Last week, President Zelensky visited Canada and signed the Ukraine–Canada Declaration for a 100-Year Partnership. It is Ukraine’s second 100-year partnership framework, after the agreement signed with the UK in 2025.

Important note: for now, it exists only at the level of a declaration, and the formal agreement is expected to be signed in December 2026.

In this brief overview, I try to place the Canada–Ukraine cooperation in the context of the revival of Canada’s defence industrial base, as well as its reforms and initiatives in the drone sector.

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This partnership doesn't really come as a surprise because Canada has historically been one of Ukraine’s most reliable allies, especially in this war against Russia. Throughout years of Russia’s aggression, Canada’s support for Ukraine has remained consistent. There were no major policy swings like those in the US that directly affected the situation on the battlefield. Nor have there been major disappointments like those Ukraine experienced with some European partners that either refused to provide key weapons systems, or delayed their delivery for so long that those delays had negative consequences for Ukraine.

This can be partly explained by the fact that Canada has not been a major producer of many of the defence capabilities Ukraine urgently needed. Nevertheless, it has provided important equipment, including armoured vehicles and drones. Canada has also led the way in imposing sanctions on Russia. It seized a Russian-registered Antonov aircraft grounded in Toronto and has been one of the first and strongest advocates for using frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine.

The new 100-year partnership framework creates much broader opportunities for both Ukraine and Canada.

Canada now has a rapidly growing defence and security ecosystem comprising more than 585 companies nationwide.

For decades, its defence industry has been deeply integrated with the United States. Canadian companies often found it easier to access the US defence market than to sell to their own government. But during these two years of the Trump administration, Canada has changed.

I have lived in Canada since August 2024, and I have seen how dramatically Trump’s annexation threats and economic pressure have shaped the country’s political debate.

The current revitalization of Canada’s defence can only partly be explained by the threat from Russia. A much more immediate factor has been uncertainty surrounding Canada’s most important ally. Although nobody seriously (at least publicly) talks about the prospect of US military action against Canada, the realization that Canada might not be able to rely on its closest partner has been something of a cold shower.

In 2026 we’ve seen a remarkable number of new defence initiatives, institutions, investments, and reforms announced. The most important policy development was the launch of Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy. The document places much greater emphasis on building sovereign defence capabilities and supporting domestic producers. It identifies ten “key sovereign defence capabilities” that will receive particular attention under the new approach.

At the same time, Canada is clearly trying to diversify its defence partnerships. The strategy calls for deeper cooperation with European partners, the United Kingdom, and countries in the Indo-Pacific. We also need to be realistic: Canada is highly unlikely to become completely militarily self-sufficient or independent from the United States in the foreseeable future. Nor would that be desirable. The two countries remain closely connected through NATO, NORAD, integrated supply chains, and decades of military cooperation. In the event of a major common threat, they would still have to respond together, making interoperability between their armed forces and military capabilities essential.

Interestingly, the Defence Industrial Strategy does not specifically mention Ukraine as a priority partner. Yet that has not prevented the two countries from deepening their partnership.

All types of drones across the land, air, surface, and underwater domains are now officially recognized as one of Canada’s ten key sovereign defence capabilities. Canada has also launched an unusually large number of initiatives in this area over a relatively short period. Compared with many other countries, even those facing immediate threats, Canada appears to be making a particularly significant push in the drone sector.

The list of these initiatives includes:

• MINERVA — a Canadian Army initiative focused on accelerating the integration of larger numbers of uncrewed aerial, ground, and littoral systems into Army operations and strengthening regular engagement with industry.

• Uncrewed Systems Defence Innovation Secure Hub (UxS DISH) — a secure innovation hub bringing together government, industry, academia, and the military to develop, test, and commercialize uncrewed technologies.

• Defence Drone Initiative (DDI) — a broader effort to accelerate the development, testing, adaptation, procurement, and domestic production of uncrewed and autonomous systems.

• Defence Drone Initiative Marketplace (DDIM) — modelled on Ukraine’s Brave1 Marketplace and designed to give the Canadian Armed Forces and Coast Guard faster access to drone and counter-drone technologies.

• RED COBALT Uncrewed Systems Accelerator — a Canadian Joint Forces Command initiative bringing together operators, government agencies, and industry to test aerial, ground, and maritime drones, as well as other emerging uncrewed capabilities, in realistic conditions.

The Canadian Armed Forces currently have only around 2,000 drones of various types in their inventory. Ottawa has now awarded contracts worth up to C$50 million, expected to expand this fleet roughly tenfold. The first procurement phase focuses on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance drones, as well as uncrewed ground vehicles, and includes six companies.

During President Zelensky’s visit, Canada and Ukraine signed a Joint Declaration on enhanced defence and security cooperation, which the Ukrainian presidency described as the first step toward a bilateral Drone Deal expected to be finalized at the end of September.

Ukraine has already signed Drone Deals with 10 partner countries. These arrangements include mutually beneficial cooperation formats, including joint production, localization, technology transfer, financing, cyber cooperation, and access to new markets, with the precise model tailored to the partner country.

Currently, Canada and Ukraine cooperate within the Build with Ukraine framework for joint drone production. The first is a joint venture partnership between Ukrainian Airlogix and Canadian Sentinel Research & Development, announced in May, focused on producing Ukrainian reconnaissance-drone technologies in Canada. The second, announced during Zelensky’s latest visit, is a partnership between General Dynamics Mission Systems–Canada and the Ukrainian company Green Tech Harvest.

Additional partnerships are currently under negotiation, most likely including two Ukrainian companies, Ratel Robotics and Skyfall.

The Ukrainian delegation organized an event in Calgary to showcase their technologies. The Ukrainian side was represented by JK Land Vehicles LLC, Airlogix, AIDRONESUA, GreenTech Harvest LLC, UFORCE, Skyfall, and Quantropi. More than 30 Canadian companies also took part, including both current and potential partners of Ukraine’s defence industry.

From the Canadian side, according to social media posts, North Vector Dynamics, which describes itself as Canada’s only domestically owned and controlled missile company, met with President Zelensky. UAS producer Volatus Aerospace was also present at the meeting. Sentinel R&D, which has already established a joint venture with Ukrainian Airlogix, participated as well.

Setting drones aside, Canada also announced more than $2 billion in new support for Ukraine, including over $1 billion in defence assistance. Canada will allocate approximately C$350 million (around US$253 million) to procure urgently needed air-defence capabilities for Ukraine through the JUMPSTART program. JUMPSTART is a US mechanism that allows allies and partners to finance the procurement of American-made weapons for Ukraine through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system.

Canada is also ready to contribute technology to the pan-European FREYJA anti-ballistic missile programme and to prepare new sanctions against Russia, including measures aimed at making it more difficult for Russia to produce ballistic missiles.

President Zelensky also visited the International Test Pilots School in Canada, where Ukrainian pilots are being trained to operate F-16 and Gripen fighter jets.

Earlier, Operation UNIFIER, under which Canadian instructors have trained more than 49,000 Ukrainian military personnel, has been extended until 2029.

The 100-year partnership with Canada was received largely positively in Ukraine, although some observers were sceptical about the broad and relatively general nature of the declaration. According to the former Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States Valeriy Chalyi, there has been real progress in some areas, particularly defence and security, while cooperation in others, including trade, economic relations, and visa-free travel, has largely remained stagnant. In some areas, such as space cooperation, there is little substance.

At the same time, Chalyi stressed that the partnership still has room to grow. He hoped the future Agreement would be more concrete, include clear and detailed commitments, and go beyond simply restating previously agreed positions.

On the Drone Deal partnership, Ukrainian military officer and founder of the Kruk drone training centre Viktor Taran said the Canadian prime minister had described the proposed model quite openly: combining Ukraine’s battlefield experience with Canadian manufacturing capacity, software, and artificial intelligence.

At the same time, Taran cautioned that the key question is not simply how many drones will be produced, but who will own the design documentation, where localization will take place, and whether Ukraine will remain a supplier of complete solutions rather than becoming merely a source of data and combat protocols for foreign production lines.

Protection of intellectual property is an important issue for Ukrainian defence producers and has become a point of discussion in partnerships with Greece and the United States.

Canadian stakeholders also welcomed partnership with Ukraine and pointed to other areas where Canada could play a more active role in supporting Ukraine in its war of survival.

Human rights and disinformation expert Marcus Kolga wrote that “it’s good news for Canadians: we stand to benefit enormously from Ukraine’s hard-won expertise in drone technology.” At the same time, he stressed the importance of helping Ukraine fight the war now: “Ukraine needs weapons now to defend its people from Putin’s escalating nightly bombardment and campaign of terror.”

Kolga argued that Canada should press allies such as South Korea to adjust their policies and allow the immediate sale of surface-to-air missiles to Ukraine, noting that thousands of Ukrainian lives are at stake.

He also called on Canada to designate Russia a state sponsor of terrorism and begin expelling Russian intelligence operatives working under diplomatic cover. Europe has already faced suspected Russian sabotage and terror operations, while Canada has not been immune either. Incendiary devices placed on DHL aircraft in Germany were reportedly intended for flights to Canada.

In his view, supporting Ukraine means helping it defend its skies now, while also strengthening Canada’s own defences against Russia’s expanding campaign of hybrid warfare.

According to national security expert Wesley Wark, “there is one unique capacity that Canada has been mysteriously reluctant to supply. The capacity is imagery from the latest set of radar satellites that the Government of Canada operates—called the Radarsat constellation mission (RCM)”.

Canada had authorized MDA to provide Ukraine with synthetic aperture radar satellite imagery capable of operating through cloud cover and in all weather conditions. The imagery was combined with other commercial satellite data to produce near-real-time intelligence for Ukrainian authorities.

Wark notes, however, that the Canadian RADARSAT support reportedly lasted only about a year before being quietly discontinued, with no public explanation. The capability had been highly valuable for tracking Russian military movements, targeting weapons systems, and supporting Ukraine’s battlefield defence.

Speaking from my personal experience, what I admire about Canadians is their modesty and willingness to learn. Unlike some others, they are not convinced that their innovations are automatically the best or that there is nothing to improve. They understand their shortcomings, are openly critical of them, and are ready to change.

That said, it remains to be seen how many of the initiatives described above will survive and develop in the coming years, because defence is a long game. We also have to understand that for Ukrainian or European companies coming to Canada, the sense of urgency probably won’t be the same as on NATO’s Eastern Flank.

The coming months will likely bring further updates on Ukraine–Canada defence cooperation, as well as new partnerships between Canadian and European companies, which are developing quickly. Stay tuned!

During my Postdoctoral Fellowship in Defence Innovation at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, which ends next month, I have written several pieces on Canada:

• Lessons and Warnings for Canada's Defence Investment Agency;

• MINERVA Initiative and Drone Integration in Canadian Army Land Operations;

• The Potential for Canada-EU Cooperation on Counter-UAS Capabilities;

• The Defence Industrial Strategy, Sovereign Capabilities, and Defence.

For the NATO Association of Canada, I also wrote two short analyses examining the nature of Canada’s military assistance to Ukraine in 2024 and 2025:

• Canada’s Military Assistance to Ukraine in 2024: Key Trends;

• Canada’s Military Assistance to Ukraine in 2025: Key Trends.

Also, here are my other articles about Canada, Ukraine, and drones:

• Drones Define the Battlefield - Is Canada Ready?

• Why Canada and Ukraine Must Team Up on Defense Innovation.

And, finally, my conversation with the Canadian journalist and top Substacker Paul Wells: The Q&A: “The human may not be able to make decisions at the speed modern war requires.”

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Thank you for reading and supporting my work! Here I publish weekly newsletters Arms Trends in Ukraine and Ukraine Drone Brief.

Also, there is an occasional newsletter Drone warfare in Ukraine.

On August 7, Abelardo de la Espriella was inaugurated as President of Colombia. During his election campaign, he promised to bring peace to Colombian society, which continues to be affected by hundreds of armed groups.

Given the new government’s political orientation toward the US and the broader Western world, the coming four years present a window of opportunity to revive cooperation between Colombia and Ukraine. I spoke with a Ukrainian drone pilot, defence industry representatives, and Colombian thought leaders and realized that such cooperation would be mutually beneficial. Ukraine could gain a strong ally in South America, while Colombian authorities could strengthen their capabilities to counter domestic security threats.

Why are guerrilla groups so difficult to counter? Because they retain the initiative and choose when and where to attack. Ukraine could contribute to developing a solution to counter armed groups in Colombia: from shaping the overall strategy and developing practical solutions, such as identifying the commercial sources of drones and building electronic warfare systems, to planning offensive actions aimed at regaining the initiative.

This article is available in Spanish. Thanks to the volunteer community InformNapalm and Anna Garsia for translating. ¡Este artículo está disponible en español! Muchas gracias a Anna Garsia, voluntaria de la comunidad internacional de InformNapalm, por su trabajo en la traducción de esta publicación.

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A week before this major political transition, I was in Bogotá for a conference organized by the Naval Academy of Strategic Studies and attended by personnel from the Colombian Navy and Army. I delivered a 40-minute presentation on drone and counter-drone innovations in Ukraine.

In Colombia, drones are not a novel technology. For over a decade, they have been used by paramilitary and drug-trafficking groups for a variety of illicit purposes, including reconnaissance, delivery, and attacks against government forces. Although the Colombian government pursued several projects in drone and anti-drone warfare, they demonstrated limited effectiveness. In this context, closer cooperation with Ukraine would help Colombia keep pace with emerging threats.

Through private conversations, I learned that there had been several attempts to establish cooperation on these issues, but due to political challenges in recent years, they did not materialize. I believe this is about to change.

Colombia–Ukraine Relations and the Russia Factor

Bilateral relations between Ukraine and Colombia have been underprioritized for years. The first communication between the presidents of the two states took place in April 2022, after Russia’s full-scale invasion. In the first months of the full-scale invasion, Colombia voted in support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity at the UN General Assembly. In the following years, however, it mostly abstained from voting on relevant resolutions.

Ukraine does not currently have a resident diplomatic mission in Colombia; bilateral relations are overseen by the Ukrainian Embassy in Peru.

Russia, on the other hand, has long maintained a strong presence in the country, allowing it to spread its narratives and build influence. Prof. Carlos Patiño from the National University of Colombia informed me that Russia has operated — and continues to operate — a structured intelligence network in Colombia since 2017.

Despite the official congratulations on de la Espriella’s victory, Russia’s frustration with the election outcome is already evident in the coverage of several pro-government information channels. The Telegram channel Rybar, for example, has been criticizing his counterterrorism agenda daily and apparently no longer includes Colombia on the list of friendly countries.

This is a good sign.

There are very few international organizations in Colombia actively trying to counter Russia’s influence. One of them is the German Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. The director of its Colombia office, Dr. Kristin Wesemann, told me that one of the Foundation’s goals is to support democratic institutions, security, and innovation-driven economies around the world. In Colombia, the Foundation works to counter disinformation and Russian narratives. It also raises awareness of developments in Ukraine and Europe and organizes workshops with military personnel, police, and politicians to strengthen understanding of Russian propaganda and influence operations.

In the context of drone warfare, Russia has already been advancing multiple disinformation narratives, claiming that Ukraine allows cartels and paramilitary groups to gain drone warfare experience or is even supplying drones to South America. These claims have been repeatedly refuted, but they can still resonate with unprepared audiences.

European intelligence agencies have also warned that Russia has been collecting captured Ukrainian drones for potential use in staged provocations in third countries. It would therefore not be surprising to see Russia attempt a similar tactic in Latin America, potentially using captured Ukrainian drones to manufacture evidence supporting its disinformation narratives.

Colombians in the Russia–Ukraine War

Currently, around 16,000 foreigners are serving in Ukraine’s armed forces, with citizens of Latin American countries comprising about 40% of that number. Some sources estimate that around 7,000 Colombians have fought in Ukraine, where they have been praised for their strong preparation and resilience on the battlefield. For instance, in July, an assault group of Colombian volunteers fighting in the Ukrainian Armed Forces eliminated Russian troops on a section of the front between Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhzhia region.

Under international law, foreign soldiers in Ukraine are not mercenaries but members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; they have the right to prisoner-of-war status and are protected by the Geneva Conventions.

Ukrainian authorities say they attempt to check the profiles of all foreign combatants applying to join the Armed Forces and even reject some. At the same time, we can understand that amid the massive manpower needs on the battlefield, Ukraine has limited resources to verify the backgrounds of every foreign volunteer.

In private conversations in Colombia, I was told that over the previous four years, there had been little interest among Colombian authorities in working with Ukraine to address this problem.

With Ukraine planning to expand foreign recruitment in the near future, this could become a more serious issue. The Executive Director of the Institute of Political Science, based in Bogotá, Carlos Augusto Chacón, believes that it’s important for Colombia and Ukraine to exchange information on criminal recruiters and intermediaries, strengthen vetting of foreign recruits, investigate attempts to divert military knowledge or components, and establish robust end-use controls. “Any investigation of Colombian returnees must be based on individualised evidence and conducted under judicial oversight, without treating all veterans or volunteers as security risks,” Carlos added.

Currently, Ukraine is building a system in which foreign recruits will be vetted and sign contracts directly with military units. Since the government plans to involve private recruitment companies and pay them for each candidate who joins the military, Ukraine will also need to check the people who identify and bring them into the recruitment system. The government should know every local agent used by a recruitment company. Before departure, candidates should receive information about their contracts, pay, and future service directly from a government-authorized centre. “When a company recruits people abroad through several intermediaries, the government should be able to see the entire chain. Otherwise, Ukraine may thoroughly check someone once they reach the country while knowing very little about how — or on what terms — they were brought there,” wrote Ihor Bezkaravaynyi, Deputy Minister of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine.

The actual number of foreign nationals fighting for Russia remains unknown. As of March 30, Ukraine had identified 27,407 foreign nationals serving with Russian forces from at least 135 countries.

The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), together with two other organizations, has analyzed Russia’s recruitment of foreigners. Cuba and Colombia have been identified as the main recruitment hotspots in the region.

In early August 2026, Colombian news channel Noticias Caracol published an investigation based on testimonies from the families of missing soldiers, describing how Russia is recruiting Colombian citizens and using them as cannon fodder in its war of aggression against Ukraine.

