and increasing the number of Ukrainian launch platforms Russia must locate and target.

The package also includes around 2,500 unguided M26 rockets with cluster warheads, providing Ukraine with a cheaper option for striking troop concentrations, assembly areas and other dispersed battlefield targets without expending scarce precision-guided munitions.

The older M39 ATACMS lacks GPS guidance and is less precise than later variants, but its cluster warhead contains hundreds of submunitions, making it useful against dispersed targets such as airfields, air-defence positions and ammunition depots. Ukraine previously used this type of ATACMS against Russian helicopter bases in Berdyansk and Luhansk in October 2023.

According to Russian Telegram channels, some ATACMS missiles may already have been delivered to Ukraine. Such transfers could be carried out discreetly via commercial shipping routes from Türkiye to Ukraine or through the Romanian port of Constanța.

Russians also argue that the reported transfer comes as Ukraine is preparing for more intensive operations in the autumn, while accumulating long-range strike capabilities, including drones and Flamingo missiles.

Türkiye, while supplying military assistance to Ukraine in a more low-key manner, has always been an important contributor to Ukraine’s defence capabilities. In particular, the use of Bayraktar TB2 drones by Ukraine’s Defence Forces proved highly effective at the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Although their significance later declined due to Russia’s advanced electronic warfare capabilities, in summer 2025, after a long pause, Bayraktar TB2 drones reappeared in the sky as Ukrainian forces struck a Russian boat and troops on the Black Sea coast.

In June 2026, the Ukrainian Navy released rare footage showing the destruction of an entire group of Russian unmanned surface vessels heading toward the Ukrainian coast. Defence Express noted that the footage shows the distinctive interface of a Bayraktar TB2 strike drone, suggesting that the system was used in the operation.

The strikes were likely carried out using MAM-L or MAM-C guided munitions, or laser-guided missiles with semi-active seekers, which have previously been seen in service with Ukrainian Bayraktar TB2s.

Following extensive Ukrainian strikes against Russian radar stations and surface-to-air missile systems, including in occupied Crimea, the operating environment over parts of the Black Sea appears to have become more permissive. This has allowed Ukraine to employ Bayraktar TB2s again against Russian boats and USVs.

In addition to Bayraktar drones, Türkiye has also provided laser-guided missiles, protective gear, Kirpi armoured vehicles, Cobta II armoured vehicles, Escort BTS410 semi-automatic shotguns, Canik M2 heavy machine guns to Ukraine.

Recent policy signals from Türkiye — including its decision to join the Drone Capability Coalition for Ukraine and its willingness to abandon the Russian S-400 air defence system to potentially return to the F-35 fifth-generation fighter program — demonstrate a shift toward deeper cooperation with NATO allies. According to The WSJ, as of July 2026, Turkey was in talks to transfer S-400 to the UAE in hopes of lifting the US ban on its purchase of advanced F-35 warplanes.

Last week, Türkiye proposed that both Russia and Ukraine declare a moratorium on strikes against vessels in the Black Sea and is awaiting responses from both sides. Attacks have affected Turkish vessels, as well as ships with Turkish owners or Turkish crews.

Read my earlier report: Bayraktar TB2 Drones and Ukraine-Türkiye Strategic Defence Partnership.

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War-Related GPS Jamming Could Pose Problems for Civil Aviation in Europe

According to WIRED, the May accident involving a twin-engine Beechcraft King Air medevac plane, which crashed after taking off from Roswell, New Mexico, occurred while U.S. military personnel were conducting a GPS-jamming exercise. It marked the first time GPS jamming had contributed to the crash of a civilian aircraft in the United States.

GPS disruptions caused by electronic warfare might affect civilian aviation in Europe, particularly over the Baltic Sea. This creates navigation risks, as pilots may lose the signal or receive false positioning data.

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With Ukraine facing a shortage of interceptors, Russia fired a record 126 ballistic missiles in July. Moscow appears to be drawing more heavily on its reserves to exploit the current gap in Ukraine’s air defence and carry out high-impact strikes with limited opposition.

In total, Russia fired 376 missiles at Ukraine during the month—more than twice the number launched in June.

Some of these missiles are reaching Polish airspace. Poland, along with other NATO members, already needs to consider how to counter this threat and support Ukraine’s air defence capabilities.

In this edition:

• Licence for Patriot Interceptor Missile Production: Trump Changes His Mind;

• Ukraine’s Long-Range Strike Tactics Become More Precise;

• How Russia Is Disrupting Starlink;

• Ukraine’s Lessons for NATO and the German Armed Forces;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

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For the first time in two years, I postponed the release of my newsletter by a day.

Last week, I was in Colombia, where I delivered a presentation to the Colombian Navy on drone warfare in Ukraine. It was a major milestone in both my personal and professional life. I have been fascinated by Colombia for the past 20 years, so it was incredible to finally visit the country and contribute, in some way, to its security and defence.

I will prepare a separate publication on the opportunities for defence and security cooperation between Ukraine and Colombia. This is a highly promising area, particularly in light of the political changes in the country.

Licence for Patriot Interceptor Missile Production: Trump Changes His Mind

President Zelensky reported that on the night of 31 July-1 August, Ukraine’s Air Force managed to intercept only one out of 27 Russian ballistic missiles due to a shortage of Patriot interceptors and called on partners to provide additional air defence capabilities.

Just a couple of weeks ago, we discussed how, during the NATO Summit in Ankara, US President Donald Trump said that the United States planned to grant Ukraine a licence to produce Patriot air defence interceptors.

Last week, however, he walked back his earlier promise. According to The New York Times, when asked about the agreement, Trump said, “We have not agreed to that,” suggesting that he had changed his mind because “it is a hard thing to give away that kind of technology” and because of the risk that “the people you give the technology to could someday turn on you.”

US Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker said that negotiations on the joint production of interceptors for Patriot systems with Ukraine and European partners are ongoing. However, an agreement is unlikely to be reached before this winter.

In earlier discussions, both government-affiliated officials and independent experts in Ukraine were cautiously optimistic about the US decision to grant Ukraine a licence to produce Patriot interceptors. They warned that establishing production lines in Ukraine would be a lengthy process, meaning that actual interceptor production would likely begin only in a few years.

