We often discuss how civilian technologies are adapted for combat use, but last week we saw the reverse. The delivery of four tons of provisions to the occupied Ukrainian city of Oleshky demonstrated how drones used for strikes can also be repurposed for humanitarian missions—delivering aid while operating under active countermeasures by enemy forces seeking to prevent such operations.

The challenges Ukraine’s Defence Forces had to overcome, including direct Russian fire and electronic warfare countermeasures, show that under conditions of active interference, missions like this would be nearly impossible for humanitarian organizations to conduct on their own.

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Oleshky is a Ukrainian city just nine kilometres from Kherson. Russian forces occupied it in the first days of the full-scale invasion. According to the Kherson Regional Military Administration, after all these years, about 2,000 people remain in the city, including nearly 50 children. They live without electricity or gas supplies, with little or no access to medical care and medicines, and face acute shortages of food and drinking water. The city is under near-total military and information isolation, with movement severely restricted and reliable information about conditions inside Oleshky extremely difficult to obtain.

All roads and approaches to the city are mined. Oleshky lies only a few kilometres from Ukrainian-controlled territory within the range of drones operated by both sides. As a result, the skies over the city have become a constant battlespace, with drones hunting other drones and targeting virtually anything moving on the ground.

Commercial drivers who attempted to bring food into the city by road during the summer came under heavy fire and were forced to turn back.

Ukraine has appealed to both the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and international partners to help organize civilian evacuations. However, these efforts have produced no result: Russia has not agreed to establish a humanitarian corridor.

Earlier, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Ukraine was allegedly obstructing the delivery of humanitarian aid to Oleshky.

Last week, several units of Ukraine’s Defence Forces carried out a unique operation that successfully delivered around 4 tons of food, drinking water, medicines, hygiene products, and other essential supplies to 100 designated locations in Russian-occupied Oleshky across the Dnipro River. According to the Ukrainian OSINT channel DroneBomber, each package weighed 38 kg. Several Vampire drones were reportedly used in the operation along with other UAV types.

The operation involved several Defence Forces units, including the Bolharychi unit of the 11th Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine and the 34th National Guard Regiment.

Ruslan Muzychuk, press secretary of the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU), wrote on his LinkedIn that this case illustrates an important evolution in how we think about unmanned systems: “The same technology used to protect troops and positions on the frontline can also help reach civilians in areas where traditional humanitarian access is impossible. And this is not a risk-free mission. Russian forces have attempted to disrupt the deliveries by shooting down drones carrying supplies”.

The National Guard of Ukraine’s Commander, Maj. Gen. Oleksandr Pivnenko told Ukraine’s Arms Monitor that ground transport cannot reach the city because it is located on the other side of the Dnipro River, and access to it is controlled by the occupying forces. A drone, however, can cross the river, reach a designated point, and drop a payload without putting a driver, volunteer, or service member at risk on a mined road under constant fire.
The drone deliveries cannot replace a full-fledged humanitarian corridor, which Russia has refused to open. But until that happens, unmanned systems remain the only practical means of delivering assistance.

Drones have long been used in rescue operations and to deliver supplies to remote or hard-to-reach areas. What makes this case particularly unusual is that these humanitarian drones are operating in an active battlespace. The National Guard told me that “Russian forces actively attempt to shoot down all of our drones, using electronic intelligence and electronic warfare systems, as well as interceptor drones. But what matters most is that the mission achieved its objective: approximately four tonnes of food supplies were delivered to the city”.

Most of the platforms used in this operation were multirotor drones; however, the NGU did not disclose specific models, payload capacities, or flight profiles, as the Russian side closely monitors how Ukraine conducts such operations and uses every detail to improve its ability to shoot down the drones.

Organizing such a mission required accounting for several challenges. The enemy can destroy drones in flight, hit the packages being dropped, or target the people who come to collect them. That is why the operation required extensive preparation, taking into account everything that could be anticipated — from routes to the choice of timing and drop-off points. Distributing the cargo across multiple locations reduces the risk that a single strike could destroy the entire delivery or disrupt the operation.

According to an interview with a drone operator from the 34th Separate Marine Brigade “Borysfen,” recorded in spring 2026, delivery routes have to be planned very carefully because Russian forces actively hunt the drones and may also target civilians receiving the supplies. “Every flight carried out for a delivery mission can become a one-way mission,” he said. Even when a drone returns to its launch point, the mission can remain dangerous because Russian forces may track its flight path and use that information to identify the launch area.

Some of the drones were reportedly lost in this operation. “As for drone losses, it would be unrealistic to claim that a mission like this can be carried out without them,” the National Guard told me.

The second challenge was coordination. This joint effort involved numerous units of Ukraine’s Defense Forces, so all participants had to synchronize their actions within a very limited timeframe.

The National Guard of Ukraine is highly experienced in these types of tasks. It has carried out logistical missions along the frontline for a long time, and each mission provides data on the enemy’s response. Modern electronic warfare and the rapid pace of change on the battlefield mean that methods that work today have to be updated every few months.

Russia uses occupied Ukrainian territories to deploy its forces and to establish drone launch sites closer to Ukrainian areas. In May, the Ukrainian Air Force identified a site in Oleshky used by Russian drone operators who had regularly targeted the Ukrainian-controlled right bank of the Dnipro River, including attacks on civilians described by Ukrainian authorities as a “human safari.” Russian forces had established the position in a former sanitary and epidemiological station and set up a battalion-level command post there.

There are fresh reports on social media that Russian personnel have been searching the homes of Oleshky residents for packages delivered by drones and confiscating them. “They immediately start asking questions if the food is not Russian-made: ‘Where did you get it?’ And they say, ‘If the Ukrainian Armed Forces are dropping food supplies to you, then you are cooperating with them,’ Tetiana Hasanenko, head of the Oleshky City Military Administration, told Ukrinform. Following this mission, Russian governmental and non-governmental sources intensified their campaign blaming Ukraine for the blockade of the city.

While this successfully coordinated and executed mission deserves recognition, it is unfortunately not enough to resolve the humanitarian crisis in Oleshky. Stronger international pressure is needed to compel Russia to open a humanitarian corridor.

In response to the humanitarian catastrophe in Oleshky, Ukraine initiated an urgent discussion of the situation at the OSCE.

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Read other relevant reports:

• “Baba Yaga” Drones in Ukraine: Key Trends;

• The Vampire: a drone that terrifies Russians;

• Heavy Bombers: A Pilot of “Vampire” Tells About His Daily Operations;

• Drones Against Civilians: How Russia Uses UAVs to Kill and Terrorize.

Just as Ukraine was getting closer to managing waves of conventional Shaheds, the threat changed again. Russia began employing larger numbers of jet-powered systems, creating a new challenge for Ukraine’s air-defence architecture.

The existing system has not adapted easily to these faster and higher-flying threats, forcing Ukraine to adjust once again. Several countermeasures are now being explored, ranging widely in cost and effectiveness, and work on new solutions is ongoing.

In this edition:

• Middle-Strike Drones Remain a Key Battlefield Capability;

• Approaches to Countering Jet-Powered Drones;

• Why Drone Carriers Have Faded Away in Ukraine.

For the list of weekly drone-related updates, check my Ukraine Drone Brief.

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Middle-Strike Drones Remain a Key Battlefield Capability

While our attention has shifted in recent months away from medium-range strike drones, also known as “middle-strikes,” they remain an effective combat capability on some of the most intense sections of the battlefield.

The Sloviansk direction currently is one of the hottest sectors of the front. Unable to overcome Ukrainian engineering fortifications, Russian forces intensified their offensive operations and focused on creating a kill zone extending roughly 40 km from the line of contact.

The systematic use of middle-strike drones over recent months has helped Ukrainian forces expand their own kill zone along the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk direction. In practice, this means protecting the first line of defence by establishing fire control over the enemy’s operational rear.

Using this approach, the Apache Unmanned Systems Battalion of the 81st Brigade acts proactively by destroying Russian offensive potential before it reaches the frontline.

Operators can launch and fly medium-range drones from protected bunkers or concealed positions using computer terminals. The operator can remain at a distance from the launch site. Even if EW completely disrupts the satellite signal as the drone approaches the target, some middle-strike systems can switch to an automatic target-acquisition mode, allowing them to identify and engage the designated object independently.

“The more logistics we cut, the more problems they have on the frontline: shortages of ammunition, drones, fuel, lubricants, and food. Morale also matters. Now they will think several times before deciding to move anywhere,” told the servicemen from the Apache Battalion in an interview with Censor.Net.

Medium-range strike capability is one of the focus areas for the British-Ukrainian company Trypillian. Trypillian told me that the medium-range segment today serves as a critical connective layer in the overall architecture of warfare, bridging the tactical battlefield at the line of contact with the strategic depth targeted by long-range strike systems.

Middle-strike operations cover an operational zone extending from approximately 30 to 200 km and beyond, where the enemy concentrates key logistical assets, including ammunition and POL depots, command posts, supply routes, heavy equipment, and repair facilities.

Trypillian’s flagship platform in the middle-strike segment, ATOM can perform both reconnaissance and strike missions. The drone carries a 2.5 kg warhead and has a stated range of around 70 km, while newer versions of the platform are being developed for greater operational depth.

Medium-range systems apply systematic, continuous pressure on enemy logistics, so the enemy loses the ability to plan predictable resupply, while supply routes become slower, more expensive, and less reliable.

In an interview with Radio Khartia, Trypillian's Commercial Director, Viktoriia Kulchytska, said that Ukraine’s UAV industry is developing ahead of current requirements, with pilot and military-engineer demands changing about every two to three months.

Trypillian’s first middle-strike platforms had a range of around 50 km, which at the time was beyond the reach of conventional FPV drones. That range gradually increased to around 70 km and is now expanding toward 100-200 km, and in some configurations even 300 km.

“When we received the first feedback from the military about our ATOM, which was flying 50-70 km, we understood that we needed to develop a second version. And that is not as simple as it may seem. It might look as though building an aircraft for 50 km and one for 150 km is essentially the same thing — just make the aircraft larger, and it will fly farther. That is a misconception. From an engineering perspective, the aircraft has to be redesigned in a fundamentally different way. When we change payload and range, we do not simply change the size of the aircraft; we change the aerodynamics and the way it flies. This takes months of work,” Kulchytska explained.

Speaking to me about trends in the middle-strike segment, Kulchytska highlighted three factors that she believes will define its evolution: expanded mass production, greater autonomy, and continuous improvements in electronic-warfare resilience.

According to Trypillian, market scaling is already underway. In the first months of this year, the Ukrainian government contracted approximately five times more middle-strike systems than during all of last year, which the company sees as evidence that the industry is moving toward more predictable mass production.

At the same time, one of the most important challenges for the company’s technology roadmap remains the “de-Chinafication” of its supply chain. Trypillian says it has reached an approximately 80% localization rate and argues that replacing Chinese components with Ukrainian and Western alternatives is essential to build long-term defence partnerships with allies and combine Ukraine’s development speed with Western financial and industrial scale.

In June 2026, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence launched its first large-scale competitive tender for middle-strike UAVs. The acquisition was expected to cover “tens of thousands” of standard attack and reconnaissance-strike drones from multiple suppliers.

One of the best-known drones in this sector is the American Hornet. Recently, Janes reported that over the past three months, the Armed Forces of Ukraine deployed more than 10,000 Hornets with a 200 km operational range.

Read my report about the Hornet here.

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Approaches to Countering Jet-Powered Threats

Jet-powered drones, rather than conventional drones, could become the next major threat for countries worldwide. This is one of the most widely discussed topics in Ukraine, and a significant share of the latest weekly developments focuses specifically on this threat.

Ukrainian experts identify four main approaches to countering jet-powered drones:

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Ukraine held its first robot parade, showcasing unmanned ground vehicles moving in formation, maritime drones, FPV drone swarms, and interceptor drones. Over the past year, Ukraine has significantly strengthened its unmanned capabilities. At the same time, new threats continue to emerge. One of the most pressing challenges is Russia’s growing use of jet-powered Shahed/Geran drones. While effective countermeasures are only beginning to emerge, some Ukrainian developers are partnering with international companies to design and test potential solutions.

In this edition:

• Korean Company Develops Battery Packs for Ukrainian Interceptor Drones;

• The Challenge of Jet-Powered Shaheds;

• What Is Russia’s Banderol Missile/Drone?

• Heavy Bombers: A Pilot of “Vampire” Tells About His Daily Operations.

For more concise weekly updates on developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia, consider subscribing to my Saturday edition of the Ukraine Drone Brief, available to VIP subscribers.

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Korean Company Develops Battery Packs for Ukrainian Interceptor Drones

According to Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR), North Korea is now deploying around 400 drone operators to Russia. HUR says their drones will likely be used for reconnaissance and attacks against targets inside Ukraine.

South Korea, meanwhile, remains reluctant to provide military support to Ukraine, which also limits its opportunities to learn directly from Ukraine’s combat experience. At the same time, South Korean businesses seem to recognize the importance of working with Ukraine much faster.

Two weeks ago, I wrote about the first Korean company testing its defence solution with Ukrainian military units. Several other Korean innovators have also been partnering with Ukraine.

Mobius is the South Korea-based company now developing, with Ukrainian partners, a high-performance battery solution for a new generation of interceptor drones capable of reaching speeds of more than 400 km/h — and potentially exceeding 600 km/h. I spoke with Eugene Choi, CEO of Mobius, to learn how this cooperation is progressing.

When the company first explored cooperation with Ukraine, its initial idea was relatively broad: developing batteries for use across different types of drones. During early discussions, the company was advised that competing with Ukrainian manufacturers in batteries and components for inexpensive drones would make little sense. “Ukraine is probably the best in the world when it comes to low-cost drones,” Eugene told me. “Cost-wise, they are way better than us.”

Instead, the Korean company began exploring technologies in which its own advantages could complement Ukrainian expertise. Ukrainian developers were seeking battery systems capable of supporting interceptor drones flying faster than 400 km/h.

As Russia increases the share of jet-powered Geran drones in its mass attacks against Ukraine, conventional interceptor drones are too slow to engage these faster-moving targets. Jet-powered Gerans can fly at speeds exceeding 300 km/h, while an interceptor generally needs to be at least 20% faster than its target. Recently, Ukraine’s Defence Forces have received their first domestically produced jet-powered interceptor, Alexa Spatium.

High-speed interceptor drones place very different demands on their power systems than conventional FPV drones.

The Korean company Mobius is developing its battery packs using commercially available cells. The innovation lies primarily in how those cells are integrated into the battery system. One of the greatest challenges is heat. Very high discharge rates can cause battery cells to heat rapidly, creating both performance and safety problems. The Korean design combines a specialized thermal-management material with a customized circuit architecture intended to prevent overheating during high-power operation.

Ukraine’s winters create another challenge for battery-powered drones. Batteries stored or deployed in very low temperatures may require time to reach an optimal operating temperature before providing maximum performance. For conventional systems, several minutes of preparation may be acceptable. Air-defence interceptors do not have that luxury. When a Russian Shahed or another aerial target is detected, an interceptor may need to launch almost immediately.

“For interceptor drones, it should be a very quick response,” Eugene Choi from Mobius explained. “Warm-up time is going to be critical.”

The project has now reached the final design stage. The formal testing of the latest design is expected to begin in September. The company representative also plans to travel to Ukraine for that purpose.

Mobius deliberately designed the pack around a standardized architecture so that it could potentially be integrated into several platforms. This could include other high-performance drones, unmanned maritime systems, and additional battery-powered defence applications that require high power output. Standardization is particularly important for Ukraine’s rapidly expanding drone ecosystem, which includes thousands of drone models.

The company is interested in working not only with its existing Ukrainian partners but with other interceptor-drone developers in Ukraine and NATO countries.

If interceptor production reaches hundreds of thousands of systems annually, battery manufacturing will also have to move far beyond prototype quantities. For the initial phase, the company plans to begin small-volume production in South Korea before the end of this year. Its current target for October through December is approximately 2,000 battery packs per month.