Russia recruits Colombians for several reasons. First, Colombia has a large number of people with military and paramilitary experience as a result of the country’s long-running armed conflict. The second reason is economic, as financial incentives can make such recruitment attractive to vulnerable individuals. A third factor is that the Colombian government has not yet taken strong measures to prevent or oppose these recruitment efforts.

The investigation also described the routes through which recruits are reportedly sent to Russia. From Colombia, recruits are first sent to Peru or Panama and then to Brazil. From there, they may travel through Morocco, India, or the UAE before eventually reaching Russia, using routes through countries that maintain relatively close relations with Moscow. While the Russian Embassy in Colombia stated that it was not involved in recruiting Colombian citizens, the Colombians featured in the investigation presented contracts signed with the Russian Ministry of Defence.

Looking at this issue in a broader context, it is important to understand that even if Colombian fighters were not cartel or paramilitary members at the time of recruitment, once they return home, they might become targets for violent groups seeking their knowledge and expertise and offering better economic opportunities.

The Use of Drones by Non-State Actors in Colombia

Violence in Colombia has lasted for decades. The modern armed conflict officially began in 1964 with the formation of two separate guerrilla groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Despite reconciliation processes, several groups that now use drones refused to demobilize following the 2016 peace agreement.

In 2025, illegal armed groups in Colombia expanded significantly and together numbered more than 27,000 members. Armed groups, which finance themselves through drug trafficking, illegal mining, and other crimes, remain active in Colombia after a six-decade conflict that has left more than 450,000 people dead.

The use of drones has risen sharply in recent years. Armed groups are using these systems mainly for two purposes: attacks and surveillance. They target specific infrastructure and attack police and the army, but another very common use is territorial control through surveillance flights.

One of the more effective tactics is to use drones for forward observation, identifying and adjusting targets before attacks with improvised explosive devices launched on indirect trajectories. Armed groups also use weaponized drones to drop 60 mm grenades vertically onto positions. Another method involves climbing to high altitude before approaching the target and releasing the payload, helping the drone reduce its exposure to some counter-UAS systems.

Colombia’s mountainous and heavily forested terrain provides armed groups with concealed areas from which they can prepare and launch drone-enabled attacks. In regions such as Catatumbo, Cauca, Nariño, and Urabá, security forces can find their movements disrupted by drones operated from hidden rear positions.

Armed groups in Colombia obtain drones through several channels, including consumer marketplaces such as Amazon and Temu, local intermediaries, and cross-border smuggling networks. Commercial systems are then adapted for operational or combat use.

Colombia’s MoD reported 8,395 weaponized drone attacks in 2025, 333 of which were “effective” in striking their targets. This represented a 445% increase over 2024, when 61 effective incidents were recorded. Overall, according to the Defence Ministry, 20 people were killed by drones in 2025, and 297 were injured.

The offensive use of armed UAVs in Latin America reached its most significant escalation on 21 August 2025, when an FPV drone “successfully” targeted a Colombian National Police helicopter, killing 12 police officers.

Since 2019, Colombia’s security forces have acquired at least nine counter-UAS systems from both domestic and international suppliers. So far, however, these investments have produced limited results. Illegal armed groups continue to adapt quickly, including by using platforms such as Autel drones with frequency-hopping capabilities that can bypass some systems currently in service. According to technical assessments, jammers may be only 30–50% effective even against relatively basic drones. Armed groups have already been reported using lower-frequency links that conventional jammers struggle to disrupt.

From their involvement in the Russia–Ukraine war, foreign volunteers are also learning how to bypass military jamming. Some are seeking drones controlled through fibre-optic cables, which allow operators to maintain a connection over long distances without relying on vulnerable radio links.

According to reports, Colombian armed groups are already beginning to use FPV drones but still lack some of the more advanced technical expertise seen in Ukraine, including “how to encrypt the communication between the drone and the person piloting it, or how to set up the explosive charge the way they do in Ukraine.”

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Window of Opportunity for Colombia and Ukraine

“The new administration of President Abelardo de la Espriella is likely to mark a decisive shift away from the negotiation-centred Total Peace policy. The new approach is expected to place greater emphasis on restoring state authority, protecting civilians, recovering territorial control, and dismantling the command, financial, logistical, and political-support networks of illegal armed groups,” says political scientist Carlos Augusto Chacón.

The new president is politically close to the United States and the Trump administration, which will certainly provide opportunities for American businesses to become more involved in Colombia. But there may also be room for Ukrainian innovations, particularly since the Colombian military and law-enforcement agencies recognize they need to learn from Ukraine.

In June 2026, President Zelensky expressed interest in strengthening bilateral relations with Colombia, while de la Espriella responded that his government would be open to expanding cooperation between the two countries.

But what specific technologies from Ukraine would actually be relevant for Colombia?

The threats the two countries face are different. Colombian authorities need to respond to highly adaptive and fast-moving actors with significant resources, rapid decision-making processes, and few constraints imposed by norms or regulations.

Ukrainian contact from one of the elite drone units told me that dealing with guerrillas equipped with drones is a particularly difficult task for any government. “The initiative will remain with guerrilla groups because they are likely to act first. Buildings are easy targets: a drone could be directed at the window of a politician while the operator is hundreds of kilometres away, in the jungle,” he told me.

Yet, we managed to identify several areas where Colombia could benefit from Ukraine’s experience.

• Prioritize early warning and the human component

Against criminal groups, detecting a drone is only part of the problem. Authorities should focus on identifying operators, training locations, assembly workshops, logistics networks, and procurement patterns before deploying drones.

“The only realistic option is to act proactively and target the sources of the threat before drones are deployed. That means identifying the workshops where drones are assembled, locating the pilots and training sites, and using intelligence to disrupt these networks. OSINT and human intelligence can play a major role here, but authorities should also pay attention to seemingly minor indicators: people talk, and information eventually emerges. Commercial activity can also reveal patterns. For example, pilot training inevitably involves crashes and broken components. If someone suddenly starts buying hundreds of propellers every month from radio or hobby stores, that should at least raise a question: why does this person need so many? These small signals, when combined, can help identify a threat before it materializes,” the Ukrainian drone operator told me.

• Establish layered counter-drone defence

BlueBird Tech, the producer of the Chuika drone detector, which is widely used in Ukraine, said that the most realistic approach for Colombia would be a multi-layered counter-drone system combining passive RF detectors, electro-optical cameras, tools for locating drone operators, and localized jamming capabilities. Such a system should be relatively affordable, energy-efficient, and suitable for deployment around military bases, prisons, critical infrastructure, border areas, and mobile convoys. Within this architecture, drone detectors could play a central role by providing early warning and situational awareness.

When dealing with criminal groups, it is often not enough simply to detect the drone itself. It may be equally important to identify the operator’s location and collect information that can later support intelligence or law-enforcement operations.

BlueBird Tech noted that for asymmetric conflicts, drone detectors need to be optimized differently from those for large-scale warfare. Under such conditions, key requirements include a low false-alarm rate, sustained autonomous 24/7 operation, discreet installation, and the ability to determine the operator’s direction or approximate location.

Particular attention should be paid to detecting activity on widely used commercial platforms and short bursts of communication, as criminal groups may operate a drone for only a few dozen seconds. At the same time, fully autonomous drones may have a very limited RF signature, making them difficult to detect with RF sensors alone. The most effective approach is therefore to combine radio-frequency, optical, and acoustic sensors.

• Electronic warfare and military communication

Colombian political scientist Carlos Augusto Chacón believes that jamming alone will not be effective against every threat. The new government inherited an ongoing national counter-drone programme. Its priority should be to evaluate its effectiveness, ensure interoperability among the Armed Forces and Police, conduct realistic operational testing, and avoid fragmented or duplicative procurement.

The Ukrainian drone pilot agrees that jamming everything is not an option. “Police should have access to separate frequencies and dedicated channels that remain usable while jamming is active. One option is to deliberately leave several protected ‘gaps’ in the EW coverage for police communications, using frequencies that are not typical for commercially available systems. The broader principle is that law enforcement should have specialized communications technologies that criminal groups cannot easily replicate with civilian radios. Otherwise, you may disrupt the cartel’s drones and communications, but at the same time lose police communications”.

HIMERA, a Ukrainian producer of tactical radios that recently tested its communication system in the Amazon jungle, noted that the trials were conducted in difficult climatic and geographic conditions, including lowland jungle terrain and heavy tropical rainfall.

The company commented that modern hybrid warfare and efforts to counter transnational organized crime require tactical communications systems that ensure information security, withstand electromagnetic countermeasures, and maintain operational continuity in geographically challenging environments. Their experience in Ukraine has enabled HIMERA to develop a solution that maintains effective communication even in the most challenging conditions. The company believes that such technologies could also be useful for other countries operating in difficult terrain and confronting organized armed groups.

Ukrainian EW producer Kvertus told me that it currently has no specific projects in Colombia but sees significant potential for cooperation. Each country has its own specific operating environment; for this reason, any counter-drone solution has to be adapted to local conditions and the specific nature of the threat.

According to the company, any potential cooperation with Ukraine would need to begin with a request from the Colombian side. If Colombia identifies a need for Ukrainian expertise and technologies, the next step could be to launch a dialogue at the state and relevant government-agency levels to define specific requirements, possible formats of cooperation, and the procedures necessary to implement such projects.

• Strengthen intelligence with the use of AI

The international intelligence community InformNapalm, which has conducted a series of successful OSINT, CYBINT, and HUMINT investigations and contributed to operations against Russian forces, told me that one of the key directions for the development of modern intelligence is the creation of an integrated ecosystem for situational awareness and intelligence fusion, capable of combining information from different intelligence disciplines and the widest possible range of relevant sensors.

This does not necessarily mean creating a single centralized database. More important is establishing an information environment in which data from different institutions can be securely shared, compared, and complemented. Such information may come from HUMINT, SIGINT, GEOINT, OSINT, CYBINT, financial intelligence, technical surveillance, and other relevant sources.

According to InformNapalm, the key challenge is moving from analysing isolated signals toward working with large volumes of accumulated data. Modern algorithms and AI systems can significantly scale analysts’ work by identifying hidden connections, recurring patterns of behaviour and movement, detecting anomalies, analysing changes over time, and helping to develop likely scenarios.

At the same time, the quantity of information should never substitute for its quality. In this model, AI should support analysts rather than replace human judgement or responsibility for final assessments.

InformNapalm sees two interconnected priorities in a complex security environment like one in Colombia:

• The first is expanding the number and diversity of relevant sensors where gaps in observation exist.

• The second, equally important, is improving the sharing, correlation, processing, and timely dissemination of information already available across different institutions. Even high-quality intelligence has limited value if it remains isolated within one agency or reaches decision-makers too late.

Conclusions

The most relevant areas of cooperation between Ukraine and Colombia are limiting violent non-state groups’ access to lessons from Ukraine’s battlefield and strengthening the capabilities of Colombian authorities to address emerging security threats.

In the age of drone warfare, it is important to prioritize the human component of unmanned operations. At least for now, around 80% of a drone mission’s success still depends on the crew. Violent non-state groups will attempt to train their personnel — if not in Ukraine, then in Russia. If that is not possible, they may seek to recruit Colombians and other South Americans returning from the war, or even Ukrainian or Russian soldiers who eventually retire and begin looking for better economic opportunities.

The international organization, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, published a report based on an analytical exercise conducted with Ukrainian drone pilots, concluding that organized crime’s use of drones is now multi-domain. The integration of drones and humans, and the convergence of physical and digital methods, produces a flexible and resilient criminal system that is increasingly difficult to counter with conventional law enforcement tools.

That is why strengthening cooperation channels between Ukraine and Colombia in this area is highly advisable, particularly as Colombia’s political climate is expected to become more favorable. The Colombian Police and Armed Forces are already eager to learn from Ukraine’s experience in drone and counter-drone operations. Strong cooperation channels between the militaries and law-enforcement agencies of both countries, including field visits and regular exchanges, would significantly support this effort. “Ukraine knows better than almost any other country how to train personnel for drone warfare. Ignoring this experience would be like shooting oneself in the foot—especially if drone warfare in the jungle is already on the horizon,” mentioned a Ukrainian drone operator.

When it comes to the actual protection of infrastructure, government facilities, and the lives of police and military personnel, Ukraine has worked with several countries, particularly in the Middle East, on establishing layered air defence systems tailored to their specific needs and operational requirements. A similar approach could be applied to Colombia, with Ukrainian experts helping develop a strategy to protect against and counter multiple threats posed by emerging technologies.

It also closely aligns with Ukraine’s broader priorities, including its ambition to become a global security provider, and could open doors to cooperation with other South American countries facing similar security challenges.

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Read my earlier reports:

• (Un)Manned Warfare: 80% of Drone Success Depends on Pilot Skill;

• Crime by Drone: a New Paradigm for Organized Crime (report by GI-TOC);

• Good Radios Save Lives: HIMERA Tactical Communications in Ukraine;

• Mesh Networks and EW Trends in Ukraine.

Also, check out my list of articles on the theme of Air Defence and Counter-UAS.

President Zelensky announced that Ukraine is ready for a Drone Deal and closer defence cooperation with South Korea. And I’ve just met the first Korean startup, Newtype Industries, that is testing its defence solution with Ukrainian military units, and interviewed its CEO, Sengwon (Joe) Cho, who has recently returned from Ukraine. He told me about their innovation, Barbara, an AI-enabled software solution designed to improve the artillery kill chain.

“In Ukraine, I don’t know why, but you feel like you want to defend this country,” Joe told me. And that deeply touched me.

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Importance of Artillery in Modern Combat

Unlike many new defence startups that focus on unmanned systems, Newtype Industries is working with a more traditional capability: artillery. In South Korea, artillery remains an important element of the country’s sovereign defence capacity.

South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace produces the K9 Thunder 155 mm self-propelled howitzer, one of the world’s most successful tracked artillery systems. The K9 is currently in service or on order with 11 countries and has achieved significant export success compared with other major Western systems, including the American M109, German PzH 2000, and French CAESAR.

South Korea is also a major producer of 155 mm ammunition. In 2023, Seoul reportedly agreed to lend the United States 500,000 rounds of 155 mm artillery ammunition, giving Washington greater flexibility in supporting Ukraine’s ammunition needs. The following year, South Korea announced plans to begin mass production of a new generation of 155 mm ammunition for the K9 Thunder.

Joe, the CEO of Newtype Industries, is a former Korean field artillery officer. He told me that today, much of the international attention surrounding Ukraine’s battlefield innovation is focused on FPV drones. But Ukraine’s shortage of 155 mm ammunition was one of the factors that accelerated the rapid adoption of cheaper FPV drones. Yet drones have not eliminated the need for conventional artillery. Instead, the challenge is finding a more effective way to combine both capabilities.

“If the Ukrainian military had a proper software system to control fires efficiently and coordinate 155 mm ammunition coming from all over the world, they might already be in a very different situation,” he argued. Ammunition is scarce, he said, making the efficiency of every artillery engagement increasingly important.

Ukrainian military officials express similar views on the role of artillery in modern combat. “Contrary to the popular idea that drones have ‘killed’ artillery, the current war has shown the opposite: guns remain one of the main tools on the battlefield,” said professional artillery officer and reserve colonel Viktor Kevliuk in an interview with Texty.Org that I summarized here.

At the same time, drones, digital technologies, and new logistics have transformed artillery into a complex IT-enabled system in which the gun itself is only the final link in the chain.

One of the key lessons of the war is that the speed of the “detect–process–strike” cycle can matter more than the sheer number of guns. Artillery increasingly requires a dedicated data-processing layer that can rapidly convert intelligence into targeting information. In this sense, the gun becomes almost like a “printer” that delivers coordinates through shells. The advantage, therefore, may not belong to the side with the largest number of barrels, but to the one that can turn battlefield intelligence into an accurate strike faster.

Barbara Software for the Artillery Kill Chain

In Ukraine, Newtype Industries is currently testing Barbara, AI-enabled software designed to improve the artillery kill chain.

Barbara focuses on the communication link between forward observers and fire direction officers, who process targeting information and decide whether and how artillery should engage a target. Rather than replacing these officers, the system is intended to help them process battlefield information faster and reduce human error while keeping a person in the decision-making loop.

Joe describes Barbara as a tool intended ultimately to help preserve the relevance and effectiveness of field artillery in an increasingly drone-dominated battlefield. He explained that the software was named after Saint Barbara, traditionally regarded as the patron saint of artillerymen.

Newtype Industries therefore began with artillery command-and-control software but has gradually expanded Barbara toward a broader cooperation system linking traditional artillery with unmanned systems, including strike drones.

The founder argues that artillery should not simply be understood as “a gun and a tube,” but as one component of a larger fires architecture.

“I don’t think drones are pushing artillery back. They are enhancing the power of fires,” he said. “They need to cooperate within one system. They are not separate tools.”

The idea behind Barbara originates partly from the founder’s own experience in the South Korean military.

He joined the military in 2010 as a field artillery officer, shortly before the North Korean shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November of that year, which killed two South Korean Marines and two civilians. His unit became involved in military efforts intended to prevent further escalation.

During that period, he says he saw serious weaknesses in targeting procedures and communication between officers.

Wanting to better understand how these problems could be addressed, he later travelled to the United States and completed a field artillery captain’s course in 2014. But he encountered another problem there: after years of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, he felt that much of the institutional knowledge surrounding conventional large-scale warfare had eroded.

In 2015, while serving as a battery commander near South Korea’s western frontline, another North Korean provocation reinforced his concerns. Despite the five years that had passed since the Yeonpyeong incident, he believed many of the same command-and-control problems remained unresolved.

He eventually left the military and founded a company to work on the problem himself.

According to Joe, many solutions developed by major defence primes are primarily designed around the requirements of senior headquarters. “Large primes say they are solving battlefield problems, but very often they are solving the problems of generals—which are partly administrative problems,” Joe said.

Barbara instead targets the lower tactical level.

The system uses voice-focused AI running through a smartphone carried by soldiers. A soldier can verbally report battlefield information, and Barbara converts that speech into a structured report that can be transmitted to a fire direction officer.

The software can also flag potential problems, for example, if reported coordinates appear incorrect or if a target may be located in a civilian area. The final engagement decision, however, remains with the human operator.