The shift in the US president’s rhetoric has no immediate impact on Ukraine’s current air defence capabilities. Nevertheless, it contributes to a broader sense of weakened security across Europe, which would also require additional air defence capacity in the event of Russian attacks.

On July 30, a Russian missile crossed into Poland as part of Russia’s massive strike against Ukraine. Polish authorities confirmed that the object that crashed in eastern Poland was a Russian Kh-101 cruise missile carrying a significant explosive payload. A Ukrainian pilot had tracked the missile but was unable to intercept it; he turned back 20 seconds before reaching the border because he could not have flown into Polish airspace. The missile was manufactured in the second quarter of 2026 at a facility in the Moscow region.

Ukrainian analyst Serhiy Naumovych wrote that there is no reason to believe that Russia’s ballistic missile campaign will ease in the coming months. Everyone is preparing for a major war, and every country needs its own missile stockpile. Ideally, those stockpiles should be increased. Following Trump’s military operation, the United States itself reportedly has very few of these missiles left—fewer than 1,000, according to some estimates. Its stocks must be replenished ‘to protect American citizens, not Ukrainians.’

Ideally, the stockpile should be 10,000–20,000. At current production rates, manufacturing that number would take 10–20 years.

He added that the only relatively quick way to try to stop Russia’s ballistic missile campaign in the coming months is to intensify ballistic missile strikes against targets in Moscow, so that every 10–15 days the city experiences scenes similar to those in Kyiv. “Only then might Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence receive, through the communication channels used for prisoner exchanges, a request to ‘discuss a moratorium on strikes against rear areas,” Naumovych added.

Ukraine has been working on several other options for countering Russian missiles, including its own air defence system, Freija, and the LIMA electronic warfare system, which is reportedly capable of interfering even with ballistic threats.

Another option is to target Russian defence enterprises that manufacture missiles and their components—not only with drones, which carry relatively limited explosive payloads, but with missiles powerful enough to ensure that Russia cannot quickly restore the damaged production capacity.

Again, this is not a task for Ukraine alone, but for a united coalition of partners capable of supporting it. Eventually, Ukraine will not be able to intercept every Russian missile heading towards NATO territory—a development that would naturally follow previous incursions by Russian drones into Poland.

According to The Atlantic, Zelensky asked Trump to persuade Musk to allow Ukraine to use Starlink for guiding long-range drones toward ballistic missile launchers in Russia.

SpaceX currently restricts the use of Starlink on Russian territory. Zelensky reportedly wanted to discuss the issue directly with Musk during his visit to the United States, but the meeting did not take place.

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Ukraine’s Long-Range Strike Tactics Become More Precise

Eighteen Russian refineries were targeted in July, including the Omsk refinery, the country’s largest and located more than 2,500 kilometers (1,550 miles) from the Ukrainian border. Bloomberg counted 30 attacks on oil infrastructure during the month, the second-highest total after 32 in May.

Of the 26 Russian refineries hit by Ukrainian drones and forced to halt production, only eight had returned to full operation as of July 27.

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Although Ukraine continues to deplete Russia’s resources, intelligence agencies across several countries warn that Russia could launch an offensive against a NATO member within a few years—or possibly even within months.

European partners have been studying Ukraine’s experience for several years, yet they still appear to lack comprehensive systems to protect themselves against these threats.

In this edition:

• Five Steps to Protect a Country From Russia;

• Space Domain of the Russia-Ukraine War: Communication Satellites;

• FPV Drone Production: The One-Piece Flow Model at Vyriy Industries;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

Many of the drone-related developments I publish in my weekly Ukraine Drone Brief.

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Five Steps to Protect a Country From Russia

Last week, media reports indicated that British intelligence assessed NATO could face a direct challenge from Russia “within months,” aimed at testing the Alliance’s resolve. Also, Russia may seek to exploit any perceived weakening of the United Kingdom’s resolve following a change of prime minister.

Recently, US intelligence warned Poland that Moscow is planning an armed "provocation" in Poland. Poland's prime minister said the country was preparing for "various" scenarios.

Robert “Madyar” Brovdi, commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, in an interview with journalist Caolan Robertson, outlined five steps that could help NATO states effectively stop a potential Russian offensive.

1. Create a buffer zone along the Russian border.
   Brovdi called for the immediate establishment of a buffer zone 2–5 kilometres wide. According to him, this is an effective distance for the dense deployment of drones capable of preventing enemy movement.

   This zone could make enemy movement nearly impossible if protected by a comprehensive drone shield capable of detecting and stopping advancing forces.

   This would also require clearing vegetation and reshaping parts of the terrain. Such measures should be implemented immediately along the entire border.

2. Deploy an extensive fibre-optic communications network.
   The zone should be equipped with a dense fibre-optic communications network linking drone launch sites to pilots operating from command posts far behind the front line, allowing them to respond immediately.

   A single remote operator at a command post should be able to control five, ten, or even fifteen drones positioned along the front line.

   Earlier, I wrote about how Russia has been deploying fiber-optic “waiting” drones that are capable of remaining in ambush for extended periods and are not affected by electronic warfare systems.

3. Build specialized mobile counter-drone air-defence.

   A mobile air-defence network should be established immediately, with dedicated elements focused exclusively on countering drones—including reconnaissance UAVs and loitering munitions such as Shaheds. Reconnaissance UAVs are considered priority targets on the front line because they collect critical intelligence for subsequent attacks.

   Regarding Shaheds, Russia could eventually launch thousands of those per day. Intercepting them with Patriot missiles would be financially unsustainable.

4. Establish an Unmanned Systems Forces brigade

   Every country should urgently establish an unmanned systems brigade with at least 300 crews capable of performing a wide range of missions—from border patrol and deep reconnaissance to FPV strikes, night-bomber operations, mining, logistics, and other tasks.

5. Expand long-range strike capabilities.
   The first 30, 40, or 50 deep-strike crews should also be established rapidly.

According to Brovdi, any NATO member could complete these five steps by the end of the year.

My contact in Ukraine’s Defence Forces commented that for the Eastern European partners, the most important thing is understanding the danger—and understanding whom they are dealing with.

“Everything within 15 kilometres of the border is doomed. Logistics within a 30-kilometre zone face roughly a fifty-fifty chance of survival. They must be prepared to lose people and territory, to look the beast in the eye and not run. Only then does it make sense to discuss technology. As for how to resist, they should come to Ukraine and learn.