If Ukrainian demand grows as expected, that capacity would be insufficient. The company therefore plans to expand production during the first quarter of next year and is considering establishing an assembly facility in Eastern Europe. Poland is one of the leading options because of its role as a logistics hub supporting Ukraine. The location could also offer an advantage: reducing investors’ concerns about concentrating the production of strategically important defence technology in a facility that could become a target of a Russian operation.

The longer-term model could consequently involve two production locations: one in South Korea and another in Eastern Europe closer to Ukrainian customers.

The company is also raising investment to accelerate this expansion. Several Korean investors and at least one European investor have expressed interest, according to the company representative.

According to Eugene, there is another obstacle to Korea–Ukraine defence cooperation – a bureaucratic one. For South Korean citizens, travelling to Ukraine remains difficult because government authorization is required; obtaining permission can take approximately 45 days.

Eugene also added that attempts to contact the relevant embassy channels had been difficult. A dedicated fast-track mechanism for companies participating in approved Ukraine–South Korea defence and technology projects could therefore make defence cooperation between the businesses considerably easier.

Although the future of a formal Ukraine–South Korea defence partnership remains uncertain, growing business involvement in Ukraine is creating a precedent for deeper cooperation and offering some hope that the broader relationship may eventually change.

Considering the U.S. administration’s decision to scale back military exercises with South Korea, Seoul may find itself in a situation similar to that of other U.S. allies, including Canada and European countries, which have been diversifying their defence partnerships over the past year. In this context, deeper defence cooperation with Ukraine could make particular sense for South Korea.

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Read other relevant reports:

• Newtype Industries: The First Korean Defence Startup Testing in Ukraine;

• Ukraine and South Korea: Underexplored Opportunities for Defence Cooperation;

• Inside Ukraine’s Interceptor Drone Race: A Pilot’s View;

• Drone warfare in Ukraine: war in the Middle East and Ukraine’s expertise.

The Challenge of Jet-Powered Shaheds

According to Ukrainian electronic warfare expert and adviser to the President, Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov, Russia is increasingly using jet-powered Shahed drones and other strike systems for attacks against targets in Ukraine’s rear areas.

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The pace of adaptation in drone warfare is so rapid that even the most effective technologies can be countered within months. Ukraine is currently facing several challenges, including Russian efforts to disrupt Starlink services, which are indispensable to many of its drone operations, as well as Russia’s own domestic innovation, including the growing use of AI-enabled technologies and mesh-network solutions in drones.

Foreign companies operating in Ukraine have a unique opportunity to learn from this fast adaptation cycle and bring a greater sense of urgency to the development and fielding of technologies in their own countries.

In this edition:

• Ukraine-Proven Technology Opens Doors in Europe: The Case of Dutch Company Intelic;

• Where Drone Warfare in Ukraine Stands, and Where It Is Heading;

• Why Tactical Radars Are So Important in Ukraine.

As usual, a detailed list of the major drone-related developments is available in my weekly newsletter, Ukraine Drone Brief, for VIP subscribers.

Just a reminder: my publications are entirely independent and not sponsored. This digest is supported only by private individuals — readers and subscribers like you.

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Ukraine-Proven Technology Opens Doors in Europe: The Case of Dutch Company Intelic

In early July, the Dutch Ministry of Defence signed a strategic partnership agreement with the local company Intelic and announced an investment of more than €30 million to create an interoperability-focused software foundation for the country’s future UAV ecosystem.

It was particularly interesting for me because I know Intelic through its work in Ukraine, so it was nice to see the company’s efforts recognized in its home country.

According to the company, its presence in Ukraine became an important source of credibility and trust. Intelic’s involvement in Ukraine began after it participated in a hackathon in Kyiv in 2024, and it has maintained a local presence in the country ever since.

The ability to demonstrate that its system had been tested under combat conditions and used by Ukrainian military units provided strong evidence for the Dutch MoD that the technology was operationally relevant.

I spoke with Marc Derksen, co-founder and Chief Product Officer at Intelic, to learn what insights the company has drawn from its work in Ukraine and how it plans to adapt them to European realities.

The two main Intelic innovations developed on the basis of its experience in Ukraine are NEXUS, a command-and-control software platform for drones, and Intelic BASE, a European catalogue of unmanned technologies inspired by Ukraine’s Brave1 Market.

NEXUS is a common command-and-control interface that allows operators to control drones produced by different manufacturers through a single system. “For example, a military unit may operate ten different types of reconnaissance drones, each with its own software and interface. NEXUS allows operators to control these systems through one interface, providing a consistent user experience,” Marc explained.

The software is currently used by approximately 15 Ukrainian military units. These units have already conducted more than 5,500 missions using the platform, primarily for resupply and strike operations.

NEXUS is also being integrated with Ukraine’s DELTA situational-awareness system. This allows information collected by drones to be transferred directly to DELTA and displayed on the operational map. As a result, operators do not have to manually share coordinates or other information through messaging applications such as WhatsApp or Signal.

In Ukraine, Intelic also partners with the Ukrainian defence company Gurzuf Defence, which manufactures the Heavy Shot heavy multicopter. The drone can carry a payload of up to 30 kg and operate at ranges of up to 20 km with a return trip.

In March 2026, the Dutch Ministry of Defence ordered 1,400 Heavy Shot drones for Ukraine, which were subsequently delivered to the Ukrainian military. I first learned about this cooperation from Russian Telegram channels, which frequently express concern about the growing integration of Ukrainian and European defence technologies.

As many readers of my newsletter know, Ukraine has a “zoo of technologies,” especially when it comes to unmanned systems. Last year alone, more than 500 new drone models were approved for use in Ukraine. The lack of standardization creates challenges for Ukrainian pilots, who must learn to operate each system, while also complicating training and repairs.

The broader objective of NEXUS is to reduce the fragmentation created by Ukraine’s “zoo of drones,” in which military units often operate numerous systems with different control interfaces. Similar fragmentation also exists across Europe, with more than 700 defence producers.

The platform is not automatically compatible with every drone. Integration requires cooperation with the manufacturer, technical testing, and confirmation that the system meets the necessary requirements.

Intelic works directly with Ukrainian drone manufacturers to integrate and test their systems with NEXUS. Cooperation usually begins before a product is deployed operationally so that both sides can verify that the drone and the software function properly together.

Related to NEXUS is Intelic BASE, a catalogue or marketplace for drones where Intelic showcases unmanned technologies that are already integrated with its software. It currently serves the needs of the Dutch Armed Forces and includes manufacturers from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Portugal, Latvia, Luxembourg, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine. Ukraine is represented on the platform by TAF Industries and several other unnamed partners.

Intelic BASE is not a procurement or sales platform. Instead, it serves as a portfolio showcasing available systems. When a government or another customer is interested in purchasing a system, the Intelic BASE team can connect them directly with the manufacturer, but it does not participate in the transaction itself.

Although the platform primarily focuses on European companies, it is also open to manufacturers from other NATO countries. For instance, Canadian companies interested in accessing the European market could therefore potentially be included, particularly if their products can be integrated with the NEXUS software.

The company plans to use the €30 million in funding from the Dutch Ministry of Defence over a three-year period to develop and refine the software architecture needed to integrate unmanned aerial and ground systems into a single operational ecosystem.

The Netherlands is known for being particularly effective and for standing out among other NATO members in its adoption of defence innovation. This case perfectly illustrates how cooperation with Ukraine can inspire change at home.

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Earlier, I wrote about the Lithuanian company also testing its defence innovation in Ukraine: Drone Testing in Ukraine: Experience of Lithuanian Granta Autonomy.

Where Drone Warfare in Ukraine Stands, and Where It Is Heading

Two Ukrainian experts—Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, a military radio technology specialist and adviser to the President of Ukraine on the development of defence technologies, and Serg Marco, a marine, a sniper, and a senior sergeant of the drone company of the 59th brigade —recorded a webinar for Victory Drones discussing the latest drone-related developments in the Russia-Ukraine war.

Here is the summary of their conversation.

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Protection against drones—both aerial and naval—is the focus of this week’s newsletter.

While Russia is doubling down on jet-powered Shaheds and Ukraine is searching for effective countermeasures, Ukraine’s campaign in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov is disrupting Russia’s export logistics. So far, Russia has been unable to implement sufficient measures to protect its vessels and other maritime assets.

In this edition:

• Jet-Powered Shaheds and How Ukraine Plans to Counter Them;

• Frontline Air Defence in Ukraine (based on the Ukrainian podcast);

• Why Russia Still Cannot Counter Ukraine’s Naval Drones (based on the Russian podcast).

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Meanwhile, thanks to your donations to my drone fundraiser, I managed to purchase not one but two Mavic 3T drones for my friend’s unit. Here is their thank-you video!

Jet-Powered Shaheds and How Ukraine Plans to Counter Them

Russia has been using jet-powered Shahed/Geran drones against Ukraine for over a year. President Zelensky identified countering these threats as one of Ukraine’s most important priorities. These drones can reach speeds of up to 500 km/h, making them extremely difficult for Ukraine’s existing air defence solutions—including mobile fire groups and interceptor drones—to counter.

The use of jet-powered Shaheds is particularly dangerous in Ukrainian regions bordering Russia. A Geran-3 launched from Russia’s Belgorod region can reach Kharkiv in about 70 seconds, leaving air defence units even less time to respond than during an S-300 missile attack. Jet-powered drones targeting Kharkiv reach speeds of up to 450 km/h. This speed complicates detection: it appears on the radar, and a second later it is already somewhere else. The sound they produce in flight also resembles that of a missile.

At the same time, jet-powered Shaheds have many vulnerabilities.

They are highly unmaneuverable. The Russians have installed a powerful engine in the lightweight, almost paper-thin airframe of the old Shahed. It cannot withstand even very wide, multi-kilometre turns without losing a great deal of speed. It is precisely during these turns that Ukraine’s air defences often manage to intercept them.

So far, the flight patterns of the jet-powered variants resemble testing, possibly even without warheads. The enemy is still experimenting and learning.

There also appear to be launch-related problems. The launch process is evidently lengthy and technically complicated. While conventional Shaheds can be launched by the dozens simultaneously, the jet-powered variants are launched, at best, one at a time every half-hour. Their range is also relatively limited.

Marian Zablotsky, a former Ukrainian parliamentarian currently serving in air defence units, described jet-powered Shaheds as “a new challenge for which there is not yet an immediate, large-scale response.” Proposed solutions for countering such attacks already exist and have been submitted by several manufacturers.

A representative of Ukraine’s General Staff identified three main interception systems currently being developed by military innovators to counter this threat:

• Interceptor drones — these operate at specific altitudes and speeds that are better “not disclosed publicly.” They also use specialized guidance algorithms designed to improve accuracy when pursuing a target from behind.

• A fixed-wing platform capable of carrying other interceptors — these interceptors would accelerate to speeds of 500–700 km/h and operate at the altitudes used by Russia’s jet-powered Shahed drones (4–6 km, and up to 9 km). This option could become the most widely deployed because it is cost-effective and easy to scale.

• A “smart” missile — described as a “new architecture built from inexpensive components,” capable of operating at altitudes of up to 6 km and ranges of up to 15 km.

If these solutions prove effective, the General Staff plans to combine them.

Jet-powered Shaheds are most dangerous when operated under real-time control through a mesh network, says Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, a former adviser to Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov and a current adviser to President Zelensky.

With support from BRAVE1 and the General Staff’s Main Directorate of Electronic Warfare, Ukrainian EW manufacturers are working on technologies designed to jam the mesh-radio control channels used by Shaheds.

The development of interceptors designed to counter this threat is gaining momentum in Ukraine.

The SPYS interceptor drone, presented by the Ukrainian company WIY Drones, has a maximum speed of 600 km/h, a range of 12 km, and a payload capacity of 0.3 kg. It is equipped with a target-guidance system and supports the integration of autonomous launch and deployment capabilities for reaching the target area.

SkyFall unveiled its new P1-SUN JetKiller interceptor, designed to counter jet-powered Shaheds. It can reach speeds of up to 370 km/h. It has undergone combat testing and has already destroyed more than a dozen jet-powered Shaheds.

According to Ukrainian experts, conventional Shaheds won’t disappear. They will be directed toward the line of contact and used much like artillery. They will also probably be employed more frequently against Ukraine’s western regions.

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I track the latest innovations, including interceptor drones, in my weekly two-page newsletter, Ukraine Drone Brief, available to VIP subscribers.

Frontline Air Defence in Ukraine

In an interview with Militarnyi, the commander of the Ramses Air-Defence Drone Battalion discusses modern frontline air defence: how Ukrainian forces protect infantry from reconnaissance and strike drones, counter waves of Shaheds, and respond to the growing threat of jet-powered UAVs.

Here is my summary of their conversation.

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Over the past couple of months, there have been many Ukrainian successes in defence innovation and its application on the battlefield. They exist first and foremost because of the talented teams working in Ukraine’s defence technology sector and the skilled, dedicated military personnel. The government’s role may be secondary, but it is instrumental in enabling industry and the defence forces to obtain what they need to work effectively.

Many of the successes we have witnessed were enabled by Defence Minister Fedorov and his team: their commitment to data-driven processes, human-centric warfare, and the removal of state barriers to effective cooperation among all actors in Ukraine’s defence ecosystem.

I will not devote much attention in my newsletter to everything Fedorov’s team achieved or to the reasons for its removal from the Ministry of Defence. Instead, I will continue focusing on the same subjects as before: technologies, tactics, adaptations, and iterations.

One thing is clear: his dismissal is a loss for Ukraine’s defence and a win for Russia. But the war goes on, and I would like to keep supporting Ukraine in every way I can.

Yesterday, we managed to close the fundraiser for a drone for my friend’s battalion in record time, and the Mavic will soon be heading to the frontline! Thank you to everyone who donated!

After such a long intro, let’s move on to the recent developments in drone warfare.

Baba Yaga drones are making headlines again. They have now become instrumental in what Russians describe as the “new assault tactics” of Ukraine.

Since Russians like to demonize something, I have combined reporting on the Baba Yaga—Russia’s name for the large Vampire multirotors—with reports on the so-called Martian drones, another Russian nickname, this time for the Hornet drones.

In this edition:

• Vampire, or “Baba Yaga,” Drones: New Tactics for Frontline Logistics;

• The Hornet Carousel: Why Quantity Matters;

• Russians Refine the Concept of Modern Anti-Drone Air Defence.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

In addition to these three long reads, I also publish the weekly two-page Ukraine Drone Brief, featuring a concise list of the latest drone-related developments.

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Vampire, or “Baba Yaga,” Drones: New Tactics for Frontline Logistics

Russian military channel Ramzay describes an emerging transformation in Ukrainian infantry assault tactics and frontline logistics:

• Ukrainian infantry is increasingly infiltrating positions in small, lightly equipped groups. Individual vehicles and convoys are still used and can sometimes succeed, but dense vegetation allows Ukrainian troops to move more covertly and approach positions on foot.

• Assault troops cross the kill zone without carrying heavy equipment. Instead of transporting all their supplies themselves, Ukrainian units increasingly rely on aerial delivery once they reach a designated area.

• Heavy drones are used to equip fresh assault groups directly near the frontline. According to Russian military channels, “Baba Yaga” heavy multirotor drones deliver body armour, ammunition, FPV drones, Starlink terminals, heavy weapons and other supplies.

• Once equipped, the assault group can rapidly advance toward its objective. Russian observers argue that this approach is effective because soldiers do not have to carry heavy equipment for dozens of kilometres before launching an attack.

• Ukrainian logistics has not disappeared; it has moved into the air. What began as isolated drone-delivery missions has reportedly evolved into a more systematic aerial resupply network.

• This creates new challenges for Russian assault units. Positions that previously may have been held by exhausted Ukrainian soldiers with rifles and limited ammunition can now unexpectedly contain well-equipped troops with anti-tank weapons or heavy machine guns.