This human-in-the-loop architecture is important. Battlefield information is messy, language varies between units, and mistakes in targeting data can have serious consequences.

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Getting Into Ukraine Was the Hard Part

For Newtype Industries, gaining access to Ukraine’s battlefield testing ecosystem was a major challenge.

Before establishing its current contacts, the company had repeatedly attempted to enter the Ukrainian market and apply for opportunities to test its system but received little response.

That changed after the founder was introduced to the Reaktion Group, which helped connect the company with Ukrainian military contacts.

Reaktion Group is a strategic intelligence, risk, and operational advisory firm that provides intelligence across Eurasia, along with field-based support in Ukraine. Headquartered in Canada, the company has been operating directly in Ukraine since 2022. It facilitates defence-tech companies seeking to battle-test drones and other dual-use products in Ukraine.

So far, the group has worked with around 10 companies from Asia, Europe, and North America, helping them test their technologies and develop partnerships with Ukrainian companies and other relevant stakeholders.

Newtype Industries has met with two Ukrainian units and received initial feedback from combat brigades. According to the founder, one reaction from Ukrainian personnel was that Barbara represented a capability they did not currently have in their existing systems.

Testing is still ongoing. Following an initial verification period, the company says the process moved relatively quickly toward a more advanced level of battlefield testing.

However, testing schedules in Ukraine cannot operate like conventional commercial product trials.

Development depends heavily on the battlefield situation. Ukrainian units must prioritize combat operations, and foreign companies cannot expect soldiers to interrupt ongoing missions simply to test new technology. As a result, Newtype Industries adjusts Barbara incrementally based on feedback whenever operational circumstances allow.

The company does not expect the current testing process to extend beyond 2026, although the timeline remains dependent on battlefield conditions.

More Than a “Battle-Proven” Label

For many foreign defence companies, Ukraine has become attractive as a place to validate technology under real combat conditions. But Newtype Industries is cautious about treating Ukrainian testing merely as a marketing certificate.

“There are a lot of scams around the words ‘battle proven,’” Joe said.

His immediate priority is to mature Barbara into a system that Ukrainian units can genuinely field and use. Only after that process does the company expect to pursue wider opportunities.

Newtype Industries sees potential customers among European countries, particularly Baltic and Nordic states, as well as in the United States and South Korea. Ukraine’s battlefield experience could make the technology more relevant to these markets.

The company completed its seed investment round approximately a year ago and is now seriously raising a pre-Series A round.

For Joe, however, the experience in Ukraine has also had a personal impact.

He said that foreign defence entrepreneurs arriving in Ukraine often encounter not only soldiers willing to explain battlefield problems but also civilians who make visitors feel personally invested in the country’s survival.

“When you meet the people and soldiers there, when you sit in shelters during air strikes together with local people, you start thinking that you want to contribute to defending this country,” he said.

We finished our conversation by discussing the recent updates on North Korean involvement in the war against Ukraine. Last week, it was reported that a North Korean missile unit had begun deploying to western Russia and could be equipped with up to 120 ballistic missiles and six launchers for strikes against Ukraine.

This comes at a time when Russia is already putting significant pressure on Ukraine’s air defences with repeated ballistic missile attacks, knowing that Ukraine has very limited means to protect its civilian population against such strikes.

Unfortunately, developing Ukraine’s own air defence systems will require significant time and resources. For now, much depends on international partners helping Ukraine strengthen its protection against deadly Russian missile attacks.

Despite the absence of a formal defence cooperation agreement between Seoul and Kyiv focused on the joint development of defence technologies, opportunities for business engagement remain significant.

When I visited Seoul this May on a work trip, I saw considerable interest among Korean startups in working with Ukraine, but also perhaps a lack of understanding of how to move forward. Korea is also increasingly interesting for Ukrainian defence entrepreneurs, who are open to exploring new markets despite their traditional focus on Europe.

This fall, the Ukrainian agency Calibrated is organizing Defence Tech Comms Bootcamp, a training programme designed for Ukrainian defence-tech professionals that will focus on introducing them to opportunities in Asia, including potential cooperation with Korean partners. Calibrated is currently open to sponsorship partnerships, and if you are interested, you can contact them here.

Check out my recent articles on the topic:

• Ukraine and South Korea: Underexplored Opportunities for Defence Cooperation;

• Ukraine-Proven Technology Opens Doors in Europe: The Case of Dutch Company Intelic;

• Drone Testing in Ukraine: Experience of Lithuanian Granta Autonomy.

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Are interceptor drones already autonomous? Can a pilot sitting in Ukraine intercept Shaheds in the Gulf? Is it enough to buy hundreds of these systems from Ukraine to protect your own country’s facilities? I discussed some of these questions with the operator of STING drones, one of the most effective Ukrainian interceptors produced by Wild Hornets.

The article is available to all readers — enjoy reading it, and feel free to share it with your network.

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There are more than 100 manufacturers of interceptor drones in Ukraine. As Ukraine offers its expertise in countering aerial threats to partners worldwide, this segment of the industry is growing rapidly. At the same time, only a handful of producers have achieved truly significant results.

One of them is Wild Hornets, a group of engineers that developed the STING interceptor and the Hornet Vision Ctrl control system, which enables remote piloting of interceptors. In May, STING drones intercepted over 3,000 aerial targets.

STING is a lightweight interceptor drone with a cruising speed of 140–170 km/h. In August 2025, Wild Hornets released a video showing tests of a faster version of STING that reached 315 km/h.

It operates at altitudes up to 5,000 m (maximum 7,000 m) and can climb at 30 m/s. Its maximum flight distance is 37 km, while its tactical radius with return is 18.5 km. Flight endurance ranges from around 6 minutes at maximum speed to up to 15 minutes at cruising speed. The exact flight distance, radius, and endurance depend on battery capacity, weather conditions, payload weight, and the operator’s flying style. The drone carries a 500 g payload.

I interviewed an experienced Ukrainian interceptor drone pilot, callsign Gorn, who shared his thoughts on the STING system and the latest trends in this segment. We covered topics such as:

• the use of STING drone and Hornet Vision Ctrl system;

• autonomy in interceptors;

• trends in Ukraine and globally;

• common misconceptions about interceptor drones.

Regular FPVs vs Interceptor Drones

Gorn began his path in this field as a regular FPV drone pilot before moving on to interceptors. According to him, interceptors represent an entirely different level of complexity compared to regular FPV drones.

An interceptor drone often operates in a vertical position, and when guiding it toward a target, another coordinate is added: altitude. While this may not seem too difficult in theory, in practice it has a major impact on the piloting process.

He explained that with regular FPV drones, pilots are often guided visually. With interceptors, however, they rely heavily on radar data and may only have an approximate understanding of where the target is. Detection accuracy is not always perfect, speeds are very high, there are many variables, and the time available to make a decision is extremely limited.

In his words, the logic of operating interceptor drones is already closer to piloting conventional aircraft than to classic FPV. The pilot has to quickly assess the situation, understand where the target is, how it is moving, how the drone itself is moving, and make decisions almost instantly.

Gorn said it may take about a week for an experienced pilot to transition to an interceptor drone and learn how to take off. But these skills can be refined endlessly, and a good pilot has to train constantly.

STING Drones and Hornet Vision CTRL

Talking about the specifics of working with STING interceptors, the pilot said that one of STING’s main advantages is its low entry threshold for pilots. This is achieved through the platform's stability and the engineers’ competence. The drone behaves predictably, remains stable, and is easy to control.

“Compared with many other systems, STING is as stable as possible,” he said. “It can maintain its maximum speed for quite a long time — essentially for as long as the battery allows”.

In late June 2026, Ukraine’s MoD codified the Hornet Vision Ctrl system, which allows pilots to remotely control drones from anywhere in the world. It was officially unveiled in March 2026. Thanks to this technology, more than 600 targets have been destroyed remotely in less than three months.

Also, Wild Hornets announced that the Hornet Vision Ctrl system allowed them to set a new distance record for controlling STING. According to the company, the pilot was located abroad and controlled a drone operating in northern Ukraine, around 2,000 km away from him.

In a major interview with DOU, a Wild Hornets representative said that the control system is a key component of interceptors’ effectiveness. Hornet Vision Ctrl emerged because of a shortage of Chinese digital systems. “We were forced to create our own system. It is not just about data transmission. It is about remote control, positioning, AI systems, and controlling different drones from different platforms — in the air, on land, and at sea,” the representative mentioned, speaking on the condition of anonymity.

The system includes a ground command-and-control station with a digital video system, a 360-degree omnidirectional antenna, and equipment to connect to the UAV operator’s workstation.

The main advantage of the Hornet Vision antenna is 360° coverage, which allows two-person crews to operate without a separate operator to turn the antenna. Another feature is one-way communication, which increases the system’s resilience to EW.

Gorn told me that he had worked with the Hornet Vision Ctrl within Ukraine, and that his experience with the system was highly positive. He described it as a very promising technology. “One of its major advantages is that a single crew can cover several positions. One pilot is enough to cover part of the front, while only spotters need to remain on the ground. They are much easier to train, and this does not significantly affect the quality of the mission,” Gorn said.

He noted that there is some control latency — around 0.2 seconds — but in practice it feels lower and is barely noticeable. After one or two flights, the pilot effectively stops noticing it.

Gorn also emphasized that distance itself is not the key factor limiting this type of remote control. If the system is built properly, geography is not the problem.

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Interceptor Drones and Autonomy

There are several ways in which autonomy and AI-based technologies can be used to intercept aerial targets.

In January 2026, the Ukrainian government, together with the U.S. company Palantir, launched Brave1 Dataroom to test and train AI models. At the initial stage, this project focuses on developing autonomous technologies to detect and intercept enemy drones. The platform enables Ukrainian defence companies to train, test, and validate their own AI models. As of June 2026, more than 100 Ukrainian companies gained access to Brave1 Dataroom and are using the platform to train AI models using real-world data.

Several Ukrainian companies have been working on AI modules for interceptors. The Fourth Law developed a TFL Anti-Shahed module that automatically guides interceptor drones toward Shahed-type drones.

Gorn said that, as of now, automatic terminal guidance in interceptor drones is not yet widespread, but the trend is clearly moving in that direction. All manufacturers are working on this capability.

He explained that these systems are still being built, tested, and improved. The operating principle is more or less the same across different systems, but the key issue is stability. “We need to know that the system can be relied on,” he said.

According to the pilot, this requires a large number of tests. The system has to work consistently in different conditions, and only then can it be truly scaled.

Wild Hornets is also working to integrate AI into its STING and has established a dedicated engineering team for this effort. The company says that external developers often have strong software expertise but lack real-world battlefield experience.

The main purpose of AI integration is not to replace the operator but to assist with target search and navigation under complex, high-speed conditions. A last-mile guidance function is also planned as part of the wider Hornet Vision ecosystem.

According to the company, AI integration could cost around $150–500 per drone, depending on functionality. The main costs are hardware and labour, while software should become cheaper with scale.

Interceptor Trends in Ukraine and Globally

Gorn said that, globally, everyone wants automatic “fire-and-forget” systems — systems that do not require a qualified pilot, in which a person simply presses a button and the technology does the rest. He said this is understandable, because no one wants to train large numbers of people.

However, in his view, fully removing the pilot from the process would be a step too far. The pilot should remain involved, and control over the drone should be preserved.

He noted that, for now, such systems do not pose a direct threat to civilian aviation — neither in terms of altitude nor speed. But the field is developing very quickly, and it needs to be closely monitored.

According to Gorn, the main trend in Ukraine is the speed of interceptors. Everyone is trying to increase the speed of these drones, and jet-powered variants already exist.

As Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Syrsky informed, Russia plans to raise the share of jet-powered attack drones to 50%. According to a report by Militarnyi, Ukraine currently lacks a systematic solution for jet-powered drones. If a jet-powered enemy drone is flying at more than 300 km/h while the interceptor is moving at 310 km/h, the speed advantage is insufficient.

For effective interception, the drone needs to be around 25% faster than the target. At current performance levels, if the interceptor detects the target in one region, it may only be able to catch up with it in the neighboring region. Interceptor drone batteries are not designed for flights over such long distances.

To respond to this threat, Wild Hornets developed STING 2.0, which is faster than the previous version. According to the company, the goal was not to exceed 400 km/h, as this would offer little practical benefit. Instead, STING 2.0 is designed to be just fast enough to catch targets, including jet-powered Shaheds, while retaining enough endurance to search for them.

Common Misconceptions About Interceptors

Since this is a new and rapidly developing niche, many myths surround interceptor drones.

Gorn told me that one of the biggest mistakes is treating an interceptor as a regular FPV drone. It is not enough to take an ordinary FPV pilot, put them behind new equipment, and expect results. “It does not work that way. You need a qualified crew,” he said.

Another misconception, according to him, is that everything is already automated. In reality, almost everything is still controlled by people. This is the work of a crew, not simply an autonomous system.

He explained that the classic operating model consists of a crew comprising a pilot, a navigator, and an explosives specialist. Without control and coordination, the system does not work as intended.

A Wild Hornets representative told DOU that people often imagine the process of downing enemy drones as simple: press a button, the drone takes off, and it intercepts a Shahed. But reality is still far from that.

For an interceptor to take off and destroy a target at the press of a button, it would need to receive precise coordinates very quickly amid electronic warfare, spoofing, fog, communication problems, unstable Starlink, and many other factors.

Once this is achieved, the human role in the interception process will decrease. For now, however, the operator remains at the centre of the process — and will remain there for a long time.

And again, this reinforces the point I have tried to make throughout my reports: it is not enough to simply produce or procure drones. It is even more important to train qualified operators.

If an experienced combat drone pilot needed about a week to transition from FPV drones to interceptors, then significantly more time and resources should be dedicated to training people with limited knowledge of drones and no combat experience.

Read my earlier report on this topic: (Un)Manned Warfare: 80% of Drone Success Depends on Pilot Skill.

And the report by Oliver Gill and Jack Matlack for LSE Ideas: "Teaching Humans in the Loop: Supporting and Integrating Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Training into Europe’s Security Architecture".

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My previous reports on interceptors:

• Drone warfare in Ukraine: war in the Middle East and Ukraine’s expertise;

• STING Interceptor Shots Down Jet-Powered Shahed;

• Everyone Is Building Interceptor Drones. This is Not Enough;

• How Do Interceptor Drones Actually Work?

• Europe Eyes Investments in Ukraine’s Interceptor Drones;

• How Ukraine Trains “Shahed Hunters”;

• STING Interceptor Drone by Wild Hornets: When Civil Society Powers Defence.

Last week, I travelled more than 10,000 km and spent 14 hours in the air to speak with Korean defence tech and military professionals about drone innovations in Ukraine. South Korea, a major defence producer, and Ukraine, an emerging defence tech hub, share similar security challenges and significant prospects for cooperation, which at this stage remain surprisingly limited. Through a series of meetings in Seoul, I tried to understand what is preventing this cooperation from moving closer.

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Sometimes I still can’t believe that the influence of Ukraine’s Arms Monitor reaches this far. My communication with the defence sector in Korea began in the summer of 2025, when I was contacted by local journalist Joshua Bang of Drone Magazine in Seoul for an interview. One year later, I found myself visiting this beautiful country and engaging directly with its defence community.

Asia-Pacific is the region that I almost never cover in my newsletter, yet after this trip, I realized there are more similarities between our realities than differences.

The North Korea-Russia Factor

First of all, both South Korea and Ukraine have to deal with problematic nuclear-armed neighbours. Since North Korea joined Russia’s war effort against Ukraine — sending personnel and military equipment — ties between South Korea and Ukraine have gradually become closer, although it is still difficult to talk about any public or large-scale defence cooperation.

Reportedly, over 11,000 North Korean troops have been fighting alongside Russia against Ukraine. They are learning how to use drones for artillery correction and reconnaissance. They have extensively studied the use of small unmanned systems, including FPV drones. Ukrainian troops reported tactics where one soldier deliberately acted as bait for an FPV drone while two others attempted to shoot it down.

North Korea has supplied Russia with KN-series ballistic missiles that can be armed with a warhead of up to one tonne. Initially, these missiles lacked precision, but battlefield lessons improved their performance over time — meaning they can now kill Ukrainians with higher accuracy. Along with ballistic missiles, North Korea supplied Russia with long-range Koksan artillery, 240mm and 107mm MLRS, 60mm and 140mm mortars, cluster munitions, and 100mm shells for T-54/55 tanks.

In 2024, North Korea ordered the mass production of attack drones, demonstrating that it is actively studying the lessons of drone warfare and implementing them domestically.

In 2025, Ukraine managed to capture two North Korean soldiers. There have been recent reports that Kim Jong Un ordered North Korean troops to commit suicide rather than fall into Ukrainian captivity.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s military intelligence reported that North Korea plans to send 12,000 workers to the production facilities of Geran strike drones at Russia’s Alabuga plant.

South Korea and Ukraine: Current Cooperation

As North Korea’s involvement in the war grows, there have been repeated signals that South Korea may consider stronger support for Ukraine. At this stage, Seoul’s support remains limited to financial, humanitarian, and demining assistance.

• In 2023, the South Korean government handed over 10 Croatian robotic demining platforms by DOK-ING to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine.

• In 2024, Ukraine received 20 new ambulances from the government of South Korea.

• In 2025, Korea provided Ukraine with a new financial assistance package worth $100 million. In addition, Ukrainian medical institutions received 30 modern mobile X-ray systems from Korea’s government.

In 2023, there was also an indirect transfer of 300,000 155-millimeter shells to Ukraine through the United States during the Biden administration.

In Ukrainian media, there has been extensive discussion of what Korea could provide that would be highly valuable to Ukraine. The most obvious capabilities are air defence, which Ukraine critically lacks. South Korea operates a diverse range of air defence systems, including:

• MIM-104 Patriot — South Korea uses upgraded variants such as PAC-2 and PAC-3;

• K-SAAM — a Korean-developed air defence system designed to protect naval vessels from missile and aerial threats;

• KM-SAM — a medium-range South Korean air defence system developed using technologies derived from the Russian 9K37 Buk system;

• K30 Biho — a short-range self-propelled anti-aircraft system equipped with 30 mm automatic cannons and missiles;

• Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) — a US-made missile defence system designed to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles in the upper layers of the atmosphere.