Ideally, our headquarters should be filled with military partners, including officers from the Baltic states, observing the war without filters and adapting its lessons to their own realities. Perhaps they will even develop solutions better than ours,” he added.

French OSINT analyst Clément Molin and the authors of the Polish outlet Służby i Obywatel analyzed satellite imagery and sections of the fortifications visible on Google Maps and concluded that Poland and the Baltic states have not established a continuous system of fortifications along their borders with Russia and Belarus. The defensive line remains fragmented and lacks sufficient depth to withstand a potential Russian offensive.

German Armed Forces personnel have joined the implementation of Poland’s East Shield programme. The programme involves constructing a network of engineering obstacles and fortifications along Poland’s borders with Russia and Belarus.

Earlier, I published several reports assessing different types of threats and highlighting the need for stronger protection, including:

• The Next Drone Threat Comes from the Sea: Is NATO Ready?

• Drone warfare in Ukraine: defending against aerial and naval threats.

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Space Domain of the Russia-Ukraine War: Communication Satellites

Communications satellites enable long-distance communication to share information and coordinate action. Militaries can also use communications satellites to pilot drones remotely. Both Ukraine and Russia are seeking to develop domestic satellite constellations for communications purposes, reducing their dependence on foreign commercial providers.

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Let’s take a look at what is happening in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. The number of Russian vessels that have been hit by Ukrainian forces is approaching 200. While destroying the vessels is not the primary objective, disrupting Russia’s export logistics is—and the economic costs of these attacks, along with the resulting logistical losses, are immense.

In this edition:

• Ukraine’s Black Sea and Sea of Azov Campaign. Operation MoLoChKa;

• Russia Launched Over 40 Missiles at Kyiv;

• Fedorov’s Dismissal: Key Points;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

Also, check out my latest Ukraine Drone Brief, available for unpaid and paid readers!

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

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Ukraine’s Black Sea and Sea of Azov Campaign. Operation MoLoChKa

The commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert “Madyar” Brovdi, regularly posts updates on the force’s operations, “MoLoChKa” and “Crimean Switch Off,” which target vessels in the Black and Azov seas, as well as energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea.

Between July 1 and 19, the two operations targeted 176 vessels linked to Russia’s shadow fleet and 96 energy facilities. The strikes have been carried out using aerial and naval drones.

Brovdi said that Operation “MoLoChKa” would continue indefinitely. He also explained the name of the operation: the acronym (MLChK) stands for “Moscow Will Fall Through Crimea.”

Most of the vessels struck by Ukraine’s forces did not sink but sustained varying degrees of damage. “The goal is to paralyse Russia’s feeder fleet, an important component of its shadow fleet,” Brovdi said. The feeder fleet involves small and medium-sized, 140-metre flat-bottomed tankers with a deadweight capacity of 7,000 tonnes.

The operation is part of a broader effort by Ukraine’s Defence Forces to systematically disrupt Russian logistics, restrict the supply of fuel and ammunition, and strike at Russia’s oil exports through the Sea of Azov.

On the southern axis, Russian logistics depend primarily on two main routes. The first runs through the Kerch Strait and includes the Crimean Bridge, ferry crossings, and maritime links between Russian ports and occupied Crimea. According to Brovdi, the Kerch ferry crossing has already lost 75% of its capacity.

The second is the land corridor along the Sea of Azov, passing through Taganrog, Mariupol, Berdiansk, and Melitopol. This route also remains under constant Ukrainian fire control. That is why the Kremlin decided to make greater use of the Sea of Azov as an alternative logistics route.

The Sea of Azov is also used for so-called offshore oil transshipment. Under this arrangement, small tankers transported oil from Russian ports to anchorage areas near the Kerch Strait, where it was transferred to larger ocean-going vessels bound for India, China, and other countries.

The consequences of this operation extend far beyond military logistics, as the Sea of Azov is also a key export route for Russian grain. CNN reported that about a quarter of Russia’s wheat exports is shipped through the Sea of Azov.

On July 13, Russia temporarily suspended applications for passage through the Kerch Strait and the Azov–Don Canal. Russia is reportedly preparing to reroute its grain exports that previously passed through the Sea of Azov.

Russian military bloggers acknowledged that the Ukrainian attacks have become continuous and now affect commercial navigation. They noted that none of the ships had sunk and that no major oil spills had been observed; however, sinking vessels may not be Ukraine’s primary objective. The strikes appear designed to hit bridges and other critical sections of the ships, intimidate crews, discourage further voyages, and ultimately paralyse maritime traffic. In their assessment, the campaign is achieving this effect with considerable success.

Also, a vessel need not sink to be removed from service. If the bridge and its internal equipment burn out, repairs may be too expensive, take a long time, or become nearly impossible under sanctions.

The insurers are increasingly unwilling to cover vessels operating in such high-risk conditions. The cost of marine insurance in the Black Sea increased 204-fold in the second quarter of 2026, while the loss ratio for reinsurance covering drone-attack risks reached 2,800%.

The bloggers also highlighted Russia’s reactive approach to protecting civilian and industrial infrastructure. According to them, vessel owners received no instructions on how to respond. This mirrors the situation with strikes on oil refineries, whose owners failed to coordinate their own defences, assumed that Ukrainian attacks would not reach their facilities, and did not put adequate protective measures in place. The military, meanwhile, remained focused on the front line, leaving the protection of refineries and commercial shipping to private operators.

Possible protective measures for vessels include installing chain-link barriers at least 15 metres away from vulnerable parts of vessels. The bloggers claimed that specialists capable of organising such defences are available, but usually demand full payment in advance—and many Russian companies remain unwilling to pay for these services.

According to the ATESH resistance movement, Russia is deploying personnel from its elite Rubikon Drone Centre to protect vessels linked to its shadow fleet in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Up to three service members could be assigned to each tanker. They are expected to use twin-mounted machine guns, man-portable air-defence systems, and interceptor drones to repel Ukrainian attacks.

Read my earlier reports:

• Ukraine Wants to Isolate Crimea from Russia;

• Russia’s Rubikon: What Drives Its Success in Drone Warfare;

• Ukraine’s Asymmetric Counteroffensive.