• Russian channels question whether their own forces can replicate this tactic. They argue that doing so would require a sufficient number of genuinely operational heavy-lift drones or unmanned ground vehicles.

• They also express scepticism about official claims regarding the scale of Russian robotic logistics. Although Russian media frequently report the deployment of thousands of unmanned supply platforms, the author implies that the number of systems actually operating on the frontline is considerably smaller.

In April, AIN reported that a Ukrainian military unit used satellite-internet control technology on Vampire heavy-lift drones. This allows operators to control the drones remotely from more than 1,100 kilometres away from the frontline.

This technology is particularly valuable in areas where unmanned ground vehicles cannot operate because of difficult terrain and where conventional drone-control links may be disrupted by Russian EW.

The main requirement for this technology is a stable internet connection. A special control module is integrated into the drone, allowing command signals to be transmitted through a satellite communications channel. Once connected, the operator gains full control and can conduct frontline missions while remaining hundreds of kilometres away from the fighting.

The system uses remote-control boards produced by a Ukrainian manufacturer.

The unit says signal latency is minimal and is not noticeable at the Vampire’s operating speeds. Starlink imposes a speed limit of approximately 70–90 km/h on the platform carrying the terminal, but this is not a major issue because the Vampire cargo drone normally flies at no more than 50–60 km/h.

Operators only need to monitor the drone’s speed in strong tailwinds, when it may approach the Starlink terminal’s operating limit.

Several satellite-controlled drones can be launched from the same position. Unlike conventional radio-controlled systems, they do not interfere with one another’s signals.

The unit claims that an operator can learn to control the satellite-linked Vampire drone in approximately five days.

Russian forces are increasingly trying to track and intercept Ukrainian Vampire drones. This has become particularly noticeable around Kostiantynivka, where Russian forces have reportedly shot down such drones more frequently in recent months, disrupting supplies to Ukrainian troops operating inside the city.

Russian forces reportedly identified one of the launch sites used for heavy cargo-drone missions. They then expended four Gerbera decoy drones in an attack on that location, underscoring the operational importance they attach to disrupting Ukrainian aerial logistics.

Russian radar systems are also helping detect Ukrainian drones and facilitate their interception. In November 2025, Ukrainian electronic-warfare specialist Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov told Defence Express that Russia’s SKVP radar accounted for approximately 90% of its overall counter-drone surveillance system. SKVP stands for System for Airspace Monitoring.

At the time, he warned that unless Ukraine fundamentally changed the situation, Russian forces could eventually destroy virtually all Ukrainian reconnaissance drones.

The SKVP radar can reportedly detect unmanned aerial vehicles at ranges of up to 20 kilometres. Once a drone is detected, Russian interceptor-drone operators are directed toward it.

Interceptor-drone crews are usually positioned approximately 2–5 kilometres from the radar, allowing them to respond quickly to detected Ukrainian UAVs. This radar–interceptor combination has become a major threat not only to Ukrainian reconnaissance UAVs but also to heavy-lift drones used for frontline resupply.

Here is my earlier report: “Baba Yaga” Drones in Ukraine: Key Trends.

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The Hornet Carousel: Why Quantity Matters

Hornet strike drones have become one of the key factors behind the “logistics lockdown” in Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine. Roads across southern and eastern Ukraine are now littered with hundreds of burned-out fuel tankers and trucks. Check out my earlier long read: Drone warfare in Ukraine: Hornet strike drones.

The first reports of the American-made Hornet drone focused on its use by the Azov Corps in occupied Donetsk and Mariupol. Since then, new accounts of Hornet operations have continued to emerge, and several elite Ukrainian units are now known to have employed the system.

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Over the past year, there has been less activity involving Ukraine’s naval drones — perhaps because all the large targets have been destroyed, disabled, or moved out of their reach. Now, Ukraine is demonstrating a novel use for this technology: air defence, with interceptor drones launched from maritime platforms. We already saw the first such case in April, and now there is a plan to create an entire defensive line of these systems along the sea coast.

In this edition:

• Ukraine to Create Sea-Based Interceptor Drone Defence Line;

• Latest Updates in Russian Drones;

• Ukraine’s Deep-Strike and Middle-Strike Missions: Who Chooses the Targets?

• Ground Drones Also Need Evacuation.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

Three months ago, I started the weekly Ukraine Drone Brief — a two-page list of the latest drone-related developments, published every Saturday. It is available to VIP subscribers and can be accessed here. And here is an example of a free edition.

Also, I recently joined Patrick Tucker, the science and technology editor at Defense One, to discuss some of Ukraine’s most notable UGV operations to date. Watch his story:

If you represent a Ukrainian defence-related company or a foreign company operating in Ukraine and are open to commenting on your work and technologies, you can reach out to me at Olena.uamonitor@gmail.com. Together we can try to find an angle that I could cover in my publication.

I never ask for or accept any payment, but my work is not PR material either. I always try to prepare balanced publications. That said, so far, I have never published anything harsh or negative about any company operating in Ukraine or helping Ukraine win this war.

And with that, let’s move on to the most recent developments in drone warfare in Ukraine.

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Ukraine to Create Sea-Based Interceptor Drone Defence Line

On July 4 in Odesa, President Zelensky said that Ukraine needs to establish a defensive line at sea using interceptor drones to protect Odesa from the air.

The president added that Ukraine has developed a fleet of naval drones unlike any other country's: it can deploy 100–200 naval drones in a single operation and even use them to shoot down helicopters.

An example of such integration was already seen in April 2026, when Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces intercepted a Russian Shahed-type drone with an interceptor drone launched from an unmanned surface platform. The operation was carried out by the naval drone division of the 412th Nemesis Brigade.

In his April article for Oboronka (which I summarized here), Bohdan Miroshnychenko wrote that Russian forces often try to overwhelm Ukrainian air defences by launching large numbers of Shahed-type drones toward the same target. Since they cannot launch all drones at once, the Shaheds are released in smaller batches and may gather outside the reach of Ukrainian air defences — including over the Black Sea — before attacking as a concentrated group.

Ukraine’s challenge is to prevent this buildup before the drones reach its cities. To do this, Ukrainian forces have been developing technology to launch interceptor drones from maritime platforms. This work took more than a year.

The concept required solving three main challenges: detecting targets at sea with a combined network of radars and sensors; creating a reusable naval platform capable of carrying launch containers, EW-resistant communications, interceptor drones, and self-defence systems; and developing a new-generation interceptor drone with improved communications and remote launch capability.

The Shahed was reportedly shot down by a STING interceptor drone produced by Wild Hornets. (My recent material about them: Inside Ukraine’s Interceptor Drone Race: A Pilot’s View).

Russian analyst Leviev said that this air defence model could be particularly relevant for the conditions of the Gulf countries, where interceptor drones can be launched from maritime platforms.

“What kind of air defence can you build if you are surrounded by water?” he noted, explaining that there had already been discussions about paying more attention to this configuration.

In his view, the war in the Middle East gave an additional push to the development of sea-based interceptor drone technologies, and President Zelensky, during his spring tour of the region, likely promoted this solution to partners.

Ukraine recently opened its arms exports, and naval drones have been among the first items made available, as Ukrainian producers can fully meet domestic demand. According to Zelensky, Ukraine has already reached agreements with Gulf countries on the supply of naval drones. (Check out my earlier articles on the topic: Maritime and River Drones.)

Ukraine is also developing a new concept for the use of naval drones, under which they would detain commercial vessels belonging to Russia’s shadow fleet in the Black Sea rather than destroy them.

But naval drones are not the only systems able to operate in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov regions.

Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces struck nine tankers from Russia’s shadow fleet in the Sea of Azov overnight on July 8. Commander Robert “Madyar” Brovdi said that 21 vessels had been hit over 72 hours: 19 shadow-fleet tankers, one dry cargo vessel, and one ferry in Kerch.

According to Russian sources, the tankers were moving in a characteristically vulnerable formation: a dense, defenseless mass of ships in the middle of the sea, effectively creating a shooting range for Ukrainian FP-2 drone operators. There was no cover from Black Sea Fleet vessels, which have long struggled to protect even themselves, and no fire teams on board the ships.

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Latest Updates in Russian Drones

Not only Ukrainian, but also Russian drones get updates and changes into the tactics of their use almost on a daily basis. I’ve summarized some of the recent trends.

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Since April, when my first report on the mysterious “Martian” drone came out, we have learned that it is the Hornet drone developed by the American Swift Beat LLC (now Perennial Autonomy). It is almost silent, resistant to jamming, fast, flies at low altitude, and has AI-based technology.

It has been used by Ukraine’s best military formations, including Azov, and continues to play an important role in the “logistical lockdown” campaign.

Given that Russian Telegram channels now write about these drones almost daily, I decided to dedicate a special edition of my newsletter to Hornet. Unlike my usual reporting, this issue will be based mostly on Russian analysis. “From this description, I can feel their fear — it reads between the lines,” commented my friend in the Ukrainian Armed Forces after seeing my drafts.

In this edition:

• Hornet or Martian-2, Analyzed by Russians: Technical Characteristics of an “Unjammable” Drone;

• Ukraine’s Use of Aerostats for Middle-Strike Campaign;

• Russian Countermeasures Against Hornet Drones;

• Rubikon’s Experience.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

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This is a longer, approximately 10-page newsletter focusing on unmanned technologies. If you are looking for a shorter read, check out my weekly Ukraine Drone Brief, available to VIP-tier subscribers.

Hornet or Martian-2, Analyzed by Russians: Technical Characteristics of an “Unjammable” Drone

I have collected information from several Russian Telegram channels and a one-hour YouTube video that provides detailed technical characteristics of this drone. They have disassembled and analyzed a captured Hornet drone.

• The first attacks by drones of this type were recorded in March 2026 near Donetsk. Later, its range increased to 150 km into the Russian rear. By mid-2026, these drones began to have a noticeable impact on logistics in southern Russia.

• Strikes on convoys along the R-280 highway became so frequent that the road connecting Rostov Oblast with Crimea began to be called the “road of rage” or the “road of death” for trucks.

• Russians describe the Hornet as a factory-made, fixed-wing, medium-range drone with an onboard AI-based target-search system.

• In Russia, this drone is known as “Martian-2.” Martian-1 was an earlier and smaller Bumblebee kamikaze quadcopter produced by the same manufacturer, Swift Beat LLC.

• Hornet is larger and flies farther and higher. It is a small fixed-wing aircraft-type drone with a straight wing of about 2.2 m in span, an elongated fuselage about 1.4 m long, and a pusher propeller in the tail section.

• The drone is equipped with a powerful SE4720 brushless electric motor, which is usually used on heavy industrial drones.

• The nose section of the drone is smooth; this is where the forward-facing optics are located. The internal space of the fuselage is divided between electronics, the battery, and the warhead.

• Russian sources note the drone’s high acoustic stealth: it is often detected too late. To reduce noise, soft rubber is used on the propeller blades, along with a vibration-absorbing motor mount.

• The straight wing was chosen to increase lift, save battery power, and ensure stable flight at cruising speed. It also simplifies and reduces the cost of producing a disposable drone.

• The downside of the straight wing is vulnerability to flutter during a dive. To reduce the risk of structural failure, the wing uses a carbon-fiber spar and metal connecting sleeves.

• The drone has no landing gear. A portable catapult with tension or pneumatic boosters is used for launch.

• The drone’s weight is up to 20 kg.

• An alternative launch method using balloons is also mentioned: the drone is lifted by an aerostat to an altitude of several kilometers, drifts with the wind, and is launched already in the air, which allows it to save battery power.

• The drone’s cruising speed is estimated at approximately 100–120 km/h.

• Power is supplied by a two-kilogram battery made of high-capacity lithium-ion cells, presumably Samsung 21700 cells in a 12S2P configuration. A fully charged battery provides a voltage of about 50.4 V.

• During the cruise phase, the drone’s main task is to pass through the frontline zone saturated with EW. For this reason, Hornet is designed as a system that is almost independent of satellite navigation.

• GPS is used as an auxiliary tool for occasional coordinate checks. Russian sources claim that, at the front, GPS is sometimes switched off so that the drone cannot be diverted by spoofing. On the drone shown in the video, there was a label in Ukrainian that read “Do not use GPS.”

• The main navigation is based on optical flow: a downward-facing camera continuously films the ground, while the processor tracks the movement of the terrain beneath the drone.

• At night or over a uniform surface, for example, snow, an infrared spotlight may be activated to illuminate the ground and help the optics maintain course.

• The flight mission is uploaded in coordinates, after which the drone enters the hunting area on autopilot.

• Along the route, Hornet can fly in radio-silence mode with its antennas switched off, making it harder to detect using electronic intelligence systems.

• When the drone begins transmitting, its signal is reportedly software-shifted to non-standard frequencies in the 160–450 MHz range via HopeRF modules.

• These frequencies were allegedly chosen to disguise the signal as channels used by Russian digital civilian radios or military radio stations. Attempts to jam such a channel may simultaneously disrupt communications of their own units.

  My Ukrainian contact in the AFU commented on this in the following way: “160–450 MHz sounds unrealistic: the antennas would have to be too different. Perhaps some systems operate in the 160–200 MHz range, while others use 400–450 MHz. In that case, the claim looks more plausible”.

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Ukraine’s middle-strike campaign is in full swing. More than 300 verified drone strikes have disabled Russian air defence systems and targeted infrastructure facilities, warehouses, depots, and military transport. Last week, Ukrainian drones delivered a critical blow to a major logistics route across the Chonhar Bridge, which connects occupied Kherson Oblast with occupied Crimea.

In this edition, we focus on some of the unique unmanned systems used in these operations, as well as a broader analysis of Ukraine’s middle-range strike campaign:

• Ukraine’s Behemoth Drone Strikes the Chonhar Bridge;

• How Middle-Strike Drones Are Destroying Russian Logistics;

• “Drone Diplomacy”: Ukraine Is Launching Drone Deals;

• Ukraine’s First Autonomous Interceptor Drones;

• and additional developments in drone warfare in Russia and Ukraine.

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If you missed it, read my in-depth piece on ground drones for the Defence Procurement International here (page 34). For this article, I interviewed the Third Army Corps’ NC13 — currently one of the leading Ukrainian units in employing ground drones — as well as the Ukrainian company DevDroid.

My earlier reporting on ground drones:

• Ukrainian and Russian Ground Robots Have Already Met in Combat: Ratel Robotics;

• Ground Drones in 2026: What to Expect.

Ukraine’s Behemoth Drone Strikes the Chonhar Bridge

Ukraine demonstrated the first public use of the new domestic Shahed-like Behemoth drone. It is a middle-strike UAV capable of carrying up to 75 kg of explosives over a distance of up to 300 km.

On the night of June 7, these drones were reportedly used for the first time in a raid on a Chonhar bridge, which connects the occupied Kherson region to the occupied Crimea. This route is one of the key logistical corridors used to supply Russian forces on the peninsula.

Russian forces use the bridge to deliver ammunition and fuel from occupied Crimea and supply Russian forces fighting in the Hulyaipole direction (Zaporizhzhia region).

The strike damaged the bridge deck and forced the occupying forces to close a key route to the peninsula. Behemoth was used as part of a strike package alongside FP-2 drones.

Ukrainian forces launched a second strike against the bridge on June 9. According to military sources, the bridge was not destroyed, but it was completely disabled. Transport traffic across the bridge has been blocked.

Ukrainian experts say that for a bridge to collapse, a strike must hit and destroy one of its supports. That is not easy to do. Bridges are best destroyed either through sabotage methods or by a powerful missile strike against the bridge support.

Behemoth was developed by GLEFA and Culver Aerospace and was presented at the Wild Drones exhibition in late May of 2026.