When it comes to US-made equipment, it is important to note that Korea cannot transfer such systems to any third party without approval from the United States.

In June 2024, it was reported that South Korea was considering supplying air defence systems to Ukraine after North Korea signed a new defence agreement with Russia. However, there were no additional public details or follow-up announcements, at least publicly.

As noted by Army Recognition, South Korea could transfer Soviet-designed armoured vehicles to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, including 43 T-80U tanks and 67 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles.

Korea also possesses a broad range of domestic military capabilities, including K2 battle tanks, K9 Thunder howitzers — often considered among the most cost-effective artillery systems in the world — as well as domestic cruise and ballistic missile production. However, the transfer of lethal systems remains even less realistic than the transfer of defensive capabilities.

There are several obstacles limiting this support.

The first is the fear of escalation involving both North Korea and Russia. Moscow has repeatedly threatened South Korea over any increase in support for Ukraine. These threats sound very familiar to Europeans, as Russia routinely portrays countries assisting Ukraine as legitimate military targets.

For South Korea, however, such concerns are even more acute. The country exists in a highly complex neighbourhood involving North Korea, China, and Russia, making escalation risks especially sensitive.

In February 2026, reports emerged that South Korea was continuing discussions with NATO on additional measures to support Ukraine, including potential participation in the PURL mechanism. PURL enables the transfer of American military equipment to Ukraine using European or non-European funding sources. Russia warned that it would retaliate if South Korea participated in the PURL program in any capacity.

Secondly, the United States’ position regarding the Russia-Ukraine war remains highly relevant, as the US is South Korea’s most important strategic partner. South Korea hosts more than 70 US military bases, including Camp Humphreys, the largest US military base overseas. Today, about 28,500 U.S. troops are stationed in Korea.

In May 2026, Seoul and Washington signed a letter of intent on drone and counter-drone cooperation. The two sides said they will work to establish a joint supply chain and develop shared standards for drone and counter-drone systems used by allied forces.

That said, while military support for Ukraine was generally encouraged under the Biden administration, under the Trump administration — which suspended military aid to Ukraine — the political atmosphere changed.

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Opportunities for Business Cooperation

At the business and innovation levels, however, cooperation between Korean and Ukrainian defence innovators remains highly feasible.

Before going on the trip, I reached out to several Ukrainian defence companies to ask what lessons from their success stories I could share with Korean startups. I received input from The Fourth Law, a producer of AI technologies; Odd Systems, a thermal camera manufacturer; and HIMERA, a producer of tactical communication systems.

All of the companies expressed a very positive view of the opportunities for defence partnership between Ukraine and South Korea.

HIMERA noted that both countries have strong expertise and indigenous technological solutions in the defence sector. The exchange of experience and technologies could significantly strengthen the capabilities of both sides and contribute to the development of more effective security solutions.

According to The Fourth Law, “Ukraine possesses unique experience in applying technologies in a full-scale war, as well as vast datasets for training AI systems. South Korea, meanwhile, holds leading positions in precision manufacturing and microelectronics. Combining Ukraine’s battlefield experience with Korea’s industrial and technological capabilities could become a pathway toward ¹shaping the future standards of global security”.

Although South Korea currently has around 600 drone producers, many primarily assemble systems from imported Chinese components, while only a limited number possess substantial domestic technological capabilities.

The level of integration of unmanned systems into the armed forces also appears limited. South Korea established the Drone Operations Command in 2023, yet just over two years later, the government decided to disband the organization due to overlapping responsibilities among military branches. The organization has not been disbanded yet. However, its role will change from conducting drone military operations to overseeing military drone policy, including overall drone procurement and research.

According to several interlocutors, the Korean military has only experimental use of aerial drones, while naval and ground drones remain almost absent from operational integration — despite the fact that local developers of such systems already exist.

Government and military stakeholders are generally aware of Ukraine’s success in drone warfare, but often lack a detailed understanding of how exactly these systems are used in combat. At the same time, I must honestly say that I was fortunate to meet several influential individuals whose knowledge of Ukrainian defence innovation and reforms was outstanding — in some cases even surpassing my own.

Many of the challenges facing Korea’s defence sector reminded me of issues I have observed elsewhere:

• Slow and bureaucratic procurement systems

• Insufficient communication between frontline users and defence startups

• Difficult access to government contracts for innovators

• The detachment of some developers from the real battlefield needs

I also learned that South Korean citizens need special government approval to visit Ukraine, a process that can take at least 30 days. This rule applies to conflict zones generally and is understandable from a security perspective, but it also directly limits the speed and efficiency of cooperation. Nevertheless, individuals who are truly determined to engage with Ukraine still go through this lengthy process.

From my personal experience, I saw strong interest among Korean contacts in learning from Ukraine and cooperating with Ukrainian innovators.

In my presentations, I spoke about the highly effective Brave1 cluster, which acts as a bridge between foreign investors, local innovators, military units, and government stakeholders. A great deal of interest was generated by the Brave1 Marketplace —an “Amazon for war” — where military units can directly view and procure available unmanned systems. For countries with traditional defence procurement systems, such mechanisms appear highly innovative and fascinating.

I also discussed the Test in Ukraine initiative, which allows foreign companies to validate defence and dual-use technologies at training grounds and with military units while receiving battlefield feedback. And, eventually, I mentioned Defence Tech Valley — Brave1’s large defence innovation exhibition already scheduled for September 2026, where Korean startups could network, learn, and meet potential partners.

That said, for cooperation between countries such as Ukraine and South Korea, the “green light” from the respective governments remains extremely important. Ukraine is currently prioritizing technology transfer agreements, so-called “Drone Deals”, primarily with its most trusted partners, particularly those that have signed bilateral security agreements. At present, there is no such agreement between Ukraine and the Republic of Korea.

According to open sources, however, defence dialogue between the two countries is ongoing. Ministries meet regularly and discuss opportunities for cooperation. Therefore, it is entirely possible that some forms of cooperation already exist outside the public eye.

In terms of concrete areas of cooperation, South Korea’s extensive artillery production makes integrating unmanned systems into artillery correction particularly relevant. Ukraine’s experience with ISR drones would also be highly valuable for Korea. Likewise, Ukraine’s expertise in naval drones could offer important lessons, considering Korea’s large maritime territories

And finally, counter-UAS capabilities. North Korea has repeatedly conducted drone incursions into South Korean territory, making advanced radars, interceptors, and anti-drone systems increasingly important.

Both countries have significant potential for building resilient supply chain cooperation. One of the most common questions I was asked concerned Ukraine’s dependence on Chinese components. That dependency still exists. At the same time, Ukraine is focusing on localizing component production and establishing partnerships with other countries in this sector. According to the report Components of Freedom by The Snake Island Institute, some Korean-made components, including accumulator batteries, amplifiers, and communication components such as antennas, VTX/VRX, and TX/RX systems, present a viable alternative to Chinese ones.

Overall, I see enormous potential for deeper partnerships, currently constrained by political limitations and insufficient knowledge of opportunities to cooperate with Ukraine.

I would like to finish this piece on a personal note.

I was invited to Korea by Joshua Bang, who dedicated 10 years of his life to military service and was among the pioneers of drone usage in South Korea. Today, he works as a journalist at Drone Magazine and has gathered around himself a community of like-minded professionals who believe that Ukraine’s experience fighting aggression matters for the entire world.

Just as I crowdfund drones for my friends in Ukraine, Joshua personally crowdfunds and invests in bringing people like me to Korea to speak about the war and the lessons emerging from Ukraine. All of this is done with one purpose: to improve Korea’s military readiness to align with the realities of modern warfare.

And this is exactly what “people’s diplomacy” looks like — when official communication is constrained, but there is strong mutual interest, cooperation continues to develop on the private level.

Joshua is well-connected not only in Korea but across the broader Asia-Pacific region. If you are interested in expanding into Asia, he is an excellent focal point.

As I write this aboard my 14-hour flight back to Canada, I keep thinking about all the remarkable professional connections and friendships I made in Korea — connections that prove countries and societies must stand together in the face of common threats.

Loyalty is something our adversaries lack. Their partnerships are transactional, ad hoc, and driven by immediate self-interest. Once one link in that chain weakens, the rest abandon it. Armenia is an obvious example: it relied on Russia for security guarantees and was ultimately left alone.

Democracies, however, should follow a different trajectory.

I truly hope that my visit to Korea was useful for its defence community and will contribute, even in a small way, to future cooperation between our countries.

This is only the beginning! 🇰🇷 🇺🇦

I visited the Republic of Korea in my independent capacity as a defence analyst and author of Ukraine’s Arms Monitor. This gives me the freedom to engage with stakeholders and discuss security matters openly as a researcher, rather than from an official institutional position, which sometimes comes with its own limitations.

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Ukraine is not only scaling its own drone production—it is also helping trusted partners test and refine their systems under real combat conditions. A growing number of international companies are turning to Ukraine for battlefield validation. The Lithuanian firm Granta Autonomy initially worked directly with Ukrainian military units and now supplies drones to Ukraine as part of Lithuania’s contribution to the Drone Capability Coalition.

Based on my personal experience, I would note that very few international partners fully understand Russia’s imperialistic mindset and support Ukraine in the same way as the Baltic states.

I’m sharing this article based on my conversation with the company’s CEO, Gediminas Guoba, and other open-source reporting on the performance of their drones. With this article, I hope other companies will be inspired and motivated to deepen their cooperation with Ukraine!

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How Granta Autonomy Got into Ukraine

Granta Autonomy is a Lithuanian engineering company producing three main types of systems: the Hornet XR reconnaissance drone, FPV drones, and loitering munitions. Their flagship product, the Hornet XR, is a lightweight, fully autonomous UAV designed for ISTAR missions. It can operate for up to 3 hours over distances of up to 160 km.

The company’s engagement with Ukraine began in 2022, when it initially worked through international funds supporting Ukrainian defence efforts. However, early experience showed that simply supplying drones was insufficient, so the firm shifted toward direct engagement with Ukrainian end users.

After conducting official demonstrations with Ukraine’s MoD and receiving positive feedback, the company proceeded to frontline testing.

According to Gediminas, this cooperation relies on trust built through personal relationships. However, if a system fails to demonstrate real value in combat, those connections quickly disappear.

This direct engagement proved decisive. Strong battlefield performance led to increasing demand for Hornet XR from Ukrainian forces, reinforcing the importance of iterative testing and feedback loops.

Today, Granta Autonomy’s systems are deployed across dozens of Ukrainian brigades, with deliveries already reaching the thousands.

End-User Feedback

Early battlefield feedback directly shaped the evolution of Granta Autonomy’s systems. “In 2022, when we delivered our first batch, it was the second-generation Hornet, with a range of 10–12 kilometers,” the CEO of Granta Autonomy explained. However, Ukrainian operators quickly questioned its value: commercial systems like DJI Mavic drones offered a similar range, raising doubts about the added benefit of fixed-wing platforms.

This feedback led to the company’s first major adjustment—significantly extending the operational range of Hornet XR. The next iterations increased the range to around 30 kilometers, while flight endurance was expanded from approximately 80 minutes to up to three hours.

Gediminas told Resilience Media that the most important thing for defence innovators is to be honest with themselves: if something does not work, it simply does not work—and you need to do whatever is necessary to improve the product.

“That was the case in the beginning—there were many questions and issues, and we still have them,” he notes. “But having a company presence in Ukraine—people, engineers, and support on the ground—is also crucial. Sending UAVs across borders takes a lot of time and paperwork.”

My introduction to Granta Autonomy began with the report on the field testing of their systems, published in Ukraine’s specialized resource, Militarnyi.

In August 2025, the company submitted its proposal to test the Hornet XR to the 7th Corps, which had been assigned a sector at one of the hottest points on Ukraine’s front line, the Pokrovsk agglomeration. The Corps always needs to hedge against supply disruptions in case the centralized defence procurement system fails.

The pilots conducted a flight and carried out reconnaissance, and the reported performance was excellent: strong resistance to electronic interference, reliable image transmission, and solid range. The Hornet is simple and user-friendly, hand-launched, and resistant to hard landings. It “forgives” minor pilot errors, features advanced non-standard control protocols that allow it to operate effectively under electronic warfare conditions, and its camera easily switches between day and night modes.

Following feedback from the 7th Corps, the Lithuanian developers further refined the automation of the ground control station.

The company’s latest innovation is its vertical take-off and landing X-Wing loitering munition, unveiled in 2025 and also tested in Ukraine. The strike drone carries a four-kilogram multi-purpose anti-armor and fragmentation warhead and will be integrated with Ukrainian-made components, including navigation electronics.

The loitering munition’s Datalink solution is jamming-resilient, operates in S-band/C-band, and is compatible with most ground-station software.

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How Has the Battlefield Changed Since 2022

The evolution of drone warfare since 2022 has been rapid. The number and diversity of drone types have increased significantly, alongside major improvements in their capabilities.

At the same time, the speed of technological iteration is uneven. Hardware evolves relatively slowly, while software development drives most of the rapid innovation. Granta Autonomy reports software update cycles of approximately three weeks.

Recent battlefield developments have also shifted priorities in system design. Following Russia’s improvements in radar capabilities, reducing detectability and enhancing survivability against counter-drone systems have become critical.

Today, key requirements include drones’ ability to operate in heavily jammed, GPS-denied environments, as well as improved sensing capabilities—particularly in optics and multi-camera configurations. For loitering munitions, precision remains a central performance metric.

Components Production and Partnerships

Granta Autonomy is also a critical component manufacturer. From the outset, they closely examined Ukraine’s experience to identify which components could be sourced locally or produced at scale.

At the same time, certain dependencies remain difficult to eliminate. Motors, for instance, are still primarily sourced from China. However, Granta Autonomy is critical of this reliance, noting that “buying from China is effectively feeding a potential adversary.” As a result, the company has been actively working to reduce external dependencies wherever possible.

Today, most core components are already produced in Lithuania, including electronics and airframes. Batteries, while still partly sourced internationally, are increasingly available from non-Chinese suppliers. Notably, the company has fully localized the production of key subsystems: electronics are manufactured in-house, and radio communication systems are developed domestically.

The company develops its own autopilot software, ground control stations, communication systems, and payload integration. According to Forbes, Granta Autonomy developed vision-based navigation, which, combined with other sensors, allows drones to compare scenery with stored maps and find their way with high precision without a satellite signal.

NATO and the War Realities

NATO countries remain behind Ukraine in how drones are used on the battlefield. Gediminas Guoba argues that all countries—including the Baltic states—need to urgently expand their drone fleets and adapt to the pace of technological change demonstrated in Ukraine.

He also noted a visible shift in how drones are perceived within European militaries. “Two or three years ago in Lithuania, the attitude was: we are not going to use drones,” he recalls. Today, that has clearly changed—drones are now present in virtually every military exercise, and soldiers are increasingly familiar with their use.

In February 2026, Lithuanian defence units demonstrated Hornet XR during a visit by Danish and Lithuanian leaders to National Defence Volunteers and Riflemen’s Union forces.

Gediminas noted that although unmanned systems are becoming more user-friendly and many drones are now simpler to operate, the role of skilled operators remains important. Currently, there is no alternative but to invest in building operator capacity at scale. Effective use still depends on continuous training and regular flight experience, particularly given the pace at which tactics and technologies evolve.

While I do not like describing Ukraine as a testing ground, it is nonetheless impossible to ignore that any country seeking to develop capabilities for modern warfare against the same adversaries must obtain battlefield feedback and innovate accordingly.

In this context, there are multiple opportunities to test military products in Ukraine—either through the official Brave1 “Test in Ukraine” program or through other partnerships, particularly by working directly with military units.

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• Training Drone Operators in Wartime Ukraine: Dronarium Academy - link.

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Not the systems per se, but skills are becoming the game changer in modern conflict. The mass use of unmanned systems in Ukraine and Russia has led to the emergence of an entirely new category of combatants—drone operators.

Ukraine has over 30 private schools and centers that train both civilians and military personnel to operate a range of unmanned systems—including FPVs, multirotor drones, interceptors, fiber-optic drones, reconnaissance platforms, heavy bombers, UGVs, USVs, and others.

One of the most well-known among them is Dronarium Academy, which, prior to the full-scale invasion, trained drone operators for the civilian sector and transitioned to military drone training in 2022. Recently, Dronarium opened a training center in Poland and is cooperating closely with Latvia, Japan, and other countries.

I discussed with Dronarium Academy how drone operator training is evolving and where it is heading as autonomous technologies become more widespread.

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About Dronarium Academy

Dronarium Group is a holding company that includes Dronarium, Dronarium Academy, and an R&D division. The group focuses on training and consulting in unmanned systems and actively partners with manufacturing companies, such as Warmax Technologies.

Through its diversified activities, the group covers the full cycle—from the development and production of aerial, ground, and underwater unmanned systems to the training of operators.

Since 2014, Dronarium activities have included organizing drone-related events and applying drone technologies in film production, media, geodesy, and agriculture.

Following the start of the full-scale invasion, the first two trainee groups were still trained under a civilian-oriented approach. After that, graduates began sharing their frontline experience, allowing the program to be continuously refined and adapted. The company, in the form of a Military Academy, began its operations in March 2022 in Lviv, where it opened the first training center.

In October 2024, Dronarium Academy became certified by the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and the Main Directorate of State Aviation of Ukraine.

Its graduates receive a certificate recognized by MoD, along with recommendations for further military service or volunteer engagement.

Training Courses

The Academy offers courses on FPV drones, multirotors, underwater drones, fiber-optic FPV systems, FPV engineering, and interceptor drone piloting.

According to Anastasia Sobova, CBDO at Dronarium, the most popular courses in Ukraine are FPV Engineering, FPV Drones, Fiber-Optic FPV, and Multirotor Systems. The latter was the first course introduced by the academy and remains highly relevant, as it provides the foundation for further training.

Other courses are offered on demand. For example, the academy recently reinstated its Humanitarian Demining course for a limited time in response to renewed interest.

Dronarium also trains operators of heavy bombers and reconnaissance drones. It works directly with manufacturers and military units that operate these UAV systems.