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Russia Launched Over 40 Missiles at Kyiv

On the night of July 19, Russian forces launched approximately 40 ballistic and anti-ship missiles at Kyiv within about 40 minutes. This was the largest number of ballistic missiles launched against the Ukrainian capital in a single attack since the beginning of the full-scale war.

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The most discussed development of the past week was the possible U.S. licence for the production of interceptor missiles in Ukraine. However, it remains to be seen whether a final decision has been made and which missile or production stage it would cover.

Ukraine is facing an acute shortage of interceptors and has struggled to shoot down dozens of Russian ballistic missiles used in recent attacks.

In this edition:

• Ukraine’s—and the Global—Shortage of PAC-3 Interceptor Missiles;

• Licensed Production of Interceptors: When Will Ukraine Have Them?

• How Ukrainian EW System LIMA Disrupts Russian Missiles and Drones;

• and 10+ developments in Ukraine and Russia.

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Last Friday, I launched a fundraiser for the fifth Mavic 3T drone for my university friend’s battalion. By a meaningful coincidence, he was recently awarded the Order of Danylo Halytskyi for his service to Ukraine.

So far, we have raised almost half of the target amount. Please consider contributing if you can - PayPal link.

Ukraine’s—and the Global—Shortage of PAC-3 Interceptor Missiles

In six weeks of summer, Russia fired as many ballistic missiles at Ukraine as it did during the entire three months of spring, with most strikes concentrated on the Kyiv region.

In the first twelve days of July, Russia launched 67 ballistic and anti-ship missiles on Kyiv and other regions of Ukraine. According to BBC Ukraine, the interception rate was 6%. During the July 6 attack, Ukraine was unable to intercept any of the ballistic Iskander or anti-ship Zircon missiles (in total, 29 of them hit the targets).

On the night of July 11, Russia struck Kyiv with ballistic missiles fitted with shrapnel warheads, which was especially dangerous to civilians.

Ukraine’s ballistic interception rates have been declining over the recent months.

In March, Ukraine’s air defences intercepted 37% of ballistic missiles (16 of 43). That figure fell to 14% in April (7 of 50) and just 11% in May (12 of 104).

Russia began significantly escalating its ballistic missile campaign in early June. Over the course of the month, it launched 114 ballistic missiles, of which 45 were intercepted, according to Ukrainian authorities.

Russia's attack pattern has become relatively consistent: either two large-scale missile strikes per month, each involving more than 30 ballistic missiles, or three to four smaller attacks per month, each using roughly half that number

Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence says Russia produces around 60–65 9M723 missiles for the Iskander-M system each month, and roughly 100 ballistic and hypersonic missiles in total. President Zelensky told the Ukraine-NATO Council that Russia produces 120 such missiles a month.

According to Ukrainian aviation expert Valerii Romanenko, Russia typically employs three missile brigades against Ukraine, with 36 Iskander-M launchers in total. The launchers are generally not reloaded in the field, with additional missiles stored hundreds of kilometers away, limiting Russia’s maximum theoretical salvo to around 70 missiles.

To intercept a single ballistic missile, Ukraine typically needs at least two—and sometimes three—PAC-3 interceptors for its Patriot systems - meaning at least 120 missiles per month, or over 1400 a year.

Meanwhile, in 2025, Lockheed Martin delivered 620 PAC-3 interceptors. The company plans to expand to 2,000 missiles by 2030. This number is intended not only for Ukraine but also for other countries, including states in the Middle East that have recently faced ballistic missile threats.

According to The Economist, in the first three days of the war with Iran, Gulf countries had fired 800 Patriot interceptor missiles at incoming Iranian missiles and drones. At the time, they did not yet realize that cheaper systems could be used to counter drones, and did not have such alternatives.

European specialists argue that the Franco-Italian SAMP/T cannot fully substitute for the U.S.-made Patriot. Europe currently manufactures only about 100–150 interceptors per month for SAMP/T and other European air-defence systems, which is insufficient for sustained large-scale air and missile defence. The situation is further complicated by European countries’ concerns about their own security, making them reluctant to share scarce interceptor missiles with Ukraine.

Currently, Ukraine wants to purchase around 100 interceptor missiles using EU loan funds. Ukraine’s defence minister has sent letters to nearly 40 partner countries, asking them to urgently provide Ukraine with Patriot missiles from their existing stocks — in exchange for future deliveries already contracted for Ukraine.

On July 9, President Zelensky announced that Ukraine would receive a new package of Patriot missiles “in the coming days.”

At the same time, Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence assesses that Russia has nearly reached its production ceiling for precision-guided missiles, allowing it to conduct no more than two or three large-scale missile strikes per month.

Although Russian sources claim the Iskander-M has a circular error probable (CEP) of 5–30 meters, Ukrainian intelligence says Russia has not achieved that level of accuracy and continues to struggle to reduce the missile’s CEP below 30 meters.

Reducing Russia’s missile capacity will require sustained Ukrainian drone attacks on the enemy defence-industrial facilities, alongside an expanded Ukrainian missile programme capable of disabling critical production.

Read my recent reports on domestic Flamingo missiles:

• Flamingo Missiles Got Intercepted Again (July 06);

• Flamingo Missiles: New Results (June 29);

• How Accurate Are Flamingo Missiles? (May 4).

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Licensed Production of Interceptors: When Will Ukraine Have Them?

During the NATO Summit in Ankara, US President Donald Trump said the US plans to provide Ukraine with a licence to produce Patriot air defence interceptors. “This way you can’t complain that we’re not giving them enough and instead, make them yourself,” he said.

The decision prompted a polarized reaction in Ukraine: government-linked figures expressed optimism, while some independent experts questioned whether reliance on a U.S.-controlled system could hinder the development of a domestic alternative.

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Ukraine has opened its arms exports, but beyond drones that may become obsolete on the battlefield within a matter of months, it has much more to offer: its experience of constant adaptation and innovation, tailored air defence solutions, and unique systems for battlefield data processing and analysis.

In this edition:

• Ukraine Opens Arms Exports: What to Expect;

• DELTA as the Backbone of Ukraine’s Warfare;

• Flamingo Missiles Got Intercepted Again;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

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Ukraine Opens Arms Export: What to Expect

On July 2, Ukraine’s Prime Minister announced that the Ukrainian government had approved a transparent mechanism for exporting defence technology and weapons without undermining Ukraine's wartime needs.