The tandem warhead is the Behemoth’s main advantage among drones of its class. The nose section contains a 40 kg high-explosive fragmentation warhead, followed by a 35 kg thermobaric warhead. The total payload reaches 75 kg, which is a very significant figure for a drone of this format. Russian channels write that this type of warhead is capable of causing critical damage to surface combat ships, as well as to a range of ground fortifications.

The drone’s cruising speed is 170–180 km/h, while its maximum speed is 200 km/h. Its operational altitude in combat mode ranges from 90 to 300 meters. This low-altitude flight profile makes it more difficult for enemy air defence systems to detect the drone.

The preparation time before launch is no more than 15 minutes, which is critically important in fast-moving operations.

Behemoth supports three control modes: FPV, semi-automatic, and fully autonomous.

Connectivity is provided via Starlink. This allows the system to be adapted to different scenarios, from precision strikes with manual guidance to operations under active EW. The developers have also confirmed the existence of a Behemoth Deep Strike version for attacks at significantly longer ranges.

Russian Telegram channels claim that Russia has still not solved the problem of a lack of airborne EW systems capable of suppressing Starlink terminals and blocking video transmission in the 13–40 GHz frequency range.

They also argue that Crimea and Mariupol, including the R-280 highway, urgently require a full-fledged counter-drone “umbrella” based on automated anti-aircraft machine-gun turret systems such as Citadel and Zubr, as well as several hundred Verba MANPADS teams dispersed around the outskirts of populated areas. They also call for large numbers of inexpensive UAV interceptors, such as Lis-2 and Molniya-2P, receiving target designation from airspace surveillance radars.

The post states that there is currently an acute shortage of Pantsir-S1/S1M and Tor-M2 systems, as well as lighter air defence assets, along the Crimea–Azov operational direction, and argues that this gap must be addressed as quickly as possible.

According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence, enemy air defence assets and radars are among the key priority targets for their middle-range strikes. In April 2026, Ukraine’s Defence Forces destroyed almost twice as many air defence systems and radars as, for example, in October of the previous year.

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How Middle-Strike Drones Are Destroying Russian Logistics

According to Oboronka’s calculations, during the first year of middle-strike drone operations, Ukraine’s Defence Forces reported more than 365 confirmed strikes with video evidence. Most of them targeted Russian air defence systems — 172 confirmed strikes. Other targets included 48 deployment points, 35 energy infrastructure facilities, 42 warehouses, and 31 aviation-related targets.

Here is a summary of the article by Ilya Volynsky for Oboronka:

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More and more, we hear claims that Ukraine has turned the tide. We cannot say this with certainty yet, but Ukraine’s recent advances in drone warfare deserve attention:

• Significant damage to Russia’s logistics through the scaling and mass use of middle-strike drones and other capabilities, making the war increasingly difficult for Russian forces;

• Ukrainian drones are penetrating multi-layered air defence systems in major Russian cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, reaching as far as the Ural Mountains, and striking strategic sites across the country.

• The growing integration of AI-enabled technologies across different domains, including air defence, short- and long-range unmanned strike capabilities.

Some of these developments are addressed in this edition of my newsletter, Drone Warfare in Ukraine:

• FPV Drone Hits Target at 103 km: A New Record;

• Drone-Assault Units: Ukraine’s New Doctrine;

• What Is NATO Doing Wrong? Lessons from the Aurora Exercises in Sweden;

• additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

After weeks of travelling and presentations, I’m returning to my regular reporting on this topic.

Also, don’t forget to check my recent open-access report: Operation Spiderweb: One Year Later.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

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Ukraine’s FPV Drone Hits Target at 103 km: A New Record

A pilot from the Fenix (Phoenix) border guard unit covered a distance of 103 kilometers using a standard FPV drone and struck enemy logistics. A military-purpose truck was hit, as reported by the Fenix border guard unit. This is a record-breaking operation, as multicopter FPV drones usually hit their targets at 25-30 km.

In a comment with Suspilne, the unit said that the FPV drone covered this distance on its own, without a so-called “mothership” (without being transported to the strike area by a fixed-wing UAV). This result was achieved thanks to several factors: “First and foremost, it was the pilot’s skill.

Second, it was the improvement of our drone fleet and its equipment with advanced technologies.

Of course, it is also worth highlighting Fenix’s engineering team, as every drone passes through their hands and is upgraded according to the specific operations it is expected to carry out.”

I spoke with the Fenix unit and received additional details about the drone used, as well as what FPV drone manufacturers should consider when developing systems capable of reaching such distances.

“The FPV drone used to carry out our record-breaking strike was made in Ukraine. It comes from a domestic Ukrainian manufacturer whose drones are supplied to the Fenix border guard unit by the Sternenko Community Charitable Foundation,” the press service of the unit told me.

To improve combat work and effectiveness, the unit remains in constant contact with the manufacturer. They send a batch of drones, the unit tests them, and then provides feedback after use. Fenix communicates all its requests and comments directly to the manufacturer’s representatives, who take them into account. When a new batch of drones arrives, it is already adapted to the frontline needs.

It is worth noting that the need to increase the flight range of FPV drones is not a whim. The enemy understands that, at the tactical level, it is no problem for Ukrainian forces to reach and neutralize any target. Therefore, they move all their activities as far away from us as possible: ammunition deliveries, food supplies, and personnel rotations — the enemy tries to carry all of this out deep in its rear. Moreover, these activities usually take place at night and in the morning, roughly between 3:00 am and 8:00 am. This is precisely why such long-range flights are critically necessary.

“What we have demonstrated now is still not the limit. Fenix pilots are capable of flying even deeper into the enemy’s rear. But every such operation depends on a number of factors:

• weather conditions;

• the individual experience and skill of the FPV drone pilot;

• the skills and knowledge of the pilot’s second operator, who is responsible for signal retransmission;

• the location from which the drones are controlled”.

It works well if the manufacturer is willing to listen to combat pilots and adapt its equipment to battlefield needs. There are several important aspects that should receive manufacturers’ attention in the future.

• It is important to equip batteries with high-quality power cells and to increase their capacity. This is an important aspect, although not the main one.

• Special attention should also be paid to radio receivers. Work is needed to improve their quality, as well as to develop and introduce unique frequencies, because this is currently a rather problematic issue on the battlefield.

• The number of FPV drones is growing — and this is a positive development. But operators are beginning to interfere with one another’s work. The signal can be disrupted not only by enemy systems but also by the neighboring friendly FPV drone pilots. And the farther you fly, the worse the signal becomes. If it was possible to fly on different, unique frequencies, this problem would not arise.

• It is also necessary to work on improving video transmitters and cameras. The signal deteriorates with distance, while nighttime operations further worsen the image received by the FPV drone pilot. Accordingly, the higher the quality of the camera and the image transmitted by the video transmitter, the greater the chance of successfully carrying out a combat operation.

When I asked my contact in Ukraine’s Armed Forces whether it makes sense to equip simple multicopter FPV drones with more expensive components, he said that it absolutely does. In his unit, improved batteries already allow drones to reach targets up to 50 km away, while improved cameras simply help operators see the target more clearly.

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Drone-Assault Units: Ukraine’s New Doctrine

In April 2026, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense announced that the Defense Forces were introducing a new model of warfare: drone-assault units that combine aerial and ground unmanned systems with infantry “into a single system.”

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Operation Spiderweb is a manual in asymmetric warfare. In June 2025, many of us were stunned by videos showing hundreds of small FPV drones striking Russian strategic aircraft one by one. Over the past year, I have published several reports and summarized a number of articles on Operation Spiderweb.

Today, I will recap some of this information, complement it with recent updates, and present the emerging concept of remote drone warfare.

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I’ll start this post with an excellent summary by the 413th Regiment of the Unmanned Systems Forces of Ukraine:

• On June 1, 2025, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) conducted the unique Operation Spiderweb, reportedly targeting 34% of Russia’s long-range aviation, including Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 cruise missile carriers, A-50 airborne early warning aircraft, and Il-78 tanker aircraft.

• The operation was remarkable not only because of the scale of Russian losses, but also because of the method used. Trucks carrying camouflaged FPV strike drones approached key Russian strategic aviation airfields, including Engels, Olenya, and Belaya. The drones then struck the aircraft from extremely close range. In the Amur region, the plan failed when the drone-bearing truck bound for Russia’s Ukrainka base caught fire on the highway.

• According to open-source reports, the strike involved First Contact’s Osa FPV drones, which are known for their reinforced frame and AI-based targeting system.

• Russia tried to conceal the scale of its losses, as the strike targeted its strategic aviation and reportedly affected nearly a third of Russia’s strategic aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

• Open-source information suggests that Russia may have lost up to 15 Tu-95MS strategic bombers, or around a quarter of its entire fleet of this aircraft type.

• As a result, Russia’s use of Tu-95MS aircraft for strikes against Ukraine reportedly declined by at least 20–30%.

• The use of Tu-22M3 bombers after Operation Spiderweb became very rare — roughly once every six months — likely due to losses sustained during the operation.

• The SBU estimated Russia’s losses at around $7 billion. However, the financial cost is not the main issue: Russia can no longer produce new Tu-95MS or Tu-22M3 aircraft, meaning any losses of these platforms are irreversible.

• Operation Spiderweb also served as a warning to the United States. It demonstrated that even American strategic aviation could potentially be disabled by simple AI-enabled FPV drones, making Ukraine’s combat experience especially valuable.

• Finally, Operation Spiderweb became a kind of prologue to the wider use of artificial intelligence in the current drone war.

  (AI technologies were reportedly used for terminal guidance. Among other methods, the AI was trained to recognize target features on real aircraft displayed in Ukrainian museums).

  Read my 1-year-old article on Operation Spiderweb.

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Damage Assessment

Russia’s Ministry of Defence estimated the damage at 2 billion rubles ($26 million). However, this figure appears low, as even the loss of a single Tu-95 would cost far more; 2 billion rubles is closer to the estimated cost of a Su-34. According to this account, Russian Aerospace Forces losses from Operation Spiderweb amounted to seven Tu-95 bombers and four Tu-22M3 bombers.

According to Ukrainian official communication, Operation Spiderweb destroyed or damaged at least 41 Russian aircraft, with estimated Russian losses of around $7 billion.

How the Operation Was Carried Out

• According to the WSJ report, President Zelensky tasked the SBU with disrupting Russia’s strategic aviation, which was used for missile strikes against Ukraine.

• The SBU chose an asymmetric approach: smuggling small FPV drones into Russia to strike high-value aircraft at airbases.

• It took the SBU 18 months to prepare this operation under conditions of absolute secrecy. According to the creator of the Osa FPV drone, Valeriy Borovyk, even the drone development team was not told the real purpose of the operation.

• The drones were transported in parts, assembled inside Russia, and launched from concealed cabins with batteries and solar panels.

• The young couple (Russian citizens of Ukrainian origin) recruited by the SBU reportedly assembled the systems in a rented warehouse in Russia. Following instructions from Ukraine via audio and video calls, they spent hours assembling around 150 drones and eight mobile cabins for transport and launch.

• The drones were hidden under the cabin roofs, which were mounted on trucks. At the right moment, the roofs opened remotely, allowing the drones to launch and attack Russian aircraft.

• Five trucks were used to transport the eight cabins, although one failed to reach its destination.

• Experienced Ukrainian drone pilots were pulled from the front line and underwent intensive training, without initially being told the final targets. They learned the actual targets only on the day of the operation.

• Once near the airfields, operators in Kyiv took control through local cellular networks and onboard camera feeds.

• In total, 117 drones were launched.

The Concept of Remote Drone Warfare: The First Contact

The drones used in this operation looked like ordinary FPV drones, yet they were unique. Cheap drones, which are now being widely used on the front line, cannot be employed to carry out such complex operations deep inside enemy territory.

In an exclusive commentary to Ukraine’s Arms Monitor in August 2025, Valeriy Borovyk from First Contact, said that such drones are primarily designed for specific operations — they are tested for a long time, redesigned multiple times, and many pilots are trained to operate them. They are only one part of a larger machine involving special groups, officers, and agents. In the end, the drones must strike precisely and not fail those who prepared the mission.

Last week, Valeriy published an article on the first anniversary of the operation. In it, he argues that Spiderweb demonstrated the emerging concept of Remote Drone Warfare — a model in which trained drone operators can conduct combat missions from afar, without being physically present at the battlefield.

Key points from the article:

• Before Operation Spiderweb, Ukrainian units had already tested a model in which FPV pilots did not need to deploy directly to the front line. Instead, drones could be activated near the combat zone, while trained operators carried out missions remotely from safer locations.

• Operation Spiderweb applied this approach at a much greater scale and complexity. It demonstrated that strike drones could be controlled remotely by pilots located thousands of kilometres away from the target.

• According to Borovyk, this experience revived an idea that had seemed almost unrealistic at the beginning of the full-scale war: a system in which drones are positioned near the line of contact, while operators from different locations — potentially even different countries — conduct missions in real time.

• Borovyk describes this as a new type of warfare, where technology reduces the importance of physical distance between the battlefield and the person participating in combat.

• Remote-control systems are no longer just being developed and tested — they are already entering active use. The goal is not only to increase operational effectiveness, but also to reduce dependence on scarce personnel.

• Ukraine has already used interceptor drones against Shaheds, with pilots controlling them remotely from thousands of kilometres away.

• Remotely operated turrets are also being used in short-range air defence, allowing operators to work from protected locations.

• Naval drones are already operating successfully and can be controlled by crews located even in another country.

• The First Contact team is discussing with Ukraine’s Air Force Command and the Main Directorate of Electronic Warfare and Cybersecurity the automation of movement and control for air defence and EW systems mounted on ground robotic platforms, copters, and remotely controlled vehicles.

• The First Contact has been working for several months on developing and implementing a full Remote Drone Warfare concept.

• The core idea is to create a model in which a significant share of combat tasks can be performed by trained remote operators without their physical presence in the combat zone.

• Such a system could change the logic of mobilization, lower the psychological barrier to participation in war, reduce fear of death, and expand the number of people who can contribute to national defence regardless of age, gender, or physical condition.

Main elements of the concept:

• Creating a network of remotely controlled strike and reconnaissance systems positioned in areas most suitable for mission success.

• Scaling the “Spiderweb” principle across the entire line of contact, as well as for sectoral and object-based defence. This includes the idea of so-called “fly-boxes” — platforms with drones that can be placed in fixed or mobile positions, remain on standby, and be activated when needed.

• Building reliable and protected communication systems for remote drone control. These systems would need redundancy, encryption, and multiple backup channels.

• Testing, scaling, and integrating technical solutions into a unified battle management system, potentially including situational awareness tools.

• Ensuring strict control over who is actually operating a drone in real time. Borovyk highlights the need for identity verification, biometric checks, operator-status monitoring, and protected control systems to prevent unauthorized access or misuse.

Overall, Borovyk presents Operation Spiderweb not only as a successful strike on Russian strategic aviation but also as a proof of concept for a broader transformation in drone warfare.

The Operation showed that even countries without nuclear weapons or other powerful strike capabilities can inflict painful damage on one of the world’s leading military powers. More importantly, such operations can target the means of weapons delivery, which changes the logic of deterrence itself. Even the most powerful weapons may remain on a state’s territory if it cannot deliver them to their targets.

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Read relevant articles:

• Drone warfare in Ukraine: operation Spiderweb;

• Osa FPV Drones and Operation Spiderweb;

• Nuclear Deterrence: Russia and Ukraine;

• How Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb Affected Russia’s Strategic Bomber Fleet;

• (Un)Manned Warfare: 80% of Drone Success Depends on Pilot Skill.

To stay up to date on the latest developments in unmanned warfare in Ukraine, subscribe to my new product, Ukraine Drone Brief, available to VIP-tier subscribers.

Ukraine has hinted at potential breakthroughs in AI-driven defence technologies—but what might those actually look like? This week, I spoke with a leading Ukrainian developer of collaborative autonomy software, Swarmer, and reviewed several interviews to assess how close we are to seeing it on the battlefield. There is clear progress—but no one is willing to predict when this shift will fully materialize.