The duration of training varies depending on the complexity of the system and the level of trainees’ preparedness.

For instance, FPV drone training from scratch typically takes around three weeks.

The fiber-optic drone course at Dronarium Academy lasts three days and is designed for experienced FPV combat pilots, electronic warfare (EW) specialists, engineers, defence tech developers, and personnel from related units within the Armed Forces. Participation requires passing an entry assessment to demonstrate basic FPV piloting skills.

Dmytro Slediuk, Head of the Training Department at Dronarium, told UNIAN that at present, fiber-optic technologies are at the peak of attention and popularity. Neither Russia nor Ukraine currently possesses a weapon capable of systematically countering these drones. Russia, however, is scaling its deployment faster than Ukraine. They are creating entire “kill zones,” where drones intercept other drones and hunt the crews operating them.

The underwater drone training course, also designed for experienced operators, lasts around five days and includes on-water practical training using three types of platforms: torpedo-type, bathyscaphe-type, and hybrid systems.

As for interceptor drones, the Head of the Training Department explains that training a single interceptor drone operator to an effective level takes approximately five months. According to him, this is a complex skill set that involves not only theoretical knowledge but also extensive motor training: the operator must be able to manually guide a high-speed drone toward a fast, maneuvering target—something that requires significant practice.

“It is practically impossible to teach this in a week, two weeks, or even a month. Ukraine can provide trained specialists and training programs tailored to existing technologies, enabling the mass preparation of operators locally. Our expertise continues to grow throughout the war with Russia, which is why our instructors will remain ahead of others,” Slediuk noted.

Dronarium has a dedicated team that collects frontline data to continuously update their training programs.

A “test drive” of unmanned systems with the 424th Battalion of the Unmanned Systems Forces, Svarog, typically lasts 3 days.

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The Instructors at Dronarium Academy

These are motivated and experienced drone operators, some of whom have direct combat experience. Those without combat experience conduct field training for military units near the front line. “As a result, there are no instructors who, so to speak, have ‘never seen combat,’ Anastasia told Ukraine’s Arms Monitor.

The shortage of instructors is a real challenge for many training schools. It is not simply a matter of recruiting experienced drone operators and providing them with teaching methodology. In practice, nearly all qualified pilots are currently deployed, while the few who are demobilized are often actively recruited by HR specialists from IT companies. Despite this, Dronarium maintained a stable core of instructors in its Kyiv and Lviv centers, with relatively low staff turnover.

State funding could have helped address this issue, but for reasons that remain unclear, it was discontinued in November 2023. When there is a need to train military personnel on a specific type of unmanned system, the training cost is, in certain cases, covered by the system manufacturer.

For other courses, civilian trainees cover their own training, partly subsidizing the training of military personnel who always study free of charge.

Launch of a Drone Training Center in Poland

In September 2025, according to Militarnyi, Dronarium Academy, in partnership with former members of the Madyar’s Birds unit, announced the launch of a joint project in Poland—Dronarium Birds —focused on the full spectrum of UAV operator training. At the beginning of March 2026, it was officially presented at the Drone World Expo in Warsaw.

Anastasia Sobova commented on the peculiarities of EU-based drone training programs prior to the full-scale war: “In the EU, training is primarily oriented toward regulatory compliance—obtaining EASA certification, documenting compliance, passing exams, and so on. Practical training is included, but it is minimal and strictly regulated, even for civilian, non-combat drone applications. Courses are short, typically lasting between one and three days.

Attempts to introduce more combat-oriented training—such as those previously launched in Poland—have largely failed to reflect the realities of modern warfare and were quickly discontinued. They relied on outdated equipment and obsolete tactical approaches. Without direct access to active military personnel, it is difficult to update training programs in a timely manner—so it is not surprising that a clear advantage remains on our side”.

This initiative is designed to train civilians, volunteers, reservists, and defence personnel, with the aim of transferring Ukrainian battlefield expertise and preparing specialists to operate a wide range of unmanned systems, including underwater, ground-based, FPV, and multirotor platforms.

Training for interceptor drone operators is expected to last from one month, depending on the trainee’s initial level of knowledge.

International Partnerships and Regional Differences

The Academy considers opening similar training centers in other countries. At the same time, partner requests vary significantly by region and specific operational needs.

“Following the start of military operations against Iran in the Middle East, demand for training in interceptor drone operations has increased substantially. We are actively working with partners in this area; however, such programs are highly specialized, as they effectively involve elements of air defence systems, which differ from country to country. Moreover, operator training in this domain is significantly more complex and time-consuming—typically ranging from two to five months—compared to multirotor operator training (around five days) or FPV drone training (approximately four weeks),” commented Dronarium Academy to Ukraine’s Arms Monitor.

In other countries, the most common requests focus on training in the combat use of FPV drones and multirotor platforms. At the same time, each project is tailored to the client’s specific needs.

For example, last year the Academy conducted training for the Latvian National Guard. Their primary requests were the transfer of real combat experience, training for FPV and multirotor drone operators, and the development of unit-level coordination in line with NATO standards.

To meet these requirements, Dronarium adapted its existing Multirotor and FPV courses, engaged an instructor specializing in combat coordination to develop NATO-aligned interaction scenarios, and introduced a new training module focused on simulated FPV strike operations.

Another project currently being developed in cooperation with Japan focuses on basic training in the combat use of FPV drones. At the same time, the training center plans to expand this program to include other types of unmanned systems in the future.

Ethical Considerations

Given the large number of international volunteers undergoing training and joining Ukraine’s defence forces, there is a growing risk that skills and knowledge, particularly related to unmanned systems, may spread to other conflict environments.

The primary focus of Dronarium is training Ukrainian operators. Since March 2022, more than 17,500 military personnel and around 1,500 civilians have completed training. This corresponds to approximately 85% military and 15% civilian trainees.

The share of foreign trainees is very small, and they typically come to fight on Ukraine’s side. The Academy screens out those who seek training simply to return to their home countries.

When asked how they assess the risk that drone operations and engineering knowledge could be exploited by criminal groups across different countries—many of which are closely monitoring the technological developments of this war—and what measures can be taken to prevent this, Dronarium representatives outlined their mitigation approach and emphasized the limits of control: “We cannot fully control how and for what purposes our graduates ultimately apply the knowledge they acquire. However, we mitigate these risks through a careful candidate selection process. At the initial application stage, we conduct a mandatory interview with each candidate to assess their training objectives and ethical principles. This procedure is the same for all applicants, both Ukrainian and foreign. If any concerns arise, the candidate may be denied admission.

It is also important to note that all candidates undergo security screening by the relevant Ukrainian state authorities. The final decision on admission or rejection rests with them. From our side, we accept applicants from partner countries, while citizens of hostile or unfriendly states are not admitted to the program.”

According to various estimates, 14,000-15,000 foreigners from 72 countries have joined Ukraine’s Defence Forces. At the same time, Russia has involved over 24,000 foreigners from 128 countries.

The Future of Drone Operators

At present, each unmanned system is operated by a human pilot, and in some cases—such as long-range or ground-based platforms—entire crews are required to support its operation. FPV piloting is also a team effort, involving a pilot, a navigator, and a sapper.

“In the coming years, the demand for drone operators is unlikely to decline. The vast majority of missions are still carried out directly by human operators.

Autonomous systems and artificial intelligence are undoubtedly promising and developing rapidly, with the potential to become highly effective tools over time. However, they remain tools in human hands, and at present, the readiness for large-scale deployment of fully autonomous systems on the battlefield—without operator involvement—is significantly overstated,” according to Dronarium Academy.

Drone operators are considered high-value targets on the battlefield. Both Ukrainian and Russian forces reportedly assign “points” for eliminating enemy specialists. Entire areas can be targeted if operator positions are identified.

In April 2026, Ukraine’s Minister of Defence announced that special attention within the military’s bonus point system would be given to targeting Russian drone operators. Neutralizing one operator earns twice as many points as a standard infantry target.

Ukraine’s objective is to reduce the survivability of enemy drone operators on the battlefield. To achieve this, dedicated units have already begun forming to identify and eliminate Russian operators.

Ukraine’s approach to drone operator training demonstrates a level of adaptability and operational integration unmatched in most global contexts. The use of unmanned systems is evolving rapidly, and we now see developments that were not present in 2022, such as the widespread use of fiber-optic drones and the growing demand for interceptor drones in air defence roles.

Training programs at centers such as Dronarium Academy are continually updated, and their close ties to frontline military units provide a level of practical experience that trainees would not be able to obtain elsewhere.

This expertise in unmanned warfare has reached a top-tier level and is applicable to virtually any armed conflict worldwide.

If you found this article useful or learned something new, I invite you to consider supporting my fundraiser for a Mavic 3T drone for my friend serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This is the fourth drone we are raising funds for, and I hope this campaign will be just as successful - https://www.paypal.com/pools/c/9nSSd7NqxK

Thank you 🇺🇦🇺🇦🇺🇦

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Read other articles on this topic:

• Turning Virtual Errors into Ukraine’s Battlefield Advantage: Drone Simulator Obriy;

• (Un)Manned Warfare: 80% of Drone Success Depends on Pilot Skill;

• Importance of Operator Training for Interceptor Drones: Kruk Drones UAV Training Center.

Check my topic navigator for more articles:

• Deep Strike Capabilities;

• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles;

• Air Defence and Counter-UAS.

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The scale of innovation on the battlefield has been insane. If Ukraine had not embraced its numerous defence innovators, but instead imposed additional bureaucratic burdens and worked only with selected industry representatives, it would likely have ceased to exist.

In peacetime, defence accelerators often help identify innovation long before national armed forces or procurement authorities begin paying attention.

NATO has its own accelerator—NATO DIANA—which selects 150 companies from thousands of applicants and provides them with funding, mentorship, and entry into the defence ecosystem. It became operational in 2023 and, as I see it, has been influenced by the war in Ukraine in many ways.

I recently returned from the launch of a new cohort of the NATO DIANA, hosted at one of its sites, COVE in the Canadian city of Dartmouth, where I spent a week with 12 startups selected for the 2026 cohort.

Here is my overview of the NATO DIANA program, including a list of companies I had the chance to network with. If you are in the defence tech world, consider them for your current or future partnerships.

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Initially, I was invited by COVE to deliver a presentation on defence procurement sector reforms across different countries (based on my recently published long-read article). I wouldn’t be myself if I didn’t conclude by discussing how Ukraine’s procurement experience is shaping policies in Western countries.

One key lesson: defence procurement systems worldwide have much to learn from Ukraine’s agile approach and its focus on end users who actually have purchasing power.

Since the Russia-Ukraine war remains the only high-intensity interstate conventional war in the world today, it shapes not only procurement processes but also technologies. Ukraine, together with its Western allies, is fighting not only Russia but an entire bloc of anti-democratic states and their combined technological capacities. This makes uniting efforts in collective defence critical.

NATO DIANA aims to identify the most promising innovator companies across the Alliance and help them scale and deliver effective solutions for the armed forces.

I spoke with several parties involved in this accelerator to better understand how the program continues to evolve.

What is NATO DIANA?

DIANA (Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic) is a competitive initiative to help innovators connect with experts, investors, and industry partners to advance and commercialize technologies that address defence and security challenges for NATO members.

It helps dual-use innovation bridge the civilian and defence sectors, as many startups lack defence experience, requiring them to adapt their technologies and models to military requirements.

The program accepts applications from any incorporated company headquartered in a NATO member nation and seeks technology solutions at TRL 4-7.

The selected innovator companies get the following:

• learn how to prepare their businesses for the defence and security environment and understand how the defence sector actually works;

• gain early exposure to potential customers;

• safeguard their solutions and manage a wide range of security risks;

• access a network of more than 200 specialized test centres across the Alliance, each offering specific technology testing capabilities;

• connect with a trusted, transatlantic pool of investors to support company growth and learn how to combine public and private funding.

In addition, innovators receive €100,000 in contractual funding and may apply for additional resources for testing, evaluation, validation, and verification activities.

At the end of Phase 1, a limited number of DIANA Innovators move on to Phase 2 of the Accelerator Programme and receive up to €300,000 in additional contractual funding to support a further six months of iteration of their solution.

Participants get access to DIANA's network of 17 sites and over 200 test centres in NATO's 32 member countries.

The Challenges

The process at DIANA starts with aggregating demand signals from across the Alliance. As a NATO entity, DIANA is not tied to any single nation, which allows it to look at defence planning processes at the NATO level and identify critical capability gaps and the solutions that could be real game-changers. “Based on a clear understanding of where the most critical gaps are, we evaluate proposals and build a cohort of around 150 companies best positioned to address them,” explained Tom McSorley, General Counsel for the NATO DIANA, in a podcast by the Emerging Technologies Institute.

The key with each challenge is articulating the problem NATO is trying to solve and the outcomes needed, while allowing industry to propose how best to solve it. For instance, here is a description of the Autonomy and Unmanned Systems Challenge for the 2026 cohort.

DIANA asks for short, low-cost proposals that outline the technology, business approach, and intended application. The aim is to identify technologies that offer the strongest solutions while also demonstrating a credible pathway to sustainability — including a path to revenue and eligibility for private investment.

In 2023, DIANA initiated its pilot challenge programs, choosing 44 startups (out of 1300) from 19 countries operating in three key areas: energy resilience, undersea sensing and surveillance, and secure information sharing.

For 2026, the program expanded to 10 challenges, including:

1. Energy & Power

2. Advanced Communication Technologies

3. Contested Electromagnetic Environments

4. Human Resilience & Biotechnology

5. Operations in Extreme Environments

6. Maritime Operations

7. Resilient Space Operations

8. Critical Infrastructure & Logistics

9. Autonomy & Unmanned Systems

10. Data Assisted Decision Making

NATO DIANA and Procurement

“NATO DIANA does not hold direct procurement authority; instead, it has the authority to issue prototyping arrangements with companies selected through its challenge programmes,” shared Mr. McSorley in a podcast.

Through these challenges, DIANA brings innovative companies into the ecosystem and, via its Rapid Adoption Service, works with interested Allies to develop more specific technical requirements - what they would like to see from a prototype. This enables Allies to issue targeted contracts for prototype development and to validate those prototypes.

Also, DIANA operates within a broader NATO procurement architecture. Its partner agencies — the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) and the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) — both have procurement authority and provide procurement support to Allies on a multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral basis. These agencies can take prototypes that have been validated through DIANA’s competitive process and move them directly into production through single-source procurement mechanisms.

At the national level, there is also ongoing dialogue on how Allies can leverage the competitive processes already completed within DIANA, avoiding the need to run additional national competitions that are costly and time-consuming.

At the same time, DIANA seeks to reduce risk for investors. A core objective of the programme is to encourage private capital to support early-stage defence and dual-use technologies.

2026 Cohort

For its 2026 programme, DIANA selected 150 companies from 24 NATO countries, chosen from a record 3,680 submissions. You can check the full list of the 2026 cohort here.

During my trip to Dartmouth, I met in person with 12 European and North American companies. Many of them focus on maritime operations, which aligns with the capabilities of their hosting site, COVE, an innovation hub for maritime technologies. Additionally, a range of other areas was also represented.

Below is a list of these companies, along with brief descriptions of their solutions. All of them are looking to scale their technologies and explore partnership opportunities globally, and many of their solutions are already highly relevant to the challenges emerging from the battlefield in Ukraine and beyond.

If you identify a potential area of overlap or cooperation, feel free to reach out to them directly—or to me, and I’d be happy to make an introduction.

Alumni Stories

Even before my trip to Dartmouth, I was already in touch with several DIANA alumni companies. They closely observe the war in Ukraine and note that, for any innovator, getting technologies to the battlefield is the most effective way to move forward in the sector.

One of them is Quantropi, a Canadian firm that specializes in quantum-secure data encryption technologies. James Nguyen, co-founder and CEO of Quantropi, shared that NATO DIANA helped Quantropi evolve from a theoretical dual-use technology to concrete defence capabilities ready for procurement. “The direct contact with personnel from a number of NATO MoDs, primes, successful suppliers, and DIANA Alumni was invaluable because it gave us direct intelligence and understanding of what is needed and what it will take to succeed in the defence sector,” James said.

Since February 2025, Quantropi partnered with a Ukrainian company, HIMERA, a producer of dual-use walkie-talkies currently used on the battlefield. This partnership enabled HIMERA to integrate advanced post-quantum encryption into its products. I wrote a separate article about this collaboration here.

Another example is the Canadian company Qidni Labs. Qidni is developing portable blood purification technologies designed to make life-saving treatment accessible to millions of patients with kidney failure worldwide. The company was selected for the NATO DIANA 2025 cohort and has attracted interest from Ukrainian end users seeking solutions for critical care in battlefield and emergency response environments.

According to Dr. Morteza Ahmadi, CEO of Qidni, Ukraine’s interest was not driven by novelty but by practicality. In a wartime environment, technologies that reduce logistical burdens and function in highly constrained settings become immediately relevant. “What Ukraine has changed for NATO innovators is speed,” Morteza explained. “Problems that used to take years to define now take weeks, and solutions are evaluated in real operational conditions. That kind of feedback loop is unprecedented in defence innovation.”

According to Dr. Ahmadi, NATO DIANA lowers the friction between dual-use startups, military end-users, and procurement ecosystems. It creates credibility and access, not just funding. Ukraine-related interest shows DIANA is not abstract; it’s operational.

DIANA Mentors and Experts

NATO DIANA has a vast network of mentors and experts who volunteer their time to work with innovators for 6 months, providing them with valuable advice and connections. For anyone in the industry interested in mentoring, there is an opportunity to apply for these positions through the DIANA website.

One of them, David Tucker, a former Royal Canadian Air Force aerospace engineer who spent half of his career in flight test and the other half supporting Maritime Helicopter operations at sea and ashore, said that he joined DIANA via COVE because he is interested in helping great tech survive contact with reality and get into the hands of operators.

According to David, NATO DIANA matters because the threats are moving faster than traditional defence procurement timelines. It gives innovators a way to get in front of real problems, get tested, and get adopted across allies, without everyone reinventing the wheel.

Another mentor, Brent Newsome, the co-founder and former CEO of Halifax-based NewPace Technology Development, a pioneering telecommunications software company, said that a military start-up accelerator should be an open marketplace where the exchange of ideas, cultures, and domain knowledge is encouraged and celebrated.