Under the new framework, Ukrainian technologies will be available only to partner states that have concluded drone-related agreements with Kyiv. President Zelensky said that, as of June, Ukraine had already concluded Drone Deal partnerships with 27 countries, including 15 NATO members and 12 non-NATO states.

A certain percentage of export deals will be transferred to a special fund of the state budget for the further development of Ukraine’s defence industry:

• 20% from the export of finished products and technologies;

• 30% from the export of components.

Ukrainian industry leaders actively welcomed this decision.

According to Ihor Fedirko, CEO of the Ukrainian Council of Defence Industry (UCDI), the new export mechanism contains several important provisions.

1. Exports will not be open to everyone, but only to Drone Deal partner countries with which Ukraine has intergovernmental agreements. This is about controlled cooperation.

2. Manufacturers’ applications must be reviewed within a defined timeframe — up to 30 days.

3. The mechanism concerns the transfer of weapons and defence technologies worth UAH 15 million (around 338,000 USD) or more. This is already the level of serious industrial agreements.

4. The state retains control over critical issues: the list of partner countries is formed by the MFA, while the list of goods that cannot be transferred is defined by the MoD together with other government bodies.

5. Ukrainian intellectual property remains protected. The transfer of technology does not mean the transfer of ownership rights. Re-export or transfer to third parties will be possible only with Ukraine’s written consent.

6. If products created using Ukrainian technologies are later exported to third countries, 20% of their value must go to the state budget.

7. Exports will be possible only if the Ukrainian military’s needs are guaranteed. If the state needs a specific type of weapon, permission may be denied. But if a manufacturer can fulfil both a state contract and an export order, it should be allowed to work externally.

   Politico mentioned that products such as Ukraine's low-cost interceptor drones may also be exported, provided manufacturers can guarantee they can fully meet the Ukrainian military's needs.

Fedirko also draws attention to the capacity of Ukraine’s State Export Control Service. Ukraine already has thousands of companies in the defence technology sector. Even if not all of them apply for export permits, but only around 200–300 manufacturers do, it will be almost impossible to review that number of applications properly. Ukraine may quickly face a classic bureaucratic situation. Therefore, together with the launch of the export mechanism, the state should review at least two things: salaries and the staffing levels of the State Export Control Service.

On July 1, Ukraine’s State Export Control Service issued a permit to export a batch of F10 strike drones produced by F-Drones. The company had already shipped 2,000 drones to the United States under a contract awarded to F-Drones as one of the winners of the first phase of the U.S. Drone Dominance program.

According to Kateryna Mykhalko, Managing Director of New Age Defence, Europe’s leading drone alliance, Ukraine should not limit itself to exporting drones; it must also export its combat-proven expertise and help partners build full drone ecosystems.

In her view, an effective drone defence ecosystem requires three elements: a scalable industrial base, professional military end users capable of integrating unmanned systems into doctrine and operations, and a coherent state policy that establishes budgets, ensures predictable demand, and enables effective cooperation between the military and industry.

She warns that no country can simply buy the “best drone” and consider itself ready for modern robotic warfare, because technological superiority can disappear within months. Instead, partner countries need support to develop doctrine, military structures, procurement processes, and mechanisms to learn from Ukraine’s battlefield experience.

Mykhalko argues that Ukraine should create a clear framework for transferring combat experience to allies, potentially including licensed private military companies that could help train foreign militaries in the use of unmanned systems.

“Tyrannies can act quickly and in a centralized manner. That is why democracies need to learn how to be no less effective — not by abandoning their free-market values, but by building new models of cooperation between the state, the military, and industry,” Kateryna wrote.

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DELTA as the Backbone of Ukraine’s Warfare

The command-and-control system DELTA has become a symbol of Ukraine’s asymmetric approach to resisting Russia’s invasion. It is built around drones, digital coordination, and the need to compensate for Russia’s greater manpower.

I’ve summarized recent materials on DELTA that were published in Ukrainian and international media.

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In recent months, amid a series of Ukrainian achievements, multiple sources have claimed that the war has reached a turning point. In this newsletter, I want to highlight several problems that Ukraine still faces. Its successes in some areas are taking place alongside persistent vulnerabilities in others.

At this point, more than ever, Ukraine needs strong support from its partners across all dimensions: the provision of requested and still-missing capabilities, financing for drone production, and sanctions against Russian war-related individuals and organizations. It’s too early to relax.

In this edition:

• Ukraine’s Asymmetric Counteroffensive;

• Military Perspectives of the Current Situation;

• Flamingo Missiles: New Results;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

Don’t forget to check out my recent report on Hornet strike drones, and the latest edition of my Ukraine Drone Brief.

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Ukraine’s Asymmetric Counteroffensive

President Zelensky announced on June 25 that he authorized a 40-day intermediate- and long-range strike campaign to influence Russia to end the war in Ukraine.

This, and a series of developments over the past weeks, reminded me of the words of the commander of Ukraine’s Third Army Corps, Andrii Biletskyi, who recently argued that Ukraine has a six- to nine-month window to seize the battlefield initiative from Russia and strengthen its position ahead of potential peace negotiations.

According to him, the Russian army is exhausted and currently unable to achieve major breakthroughs. If Ukrainian forces can increase and sustain the tempo over the next several months, they could regain the initiative along the front line and force Russia to abandon its plans to capture the contested parts of the Donetsk region.

Last week, NATO Deputy Secretary General said that Ukraine has managed to create a window of opportunity, but that this window will not remain open forever and must be used. The German Chancellor highlighted that Ukraine is now in a new position of strength on the battlefield and that Russia should therefore begin talks to freeze the front line.

Among the key developments of the past few months has been the parallel advancement of Ukraine’s long- and medium-range strike campaigns.

Some of the key long-range targets struck by Ukrainian forces in recent weeks included:

• VNIIR-Progress defence plant known for producing Kometa anti-jamming navigation modules used in Shahed drones (June 10);

• The Moscow Oil Refinery that supplies around 35% of Moscow’s fuel market, including 40% of its gasoline, 50% of its diesel, and fuel for Moscow’s airports (June 16);

• The Voronezh Semiconductor Devices Plant that produces components for Russian weapons, including cruise missiles (June 22);

• The Titan-Barrikady plant that produces launchers for the Iskander-M ballistic missile system (June 27).