In this edition:

• “Our Goal Is to Replace All UAV Operators”: Ukraine’s Swarmer on Responsibility in Swarm Tech;

• Russians Alarmed by Ukraine’s Mysterious “Martian” Drone;

• Ukraine Seeks Local Developers of Mesh Modems;

• and 5+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

On Saturday, I’ll release the second edition of my 2-page weekly brief on drones in Ukraine and Russia. I plan to continue publishing it even during weeks of reduced availability, when I’m unable to release the full Drone Warfare in Ukraine edition.

In a couple of weeks, the Ukraine Drone Brief will be available only to VIP-tier subscribers.

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“Our Goal Is to Replace All UAV Operators”: Ukraine’s Swarmer on Responsibility in Swarm Tech

Recently, the Head of the Presidential Office, Kyrylo Budanov, noted that Ukraine is placing a strong emphasis on AI in defence technology, which could become a game-changer.

A Ukrainian company, Swarmer, is already making progress in this direction and last year secured the largest publicly announced investment in Ukraine’s defence sector.

Swarmer develops software for coordinating drone swarms. It focuses on models in which the operator sets the objective, and the system distributes tasks among the drones and ensures mission execution, even in environments without GPS or with limited communication.

The technology developed by Swarmer is not tied to any single platform. “It operates at the intelligence layer – enabling large numbers of low-cost unmanned systems to function together as a coordinated, resilient force,” Swarmer Global CEO Serhii Kupriienko told Ukraine’s Arms Monitor

Reportedly, since April 2024, Swarmer’s tech has been deployed in Ukraine with more than 100,000 real-world missions in active combat environments, informing the software and machine-learning models that feed into it.

While the term “drone swarm” is often used to describe large-scale group attacks conducted by Russia against Ukraine, Serhii Kupriienko explained that his company uses a narrow definition of swarming: every member of the group knows everything about all the other members of the group, and can make decisions independently, without a leader and without a single point of failure.

In his interview with the Eastern Circles newsletter, he shared the following:

• A true swarm relies on decentralized coordination, where each drone, depending on its application (reconnaissance, strike drone, demining, logistics…) and environment (land, sea, air), continuously shares data, adapts to changes, and contributes to a collective objective without relying on constant human control.

• One “swarm” can include up to 690 drones (today), split into groups of robotic systems based on their application.

• In a swarm, drones navigate through mutual awareness, constantly recalculating their positions and roles. If one drone is destroyed or fails to complete its task, others immediately adjust—approaching the target from different angles or redistributing responsibilities in real time.

• Unlike humans, who can typically coordinate their actions only with a few individuals they can reach, computers can simulate and manage interactions with hundreds simultaneously.

• Technically, this requires a specific architecture. Swarmer’s approach is based on AI software that connects multiple drones into a unified network. A single operator can supervise the overall mission while the drones themselves handle navigation, targeting, and adaptation.

• With a single drone, a human operator can intervene if something goes wrong. With a swarm of drones, intervention becomes impossible.

• That is why the system should be designed to handle a wide range of failure scenarios: loss of communication, navigation errors, malfunctioning payloads, or rapidly changing battlefield conditions. Each of these variables depends on context—terrain, enemy position, and electronic warfare interference—making the engineering challenge harder.

• Cooperative autonomy has not yet become widespread. Building truly autonomous, coordinated systems requires not only advanced AI, but also new training models, supercomputers, and hardware-software integration.

In an interview with NV, Serhii noted that the underlying technology is not new: early startups working on group control and drone autonomy systems began emerging in the early 2000s. Currently, around one to two dozen companies in Ukraine are working on swarm solutions.

When asked whether a drone could make mistakes and trigger a chain of incorrect decisions within a swarm, Serhii agreed that mistakes are possible. He emphasized that—unlike image generation or systems like ChatGPT—this is about real life, where failures can cost lives.

“In testing, we follow an approach used in the automotive industry—humanity has already partially solved similar challenges in self-driving cars.

Our goal during testing is twofold: first, to reduce the error rate; and second, to ensure that every error can be traced, its root cause understood, and that it is prevented from recurring on the battlefield,” Serhii told NV Business.

The goal of this technology is to remove micromanagement from the human operator without removing responsibility.

“Imagine a scenario where ten drones are deployed with a task: somewhere in a designated area, there are tanks or electronic warfare systems, and the task is to find and strike them. This is a standard concept—in NATO doctrine, it is referred to as a “kill box”, according to which the person assigning the task remains responsible for ensuring that there are no civilians in the area and that all risks are considered, just as in operations involving systems like the Grad rocket launcher or other artillery. The drones do not independently decide what to do; they operate within predefined priorities”.

This is not a scenario where the system “decides on its own.” The level of decision-making autonomy assigned to the system is deliberately limited and does not approach that of a human pilot.

Over the past six to seven months, Swarmer has focused on bringing the solution to operational use on small drones—starting with groups of ten or more FPVs.

Two years ago, Swarmer integrated its system into UGVs, but navigation remains a major challenge for achieving real autonomy. The team is in constant cooperation with UGV manufacturers and partners and is searching for a solution that does not yet exist in the required form.

Background info: Swarmer went public on the Nasdaq on March 17 under the ticker SWMR, with US-based Lucid Capital Markets managing the IPO. The company raised around $15 million in its IPO. The raised funds will be used partly for operational needs, but primarily to continue product development according to the roadmap and to drive adoption. In practice, the bulk of the investment will go toward accelerating integration with different clients, various drone platforms, and information systems.

On April 29, Swarmer announced a strategic partnership with a Ukrainian producer of tactical radios, HIMERA. The collaboration will integrate HIMERA’s jam-resistant radios directly into Swarmer’s next-generation autonomy stack. Read my article about HIMERA: Good Radios Save Lives: HIMERA Tactical Communications in Ukraine.

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Russians Alarmed by Ukraine’s Mysterious “Martian” Drone

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A record-breaking week for Ukraine: an interceptor drone launched from 2,000 km away; the first successful strike on a Shahed by an interceptor deployed from a naval drone; and ground robots capturing positions and accepting Russian surrenders. This is how Ukraine’s novel use of unmanned systems is setting new precedents and attracting growing international interest in partnership.

In this edition:

• Ukrainian and Russian Ground Robots Have Already Met in Combat: Ratel Robotics;

• Ukraine Introduces Universal Ground Control Station for Fiber-Optic FPVs;

• Ukraine Shoots Down Russian Shahed from an Unmanned Boat;

• and 5+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia!

Tomorrow (April 25th), I’m launching a new section of my newsletter: a 2-page weekly brief on unmanned tech developments in Ukraine and Russia for those who want to save time on long reads. This week’s edition will be open access; future issues will be available to founding members only. Consider subscribing!

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Ukrainian and Russian Ground Robots Have Already Met in Combat: Ratel Robotics

On April 13, President Zelensky stated that, for the first time in the war, an enemy position had been captured exclusively by unmanned platforms—ground robots and aerial drones. Russians surrendered, and the operation was carried out without the involvement of infantry and without any Ukrainian casualties.

While this announcement has attracted significant media attention, it remains unclear which specific operation the President was referring to. Since summer 2025, there have been reports of multiple operations conducted solely by unmanned systems. And in January 2026, a video circulated showing several Russian occupiers surrendering to a ground robot.

More than 20 Ukrainian military units now have dedicated divisions specifically for ground drones, and they have privately reported that dozens of similar operations have already been conducted in different configurations.

Recently, it was announced that the Ministry of Defence will contract 25,000 ground robotic systems (UGVs) in the first half of 2026. In 2025, a total of 15,000 ground robots were contracted in Ukraine.

I’ve spoken with one of the top UGV producers in Ukraine—Ratel Robotics—whose Ratel line of robots was mentioned in the President’s speech—about the types of operations they expect to see on the battlefield in 2026 and the technological challenges they face.

Their product line features multiple ground complexes, including a Ratel H, a multi-purpose logistics drone designed for cargo transport and casualty evacuation. It has an operational range of over 50 km, a maximum travel distance of up to 60 km, and a payload capacity of up to 400 kg.

In April 2026, the company introduced the Nurse TB tracked unmanned ground vehicle developed for logistics missions and remote mining. Weighing 120 kilograms, the UGV has a claimed payload of 150 kilograms. In particular, it can transport up to six TM-62 anti-tank mines. The ground drone was equipped with an intelligent "follow me" system: thanks to its camera and target acquisition function, it can automatically follow the fighter.

“The main trend of 2026 is the transition of ground robotic systems from a supporting role to full-fledged combat participation. While previously UGVs were primarily seen as logistical tools, they are now becoming active participants in assault operations. In effect, we are witnessing a paradigm shift: the robot goes in first—while the human operates from a safe distance,” Taras Ostapchuk, CEO of Ratel Robotics, told Ukraine’s Arms Monitor.

One of the key areas here is strike platforms. Mining robots such as Ratel S have already demonstrated their effectiveness—they are capable of reaching detonation range against fortifications, dugouts, and crossings.

The next stage of this development includes:

• integration of mortars;

• installation of remotely operated turrets;

• development of platforms for fire support and FPV protection.

This opens the door to a new tactical approach: the machine enters the position first, suppresses firing points, and after that, infantry can operate in significantly safer conditions.

At the same time, a parallel trend is emerging toward multi-role platforms capable of performing several functions simultaneously—from logistics to strike missions—depending on the installed module.

Importantly, logistical and evacuation platforms are not disappearing—on the contrary, they have already proven their effectiveness on the battlefield and remain a critical part of the ecosystem. Ammunition resupply, casualty evacuation, and position support are already being carried out at scale by UGVs, reducing risks to personnel.

Currently, approximately 80% of logistics tasks on the frontline in Ukraine are performed by ground drones, and Ukraine’s MoD aims to have 100% of frontline logistics handled by UGVs.

When asked whether, in 2026, we will see the first encounters between Russian and Ukrainian ground drones, Ratel Robotics explained that, despite the absence of publicly visible “robot duels” in the media, it is highly likely that the first combat contacts between Ukrainian and Russian UGVs have already occurred.

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The drone munitions sector in Ukraine is evolving alongside unmanned systems and must be continually adapted, as military units require specific quantities of munitions of varying weights and characteristics for their tasks. The same delivery platform can carry varying amounts of explosive material, enabling different effects. Although the state incentivizes Ukrainian manufacturers, improvised munition production continues to play a significant role in filling this critical capability gap.

In this edition:

• Hell’s Kitchen: Drone Munitions in Ukraine;

• Can Ukraine Get Rid of Chinese Cameras?

• Fiber Optics Are Getting More Expensive — So Are Drones;

• and 5+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

If you care about drones as much as I do, don’t ignore this fundraiser for a Mavic 3T drone for my friend serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Currently, over 50% of the target amount has been raised!

Here is the link to the campaign page - PayPal.

Thank you 🇺🇦🇺🇦🇺🇦

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Hell’s Kitchen: Drone Munitions in Ukraine

Ukraine’s Arms Monitor’s source in the Armed Forces of Ukraine stated that around 90% of drone munitions in the military are improvised, while only about 10% are factory-produced. “Factory-produced munitions are always better, as they are properly engineered and tested. But this is not a matter of preference—it is the result of a munitions vacuum. The state does not allow its widespread production, and it takes time to develop and refine solutions. The battlefield, however, demands results “here and now,” the serviceman mentioned. “There have been absurd cases—for example, when a brigade was supplied with 7-inch drones and then, separately, with 8.5 kg aerial bombs. And what were we supposed to do with that?” he added.

As a result, highly skilled personnel have emerged within the military to fill this gap. In practice, almost every unit has its own workshop or production capability. The sources of explosives are either the battlefield itself or repurposed stockpiles.

• According to the serviceman, the first munition adapted for drones appeared in 2022—an F1 grenade rigged for release from a Mavic drone. Development was initially very simple: a pipe filled with ~0.5 kg of plastic explosive, plus another 400–500 grams of ball bearings for fragmentation. The focus was on increasing the effect of dropped munitions.

• “Then FPV drones appeared. The first munition used was the PG-7—a rocket from an RPG, as the initial focus was on targeting armored vehicles and FPVs were still scarce. A simple activation mechanism was devised using contact “whiskers”: like a button—contact equals detonation. The goal was straightforward: impact the tank”.

• The evolution then split into two main paths: bomber drones and FPV drones.

Bomber drones:

• Initially used anti-personnel mines and 82 mm mortar rounds, along with various types of grenades.

• The first custom designs appeared around 2023: a pipe filled with plastic explosive or TNT plus fragmentation elements.

• These produced significantly stronger blasts, although factory-made munitions fragment more effectively—as expected, since they are properly engineered rather than improvised.

• For bombers, the classic option remains the VOG-25 grenade.

  • It has been used since the early stages and continues to be used today.

  • It can be loaded in large numbers (e.g., 20 in a rotary dispenser) and dropped sequentially.

  • Lightweight but highly effective against infantry in trenches.

FPV drones:

• Evolution started from the PG-7. It was later modified by adding fragmentation elements around the explosive, creating what became known as a cumulative-fragmentation munition.

• This type remains widely used today due to its versatility.

• Another development was a simple pipe filled with plastic explosive or TNT, resulting in a high-explosive (blast) munition, used for attacking dugouts and shelters—relying primarily on blast effect rather than fragmentation.

Modern variants:

• The core concepts remain the same, but the range of weights has expanded: 0.4, 0.5, 0.8, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 4, 4.5 kg, etc.

• These can be cumulative-fragmentation, purely cumulative, or high-explosive (without fragmentation).

Earlier, UNITED24 reported on a workshop led by Ukrainian servicemen from the Special Forces Regiment that processes dozens of defective shells every day, converting them into munitions for FPV drones and bomber UAVs.

• With limited resources, the team repurposes old, unusable artillery shells, some of which date back to the 1950s.

• Frontline troops also supply anti-tank missiles from systems such as Javelin and NLAW that were damaged by shrapnel but still contain explosive material. This explosive is used to fill the warheads used by Ukrainian drones.

• For instance, footage showing the cutting of one of the shells revealed that it had been exposed to corrosion for a long time and was unlikely to be usable for its original purpose. Such munitions are filled with phlegmatized explosives, meaning they will not detonate without a proper detonator.

• The workshop also repurposes PG-7 shaped-charge grenades for RPG-7 launchers by adding counterweights and stabilizing fins so that they can be dropped from bomber drones.

• In October 2024, the Cabinet of Ministers authorized the extraction of explosives and other components from unexploded ordnance for use in support of the Defense Forces, effectively legalizing a long-existing “industry.”

• According to rough estimates, up to 20% of munitions in combat zones fail to detonate. A mechanism was therefore developed not only to safely dispose of hazardous items, but also to turn this process into a benefit for the military.

A proper UAV munition must be effective, and only then convenient and easy to use, wrote Vladyslav Khrystoforov for Oboronka in January 2026. It should consist of a warhead of optimal weight, a guidance or stabilization system, an initiation system, a detonator/explosive charge, and a standardized mounting mechanism for UAV platforms. At the same time, it must withstand the harsh conditions of the frontline—vibrations, temperature fluctuations, and challenging storage environments.

Currently, the market for drone munitions in Ukraine is gradually stabilizing. Professional manufacturers have emerged, but a significant share is still supplied by volunteers and improvised (“garage”) production.

• Military units often receive drones separately, while munitions are procured through different channels—or even assembled on-site.

• To compensate for shortages at the front, non-standard “drops” are used. For example, servicemen from the “Khartiia” unit modified an unexploded Russian Grad rocket and used a bomber drone to strike enemy infantry positions.

• Drone operators from the “Perun” unmanned systems battalion have dropped 155 mm and 122 mm munitions on enemy targets. Such solutions are largely a forced measure due to the shortage of dedicated UAV munitions.

• The volunteer initiative “DrukArmiia” unites around 2,500 volunteers with their own 3D printers, producing plastic components for “cold” munitions and sending them to the front. Their product line includes 128 munition variants.