“In my short exposure to the companies participating in COVE’s activities, I observed this cycle of learning and exchange of experience in real time. A couple of companies were represented by veterans who provided valuable and critical feedback to companies in other countries run by civilians who had little exposure to military field conditions,” Brent added.

Indeed, I also witnessed that many companies selected for DIANA initially struggled to identify concrete defence applications for their technologies. In many cases, these ideas emerged in real time through brainstorming sessions, peer reviews, and iterative feedback unfolding directly in front of us.

Mr. Newsome added that he wished there had been more uniformed service members present as advisors/observers to provide real-time feedback and to gain exposure to the ideas being presented. “It was a powerful moment and there was a real spark from that conversation, and I am keen to see how the process of exchanging ideas between companies and with end-users unfolds through this cohort,” he said.

Concluding Thoughts

During my involvement with the NATO DIANA program as an external observer, I realized one key thing: it is crucial for defence innovation companies to work closely with end-users. This allows users to actively guide new companies and help them develop viable products that address real-world, rather than abstract, challenges.

Ultimately, armed forces benefit as well, as they receive functional capabilities tailored to their actual needs.

As Artem Pyndyk, a Ukrainian veteran with experience working in a defence accelerator in Ukraine, puts it, “in Ukraine, having a direct link to the frontline is a must-have: visiting training grounds together with your team and engaging with military personnel not only in third-wave coffee shops.”

For companies in Europe, the UK, North America, or Australia, engaging with their armed forces is essential to understanding their demands.

In many countries, this realization has only recently begun to emerge.

In the context of the Russia–Ukraine war, from my perspective, getting involved in Ukraine is one of the best ways for companies worldwide to understand how relevant their innovations truly are and to receive direct battlefield feedback. There are multiple ways of doing this. We also know that the feedback might not always be positive, but it is a necessary step on the path to success.

Among the participants I met, I saw significant interest in engaging with Ukraine. In my personal capacity, I try to leverage my networks across Ukraine, Europe, North America, and Asia to help NATO DIANA innovators develop products that meet the real needs of the militaries in different countries and regions.

In December 2025, it was announced that Ukraine could become the first non-NATO partner in the DIANA program. Reportedly, the parties are already negotiating and preparing a cooperation agreement that would give Ukrainian companies access to Alliance infrastructure and funding.

For Ukraine, getting involved in the DIANA program would mean additional access to funding and unlocking opportunities for Ukrainian companies to reach the wider NATO market.

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Read my series of open-access articles “Defence Tech in Ukraine”.

From the moped-like sound of Shahed drones, deliberately used as a tool of psychological warfare, to Shaheds dropping mines, cluster munitions, and targeting trains, Russia’s innovations in UAVs are focused not only on battlefield utility. They are optimized for terror, disruption, and societal exhaustion.

In 2025 alone, Russian forces launched more than 54,000 long-range drones against Ukraine. The number of FPV drones used by Russia is estimated at 1,200–1,400 per day, and their use is not limited to the battlefield. The reported numbers of Ukrainian civilians killed (2,400) and injured (12,000) represent an increase of around 30% compared to 2024.

In this article, I examine six key Russian innovations in unmanned technologies aimed at targeting the civilian population, driving Ukrainians from their homes, and ultimately rendering Ukraine unlivable.

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1. Remotely operated kamikaze Shahed-type drones

“The Shahed operator spotted a passenger train moving below. The operator clearly saw and understood that it was a train carrying people. The Shahed pilot decided to attack the train, but only by a stroke of luck did he miss. I will not name the train number, but the people who were peacefully sleeping on board have no idea that they were essentially born a second time,” wrote the Ukrainian drone and radio tech expert Serhiy FLASH Beskrestnov.

The innovation lies in implementing solutions based on mesh modems and installing forward-facing cameras on Shahed-type drones.

The mesh modems enable the creation of dynamic networks with chain-based relaying, in which each modem functions as a repeater for others, thereby extending connectivity and resilience.

Since August 2025, such cases have become increasingly frequent, and by early September, it became clear that this was a serial solution. Russia is now routinely equipping its long-range Geran-2 drones with modems and cameras.

The online control mode enables the Shahed to conduct reconnaissance, strike moving targets, and select impact points with greater precision.

“We have seen Shaheds strike railways and even moving locomotives. A Shahed can identify the most vulnerable point at an energy substation — meaning it can do more than just attack a set of coordinates. An operator can guide it precisely into the transformer that is most critical,” FLASH added.

Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate presented a detailed analysis of the new Russian Geran-5 drone equipped with a radio modem. Similar devices had previously been identified in Geran-2 and Gerbera drones.

Russian forces have fitted the drone with Chinese XK-F358 radio modems, designed for video transmission and platform control. The XK-F358, produced by the Chinese company Xingkai Tech, is a specialized radio modem intended for unmanned platforms and the deployment of distributed communications networks.

2. Shaheds + mines

Cases of PTM-3 anti-tank mines being dropped by Shahed drones have been recorded across different regions of Ukraine. The mines are equipped with a magnetic detonator. In some instances, this is simple area mining, but often it involves mining locations near the Shahed crash site.

Reportedly, the tactic is designed to target emergency responders—anticipating that State Emergency Service or police vehicles approaching a downed Shahed may be detonated. The mine has a square shape and uses a magnetic trigger.

In summer, such mines are often found by emergency services, the military, or mobile fire groups, who then call in sappers to neutralize them. In winter, however, a mine can fall into a snowdrift and disappear from sight. If any vehicle passes nearby, the mine can detonate and damage the vehicle.

In January 2026, FLASH reported that half of the Shahed drones attacking the Kovel–Kyiv railway have been carrying magnetic mines, which they drop into the snow.
Shahed-type drones can be launched from the territories of both Russia and Belarus, making access to western parts of Ukraine easier.

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3. Shaheds + cluster munitions

In November 2025, Russia attacked the city of Vyshgorod in the Kyiv region with a Shahed-type drone equipped with cluster munitions. According to Ukraine’s State Emergency Service, the Shahed struck the building’s roof but failed to explode. On-site, bomb technicians discovered the drone’s warhead along with 21 intact cluster submunitions equipped with self-destruct fuzes.

The munitions consisted of tube-shaped elements packed with fragmentation components, designed to detonate together with the main warhead—an intended mechanism to complicate demining efforts and maximize civilian casualties.

David Hambling reported on a similar incident that happened back in May 2025, and these cases are becoming more frequent.

“What is clear though is that the new weapons are not aimed at military or infrastructure targets. They have been designed specifically to kill, injure and terrify as many people as possible,” Hambling wrote for Forbes.

4. FPV drones for the precise killing of civilians

“An FPV drone has a limited battery life. If the battery is running low and there is no military target nearby, but there is a civilian one, Russians will attack the civilian target so as not to waste the drone,” commented a Ukrainian servicemember in a personal remark.

In the report “Deadly Drones: Civilians at Risk From Short-Range Drones in Frontline Areas of Ukraine,” published in May 2025, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine concluded that drones have emerged as a leading cause of civilian death and injury in Ukraine, and in some months, even surpassed more powerful weapons like missiles, artillery, and aerial bombs. The vast majority of the casualties occurred as a result of Russian attacks in territory controlled by Ukraine.

The drones used in most attacks are known as FPV drones. The enhanced visibility provided by FPV technology should support more accurate assessment and verification of the military or civilian character of a potential target. Nonetheless, operators have deployed these weapons against civilians who showed no signs of direct participation in hostilities.

Documented casualties include civilians on bicycles, in private cars, on regular public buses, in ambulances, while delivering humanitarian aid or conducting evacuations, walking outdoors, and outside on their residential property.

According to the report, some incidents may amount to intentionally directing attacks against civilians, a war crime.

Another report by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, published in October 2025, established that attacks with short-range drones directed by Russian armed forces have targeted civilian persons, houses or buildings, humanitarian distribution points, and critical energy infrastructure servicing civilians.

They have even hit first responders, including ambulances and fire brigades, regardless of their special protection under international humanitarian law, thereby obstructing their interventions.

Many of the attacks have struck the same objects repeatedly, deliberately setting them on fire. Residents of the targeted localities have described life conditions as unbearable. One man stated, “We are hit every day, drones fly at any time – morning, evening, day or night, constantly.”

The Commission’s investigation shows that Russian armed forces have used drones to target civilians in a much larger area than previously reported, stretching over 300 km along the Dnipro River and over the Dnipro Gulf, across Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv Oblasts.

The Commission has concluded that these relentless drone attacks amount to the crimes against humanity of murder and of forcible transfer of population, as well as other crimes and human rights violations.

Reportedly, in September 2025, Russians began using their Molniya drones as carriers to transport FPV to other regions of Ukraine, thereby extending their range.

They likely used FPV drones to strike a Ukrainian An-26 aircraft in the Mykolaiv region and a Mi-24 helicopter in the Poltava region in December 2025.

For these operations, Molniya drones equipped with Starlink terminals may have been used. The experts anticipate that soon Starlink terminals will also be used on Shahed-type drones, making them significantly harder to jam.

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5. Fiber-optic waiting drones

Below is an excerpt from the “Algorithm of Actions for Civilians in the Event of Detection or an Attack by a Fiber-Optic FPV Drone,” published by the territorial community in the Kharkiv region:

“The “Zhdun” FPV drone is connected via a fiber-optic link, waiting in ambush for its target until a suitable object appears. These drones are primarily used to strike military equipment, but can also be employed against the civilian population. The estimated loitering (waiting) time ranges from 30 minutes to 2 hours, depending on the batteries”.

“Zhdun” is Ukrainian for “the one who waits.” Such drones are capable of remaining in ambush for extended periods and are not affected by electronic warfare systems. According to some sources, they can loiter in ambush for many hours, even up to about a day.

Like other FPV drones, they are effective at short ranges of 20–30 km, although recent Russian innovations have extended their operational range to 50 km.

In December 2025, in Kostiantynivka in Donetsk Oblast, a Russian fiber-optic FPV drone struck an evacuation vehicle. As a result of the attack, Kharkiv-based volunteer and head of the “Unbreakable” (“Nezlamna”) charitable foundation, Viacheslav Ilchenko, was killed.

6. Semi-autonomous technologies for attacks

In May 2025, Russians attacked the town of Velykyi Burluk (Kharkiv region) with a “swarm” of seven UAVs. While flying over the area, the drones apparently detected a cluster of vehicles near a Nova Poshta (Ukraine’s most popular delivery service) facility and a concentration of people at a local market. The UAVs formed a circular holding pattern and then dived onto the target. Miraculously, no one was killed or injured.

A unique color marking on the wings allows the “swarm” to maintain formation. The drones fly one above another, like birds, using the markings to keep visual contact and stay together.

Experts concluded that this was not yet a “smart” swarm. Based on the described behavior, it can be assessed as a conventional swarm exhibiting flocking, with a group center and each UAV seeking to maintain cohesion by not exceeding a defined separation distance.

While these technologies do not yet constitute fully autonomous systems or true drone swarms, there is clear evidence that Russia is experimenting and moving in that direction.

Given that the intentional targeting and killing of Ukrainian civilians is already systematic, it would be naïve to assume that future Russian drone swarms will maintain any civilian–military distinction.

Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported that since the start of this year’s heating season (October 15), SBU has documented over 250 Russian air attacks on Ukraine’s energy facilities and heating supply systems. Russians have deliberately targeted 11 hydroelectric power plants and 45 of Ukraine’s largest combined heat and power plants.

In addition, Russian forces carried out 49 precision air strikes against thermal power plants and 151 strikes against electrical substations across various regions of Ukraine.

Each of these attacks was combined in nature and conducted using dozens of Russian drones and missiles.

These statistics were published on January 15, and since the attacks have been continuing almost daily, the actual numbers are now higher.

All of this is happening under exceptionally cold conditions, with temperatures reaching –15 to –20°C.

The Ukrainian government has declared an energy emergency as the damaged power grid is meeting only 60 percent of the country’s electricity needs. Zelensky stated on January 16 that Ukraine needs about 18 gigawatts of power to meet domestic consumption needs in the winter, but that Ukraine’s power generation capacity can currently only produce 11 gigawatts of power.

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) warned on January 17 that Russia was planning strikes on electricity transmission substations, which Ukrainian nuclear power plants depend on to operate.

“The last few days of my life have been the most surreal. I kept thinking more and more about whether I would even be able to wake up at all. The cold was so piercing that I did wake up—but from shivering, not from the alarm clock. Now, my roommates and I have been without electricity for 85 hours and without heating for 9 consecutive days,” wrote Daryna, a student at Kyiv School of Economics.

In the concluding thoughts, I want to emphasize the element of intentionality. The majority of the points described above involve the deliberate use of armed drones, as well as other weapons — including internationally banned mines and cluster munitions — by Russian forces to inflict maximum harm on civilians in Ukraine.

This is partly due to frustration over the lack of significant breakthroughs on the battlefield. It is also driven by the deeply dehumanizing view of Ukrainians within Russian society, where murder and torture of the Ukrainian population are welcomed.

Finally, this violence is directed at Ukraine’s strength itself — its civil society — which poses an existential threat to Russia’s imperial ambitions and to the survival of Russia even in its current form.

The decision of the Ukrainian population to stay in Ukraine and continue their resistance, despite everything, is one of the key reasons why Russia’s invasion did not succeed.

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I can’t really believe that my Monitor is two years old. It was launched in January 2024, while I was still living in Türkiye. It was on LinkedIn and had a totally different format. At the end of 2024—which was a very complicated year for me—I was considering entirely stopping my reporting.

But instead, I decided to double down. In 2025, I moved the Monitor to Substack, added a section on drones, and another on Russia. And 2025 became a completely different year for me.

In this article, I want to summarise some of the most memorable and important moments for Ukraine’s Arms Monitor—and for myself—over the past year.

The goals of Ukraine’s Arms Monitor in 2025

Through my digest, I pursue three main goals that developed organically over time:

1. Observing defence innovation in Ukraine and informing the global audience

I aim to document defence innovation in Ukraine and explain what is happening on the ground, bringing a Ukrainian perspective to international audiences. Most of my sources are Ukrainian, including interviews published in Ukrainian media, surveys, analytical pieces, and op-eds. I also conduct my own interviews with local experts and defence industry professionals. This brings me to my second point.

2. Supporting Ukraine’s defence capabilities
In 2025, I began publishing profile articles on successful Ukrainian producers, as well as on government initiatives such as Brave1. Ukraine has a lot to teach the world, and I want to highlight this potential. Ukraine openly shares valuable data and is highly receptive to cooperation with those who want to help it win the war. I hope my work has facilitated some of those connections.

3. Helping my friends in Ukraine’s Armed Forces
Just reporting is not enough for me. Especially knowing what my friends are going through.

I am not part of any charity, but my experience shows that even one person can make an impact—or at least try to.

In 2025, I launched three fundraising campaigns and gathered money for three Mavic reconnaissance drones for my close university friend. These are unarmed commercial drones.

Honestly, this was a personal dream—to get him a drone. For years, I donated privately in small amounts. In 2025, Ukraine’s Arms Monitor made that dream a reality thanks to the support of my subscribers and followers on Substack and LinkedIn. The third fundraiser lasted only one week, and by the New Year, I had purchased and delivered the third Mavic drone. This experience showed me that the Monitor has a real, physical impact.

For the most part, no one informs me whether my reporting has led to any deals or other concrete outcomes. But through these fundraisers, I know that together we can achieve something tangible.

Jobs

Ukraine’s Arms Monitor is not an organisation; it’s my private initiative, and I do not receive funding or sponsorship from anyone. Therefore, throughout this time I’ve had to combine it with employment—and sometimes with more than one job at once.

When I started the Monitor, I hoped it would help me find a job. In 2024, I failed. In 2025, jobs poured in, which was a very nice feeling, but also overwhelming.

For over half a year, I was combining two jobs: a full-time role and remote freelancing. And, of course, I had the Monitor—with two, and sometimes three, publications a week.

Those were tough six months. Sometimes, very early calls with the team in London. Then a full day of work in Toronto. Then the Monitor.

By September, I had secured another job—a one-year postdoctoral fellowship in defence innovation at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute/COVE (article about my fellowship). I’m incredibly lucky to have it.

I continue producing Ukraine’s Arms Monitor in my personal capacity as an independent researcher.

Connections

Wow—where to start. Thanks to the Monitor, I keep meeting so many amazing people. Some are… less amazing. Someone once messaged me on LinkedIn asking for assistance with recruiting mercenaries for Wagner. There’s always someone trying to sell something to me, or with my help.

But most are great.

A separate cohort is the Ukrainian defense industry and the numerous associations related to it. I’ve repeatedly stated in my articles that I do not receive payment from producers, investors, or any other companies or individuals. If you see someone’s name, it’s because I find their work important—not because I was paid to write about them. I’ve been approached many times with offers of cooperation, but my only condition is that they be relevant to Ukraine. If what they do matters to Ukraine, I’ll write about them for free.

The Monitor's only source of funding is paid subscriptions, and I’m deeply grateful to everyone who supports me this way.

The Monitor became a Substack bestseller within 10 months on the platform, which is a huge recognition of my work. It helps me fund important things: my stay in Geneva, travel to Ukraine, books and subscriptions, and donations to Ukraine’s Armed Forces.

Podcasts and speaking engagements

I started being invited to comment much more often—both in print and live. The Economist, Forbes, Le Monde, Al Jazeera, Channel 4, BBC.

At the beginning, I was so nervous about BBC radio that I spent hours preparing and stressing. Somehow, I managed to turn them down three times. I still regret it, because apparently, they removed me from their list of experts.

Now I feel much more confident and don’t spend hours preparing. Some of my favourite podcasts were with Brian Crombie in Canada and Arthur Snell in the UK.

Separately, thanks to an interview on the Ukrainian diaspora channel Forum TV, conducted in Ukrainian, my parents finally learned what I actually do. I think they were a bit shocked.

Community

The best part about being on Substack is that it allows me to be myself and follow my creative direction. I love my country. I want to help it. I like defence. I like talking to people and gathering insights. And I like writing.