A separate topic is Ukraine’s campaign in Crimea. For several weeks in a row, Ukraine has been attacking targets in the peninsula, as well as bridges, to isolate Crimea from other Russian-controlled territories.

Last week, Russian authorities in Crimea declared an “emergency situation”. According to the OSINT channel ASTRA, a 15-kilometre queue formed on the road out of Crimea via the bridge, as people attempted to leave the occupied peninsula.

Regarding the situation on the front lines, ISW calculated that the Russian rate of advance was about 4.6 square kilometers per day between January 1, 2026, and May 21, 2026 — less than half the Russian daily average during the same period in 2025.

Ukraine currently estimates Russian losses at over 32,000 personnel per month, with a declared goal of increasing that figure to 50,000 personnel per month. Russia mobilizes approximately 40,000 to 50,000 people every month.

Yurii Fedorenko, commander of the Achilles Unmanned Systems Brigade, described the current stage of the war as an “asymmetric counteroffensive.”

The main objective of this campaign is to achieve a systemic effect: the social, economic, and military destabilization of the enemy. Judging by economic statistics, polling data, and the battlefield situation, he argues, this approach is working, while Russia’s military-political leadership is finding it increasingly difficult to respond effectively.

This campaign has a cognitive element and can also be seen as an attempt to influence segments of Russian society that have remained largely indifferent to the war.

As Serhiy “Flash,” an adviser to Ukraine’s defence minister, put it, the real opportunity to accelerate the end of the war lies in how the Russian population reacts to Ukraine’s actions. Previously, Russia’s so-called “special military operation” felt distant for many Russians; now, it is suddenly getting much closer.

All of this is based on the expectation that, at some point, sustained attacks across multiple directions will force the Russian authorities to reconsider their maximalist demands. For now, this is not happening.

In his June 28 speech to the ruling United Russia Party Congress, Putin reaffirmed his commitment to pursuing Russia’s objectives through military means and dismissed diplomatic pathways to ending his war against Ukraine.

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Military Perspectives of the Current Situation

When I briefly interviewed two of my contacts in Ukraine’s defence forces, serving in different sections of the front line, their assessments of the current situation differed.

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Last week, there were multiple updates on the development of deep-strike and air defence capabilities in Ukraine. Ukraine is seeking a licence to produce interceptors for Patriots, and the U.S. has signalled a tentative readiness to consider the idea, though experts remain sceptical about how realistic this scenario is.

At the same time, Ukraine’s private initiatives to produce air defence systems, interceptor missiles for them, and ballistic strike missiles are taking shape and finding European partners ready to fill in the missing pieces.

Unsurprisingly, this week’s report turned out to be very missile-focused.

In this edition:

• Ukraine’s Largest Attack on Moscow: What Systems Were Used?

• Ukraine’s Domestic Missile and Air Defence Development;

• Ukraine is Moving Closer to a Missile Breakthrough — But Major Gaps Remain;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

Last week, I shared some of my thoughts on Ukraine’s missile-related innovation with The New York Times for their article: A Missing Ingredient in Ukraine’s Barrages on Russia: Ballistic Missiles.

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Ukraine’s Largest Attack on Moscow: What Systems Were Used?

On June 18, Ukrainian drones carried out a large-scale attack on Moscow and the Moscow region. The strikes, combined with Russian air-defence activity, caused multiple fires, including at the Moscow Oil Refinery, which supplied around 35% of the Russian capital’s fuel needs. It was one of Ukraine’s most successful missions, particularly in terms of penetrating Russian air defences.

Russian sources claimed that more than 190 Ukrainian drones were shot down over Moscow.

During the attack, several types of Ukrainian long-range strike systems were publicly recorded: Bars, Sichen, FP-1, Liutyi, and Morok. Russian milbloggers also noted the use of UJ-26 Bober drones and, reportedly, long-range tactical cruise missiles Peklo.

Sichen

• Estimated range: up to 1,400 km;

• Warhead: up to 40 kg;

• Speed: up to 200 km/h.

According to open-source data, the pre-flight preparation takes no more than 15 minutes. The drone is capable of operating under active EW conditions and conducting missions in the operational-tactical depth, both day and night.

FP-1

In its earlier version, FP-1 was designed to strike strategic targets at ranges of up to 1,600 km and could carry a warhead weighing up to 113 kg. In its updated version, its operational range has increased, and Russian sources cite the following characteristics:

• Flight range: up to 2,600 km;

• Maximum speed: up to 205 km/h;

• Cruising speed: 140–180 km/h;

• Maximum payload: up to 60 kg.

Recently, Ukraine’s Fire Point unveiled upgraded versions of its FP-1 and FP-2 drones - check my Ukraine Drone Brief for more details.

Liutyi

• Range: up to 2,000 km;

• Warhead: 50–75 kg;

• Speed: up to 160 km/h.

Morok

• Range: up to 800 km;

• Warhead: around 30 kg;

• Speed: around 300 km/h.

Russian reports claim that Morok is developed by Ramzay based on the 2021 RZ-60 UAV. It might be launched from an inclined ground platform with a solid-fuel booster, similar to a cruise missile. Russian sources also claim that the two-cylinder version carries around 10 litres of fuel and has a 15 hp engine, while a more powerful four-cylinder version may increase flight endurance if fitted with a larger fuel tank and lighter warhead.

Bars

• Estimated range: around 700–800 km;

• Warhead: estimated at up to 100 kg.

During Eurosatory 2026 in Paris on June 15–19, Ukraine displayed the Bars RS missile-drone, which may have been used in mass strikes on Moscow on May 17 and June 18, 2026. The manufacturer’s name remains classified for operational security reasons. The Bars RS variant has a larger fuel tank, higher maximum take-off weight, and a heavier warhead. Reported specifications: 22 kg warhead, 135 kg maximum take-off weight, and a 95-litre fuel tank. The Bars missile family has conducted around 7,000 launches.

During these launches, the confirmed cruising speed was 400–450 km/h, with a maximum flight speed of 620 km/h.

Bober (Beaver)

• Estimated range: 800–1,000 km; up to 1,400 km in certain configurations;

• Warhead: about 20 kg, a KZ-6 shaped charge;

• Speeds: up to 200 km/h;

• Endurance: up to 7 hours.