• “DrukArmiia” ships over 110,000 “cold” munitions per month. However, these are not yet “hot,” combat-ready munitions. Their effectiveness depends on the correct composition and quality of the explosive material, as well as proper assembly—often carried out by sappers on the frontline.

• Another category includes improvised drops with stabilizing fins. These were often made from rounds for automatic grenade launchers or by attaching hand grenades to drones that mechanically release the safety pin over the target. To improve aerodynamics, such munitions began incorporating 3D-printed tail fins, fairings, and impact fuzes.

• One of the most difficult challenges in munition production has been sourcing explosives. Many new manufacturers and volunteers, lacking access to standardized military-grade explosives, rely on industrial explosives with lower explosiveness. This reduces both armor penetration and fragmentation effectiveness against enemy infantry.

• The global explosives market is relatively limited, and procuring components is economically viable only under large contracts.

• At the same time, to secure contracts, manufacturers must already have access to these materials. Importing and storing them is costly and requires specialized facilities—leading many companies to focus only on “cold” munition production.

• The company Defenses Solution was for a long time a major importer of VOG rounds for grenade launchers. Through surveys of military personnel, it identified demand for drone-delivered munitions. It turned out that VOG-type munitions were increasingly used not for their original purpose, but as drops from DJI Mavic drones.

• One of the solutions developed is the “Tsviakh” munition, designed primarily to engage infantry in open terrain or lightly protected structures. It can also disable vehicles, communication antennas, electronic warfare systems, and unprotected infrastructure.

• “Tsviakh” consists of plastic components produced via injection molding and metal parts manufactured on high-precision CNC machines. It is delivered as a fully assembled munition, including initiator and explosive charge.

• Ukrainian Armored Vehicles, traditionally focused on artillery munitions, developed the UB60D FPV drone munition based on a 60 mm mortar round. This codified munition can be used both as part of a mortar shot and as an FPV drone drop, allowing production standardization and rapid scaling. Compared to a standard mortar round, the FPV version lacks the tail assembly and propellant charges and features a modified fuze.

In July 2023, the Ministry of Digital Transformation launched a two-year experimental project on the production, procurement, and supply of munitions for unmanned systems, as well as warheads for UAVs. This initiative aimed to encourage private companies to manufacture drone munitions.

As a result of this initiative, 76 new companies were added to the Register of participants and contractors eligible for state defense procurement, granting them official manufacturer status.

The duration of approval processes has been reduced to just a few days, due to the temporary suspension of requirements under 19 existing regulatory acts.

This has significantly accelerated munition development and delivery: 370 new munition types have been codified and approved for use by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, of which 250 are specifically designed for unmanned systems.

Seán Moorhouse, Mine Action/EOD Consultant, wrote in his recent article that this revolution in drone warfare has left the EOD/IEDD world behind:

• There is no lexicon to describe factory-designed and produced one-way-attack UAV warheads. To further confuse the issue, Russia and Ukraine use very similar nomenclature to describe their drone-delivered munitions.

• “The Geran-2 can be fitted with a range of warheads, from the most common, 50 kg blast and fragmentation version, to a 90 kg blast and fragmentation version and 50 kg thermobaric version. All versions can then be further modified by the addition of an incendiary compound. What do we call the warheads fitted to one-way-attack drones like the Geran-2? Their role is clear, but there is no existing lexicon that they fit into,” Seán writes.

• There is a similar gap regarding munitions delivered by bomber drones.

• Munitions dropped from bomber drones fall into three categories: factory-produced, modified, and improvised. Having three categories is controversial, with many in the sector arguing that there are only two: factory-produced and improvised. That said, there is no place in the existing lexicon to adequately describe a factory-produced munition dropped from a bomber-drone or a munition that has been modified, rather than improvised.

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Can Ukraine Get Rid of Chinese Cameras?

Cameras are a critical component of unmanned systems, as they determine navigation, reconnaissance, and data transmission from the battlefield. In my article last year on the localization of FPV drone production in Ukraine, several manufacturers identified cameras as one of Ukraine’s biggest import dependencies.

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Ukrainian interceptor drones are likely at the peak of global demand. Ukrainian crews have travelled to the Middle East to demonstrate the effectiveness of interceptor systems, while foreign delegations are visiting Ukraine to learn the secrets of its air defence. Ukrainian manufacturers are also being contacted by private companies in the Middle East seeking to protect their facilities from Shahed attacks.

Ukraine has long warned that other states would eventually need to defend themselves against Shahed drones and reportedly even offered the United States cooperation in this area, which was not fully appreciated at the time.

In this edition:

• Ukrainian Drone Interceptors Are Becoming a Global Currency;

• Drone Piloting Should be as Remote and Protected as Possible: 412 Nemesis Brigade;

• P1-SUN: Ukrainian Interceptor Drone by SkyFall;

• 10+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

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Ukrainian Drone Interceptors Are Becoming a Global Currency

On March 11, President Zelensky announced that Ukrainian experts in counter-drone technologies had begun working in Gulf countries. “Three of our teams have gone to the Middle East. Strong teams — with experts, military personnel, and engineers. Our military is already communicating and already working there,” Zelensky said.

The presidential spokesperson separately confirmed that the three countries where Ukrainian experts are currently operating are Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Others are also helping the US defend its military presence in Jordan.

In his column for Liga.Net, Valentyn Badrak, Director of the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies, argues that Kyiv’s logic in helping provide protection for U.S. bases (particularly in Jordan, and possibly Saudi Arabia) is well-grounded and aimed not only at countering Russian missile attacks today, but also at building a safer future.

• Ukraine has received 11 requests from countries neighboring Iran, as well as from European states and the United States, seeking security support in countering Iranian drones.

• This points to the formation of stable political partnerships through defence technologies — and potentially, in the future, even deeper alliance relations with the United States.

• The author suggests that the use of Ukrainian interceptor drones could significantly reduce the consumption of expensive interceptor missiles. In the longer term, this could lead to Ukraine obtaining U.S. licenses for air defence missile production, and possibly even for strike missiles such as ATACMS or PrSM.

  (Last week, President Zelensky stated that Kyiv needs only one step from Washington — a license to produce interceptor missiles capable of stopping Russian ballistic threats. According to him, Ukraine’s industrial base and engineers already have all the necessary technologies to quickly establish mass production and provide air and missile defence not only for Ukraine, but potentially for the entire European continent.)

• A key issue for Ukraine is the ability to rapidly scale up domestic production of interceptor drones.

• This challenge can be addressed primarily by expanding the number of manufacturers, including through licensing agreements with large and experienced companies, particularly private enterprises.

• In early January, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense announced that it had granted 30 licenses to private manufacturers to use military-developed technologies. These licenses covered radio-electronic intelligence systems, countermeasures against Shahed-type strike drones, and guided munitions with automatic terminal guidance.

• MoD has also changed its drone procurement approach: demand for drones will now be generated automatically based on battlefield data — eliminating human bias, subjective influence, and corruption risks.

• Already in December–January, Ukraine’s Defence Forces were receiving more than 1,500 interceptor drones per day.

• There are, therefore, strong grounds to believe that Ukraine will be capable of supplying interceptor drones to both its own armed forces and partner countries.

• Ukraine has de facto already built a layered air and missile defence system. The development and integration of interceptor drones into the air defence system has become a Ukrainian solution to the problem

Ihor Fedirko, Executive Director of the Ukrainian Council of Defence Industry, said in an interview with Radio NV that the current production of Ukrainian interceptor drones exceeds the Defence Forces' needs by two to three times.
As of January 2026, Ukrainian defence manufacturers were producing 80–90% of the interceptor drones required by the Defence Forces, but over the past two months production has increased significantly.

The WSJ reported that the oil corporation Saudi Aramco is negotiating with at least two Ukrainian companies (SkyFall and Wild Hornets) to purchase interceptor drones to protect oil fields from potential attacks by Iran. According to sources, Saudi Aramco is moving quickly to secure these drones — racing ahead of the Saudi government itself and regional competitors, particularly Qatar.

Wild Hornets wrote on their social media that this information does not reflect the company's current position or activities. The company is not conducting any direct negotiations regarding exports. "The Government of Ukraine is currently engaged in discussions with international partners regarding operator training and the potential supply of interceptor drones within broader security cooperation frameworks. Should such initiatives require industrial participation, Wild Hornets is prepared to contribute accordingly,” the manufacturer added. Read my article about Wild Hornets and their interceptor drone Sting here.

Here is my earlier open-access report, “Drone warfare in Ukraine: war in the Middle East and Ukraine’s expertise.”

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Drone Piloting Should be as Remote and Protected as Possible: 412 Nemesis Brigade

The 412 Nemesis Brigade operates in a multidomain format. It works at different depths and across different environments—from interceptors and maritime operations to frontline and middle-range strike missions. The brigade is also one of the leaders in intercepting Shahed drones.

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This week, Shahed drones once again made headlines, this time in the context of the war in the Middle East. Affected countries and their Western partners immediately sought Ukraine’s expertise in countering Shaheds.

Ukraine remains in a unique position to provide valuable insights into Shahed variants, the development of layered air defence systems, and the application of low-cost countermeasures.

That said, such preparations should have begun earlier, and implementing these solutions may now take months.

This is a special edition of my Drone Warfare in Ukraine newsletter, focused exclusively on several aspects of Shahed countermeasures, interceptor drones, and featuring multiple exclusive commentaries. It is free to read and share.

In this edition:

• War in the Middle East and Ukraine’s Expertise;

• Thermal Imaging Cameras in Ukraine’s Interceptor Drones: Odd Systems;

• Importance of Operator Training for Interceptor Drones: Kruk Drones UAV Training Center;

• Russian Drone Adaptions: Future Trends

• additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

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War in the Middle East and Ukraine’s Expertise

Since the United States and Israel launched a military operation against Iran, Iran has turned to using its Shahed drones to strike targets in multiple countries across the region. According to the BBC, in six days Iran launched more than 2,000 low-cost drones at targets across the Middle East to overwhelm defences and spark chaos in the region.

The Gulf states have been using Patriot interceptor missiles to defend against attacks by Iranian drones. However, their stocks of interceptor missiles are already being depleted, and Middle Eastern countries are now seeking cheaper alternatives to Patriot missiles.

This is largely because a single Shahed drone costs around $30,000, whereas interceptor missiles such as the PAC-3 used in the Patriot system cost millions.

Since then, there has been a surge of interest in Ukrainian interceptor drones capable of intercepting Shaheds at a very low cost, according to the FT report.

An industry representative noted that any sale of Ukrainian systems — even those manufactured outside the country — must be approved by Kyiv.

President Zelensky stated that partner states are seeking Ukraine’s assistance in stabilizing the situation amid ongoing hostilities in the Middle East. Ukraine is now discussing with them the possibility of sending Ukrainian experts to the region. He added that the Ukrainian military has the necessary capabilities, and that Ukrainian experts will “work on the ground”.

On March 5, Zelensky wrote that Ukraine had received a request from the United States for specific support in defending against Shahed drones in the Middle East. Reuters reported that in addition to interceptor drones and electronic warfare systems, the United States and Qatar have also expressed interest in Ukrainian acoustic detection systems designed to identify long-range strike drones.

Zelensky also said that Ukraine is considering providing interceptor drones in exchange for PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptor missiles for Patriots.

However, there is a mixed response from Ukrainian military personnel and experts regarding the type of assistance Ukraine may be able to provide to Middle Eastern countries.

A major in Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service, aerial reconnaissance specialist, and founder of the Matrix-UAV drone bureau, Yuriy Kasianov, noted that long-range strike drones in the Middle East are used mainly as a cheap supplement to ballistic missiles. According to him, drone attacks by Iran are primarily terror-style operations aimed at spreading fear, causing panic, and exhausting air defence systems.

He criticized attempts to highlight Ukrainian successes abroad while Russia continues to strike Ukrainian military, civilian, and energy infrastructure near the front line and border regions.

At the same time, even if Ukraine can supply some interceptors, merely deploying Ukrainian systems in other regions would not be enough.

A Ukrainian serviceman who has been directly involved in intercepting Shahed-type drones told Ukraine’s Arms Monitor that Ukraine faces a large-scale, daily drone threat, and its air defence responses have evolved around this reality. Russia conducts attacks according to a structured and methodical concept, which allows Ukrainian forces to anticipate the approximate directions, frequency, and patterns of strikes. For example, when Shahed drones follow known routes—such as through the Chernihiv region—defenders can estimate the azimuth and deploy mobile fire groups in advance.

The situation in the Middle East is different. Drone attacks there tend to be less predictable and less structured, often involving single drones or small numbers of drones flying toward different countries in seemingly random directions. As a result, only part of Ukraine’s experience can be directly applied.

According to the serviceman, there is one major limitation to the use of interceptor drones. Their practical interception radius is usually around 10-50 kilometers (depending on type), meaning that saturating entire national borders with interceptor coverage would be extremely difficult.

However, Ukraine can still provide valuable expertise in several areas. The first is technical knowledge about Shahed drones. Ukrainian specialists have accumulated extensive data on different Shahed variants and their components. For instance, about nine months ago, Russia began widely deploying Kometa navigation modules, which are highly resistant to electronic warfare interference.

It remains unclear which generation of Shahed systems Iran currently operates, but understanding these technical differences is crucial because countermeasures vary significantly between models.

Some drones can be disrupted by cutting mobile communications, others by electronic warfare systems, while certain variants require physical destruction. Some platforms also serve as reconnaissance drones or communications relays, complicating the defensive picture. Ukraine’s main contribution in this area could be sharing technical databases, identification methods, and operational experience.

A second area where Ukraine could help is in operational coordination and doctrine. Ukrainian forces have developed practical methods for organizing mobile fire groups, communication procedures between them, and low-cost countermeasures against Shahed drones.

One tactic that could be particularly relevant for Middle Eastern countries is the layered defence of urban areas. Creating a defensive ring of 8–10 kilometers, forming a buffer zone where drones can be intercepted before reaching urban infrastructure, is a realistic solution.

Even within Ukraine, the situation differs significantly between fronts—for example, between the Kharkiv and Kherson directions—and Russia’s tactics for employing different types of Shahed drones vary. The operational environment in the Middle East is, therefore, fundamentally different as well.

“One area where Ukraine can provide meaningful assistance is in rapid adaptation to evolving threats. Ukrainian forces have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to quickly adjust tactics and countermeasures in response to new developments. This experience could help partners develop flexible and adaptive response frameworks tailored to the specific threats they face,” a Ukrainian serviceman told Ukraine’s Arms Monitor on condition of anonymity.

At the same time, implementing a large-scale interceptor drone system in the Middle East would require time, infrastructure, and trained operators—something that ideally should have begun earlier.

In the near term, many countries are likely to rely more heavily on short- and medium-range air defence systems, such as Stinger, which are available and already integrated into air defence architectures.

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Thermal Imaging Cameras for Ukraine’s Interceptor Drones: Odd Systems

According to the Victory Drones community, the interceptor drone STING, developed by the Wild Hornets, has remained the most effective interceptor drone for five consecutive months. According to official data, STING currently leads in the number of successful interceptions of Shahed-type drones. Read my article about STING here.

In August 2025, it was reported that Sting drones were equipped with Kurbas thermal imaging cameras developed by the Ukrainian company Odd Systems.

The founder of Odd Systems, Yaroslav Azhnyuk, mentioned that the Kurbas module outperforms Chinese-made Caddx cameras, offering better image quality, greater reliability under heavy vibration, and improved moisture resistance — all at the same or even lower cost.

Last week, the company unveiled an updated version of its Kurbas thermal imaging line - the new Kurbas-640 Beta thermal camera.

The updated model includes pre-configured modes for different operational scenarios, including “Air Hunting,” “Ground Hunting,” “Navigation,” and a mode designed for extreme weather conditions.