On Substack, I’ve unexpectedly built a small community of people who appreciate these things—and, most importantly, who want Ukraine to prevail. When I had immigration issues in Canada and wasn’t sure I’d be able to travel to the UN, many of you reposted my notes and wrote to me directly with advice and words of support.

While my newsletter focuses on military issues, in Substack Notes, I write about everything else - stories, notes from my travels, conversations with my parents about the war, photos and videos, and other news beyond military topics.

My favourite moments of the year

There are so many. I guess number one was shopping in Toronto, picking up The Economist, and seeing my name in it. That felt great—and still does.

Second—on the same level—was my trip to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), where I delivered a presentation. The best part was meeting in person people in the arms control community, whose work I’ve been following for years.

Since I work online from Toronto, I rarely get to meet European colleagues in person. That kind of connection is on a completely different level.

After 1.5 years in Canada and long immigration delays, I finally managed to go to Ukraine for a visit. That alone was huge. As I’m writing this from Ukraine, the weather is dark and gloomy and not ideal for travelling — but every single day I feel incredibly lucky to be back home.

I know that I am able to visit my home because someone is staying in trenches, abandoned houses, and basements. In dirt and cold. Under drones and artillery fire.

The Monitor in my life

It still feels surreal to see or hear the Monitor’s name mentioned in publications or at events. Sometimes it feels like it’s already living a life of its own.

Writing Ukraine’s Arms Monitor has helped me cope with many challenges: immigration stress, unemployment, and the feeling of helplessness because of the war. The desire to keep Ukraine close. To help my friends who are serving. To do something. It is also about having a small sense of control over a situation that I can’t control.

A large part of my work focuses on Russian aggression. It may seem like we already know everything about Russian Shaheds and missiles—but we don’t. Not nearly enough.

Russia is a huge war machine with an imperial mindset and deep contempt for others—and often for its own people. I try to show through my reporting what they keep doing: producing weapons, stockpiling them, recruiting globally, and spreading violence far beyond Ukraine.

Letting Russia do what it does shows others that force prevails over the rule of law. It also increases the appeal of nuclear weapons, as Ukraine—having once relinquished them and relied on international frameworks—now finds itself in this difficult position.

Is this the world we want to live in?

No one is safe when Russia is empowered. Unfortunately, in 2025, it was empowered at an entirely new level.

“We can tell them, but they won’t hear us,” wrote my friend in the Armed Forces.

“You’re right. But my duty is to keep telling,” I replied.

Whoever has ears, let them hear.

I started thinking about this post in Toronto. Wrote part of it in Geneva. Continued in Warsaw. And now I’m publishing it from my hometown in Ukraine. As I move closer to the front lines, I see how people and communities change. When I was here 1.5 years ago, it was different. Now Shaheds and missiles are flying over my parents’ house every night. We have electricity for about six hours a day, at best. No one in Ukraine deserves to live through that.

Thank you for reading this far. Thank you for choosing Ukraine’s Arms Monitor. And thank you for standing with Ukraine.

I wish you all a happy and prosperous 2026!

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Read some of my posts:

• Drone Warfare in Ukraine: Key Trends of 2025;

• Nuclear Deterrence: Russia and Ukraine;

• Russia’s Arms Trends: Burevestnik testing and the role of civil society.

Among my 157 articles published in 2025, the most popular were:

• (Un)Manned Warfare: 80% of Drone Success Depends on Pilot Skill

• Ukraine’s Pursuit of Drone Autonomy: NORDA Dynamics

• Stopping Shaheds: Ukraine’s Solutions.

Also, I’ve organized my previous articles into themed lists:

• Deep Strike Capabilities;

• Air Defence and Counter-UAS;

• Naval Drones;

• Autonomy and AI.

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On December 8, I delivered a presentation at the conference, “Inside the networks: How knowledge transfer drives improvised weapons production,” organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva.

I am so happy that I finally made it there despite many bureaucratic hurdles, which I was able to resolve only weeks before the event (thanks to the office of Hon. Chrystia Freeland for assisting with that).

In my presentation, I emphasized the role of FPV drones on the battlefield and the efforts of civilians in both Ukraine and Russia to produce them, as well as to develop the knowledge and skills needed to adapt these systems to specific battlefield conditions, including making them highly resistant to electronic warfare.

I also highlighted the role of frontline workshops that arm, redesign, and modify drones. A dedicated section of my report focused on the importance of drone pilots and the training of large numbers of personnel capable of operating these systems. Ultimately, the intention behind these efforts is what matters most—and for Ukraine and Russia, those intentions are fundamentally different.

You can read my speech and view the presentation below.

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Good afternoon,

Today, I will address how the Russian-Ukrainian war has driven the improvised production of unmanned systems, and how the skills required to assemble, adapt, and operate them are spreading far beyond traditional military structures.

This war is a conflict that draws deeply on societal mobilisation. Both Ukrainian and Russian civil societies have engaged to an unprecedented degree, raising funds, producing equipment, volunteering technical expertise, and filling critical capability gaps.

As a result, the skills, tools, and knowledge that shape today’s battlefield no longer belong exclusively to military personnel. Hundreds of thousands—if not millions—of civilians on both sides are directly involved in developing systems that have redefined modern warfare, particularly unmanned systems.

The most visible trend of the Russian-Ukrainian war has been the rise of small, inexpensive UAVs, especially first-person view (FPV) drones. These drones have proven effective in destroying heavy equipment such as tanks, armoured vehicles, and artillery systems.

Once weaponized, these drones can be employed not only for military purposes but also for striking civilian targets. In the context of this war, they have become tools used to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity against the Ukrainian civilian population.

In Russia and Ukraine, programs run by NGOs and private initiatives—and further supported by the governments—train anyone interested in assembling and operating drones.

Manuals, tutorials, and step-by-step assembly videos circulate widely on social media platforms such as Telegram, YouTube, and Russian VKontakte, making production accessible to anyone with a basic technical interest.

The 3D printing technology has transformed these processes even further, allowing specialists to print necessary parts and spare components to meet the immediate operational requirements of frontline units.

The advantage of 3D printing is that drone parts can be fully customized to meet specific requirements.

Based on information available on open-sources, the most commonly 3D-printed components include:

• payload delivery systems

• structural and mounting parts

• and launch infrastructure

Virtually any 3D-printed quadcopter can be built at home if a person has the necessary schematics also widely available in open sources.

Hobbyist communities collaborate online to print, modify, and troubleshoot components, especially for FPV designs.

Assembly is only one part of the required skill set. To make these drones effective, they must be fine-tuned in frontline labs or workshops on both sides of the war. According to my interviews with Ukrainian servicemen, 100% of FPV drones received by their units go through the frontline labs.

Similar workshops also operate on the Russian side, where teams of 5-7 engineers and technicians modify hardware and software, arm drones, replace civilian firmware with military versions, and adjust frequencies. They also reprogram the captured drones and can redesign them for other functions.

The continuous contest between drones and counter-drone systems also drives the rapid iteration cycle of unmanned technologies on the battlefield.

2025 has seen the expansion of drones resistant to electronic warfare, the most prominent being fibre-optic vehicles.

There are now detailed instructions and videos online showing how to assemble these drones in domestic conditions and how to attach commercially available spools with fiber-optic cable.

In frontline workshop conditions, most standard FPV drones can be transformed into unjammable fiber-optic vehicles.

The rise of autonomous technologies, which allow drones to operate without a pilot during the final stages of a mission, has encouraged civilians to experiment with machine vision and automated target-recognition.

One documented example describes a hobbyist with no technical education who, in two weeks and with the help of AI tools, created a working machine-learning model capable of recognizing targets in FPV video.

His work was not used on the battlefield, but it demonstrates how low the entry barrier to autonomy has become.

Next-generation drone technologies, such as autonomous and swarming systems, will pose a set of dangers as they proliferate into the hands of state and nonstate actors.

While autonomy remains limited on the battlefield, reliance on human drone pilots is high, which makes training essential.

Drone crews are responsible for more than 70 percent of drone mission success.

Training can now begin at home using a personal computer or even a mobile device, supported by highly realistic simulators such as Liftoff, the DRL Simulator, and VelociDrone.

Given the conditions of active war, training is also delivered through organized courses designed to rapidly prepare new pilots.

In Russia and Ukraine, there are state-funded and private schools for drone crews. It takes, on average, 21 days to train an FPV drone pilot in a course, and about two months to train an engineer.

Ukraine aims to train 30,000 drone pilots.

According to government sources, Russia’s goal is to train 1 million specialists in unmanned systems by 2030.

Particularly concerning is the involvement of children and youth. Over 500 Russian schools and 30 colleges now teach standardized drone curricula. The first official Russian UAV textbook developed by a drone manufacturer has entered the federal education system.

In addition to that, there are reports that in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, the Russian authorities are involving Ukrainian children in assembling FPV drones for the needs of their armed forces.

The existence of a large pool of trained operators—and long-term plans to expand that pool—creates serious risks of skill proliferation beyond the region. These skills may diffuse not only through formal channels but also through political, military, and economic networks that extend far beyond the battlefield.

The trends emerging from the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine will not remain confined to the region. They will shape future conflicts, empower new actors, and challenge existing arms-control frameworks. Understanding these dynamics is essential for any effort to build effective international responses.

I will conclude by emphasizing that my analysis today, and my work more broadly, is framed within the assessment that Ukraine is exercising its inherent right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, while the Russian Federation’s use of force constitutes a violation of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter.

The full presentation is available at the following link.

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This is an English version of my piece originally published in German by the journal Ukraine-Analysen. You can read the German version here - Drohnenkrieg in der Ukraine: Das Zusammenspiel von High- und Low-Tech.

Since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war, the role of unmanned systems in land, air, and naval operations has grown significantly. While drones have not yet produced a decisive military breakthrough—such as the achievement of a war aim or outright victory by either side—they have been essential to Ukraine’s primary objective of national survival. At the same time, they have become a force multiplier on the battlefield, substituting for such traditional capabilities as artillery and reducing the direct exposure of soldiers to frontline combat.

The use of unmanned systems made the frontline deadlier. It has expanded the kill zone along the frontline to 20 km, with both sides now specifically targeting drone teams of the enemy.

Despite expectations that drone warfare would quickly progress toward more advanced solutions, increasingly integrating technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), developments in both Russia and Ukraine demonstrate that this transition has been slower than anticipated. While several innovations have emerged in both countries, as of summer 2025, neither has achieved mass production of such advanced systems.

By contrast, the most significant battlefield impact to date has come from a comparatively low-tech but highly effective solution: First Person View (FPV) drones controlled through physical fiber-optic cables. FPV drones are highly agile and maneuverable quadcopters equipped with a camera that are piloted using specialized immersive goggles. Usually, they are radio-controlled, but in this case, the signal is transmitted through a physical fiber-optic cable to make it less susceptible to jamming.

The coexistence of high- and low-tech, such as advanced AI-enabled technologies and more basic fiber-optic solutions, in drone warfare during Russia’s war on Ukraine highlights an important trend: under conditions of constantly evolving counter-drone measures, innovation can take unexpected directions, and the creative repurposing of existing technologies can prove as effective on the battlefield as more sophisticated systems.

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History of Drone Warfare and Its Role in the Russia-Ukraine War

The use of unmanned systems in warfare dates back to 1584, when explosive ships were employed during the Antwerp blockade. In 1916, Britain’s Ruston Proctor Aerial Target, inspired by Nikola Tesla’s experiments with radio control, marked an early milestone. The United States soon tested aerial torpedoes in the 1930s and later deployed radio-controlled weapons during the Second World War against German rocket sites. During the Cold War, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) such as the RP-71 advanced the possibilities of remote reconnaissance.

In Vietnam, drones like the Ryan 147A Fire Fly were used for surveillance and signals intelligence, followed by Lockheed’s Aquila, which introduced laser target designation. Israel’s 1982 Pioneer UAV revolutionized battlefield surveillance and directly influenced later U.S. adoption in the Gulf War, where systems such as the Hunter with infrared sensors were deployed. The 1994 Predator, the first U.S. medium-altitude UAV with autonomous functions, saw action in Bosnia, Somalia, and Kosovo. By 2001, more than 5,000 drones were in use in Afghanistan. Subsequent systems—including the Raven, MQ-9 Reaper, and Global Hawk—expanded both intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike capabilities.

Non-state actors also recognized the potential of drone warfare. The Islamic State effectively adopted drones in Syria and Iraq, most notably during the coalition’s siege of Mosul in late 2016 and early 2017. Drones enabled IS militants to track coalition troop movements in and around the city, providing them with a battlefield advantage.

The use of drones gained further prominence in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020 when Azerbaijan established air superiority over Armenia by deploying Turkish Bayraktar armed drones.

Drone technologies emerged on the battlefield in Ukraine well before the full-scale invasion of 2022. With the outbreak of armed conflict in the Donbas between Russian-backed forces and the Ukrainian army in 2014, Ukraine invested in building a domestic drone industry.

Today, Ukraine’s drone ecosystem is highly decentralized, comprising at least 500 producers, in addition to numerous small-scale, non-commercial manufacturers capable of assembling low-cost drones under home conditions.

According to official data, Ukraine produced over 2 million drones in 2024 and plans to increase production to 4 million, with the capacity to manufacture up to 10 million systems in 2025. Drone prices range from a few hundred dollars for FPVs to a quarter of a million dollars for long-range or more sophisticated reconnaissance systems.

By the summer of 2025, a notable trend on the battlefield has been the growing use of ground unmanned vehicles by Ukrainian troops for diverse purposes, including remote mining, logistics, and medical evacuation. Ukraine has also advanced the deployment of naval unmanned systems—both surface and underwater platforms, such as the SeaBaby and Magura—to strike Russian infrastructure and military targets in the Black and Azov seas.

Russia, in contrast, has maintained a more centralized system of drone production. Its most prominent UAV used against Ukraine is the Iranian-designed Shahed-136 kamikaze drone, locally designated as the Geran. Russia localized its production in several factories deep in its rear, including at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in the Republic of Tatarstan. The Russian defence industry is sharply increasing production of Shahed-family drones, targeting output of more than 6,000 units per month—around 200 per day. If sustained, this pace could push production in 2025 beyond 70,000–75,000 drones.

Following Ukraine’s lead, and in response to battlefield challenges, Russia has also accelerated the development of ground and naval drones, though its progress remains slower than that of Ukraine.

Drones: Concept and Classification

Unmanned vehicles, commonly referred to as drones or remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), are systems operated without a pilot physically on board. For this article, the term “drone” is used broadly to cover aerial, naval, and ground systems.

The war in Ukraine has produced an extraordinary variety of unmanned systems. In May 2025 alone, Ukrainian forces reportedly used 400 different types against Russia.

In Ukraine, drones are grouped by configuration (quadcopter, fixed-wing), payload, and propeller diameter. By purpose, they are commonly divided into reconnaissance (surveillance), strike, armed platforms (launching missiles or bombs), loitering munitions (the drone itself as a weapon), transport (cargo and supply), and multirole systems that combine several of these functions.

Based on the classification of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, drones are divided into strike FPV drones, reconnaissance multicopters, reconnaissance fixed-wing drones, unmanned strike bombers, and deep-strike UAVs.

The impact of small drones in Ukraine is considerable. Russian military medical reports suggest that over 75% of injuries sustained by their soldiers during low-intensity combat were caused by FPV strikes. Drones have also proven highly effective against heavy armor: by early June 2025, of the 31 U.S.-supplied tanks lost by Ukraine, 27 were destroyed by drones.

In July 2024, Ukraine established its Unmanned Systems Forces, which is the world’s first dedicated military branch that employs unmanned aerial vehicles, ground-based robotic systems, and marine surface and underwater drones to carry out a variety of tasks. Although drone teams represent roughly 2% of Ukraine’s military, they are responsible for a major share of Russian losses.

Many brigades and battalions have dedicated drone units, but there are also specialised formations focused solely on unmanned systems — for example, the 429th “Achilles” Separate Unmanned Aerial Systems Regiment and the 414th Separate Brigade “Birds of the Madyar.” In March 2025, five of these elite units were selected for the new Drone Line project, which will reinforce Ukrainian ground forces on key sectors of the frontline.

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the creation of Russia’s own unmanned-systems forces in June 2025, roughly a year after Ukraine established similar units. It’s worth noting the existence of another organization in Russia, the Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies “Rubikon”. Rubikon functions as a procurement, analytics, and R&D hub. Emphasising isolation of Ukrainian formations by striking logistics and targeting UAV teams, Rubikon’s arrival to separate parts of the frontline reportedly led to some Ukrainian brigades losing 40–70% of their UAV positions within a week.

High-Tech Solutions: Towards Greater Autonomy in Drone Warfare

Both Ukraine and Russia face major challenges in drone operations, including shortages of skilled personnel, the growing volume of battlefield data, and the expansion of electronic warfare. These pressures have pushed both sides to invest heavily in autonomous systems.

For Ukraine, a key goal is to reduce reliance on soldiers in direct combat roles by substituting them with autonomous unmanned platforms. At present, the effectiveness of drones depends largely on pilot skill: most FPV systems achieve a hit rate of 30–50%, but for inexperienced pilots this can be as low as 10%. Forecasts suggest that AI-controlled FPV drones could reach accuracies of around 80%. Integrating AI would allow drones to process data, make decisions, and perform tasks with minimal human input.

In military contexts, autonomy refers to the ability of a system to accomplish objectives with little or no human oversight in complex and unpredictable environments. Full autonomy has not yet been observed on the battlefield in Ukraine. While AI is already aiding decision-making through warfighting systems, its role remains partial: improving certain functions rather than enabling complete autonomy.

Since mid-2023, both Ukraine and Russia have accelerated work on drones equipped with machine vision, which uses image recognition algorithms to store a target’s image and maintain lock even while it is moving. Mastering this technology would allow drones to overcome electronic warfare in the final meters before impact, since the strike command would be issued outside the range of jamming. According to Ukraine’s defense tech cluster Brave1, FPV drones with machine vision are already deployed at the front and procured by the state. However, they face obstacles, such as poor camera quality, difficulties in targeting vulnerable points like tank weak spots, and problems adapting existing drones to new modules.

As of summer 2025, AI development for unmanned systems in Ukraine has advanced in several directions — optical target recognition and acquisition, navigation algorithms, and swarm technologies.