The drone is launched from a catapult, and the latest modifications include a thermal imager and manual operator control, similar to FPV drones. This allows it to strike not only strategic facilities, but also tactical targets, including air defence systems, radars, and aircraft at airfields.

Peklo (Hell)

Peklo is described as an unmanned aerial system designed to engage stationary targets at operational depth. Launch is performed using a solid-fuel booster from a mobile platform, without reliance on fixed infrastructure.

After launch, the system transitions to cruise flight mode. It has a range of 700 km, a speed of 700 km/h, and carries a 23 kg warhead.

Kremlin spokesperson Peskov claimed on June 19 that Russian air defences were performing well “despite everything”. Both Peskov and Foreign Minister Lavrov also stated that Russia would continue carrying out regular strikes against Ukraine.

Russian milblogger Leviev said in his YouTube video that Russian air defence performed relatively well, arguing that the number of Ukrainian drones that reached their targets was limited compared with the large scale of the attack, with Ukrainian drones allegedly numbering in the hundreds.

He also stressed that no country can provide 100% protection against mass drone attacks, calling this a technological challenge for all modern armies.

At the same time, he noted that even successfully intercepted drones can cause additional damage on the ground. For example, the Sadovod market fire was caused by the explosion of a drone that had been intercepted but then detonated after falling to the ground.

According to Leviev, this poses a new engineering challenge: air-defence systems must ensure that intercepted drones are destroyed in the air rather than falling intact or semi-intact into urban areas.

He also pointed to problems with Russia’s point-defence systems, especially the Pantsir. Leviev argued that the system needs to be modernized because, when it was designed in Soviet times, its developers did not expect it to be used in populated areas. Some Pantsir missiles use detachable booster sections, which can fall into residential areas after launch. He said such missile variants are still being used, including during the attack on Moscow.

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Ukraine’s Domestic Missile and Air Defence Development

Ukraine’s Anti-Ballistic Shield

Fire Point’s Chief Engineer, Denys Shtilierman, said the company’s “anti-ballistic shield” is not yet a complete operational system, even though the missile itself is ready.

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Both Ukraine and Russia understand that modern war is not about which side has more personnel, weapons, or military equipment. It is about who makes smarter and faster decisions.

It is about destroying the archer, not the arrow. This is why Ukraine’s long-range strikes — banned for years by Western governments — are aimed at Russia’s drone and missile production capacities. Destroying these facilities means fewer missiles and drones will be launched at Ukrainian cities, and fewer Ukrainian civilians will be killed in mass attacks.

Strikes on depots and logistical hubs have the same logic: the fewer supplies that reach Russian troops, the fewer problems Ukrainian soldiers face on the frontline.

And the growing introduction of AI technologies, which are gradually taking over more elements of decision-making in modern warfare, is elevating this transformation to a new level.

In this edition:

• Ukraine Wants to Isolate Crimea from Russia;

• Artillery After 2022: Guns Are Turning Into an IT System;

• AI is Shaping a New Paradigm of Warfare in Ukraine;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

Don’t forget to check out my special open-access edition of Ukraine Drone Brief (usually reserved for VIP subscribers only).

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Ukraine Wants to Isolate Crimea from Russia

Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, told Reuters that Kyiv’s goal is to isolate Crimea and cut the occupied peninsula off from Russia. According to him, drone strikes have reduced the traffic using the Novorossiya highway - a critical Russian military supply route through occupied southern Ukraine to Crimea - by more than two-thirds over the past month.

“We will create conditions under which it will be extremely difficult for any serviceman or defence industry worker to remain in Crimea,” he added.

Russian milbloggers from the Razrabotchik BPLA channel appear to be seriously concerned over this issue, saying that “the most alarming part is that a country without a proper navy or air force is already, in practice, implementing this plan”.

For several months, Ukraine has waged a systematic campaign against Crimea’s air defence network — targeting SAM systems and radars.

In the first five months of this year, the units destroyed 174 Russian air defence complexes (not only in Crimea) worth about $5.4 billion, Brovdi said.

Now, Ukraine has moved to cutting the land corridor and damaging bridges, which is already contributing to fuel shortages.

A week ago, Ukraine struck the Chonhar bridge, which connects the occupied Kherson region to the occupied Crimea. This route is one of the key logistical corridors used to supply Russian forces on the peninsula. Read about drones used in this operation here.

Queues of Russian trucks heading from occupied Crimea to the temporarily occupied part of the Kherson region have formed at the approaches to the pontoon crossing near Chonhar.

Russian milbloggers are also concerned that Ukraine’s future ballistic missile strikes may not necessarily be aimed at Moscow. Instead, they worry that the real target could be the Crimean Bridge — the last major artery still connecting occupied Crimea with Russia.

The Ukrainian-made FP-7 surface-to-air missile is currently undergoing flight tests, while the more powerful FP-9 missile is already under development. Both missiles are ballistic.

Ukrainian analysts note that FP-7 and FP-9 could be perfectly capable of striking Russian military targets across Crimea. While the capabilities of the FP-7 (200 km range) would depend on the launch location, the longer-range FP-9 (900 km) could potentially reach targets anywhere on the peninsula.

A military expert from Crimea, a former Ukrainian officer and reserve lieutenant colonel, told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that the FP-9 could be launched, for example, from the Kyiv, Zhytomyr, or Khmelnytskyi regions.

“FP-9 has a speed of Mach 2 — twice the speed of sound, or around 2,200 km/h. It would take less than half an hour, around 25 minutes, to reach the most distant targets in Crimea, such as Sevastopol or Kerch. If the launch distance is reduced, the flight time would also decrease,” the expert said.

Russia may struggle to counter Ukrainian ballistic missiles because they are fast, difficult to track, and can usually be intercepted only in the final phase of flight. This leaves air defence systems only seconds to detect the missile, calculate its trajectory, and launch an interceptor.

Although Russia deploys systems such as the S-400, S-300V, and possibly S-500, their real effectiveness against ballistic targets in combat remains unclear. Another weakness is that Russian interceptors reportedly rely on fragmentation rather than direct kinetic hits, which experts consider less reliable against ballistic missiles. As a result, Ukrainian FP-7 and FP-9 missiles could pose a serious challenge to Russian air defence in Crimea.