In addition, the camera offers deep customization options for drone manufacturers and military engineers, allowing them to create their own image profiles by adjusting parameters such as contrast, brightness, noise reduction, detail enhancement, gamma settings, digital zoom, and sensor recalibration algorithms.

“The strength of Kurbas-640 Beta lies in its maximum adaptability to mission requirements. From now on, not only we as the camera manufacturer, but also any drone manufacturer or unit operating drones can configure the camera to meet their specific needs. Moreover, this can be done not only before a mission but also during the mission, including changing image parameters and modes programmatically,” wrote Yaroslav on his post on LinkedIn.

A week earlier, Odd Systems announced plans to build a factory to produce sensors for thermal imaging cameras. The goal is to reduce Ukraine’s dependence on foreign components, particularly those imported from China.

According to Azhnyuk, Europe currently produces fewer than 500,000 such sensors per year, while Ukraine consumes roughly the same amount in about five months. He noted that European sensors are around five times more expensive than Chinese ones and are often not of higher quality, and that they are extremely difficult to purchase due to high demand within Europe itself. The plant is expected to triple the production of sensors for thermal imaging cameras on the European continent.

In my conversations with Odd Systems, the company highlighted several important points regarding the localization of component production.

• Supply chains for miltech components are not only about price. They are also about availability and risk. For some critical components, localization is a security issue.

• Over the last two years, Ukraine has launched many new manufacturing facilities. At first, this was mostly low-tech production, for example components for FPV drones. Now we see a new phase.

• New factories are being launched that focus on more advanced components. This helps Ukraine become independent not only in security terms, but also economically. In many categories, Ukrainian producers can already compete with China on price.

• This includes motors, cameras, communication systems, and other key components.

• Microelectronics will also develop in Ukraine. This is not about leading-edge chips. It is about industrial microelectronics designed for real-world use, with a focus on reliability, stability, and repeatable production.

In 2025, Odd Systems started a partnership with the Danish prime Terma. The teams are working closely on a low-cost, AI-powered drone interceptor.

Odd Systems brings its expertise working with FPV drones, thermal cameras, and cooperation with the Ukrainian Defense Forces to deliver a scalable and reliable platform for countering various drone threats that arise in modern warfare.

The company’s focus is on joining R&D efforts to develop effective battlefield solutions, enhancing capabilities, and scaling internationally.

Odd Systems has a sister company, The Fourth Law, which focuses on autonomous technologies.

On March 6th, Yaroslav Azhniuk presented Zerov — an autonomous Shahed interceptor. Autonomous detection enables the system to identify targets at distances 2–3 times greater than comparable solutions.

Technical specifications of Zerov-8:

• Designed in a tailsitter configuration (an interceptor model with vertical takeoff and landing), combining the speed of a missile with the maneuverability of a drone.

• Maximum speed: 326 km/h (intercepts targets moving up to 270 km/h).

• Combat radius: up to 20 km.

• Warhead: up to 0.5 kg.

• Deployment time: vertical takeoff (launch within 30 seconds).

• Optics: daytime or thermal camera, depending on mission requirements.

“The most important part of an autonomous interceptor is detection. We trained the system to see targets where the human eye or standard sensors fall short. That gives us precious time and distance to maneuver — the difference between a Shahed being intercepted or striking the ground,” wrote Yaroslav.

I published a detailed profile article on The Fourth Law, which you can read here.

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Importance of Operator Training for Interceptor Drones: Kruk Drones UAV Training Center

To better understand the role of operators in the effectiveness of interceptor drones, I spoke with Viktor Taran, co-founder and CEO of the Kruk UAV Operator Training Center.

The center was established in April, 2022, in response to the urgent need of the Ukrainian Defence Forces for qualified UAV operators. Today, Kruk operates as a non-governmental training center certified by the Ministry of Defence, specializing in training operators for various types of UAVs as well as related technical and operational specialties.

Here are the key highlights from our conversation:

• For more than two years, Ukraine has warned its partners that the nature of the air war has fundamentally changed.

• Drones have become the main threat because they are: inexpensive; widely available; highly precise; capable of targeting specific objects (for instance, using Starlink communication).

• Traditional air defence systems, built around expensive interceptor missiles, are not designed for this type of threat.

• Countering drones requires a fundamentally different air defence architecture.

• These warnings were largely underestimated by Western partners in the early stages of the war.

• At the Ukrainian House during the Munich Security Conference in February 2026, visitors were shown a downed Russian Shahed drone and an AI-generated video simulating drone attacks on European cities, including Munich, Vienna, Davos, and Brussels.

  The video depicts drones launched from Russian territory striking major landmarks, including the European Parliament in Brussels, and features quotes from Western officials alongside threats from Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov.

• Even then, many Europeans treated the threat as exaggerated.

• Today, Western countries are trying to rapidly implement Ukraine’s experience in counter-drone warfare, but building such systems takes months and often years.

• A good example is the announced “drone wall” along the EU border, which has yet to materialize.

Interceptor Drones

• Interceptor drones will remain an important element of air defence, but they are not a universal solution.

• Their effectiveness depends heavily on the type of drone being intercepted.

• Against Shahed-type drones flying at 200–250 km/h, interceptor platforms are effective.

• Against jet-powered Shahed variants, flying at higher speeds (350-500 km/h), interceptor drones are less effective.

• Future developments may include interceptors with autonomous or AI-assisted targeting.

Training Interceptor Operators

• The biggest challenge today is not interceptor drones, but the shortage of trained operators.

  • Training a single operator at the Kruk Center can cost 40,000–70,000 UAH (910-1600 USD) for Ukraine’s Defence Forces. Organizing similar training programs for foreigners would likely cost more.

  • Current training groups at Kruk typically include 4–6 people, while the actual need is in the tens of thousands.

• Training interceptor drone operators is complex and time-consuming. A beginner with no drone experience requires 1.5–2 months of training. Experienced drone pilots can transition to interceptors in 3–4 weeks.

• Kruk Center conducts training in two main categories of interceptor drones:

  • Fixed-wing interceptors (similar to the Mriya or Interceptor concept)

  • FPV interceptor drones such as P1Sun or Bullet

• At the moment, fixed-wing interceptors show higher interception success rates. FPV interceptors are a newer direction at the Kruk Center.

• Training includes:

  • simulator sessions

  • theoretical instruction

  • work with radars

  • operating multiple drone platforms

  • interception training

  • night operations

  • field deployments.

• The center operates a large drone training range near Kyiv (around 80 hectares) equipped with electronic warfare systems; training support from friendly units; and operational testing environments.

• The center also deploys alongside combat units and participates in operational missions.

• In addition to training operators, Kruk also offers testing services for promising domestic and foreign defence innovations, allowing developers to receive feedback from end users.

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Russian Drone Adaptions: Future Trends

Ukrainian activist and Victory Drones founder Maria Berlinska shared her vision of Russian drone developments over the next 1–2 years:

• Using Shahed/Gerbera-type drones as a universal platform.
  These UAVs may increasingly serve multiple functions: acting as communication relays and mesh-network nodes, laying mines, serving as “mother drones,” and enabling real-time attacks on civilian infrastructure.
  Attacks using fiber-optic drones are also likely to increase, potentially carried by other drones, which would extend the effective strike range even further.
  Ultimately, the side with the longer strike reach and faster decision-making cycles—including through remote control, autonomy, and networked operations—will have a clear advantage.

• Expanded use of LTE networks to intensify aerial attacks.
  It is likely that Russia is already planning operations even larger in scale than Ukraine’s “Spiderweb” operation, where operators located thousands of kilometers away could simultaneously control hundreds of drones to attack critical infrastructure.
  Fully autonomous drone operations are also becoming increasingly plausible. Overall, the use of autonomous systems will continue to grow, alongside countermeasures such as electronic warfare, mechanical interception, laser systems, and electromagnetic defences.

• Integration of unmanned systems into a unified operational network.
  Russia is likely to link its aerial, ground, and maritime unmanned systems into a single coordinated ecosystem through software and mesh networks.
  In simpler terms, this would resemble an “army of unmanned systems” where drones provide communications for one another and are controlled from thousands of kilometers away through unified software platforms. Operators could then assign tasks—such as targeting specific locations—in real time via centralized digital interfaces.

Additional Updates

• There are two main types of interceptor drones: fixed-wing drones and multicopters, wrote Vladyslav Khrystoforov for Oboronka.

  Fixed-wing interceptors resemble small reconnaissance aircraft. They are equipped with a warhead and additional target detection and tracking systems and are typically launched from a catapult.

  These interceptor aircraft have a relatively low speed of around 160–180 km/h, but they can remain airborne longer and reach higher altitudes. If the mission fails, the drone can be safely recovered, refurbished, and launched again. To enable this, the detonation system is designed so that the drone explodes only on the operator’s command rather than on contact.

  Multicopters, on the other hand, are operated similarly to standard FPV drones. They take off vertically from hard surfaces and can reach high speeds of 350–400 km/h. These drones can be controlled either with a traditional FPV controller and goggles or with a more advanced control panel with a screen.

  Their main disadvantage is short flight endurance. While a fixed-wing interceptor may have time for a second interception attempt or return to base after a miss, a multicopter may run out of battery during additional maneuvers. Moreover, landing an explosive-equipped multicopter for reuse can be dangerous.

• Due to weather conditions, interceptor drones targeting Shaheds have been less effective, and work is underway to improve them, President Zelensky said. “We are currently upgrading interceptor technologies. We are working on universal interceptors that can operate in any weather conditions. This winter showed us that interception rates can drop due to weather. We are now developing new technologies to ensure they function effectively in all weather,” he noted.

• Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov, technology advisor to the Defence Minister, wrote that Ukraine is steadily improving the effectiveness of its interceptor drones and will sooner or later reach an interception rate of up to 90 percent. He added that he believes this could happen relatively quickly.

  At the same time, he outlined how the enemy may respond:

  1. Introducing evasion systems

  2. Creating flight corridors for drones

  3. Flying at extremely low altitudes in manual mode

  Serhiy argues that Ukraine will be able to address these challenges, but that the enemy’s main bet will likely be speed.

  This could include increasing the speed of jet-powered Shahed drones from 280–320 km/h to 350–400 km/h, and potentially introducing the Geran-5 variant, capable of speeds of 500–600 km/h. In such a scenario, many of Ukraine’s current interceptor drones could suddenly become ineffective.

  FLASH, therefore, called on manufacturers to begin developing interception systems capable of countering strike UAVs at these higher speeds now, while there is still time.

Related articles:

• Stopping Shaheds: Ukraine’s Solutions;

• Russia’s New Geran-5 Drones;

• Shahed Drones Are Evolving in Three Main Directions;

• Drones Against Civilians: How Russia Uses UAVs to Kill and Terrorize;

• Shaheds with real-time remote control.

Read more about long-range drones in this section: Deep Strike Capabilities.

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Ukraine has been actively working to disable Russia’s mesh-network technologies — a new solution designed to compensate for the loss of access to Starlink. Last week, the Defense Forces neutralized a mesh network that had enabled Russian Shahed-type drones to enter northern Ukraine from Belarus.

With all these innovations being actively reverse-engineered and adapted, the key question is: when will Ukraine adopt mesh networking? Or perhaps that process has already begun?

In this edition:

• Mesh Networks and EW Trends in Ukraine;

• Depth Ownership in Ukraine’s Drone Warfare;

• Ukraine’s Long-Range Drone Capabilities;

• and 5+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

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Earlier this week, I joined for a 30-min conversation about drones in Ukraine - listen here.

Mesh Networks and EW Trends in Ukraine

In last week’s digest, I wrote about the growing challenge posed by mesh networks in Russian drones and the need for Ukraine to further strengthen its EW capabilities.

Mesh has the potential to reshape not only the tactics of mass drone attacks but also to increase drones’ resilience against electronic warfare and the loss of direct communication with operators.

Tymofiy Yurkov, a Ukrainian defence industry expert in the development and production of EW equipment, told ArmyInform that mesh networks allow the enemy to rapidly respond to areas of active countermeasures and attempt to reroute drones around zones where air defence or EW systems are most effective.

Mesh modules are not installed on every drone, according to Tymofiy. They are typically used during mass launch scenarios, when a large group of Shaheds is simultaneously airborne. In these cases, the network architecture makes sense and provides additional capabilities for control and coordination among unmanned systems.

There have been documented cases in which Russians use algorithms or elements of artificial intelligence to enable automatic drone coordination.

At the same time, operator-controlled systems remain more effective for now. However, the algorithms are already embedded: the system can automatically register that a drone has successfully passed through an area covered by EW or air defence, and redirect other Shaheds along a similar route without direct operator intervention.

The logic behind the development of such systems is to reduce dependence on human operators and shift decision-making directly to algorithms.

Full autonomy would mean that a group of UAVs could independently assess the operational environment — identifying areas where electronic warfare is active, where air defence systems are engaged, and which routes are safer — and adjust their behavior accordingly without manual intervention. “This is the direction in which the enemy is evolving. Given the current pace of development, such capabilities could emerge in the near term, potentially within the next six months,” explained Tymofiy.

To better understand these developments, I spoke with the Ukrainian company Kvertus, one of the leaders in developing tactical electronic warfare (EW) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems.

According to Yaroslav Filimonov, CEO and co-founder of Kvertus, we are now seeing a transition from standalone pieces of equipment to a unified digital battlefield.

• The key trend is the deep integration of electronic warfare (EW) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems into interconnected networks, where target detection and suppression occur almost instantaneously.

• Beyond expanding frequency ranges, we are also seeing the active deployment of AI-enabled algorithms to analyze the electromagnetic spectrum. This enables the automatic identification of hostile signals among thousands of others — a capability that is critically important in today’s highly saturated and contested spectrum environment.

Yaroslav shared that the main difficulty in countering mesh technologies lies in their decentralized resilience. Drones relay signals to one another, meaning that disabling a single node does not collapse the entire network. This significantly reduces the effectiveness of traditional jamming solutions.

Today, Ukraine’s primary challenge is not technological capability per se, but scale. The critical task is to move from isolated solutions to the development of global, automated systems. The future lies in architectures where data from ELINT sensors is automatically transmitted to strike systems or EW assets with minimal operator involvement. In modern warfare, the speed of information transfer determines frontline survival.

“As for future threats, we are already seeing the adversary move toward machine vision capabilities. This allows drones to ignore electronic warfare interference in the final phase of flight, as the system switches to autonomous terminal guidance. We must begin preparing now for the large-scale deployment of such “smart” drones,” Yaroslav added.

At the same time, Ukraine needs not only to scale up its electronic warfare (EW) capabilities but also to improve coordination among military units. According to the commander of the EW company of the 260th Territorial Defense Brigade “Khortytsia”, the effectiveness of EW operations depends on coordination between units, as it is necessary to agree on who is blocking which frequency, given that both enemy and Ukrainian drones are operating simultaneously in the air. EW units need personnel ready to operate electronic warfare systems at the front, as well as developers.

He emphasized that in the first years of the full-scale war, Ukraine paid insufficient attention to the field of electronic warfare, while Russia had been systematically developing these capabilities for a long time.

“The enemy’s EW is not just powerful — it is several times stronger, and this must be taken into account. The adversary has been developing it for a long time. They have many long-range systems that ‘hit’ at 45 kilometers and are also capable of jamming communications at distances of 60–80 kilometers,” the serviceman noted.

Since November 2025, Ukraine’s government has been promoting the decentralized procurement of EW systems, allowing military units to purchase them directly. 180 brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the National Guard of Ukraine can now order EW equipment directly through the DOT-Chain Defence weapons marketplace using their own allocated budgets. On the very first day after EW systems appeared on DOT-Chain Defence, military units placed orders worth nearly 6 million UAH (139,000 USD).

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Depth Ownership in Ukraine’s Drone Warfare

One of the most discussed pieces in Ukraine was a thread on X by Ryan O’Leary, an American serviceman and former company commander in Ukraine. In January 2026, he wrote that Ukraine is not losing the drone war tactically. Rather, it is losing operationally and strategically because it never defined control of depth as the objective.

His ideas gained significant attention in Ukraine’s military and defence-tech circles and prompted a response from the Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert “Madyar” Brovdi.

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Ukraine’s solution to the Starlink problem affected Russian long-range drone operations, but their current adaptations are even harder to counter. Russia is now focusing on the mass deployment of mesh technology across various types of drones — something that has been observed since the end of last year. It allows a group of drones to operate as a chain, with the signal relayed through aircraft that remain in the air.

Investment in electronic warfare and radar infrastructure by Ukraine must grow exponentially.

In this edition:

• “Baba Yaga” Drones in Ukraine: Key Trends;

• Mesh Networks on Russian Drones and Ways of Countering Them;

• Russia’s Use of LTE Networks to Control FPV Drones;

• Drone Warfare Lessons for NATO: The Hedgehog-2025 Exercise;

• and 5+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

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Last week, I joined Samuel Bendett, one of the leading experts on Russia, on his podcast to discuss drone developments on the battlefield. Listen to the recording on X Spaces ⬇️

“Baba Yaga” Drones in Ukraine: Key Trends

One Russian milblogger, in a recent interview with Radio Sputnik, stated that the area where Ukrainians hold an absolute advantage is the so-called “Baba Yaga” drones — thousands of heavy multirotor drones capable of dropping six 82mm rounds, hovering over Russian positions, and leveling trenches. He said it remains an absolute mystery to him why Russia, now almost in the fifth year of the war, has not deployed such bombardier drones at scale.

“We have very good FPV drones. But all Ukrainian FPV drones are integrated into a unified ground control station, while ours are fragmented — there’s a control station for Ovod drones, then separate systems for fiber-optic drones — all different. They have better standardization. The biggest problem is ‘Baba Yaga,” the blogger added.

He also cited private initiatives to produce such drones. For example, the Upyr drone was presented to Putin after reportedly striking an Abrams and a Bradley. It had been built with public donations, and after seeing its performance, Putin ordered funding for further production. Later, the heavy Berdysh drone emerged, but it still remains at the level of a grassroots individual initiative.

Four years have now passed, and these drones still do not exist at scale.

Before the war, the drones now known as “Baba Yaga” were agricultural platforms used for spreading fertilizer.

A personal contact of mine on the frontline mentioned that: “The Russians tend to call all heavy bombers’ Baba Yaga,’ regardless of the specific model. And the sound it makes - it’s like a helicopter on steroids! At night, it really gets under your skin. They fear it first and foremost because of the sound”.

Now, Ukrainian units use “Baba Yaga” type drones for:
• precision strikes against equipment in the enemy’s near rear;
• targeting ammunition depots and personnel concentrations;
• remotely mining routes used by enemy vehicles;
• maintaining a constant aerial threat, especially at night — when it may not be visible, but can always be heard.

One of the most well-known units to have mastered the use of “Baba Yaga” drones is the 412th Separate Unmanned Systems Brigade “Nemesis.” It is known for actively striking enemy air defence systems with its bomber drones. The military personnel of this unit created their own heavy bomber, also named Nemesis. It can fly over 20 kilometers, and for uninterrupted communication, Nemesis integrated Starlink satellite communication terminals. According to the unit, “We have an operator who sits in Kyiv in a warm office with a smoothie and drops 3-4 shells in one mission.”

The flight route is programmed in advance using specialized systems, and only at the final stage — when the target is in close proximity — the operator takes manual control to guide the drone onto the object and evade electronic warfare systems.

The Nemesis unit has its own workshop, which monitors the condition of the bombers, conducts inspections, and performs test flights. In addition, there is meticulous record-keeping of sorties and returns, operator checklists, and verification of operational algorithms.

One of the representatives of “Baba Yaga”-class drones in Ukraine is the Vampire drone (I reported on it here in April, 2025). It is a large hexacopter that previously operated at around 20 km and can now reach targets up to 60 km away. The payload capacity of the drone is steadily increasing (over 15 kg).

Developed by the Ukrainian company SkyFall in 2022, the Vampire was designed for strike missions, including the destruction of armored vehicles, fortifications, ammunition depots, and enemy personnel. It is also used to deliver equipment to the frontline.

According to a Ukrainian serviceman interviewed for this article, “frontline logistics would collapse without it. So it’s not only a strike platform, but also a very high-quality logistical tool.”

The manufacturer recently told Oboronka that the current version of the Vampire drone surpasses the first version in every aspect — communications, range, resilience to electronic warfare, ease of operation, speed, and design for production.

Previously, the company could produce around 50,000 units per year; now, it has a capacity of 100,000 units annually while maintaining consistent quality.

The producer mentioned that there are still many areas for improvement. Whereas earlier the system relied on GPS, it no longer does. Alternatives include visual navigation, inertial guidance, and ground-based “beacons.” In the Starlink-enabled version, navigation can also be based on satellite constellation tracking.

The goal is to ensure that, even under heavy signal suppression, Vampire can complete its mission and return safely.

SkyFall has more than halved the production cost of its Vampire drone during the full-scale war, from nearly $20,000 to the current $8,500 per unit.

The producer acknowledged that there is still room to reduce the price further, but the potential for further reductions is limited. The company plans to lower costs by installing its own camera and localizing the production of key components, which, in some cases, are already cheaper than their Chinese counterparts.

SkyFall has already localized a significant share of production: communications systems, antennas, the chassis, and almost the entire ground control station are now Ukrainian-made. The company has also developed its own motors, although their serial production has not yet been scaled.

A separate focus area is the development of an in-house camera. A prototype has already been created, with an MVP version expected in the spring. By the end of the year, SkyFall plans to launch mass production of cameras for the Vampire. The company already offers a “Vampire non-China” version — free of Chinese components — and aims to make the drone fully Ukrainian by the end of the year.

According to Russian media, Russian forces repair downed Ukrainian Baba Yaga drones and then use them against Ukrainians.

Reportedly, a trophy “Baba Yaga” drone can be purchased at the market in occupied Donetsk for approximately 600,000 rubles ($7,860 USD). Some drones are cheaper. Sellers are reportedly willing to arrange a “test drive” outside the city to demonstrate the drone in operation.

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Mesh Networks on Russian Drones and Ways of Countering Them

Ukrainian military communications specialist and advisor to Minister of Defence, Serhiy “FLASH” Beskrestnov, wrote on Facebook that a fellow serviceman had sent him photos of the internal configuration of a new Russian Molniya UAV. The images confirmed what he had feared - Russian forces have installed a mesh modem on the Molniya UAVs.

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Ukraine is known for its successful use of ground and waterborne unmanned vehicles against the enemy. These systems are considered among the best in the world in their respective domains — cheaper, and often more effective than their Western counterparts.

At the same time, Russia is developing similar systems. While we have not yet seen many notable successes on their side, once Russia identifies a viable solution, it is likely to scale it rapidly, as it did with Shahed-type drones, fiber-optic drones, KABs, and the adoption of Starlink.

In this edition:

• Ground Drones in 2026: What to Expect;

• Small and Agile Systems: The Role of River and Naval Drones in Ukraine;

• Russia’s Gerbera Drones as FPV Carriers;

• Is the Starlink Whitelist an Effective Solution?

• 5+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

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I'm running a fundraising campaign to buy a vehicle for my friend Volodymyr, who is serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine 🇺🇦

I’d appreciate it if you consider donating to PayPal.

In 2025, here on Substack, we raised funds to purchase three Mavic drones for recon purposes for another friend of mine serving in the Ukrainian army.

Ground Drones in 2026: What to Expect

Some weeks ago, we saw an awesome video of the Ukrainian Droid TW-7.62 ground robotic system, based on the NUMO platform, that captured three Russian soldiers. The video was shared by the manufacturer, Ukrainian company DevDroid.

I connected with the company and asked for their assessment of trends in ground drone development in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. “From a technological perspective, 2026 will be a year of evolutionary rather than revolutionary change,” the company said.

And here is what we can expect from ground drones in the coming months:

1. Increased range and speed

The first and most fundamental challenge for Ukraine’s Armed Forces is the expanding kill zone. If earlier tactical and technical specifications for unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) assumed an operational range of 5–7 km, this is no longer sufficient. Real combat tasks now require a one-way range of up to 20 km.

At the same time, speed requirements are also increasing. The optimal speed must be 40–50 km/h; otherwise, these platforms become easy targets.

For manufacturers, this means working simultaneously with several complex parameters: energy consumption, communication stability, drivetrain reliability, and platform survivability.

2. UGVs as the backbone of battlefield logistics

The second key trend is the growing logistical role of UGVs. In some combat areas, up to 90% of logistical tasks are already performed by ground robots: ammunition resupply, evacuation, and equipment delivery.

Human resources have limits. Operators often conduct two to three missions in a row. In reality, units are sometimes forced to pause operations for several days simply because operators are physically exhausted.

This directly leads to the next major trend.

3. Transition to semi-autonomy

In 2026, UGVs will inevitably move toward semi-autonomous modes. This is one of the most technically complex challenges ahead.

Civilian autonomous vehicles operate on paved roads, with lane markings, traffic lights, and predictable environments. UGVs, by contrast, operate off-road, under fire, and in conditions of unstable communications.

Full autonomy will not yet be achieved, but the first functional solutions—of varying quality—will appear. This will serve as a starting point for reducing operator workload and scaling UGV use.

4. Countering FPV drones

Another serious challenge is protecting UGVs from FPV drones. Previously, the primary reliance in this area was on electronic warfare. However, the battlefield is seeing a growing number of “loitering” FPV drones that can wait for targets for extended periods, as well as fiber-optic FPVs that are immune to traditional jamming methods.

As a result, developers will increasingly focus on finding new solutions to protect UGVs from FPV threats.

5. Combined combat operations

The next stage of evolution is multi-domain operations. Coordinated use of ground and aerial unmanned systems significantly increases the effectiveness of firepower and enables faster and more precise responses to battlefield threats.

When an enemy group is detected, a machine-gun-equipped ground robot moves in first, using suppressive fire to pin the enemy down. A second robot armed with a grenade launcher then advances, engaging targets with fragmentation effects within a radius of approximately 25 meters. FPV drones are used to eliminate what remains.

If FPV drones are deployed first, the enemy tends to disperse and hide, making detection—especially in wooded terrain—much more difficult. This is why sequencing matters: machine gun first, then grenade launcher, followed by FPVs, delivers better results.

In combat scenarios, ground robotic systems can also function as carrier platforms—acting as “mother drones” for FPVs.

6. From improvised solutions to mass platforms

While improvised systems dominated at the beginning of the war, the market is now moving toward scalable platforms. This includes adaptations based on serially produced equipment—such as quad bikes, pickup trucks, and heavier carriers—modified to meet combat requirements.

In October 2025, DevDroid created a universal “operating system”, Droid Box, to accelerate UGV development. The Droid Box is the "brain" of a ground drone, responsible for all key functions, including communication, control, and integration of combat modules.

Also, the company is integrating an AI-driven optical detection system into its ground robotic complexes.

Read my previous report on their work here: Ground Drones as Mini-Artillery Systems: DevDroid.

And here is my assessment of general drone trends in 2025: Drone Warfare in Ukraine: Key Trends of 2025.

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Small and Agile Systems: The Role of River and Naval Drones in Ukraine

Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi published an insightful interview with Velbot, Commander of the 443rd Separate Naval Division “Neptun Shadow” of the 9th Brigade of the Unmanned Systems Forces. He shared insights on the use of maritime and river drones in Ukraine. Here is my summary of this interview.

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This week, Russia deliberately struck a passenger train with a Shahed-type drone, later claiming that the train was transporting military personnel.
Unfortunately, this development had been anticipated weeks earlier, amid a rapid increase in Russian drones equipped with mesh modems or Starlink terminals, enabling real-time, online control.
New upgrades to Shahed-type drones are being documented on a weekly basis, and with freezing temperatures returning across Ukraine in the coming days, there are growing concerns that Russia may launch another wave of destructive attacks.

In this edition:

• Russian Shaheds Strike a Passenger Train in Ukraine;

• Ukraine Aims to Create an Anti-Shahed Shield;

• Ground Drones as Mini-Artillery Systems: DevDroid

• 10+ additional developments in drone warfare in Ukraine and Russia.

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Russian Shaheds Strike a Passenger Train in Ukraine

On January 27, three Russian Shahed-type (Geran-2) drones with online control attacked a moving train carrying 291 passengers in the Kharkiv region. As of January 28, six fatalities have been confirmed.

The strike was not directed at the locomotive but at the train's center. Serhiy FLASH Beskrestov, now an advisor on technological issues to the Minister of Defence, wrote on his social media that the operator who controlled the Shahed (either via a radio modem using a mesh network or Starlink) acted deliberately, as drone operators can clearly distinguish between different types of railcars.

Russian channels are claiming that the train was transporting military personnel, which is false. Among the passengers were service members returning from leave and traveling back to their units as ordinary passengers. Many of them, having combat experience and medical training, provided first aid to injured women and children.

The attack occurred near Yazykove, approximately 60 km from the front line. According to comments, only one daily passenger train currently operates on that section of the route, with another running every other day.
This not only raises the issue of deliberate targeting, but also suggests careful planning and prior study of the train schedule by Russians.

In an earlier interview with The New Voice, Serhiy FLASH said that Ukrainian experts had documented the use of Starlink terminals with Molniya UAVs. According to his own statistics—compiled with the help of OSINT colleagues—38% of these attacks were successful.
Molniya UAV controlled by a human operator via Starlink can fly at very low altitude, evade Ukraine’s interceptor drones and radars, and strike targets with high precision.

Later, he observed Starlink terminals on the BM-35, a fuel-powered UAV. It can strike targets at distances of up to 500 kilometers thanks to its fuel reserve. While it is smaller than a Shahed, it remains highly dangerous.

This pattern of attacks is expected to continue. Starlink performs very well: it provides a stable video transmission channel and precise control.

On January 24, Russian forces carried out a Shahed drone strike on helicopters in the area of Kropyvnytskyi. “In the footage, we can see automatic target lock and manual guidance based on the video feed. However, there were no UAVs nearby to form a mesh radio network. I therefore conclude that this is the first recorded use of Shahed drones operating via Starlink,” FLASH explained.

Serhiy added that Ukraine cannot wait for the enemy to devastate everything using Starlink-controlled Shaheds. Ukraine must act quickly and develop countermeasures. The most immediate solution is administrative and regulatory—at the level of SpaceX, the U.S. government, and Ukraine’s government.

According to him, one countermeasure Ukraine can take is to ban roaming for foreign Starlink terminals entering Ukrainian territory. Only authorized Ukrainian Starlink terminals should operate within the country.
”To achieve this, we need to establish a registry of all Starlink terminals used by the Armed Forces and volunteers, transfer them to servicing by an official dealer in Ukraine, and ensure that all new activations go exclusively through that channel. This would give us full visibility of all terminals operating inside the country. Any Starlink terminals purchased abroad should not function on Ukrainian territory,” Serhii said.

On Jan. 29, Minister Fedorov and advisor Serhii FLASH reported that the Ministry of Defense team promptly contacted SpaceX and proposed concrete steps to address the issue. “I am grateful to SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell and personally to Elon Musk for their swift response and for initiating work on resolving the situation,” mentioned the Minister.

According to FLASH, the teams are preparing a comprehensive response that includes both rapid, temporary measures and more systematic, long-term solutions.

Just a week earlier, I reported on at least six methods by which Russia uses its UAVs to kill and terrorize Ukrainian civilians; check this free article.

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Ukraine Aims to Create an Anti-Shahed Shield

During the daytime on January 26, a Russian Shahed drone was observed flying over Kyiv; however, no air raid alert was issued. This may indicate not the absence of air defence, but rather that the UAV was flying below 100 meters. Ukrainian experts say the UAV’s ability to reach the capital undetected is deeply concerning.

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