Russians point out that by 2026, the war moved from the trenches into the sky and deep rear areas. “Victory no longer belongs to whoever captures more tree lines. It belongs to whoever can launch drones, shells, and missiles farther, more accurately, and in greater numbers. There is no need to fight for some village if the enemy has no ammunition left to defend it — either because the factory producing that ammunition was hit, or because the vehicle carrying it never reached the front”.

They are now questioning Russia’s own unmanned capabilities in Crimea, asking how many unmanned surface vessels and interceptor drones the Russian military actually has defending the peninsula.

According to the ISW report, the Russian military command is planning to relocate remaining Black Sea Fleet (BSF) command structures out of occupied Crimea, as BSF headquarters are steadily losing functionality amid severe logistics issues due to Ukraine’s intensified strike campaign against Crimea.

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Artillery After 2022: Guns Are Turning Into an IT System

Even in the “age of drones,” artillery survives — and in some cases remains indispensable. Its speed and firepower, ability to operate in almost any weather conditions, and tactical adaptation to reduce risks still make certain artillery systems highly useful in both defence and offence.

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In the face of a global shortage of anti-ballistic interceptors, Ukraine is testing its domestic technology, which is expected to be cheaper and more scalable than existing solutions. The system will be based on already available technologies, which should shorten the development timeline.

As in many other areas of this war, Ukraine is demonstrating that there may be faster and more practical solutions to existing problems. Rather than relying solely on delayed allied supplies, Ukraine is increasingly focused on developing its own capabilities.

In this edition:

• Anti-Ballistic Interceptors in Ukraine;

• Tanks Are Adapting, Not Disappearing, Despite the Drone Threat;

• How UFORCE, a Ukrainian-Origin Defence Integrator, Plans to Become the Next Anduril;

• and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.

Last week, my article on ground drones was finally published in the UK-based Defence Procurement International. For this piece, I interviewed the Third Army Corps’ NC13 — currently one of the leading Ukrainian units in employing ground drones — as well as the Ukrainian company DevDroid. If you want to understand what the future of ground drone warfare may look like, you can read the article here, page 34.

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Anti-Ballistic Interceptors in Ukraine

Last week, Ukrainian Fire Point demonstrated tests of the FP-7.x missile, which is expected to become the basis for Ukraine’s FREYJA anti-ballistic interceptor.

The FP-7.x has a flight speed of 1,500–2,000 metres per second and is 7.25 metres long. Tests of this type of missile were already shown in February 2026, when it was described as being designed for rapid engagement of targets at medium ranges.

Back in April 2026, Fire Point announced plans to deliver a new air-defence system to the Ukrainian army as early as 2027, capable of intercepting ballistic missiles. At the time, the Chief Engineer Shtilerman said the system would provide a cheaper alternative to Patriot, with each interceptor costing less than $1 million.

Ukrainian analysts at Defense Express note that one of the key factors determining whether the system can intercept ballistic targets such as the Iskander-M will be the FP-7.x's ability to perform intensive maneuvers.

For effective and reliable interception of ballistic missiles, it is not enough for an air-defence missile to simply explode nearby. It must accurately strike the warhead directly, using the so-called “hit-to-kill” principle. Such a high level of accuracy must be achieved even when the enemy ballistic missile is actively maneuvering at speeds of several Mach.

The entire surface-to-air missile system will be assembled from existing solutions already available in Ukraine and Europe. This should significantly reduce both the development timeline and the overall cost of the program, which is critically important for Ukraine at this stage.

The Russian military channel Voyennyi Osvedomitel suggests that the FP-7 may no longer be viewed by Ukraine primarily as a ballistic missile for striking ground targets. Instead, it may have been redirected for use within an air-defence system, while the more powerful and longer-range FP-9 may become Ukraine’s full-fledged ballistic strike missile.

Last week, the Chief Engineer of Fire Point said that the first FP-9 strike on Moscow could take place “in the summer or, at the latest, in early autumn.” Stillerman added that the company will initially produce around a dozen test missiles. After the weapon is codified, Fire Point plans to expand ballistic missile production. Stillerman also suggested that potential targets in Moscow could include energy facilities.

Russian bloggers noted that Ukraine’s possession of its own ballistic missiles — even if they are not the most advanced — creates a serious threat to targets near the front line and to critical infrastructure in rear/frontline areas, because not all air-defence systems are capable of effectively countering such targets.

According to Bloomberg report, Ukraine has asked Germany to provide dozens of additional Patriot interceptor missiles from its own stockpiles. Ukraine proposed a deal under which it would receive the missiles now in exchange for supplying Germany with interceptor drones in the future.

Defense Express wrote that even if Ukraine receives all available Patriot interceptor missiles, it will still not be enough for its defence needs.

According to Ukrainian intelligence data, if we consider only the types of missiles that require Patriot systems for interception, Russia produces the following quantities each month:

• 9M723 ballistic missiles for the Iskander-M system: 60 units

• PM-48U ballistic missiles for S-300/400 systems: 40 units

• Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles: 10 units

• Tsirkon hypersonic missiles: up to 3 units

In total, Russia produces up to 113 ballistic, aeroballistic, and hypersonic missiles per month.

At the same time, throughout all of 2025, the U.S. company Lockheed Martin produced 620 PAC-3 MSE interceptors — around 51–52 missiles per month. I

Even if Washington radically changed its policy and sent every newly produced interceptor to Ukraine, this would still not be enough. This remains true even under a 1:1 interception ratio, which Ukraine’s Air Force currently tries to use, despite the standard practice of launching at least two interceptors per target.

Meanwhile, actual deliveries of Patriot interceptors to Ukraine are already complicated by the fact that the United States wants to replenish its own stockpiles after the war with Iran, during which it reportedly used 45% to 61% of its Patriot interceptor stocks. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have similar concerns, as they also reportedly fired several thousand Patriot interceptors.

According to the analysts, interceptor missiles alone cannot be the answer to Russia’s ballistic missile threat. Without strikes on launchers, missile stockpiles, and production facilities, no missile-defence system will be able to cope with a threat of this scale.

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Tanks Are Adapting, Not Disappearing, Despite the Drone Threat

According to Russian sources, despite the sharply increased role of drones in modern combat, tanks remain an important means of firepower.

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