Ukraine’s defense industry is also building standalone AI-driven software modules that can be integrated across different systems—from FPVs and long-range drones to turrets on unmanned ground vehicles. These modules are designed to provide specific autonomous functions while ensuring cross-platform compatibility. Current AI-enabled tools include the acoustic reconnaissance system Zvook; ePPO, a mobile app that collects and analyzes civilian reports of missiles and drones; ZIR software for automatic target detection; and an AI-enabled navigation system developed by The Fourth Law.

Elements of AI are also being applied in long-range strike missions against Russia. While drones such as Liutyi are not fully autonomous, they can already execute parts of their flight routes independently.

One of the most striking demonstrations of AI in drone warfare was Operation Spiderweb, conducted by Ukraine’s Security Service on June 1, 2025. The operation destroyed or damaged at least 20 Russian strategic aircraft —Ukrainian sources claim as many as 41 —using FPV drones with specialized construction. Although the drones were manually piloted from Ukraine, AI elements contributed: the systems were reportedly trained to identify vulnerable points on bombers and to carry out pickering algorithms, automatically directing strikes at weak spots in aviation equipment.

Another advanced concept under development is swarm intelligence, where multiple drones operate collaboratively by sharing data and coordinating tasks through decentralized AI—similar to flocks of birds or ant colonies (Biju et al., 2025). In February 2025, Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, announced that a dozen companies are working on drone swarm technologies.

As of summer 2025, Ukraine has reportedly employed drone swarming technology in over 100 operations. Developed by the Ukrainian company Swarmer, the technology enables groups of drones to coordinate strikes autonomously, adjusting roles if one drone becomes inoperable or loses power. Military units have operated swarms of three to eight drones, while the software has also been tested with as many as 25. A common configuration involves one reconnaissance UAV working in tandem with two strike UAVs to target a Russian trench.

Separately, Ukrainian companies have begun mass-producing drones fitted with AI-enabled onboard terminal-guidance systems. Terminal guidance allows a drone or missile to home in on its target automatically during the final phase of flight. Once the drone is close, onboard AI-enhanced sensors take over and steer it precisely without operator input—a true “fire-and-forget” strike. Expectations are that most frontline drones will be fitted with similar autonomy systems within six to nine months. This technology has increased strike effectiveness by two- to four-fold.

Ukraine’s government, military, and industry emphasize the “man-in-the-loop” (MITL) concept, ensuring that a human operator remains involved in decisions about target engagement. This principle is meant to prevent AI from independently authorizing lethal strikes.

Russia, meanwhile, is also experimenting with AI integration. AI is reported to play a role in Russian drones such as the Lancet, Tyuvik, and V2U, enabling them to navigate independently under electronic suppression and locate and strike targets without pilot control.

In December 2024, reports indicated that Shahed-136 strike drones had been upgraded with AI. Experts cautioned, however, that this was not a true breakthrough, as the enhancements appeared to rely on computer vision algorithms rather than advanced AI. Still, these upgrades improved navigational accuracy and resilience against jamming, representing a notable increase in threat.

Shahed (Geran) drone strikes, once largely ineffective with hit rates below 10 percent, are now achieving nearly 20 percent penetration. This increase is not due to weakened Ukrainian defenses or increased use of AI technologies, but rather to Russia’s evolving tactics. By employing new methods, such as overlapping flight paths and staggered launch waves, Russian troops force Ukraine’s defenders to stretch thin and exhaust their interceptors more rapidly.

Overall, throughout 2025, the number of aerial weapons used in Russian strikes against Ukraine increased from an average of about 90 per day in January to 140 per day in August. The ratio of drones to missiles in Russian attacks has remained largely consistent, with drones making up 95–97% of the total. This trend is likely to continue.

Low-Tech Solutions: Fiber-Optic Drones and Their Countermeasures

As progress with advanced technologies is slow and electronic warfare (EW) has expanded on the battlefield, Russian developers have turned to designing and producing fiber-optic drones in parallel. While not a new concept—wire-guided munitions have existed for decades—their resilience against EW, ability to deliver precise strikes on armored targets, and relatively simple design made them easy to scale.

The Soviet Union experimented with such systems as early as the 1970s, notably with the Fagot anti-tank missile guided by long control wires. Cable-operated technologies later became common in civilian drones used for inspecting tunnels, pipelines, and mines, where connectivity is limited.

With the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, both Russian and Ukrainian engineers tested fiber-optic drone prototypes. Russia, however, moved faster, partnering with Chinese manufacturers and rapidly scaling production. By late summer and early autumn 2024, these drones had become a significant tactical challenge for Ukrainian forces—particularly in Russia’s Kursk region.

Ukraine’s early experiments with fiber-optic drones in 2022 struggled to gain traction. According to Ukrainian radio-technology specialist Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov, one team successfully flew fiber-optic drones for the military, but the idea attracted little interest. A later project submitted to a Ministry of Defence hackathon was also shelved. Meanwhile, videos from mid-2024 onward began showing Russian fiber-optic drones in action, both in the Kursk region of Russia and in the Donetsk region of Ukraine.

In 2025, fiber-optic drones became one of Ukraine’s biggest challenges on the battlefield. Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation described these vehicles as one of the game changers in modern technological warfare. The technology offers high-resolution imaging, resists electronic warfare, and provides stable connections with operators, enabling greater precision in target acquisition. These drones are most often used in ambush scenarios: they can remain in standby mode along a preset route, wait for a target, and even land in a field without losing contact.

As of summer 2025, fiber-optic drones are being deployed on a large scale by both Russia and Ukraine. According to researchers’ estimates, by the end of 2024, Ukraine’s and Russia’s production of fiber-optic FPV drones accounted for around 10% of total FPV output. Based on this data, Ukraine is currently producing at least 20,000 such drones per month, while Russia produces around 50,000.

The operational range of these systems depends on the length of the fiber-optic cable: early models were limited to about 10 km, whereas current versions can reach up to 40 km. Russia has localized fiber-optic cable production, with the main facility located at the Saransk plant. The factory operates six production lines that together produce 12,000 km of fiber-optic cable per day—around 4 million km annually.

Countermeasures against fiber-optic drones are necessarily physical, since jamming is ineffective. Cutting the cable disables the system. The most common defenses include small arms and machine guns. In many cases, Ukrainian FPV drones are used to sever fiber-optic cables with their propellers, instantly neutralizing the threat. Another method, increasingly common along the front line, is the installation of fishing nets designed to catch and disable incoming drones.

Despite their effectiveness, many drone developers and military professionals see fiber-optic drones as a “dead-end branch” of technological evolution, with limited development prospects. The shift toward low-tech fiber-optic drones is not only a response to electronic warfare on the battlefield but also risks diverting Ukraine’s already limited financial and human resources away from the development of more advanced and efficient technologies.

The rapid evolution of drone warfare in Ukraine has produced hundreds of unique unmanned systems, each designed to address specific battlefield challenges. Ukraine’s decentralized production model, shaped by direct feedback from frontline operators, has enabled the emergence of diverse aerial, naval, and land systems. Russia, by contrast, has relied on massive financial investment and support from its allies, China and Iran, to scale the most effective unmanned systems for mass deployment against both Ukrainian forces and civilian targets. The Russian drone attacks against Ukraine in 2025 increased, and this trend is likely to continue.

Despite their growing role, drones alone have not delivered decisive results for either side. Conventional systems, therefore, remain central in shaping the outcome of this conflict. The mass integration of artificial intelligence into drone warfare could mark a turning point in the near future—enhancing data processing, target recognition, and autonomous decision-making, with humans involved only at the final stage of engagement.

As of summer 2025, attempts to integrate AI for automatic targeting, navigation, and ISR functions are expanding, yet fully autonomous systems remain beyond reach for both Ukraine and Russia. While both sides have turned to scaling low-tech alternatives such as fiber-optic drones, their limited potential suggests they are unlikely to remain relevant in increasingly technology-driven conflicts.

Rapid advancements in AI are likely to continue in the coming years, with successful developments enhancing the capabilities of individual combatants and helping countries address manpower shortages and reduce the impact of human limitations in warfare. In this context, both sides of the war will need to prioritize the development of novel counter-drone measures and the tactics for employing them.

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With the start of the full-scale war, Ukraine decentralized its defence procurement system and has since become one of the strongest examples of how this model can quickly supply armed forces with the most up-to-date equipment. Brave1 Market is widely known as an “Amazon for War,” where military units can simply open a webpage and select the products they need. But it is much more than that: it connects different stakeholders and sheds light on a defence-tech sector that was previously closed and siloed.

Brave1 Market is now the largest catalogue of defence innovations in Ukraine, where military units, investors, and even someone like me continue to discover new manufacturers and new products. Its value for strengthening Ukraine’s defence capabilities cannot be overstated.

In this article:

• Brave1 Market: The Catalogue of Solutions

• Cooperation with the Defence Procurement Agency

• Army of Drones Bonus Project

• E-Points

• User Reviews

If you haven’t yet, read my first article on Brave1: Brave1: The Engine Behind Ukraine’s Defence-Tech Community.

My publications are not sponsored. This digest is supported only by private individuals — readers and subscribers like you.

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The full-scale war has created completely unprecedented challenges for Ukraine. The nature of combat is changing rapidly, and frontline technologies are evolving just as quickly. At the start of the invasion, many imagined the Ukrainian army as reliant on Soviet-era equipment and Ukraine itself as a country dependent on international assistance, which was only partly true.

It soon became clear that this equipment was not enough: the operational situation changes daily, while centralized deliveries can take six to eight months.

This created a big gap between what soldiers need today and what they actually receive.

Ukrainian engineers, entrepreneurs, and volunteers started developing new technologies rapidly, flexibly, and in constant dialogue with the front. To support these processes, the Brave1 government cluster was created as a tool to help identify technological solutions for the military, relay real needs from frontline units to manufacturers, and organize testing of new developments.

One of their key innovations has been the Brave1 Market.

Brave1 Market: the Catalogue of Solutions

“Soldiers usually receive weapons through centralized state procurement, which, while ensuring common standards, is a complex and slow process. Meanwhile, the daily operational situation on the front does not wait. This raised an important question: how can we speed up soldiers’ access to the technologies they need?” commented Yuliia Myrna, project manager of Brave1 Market, to Ukraine’s Arms Monitor.

The Brave1 Market is an online platform, created in April 2025, that connects Ukrainian military units with developers to integrate innovative defence-tech solutions into the Security and Defence Forces. Units can contact manufacturers directly and purchase drones, various types of robotic systems, AI-based modules, electronic warfare (EW) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) devices, as well as other components that support soldiers in carrying out their missions.

Under Ukrainian law, Brave1, as a civilian organisation, has the right to create an open catalogue of technologies. Each product card includes technical specifications, manufacturer contact information (allowing direct communication and simplified ordering), the option to share the card via messengers, and a section for reviews and comments, enabling users to exchange information about product effectiveness.

The catalogue allows manufacturers to see one another, understand their competition, and assess their own specifications, pricing, and relevance. What was previously done “blindly” has now become transparent.

In just 6 months, Brave1 Market has built an impressive portfolio:

• More than 600 manufacturers are represented on the platform.

• Over 2,600 product cards are divided into 11 categories, which were created through direct dialogue with the military.

Navigation through these 2,600+ product cards is made as simple as possible thanks to dedicated tools:

• If you know exactly what you are looking for, you can use direct search. There are also filters by sub-category to help narrow down the selection.

• You can select several items within one sub-category and compare their technical specifications and prices on a single screen.

Through it, soldiers can easily compare products by technical specifications and price; find verified manufacturers; and contact them directly for procurement.

This tool helps both soldiers and civilians. “When someone has a relative fighting on the front, they naturally want to find the necessary equipment—and previously, this was almost impossible. Brave1 made the defence technology catalogue open to the public, which is a unique case globally. The catalogue enables every Ukrainian to contribute and help from wherever they are,” Yuliia added.

Every manufacturer undergoes a thorough vetting process, including checks for:

• links to the enemy or terrorist organizations;

• bankruptcy risks;

• ongoing legal proceedings;

• actual production capacity.

This builds trust in the Brave1 marketplace: military users know that every manufacturer in the catalogue has been verified, and in case of communication issues, Brave1 will help resolve them.

The Brave1 Market catalogue has an open and a closed section.
The open section contains products that manufacturers have agreed to make visible to all internet users. The restricted section contains products that manufacturers choose to show only to the military. For example, the Ammunition Catalogue is available exclusively to verified service members.

To gain access to the full catalogue (including restricted product cards), military personnel must log in using their military credentials.

Currently, Brave1 is working on implementing a user feedback system: “It is very important to provide feedback to manufacturers, and we do not want to become a bottleneck in this communication or slow down the process. To avoid this, we are implementing a feature that will allow military personnel to leave feedback directly on a product card — visible only to the manufacturer. This ensures that feedback is used for communication and improvement, not for manipulation”.

Brave1 supports several models for acquiring equipment:

1. centralized government procurement;

2. purchases made directly by military units using allocated funds;

3. purchases by volunteer organizations;

4. Army of Drones Bonus program, in which soldiers can acquire equipment using combat points.

If the equipment is in stock, delivery to the front can take as little as six days.

Brave1 deliberately does not aggregate delivery data to avoid creating cyber risks — the enemy actively targets critical systems, and the potential consequences of an information leak are too severe.

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Army of Drones Bonus

Brave1 works with many government institutions, but its closest cooperation is with the Defense Procurement Agency (DPA). Their procurement processes are happening in parallel. However, unlike the DPA, Brave1 Market enables the military to purchase non-codified products. “If a technology proves effective, it needs to be scaled immediately rather than delayed by lengthy formal procedures of codification,” mentioned Yuliia Myrna.

The Defense Procurement Agency (DPA) of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine is the national agency responsible for supplying ammunition, UAVs, and equipment for the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

One of the most successful cases of cooperation between Brave1 and DPA is the Army of Drones Bonus project. It is an incentive program that provides equipment to all units of Ukraine’s Defence Forces.

For damaging or destroying the enemy’s equipment or personnel, Ukrainian service members earn points, which they can redeem for Ukrainian-made UAVs, electronic warfare systems, and night-vision devices.

For effective implementation, the Defence Procurement Agency uses the digital system DOT-Chain Defence. Thanks to this system, the average time from placing an order to a unit receiving the equipment is 10 days.
Equipment delivered through the DOT-Chain Defence under the Army of Drones Bonus program is additional and is supplied in parallel with other centralized military procurement programs.

Process overview:

1. Access to the catalog:
   Authorized military personnel log into Delta and access the Brave1 Market, where they can view product cards with specifications and available quantities.

2. Earning points:
   Units upload verified photo/video evidence of destroyed enemy targets into Delta. After confirmation, points are credited and displayed in the Brave1 Market.

3. Placing an order:
   Military users select items in the Brave1 Market, confirm the order, and specify the territorial community for transfer. Delivery details are arranged directly between the unit and the manufacturer. The order is then transferred to DOT-Chain Defence.

4. Order tracking:
   Authorized personnel log into DOT-Chain Defence to track order status, view documents, and sign delivery and acceptance forms.

5. Authorization and onboarding:
   The DPA requests a list of authorized individuals from the unit. After the unit confirms this list and a brief training session is completed, personnel receive system access.

6. Delivery and documentation:
   In DOT-Chain Defence, units track deliveries and expected timelines. Once the equipment arrives, the delivery note is signed digitally. Average delivery time is 10 days.

7. Completion of the cycle:
   The supplier issues acceptance certificates, signed by the supplier, the unit commander, and the DPA. After this, payment is processed, and the supply cycle is complete.

8. Finalization and payment:
   The supplier issues acceptance certificates for the delivered goods. These are signed by three parties—the supplier, the unit commander, and the DPA—which allows payment to be processed. This completes the full supply cycle, from order to payment.

Responsibilities:
Steps 1–4 — Ministry of Digital Transformation and Brave1
Steps 5–8 — Defence Procurement Agency (DPA).

From August to November 2025, under the ‘Army of Drones Bonus’ program, 71,000 units of equipment were delivered to the military via DOT-Chain Defence. This includes various types of drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems, with a total value of UAH 2.8 billion ($66.5 million USD).

E-Points

One of the most interesting elements of procurement in Ukraine is the so-called e-points (in Ukrainian, “ye-baly” — a name with a humorous connotation; drop me a note if you want to know what it means).

E-points are special points awarded to Ukraine’s military units for verified destruction of enemy equipment or personnel. They can be exchanged for essential equipment available on the Brave1 Market — drones, EW systems, components, and more.

For instance, for eliminating an enemy infantryman, a soldier receives 12 points; a precise hit on a tank earns 40 points, and damaging a tank earns 20 points. Destroying an enemy multiple-launch rocket system yields up to 50 points. The accumulated points form each unit’s rating.

Products on the marketplace also have different point values: FPV drones start at 2 points for 7-inch models and 6 points for FPV drones with night vision. Reusable “bombers,” such as the Vampire drone, cost 43 points.

As of 1 October 2025, points are awarded not only for eliminating enemy forces and mining operations, but also for reconnaissance and logistics missions. Points will soon also be granted for successful battlefield evacuations.

“If the enemy is conducting active assaults, you can destroy a large number of targets—and earn a large number of points,” explained Ihor Raikov, head of the unmanned systems service of the Khartia Brigade, to Radio Svoboda.

Each month, all points earned by every unit are summed up and used to form a ranking of brigades along the entire frontline. The logic is simple: the more enemy targets destroyed, the more points a unit earns—points that are then converted into new equipment.

Each point is worth 10,000 hryvnias ($239), credited as virtual funds to the unit’s account. A soldier logs in and chooses from the products available in exchange for these so-called e-points.

This phenomenon, often called “the gamification of war,” has a positive effect on soldiers’ motivation and a potentially negative impact on their perception of the conflict.

“This kind of ‘gamification’ can distract us from reality. We can get carried away with the game, so to speak—understanding our immediate task very well, but losing sight of the brigade’s or the broader front’s objectives. You might push your own idea of destroying the enemy, while preventing other units from doing their work,” said military psychologist Andrii Kozynchuk to Radio Svoboda.

According to the Khartia Brigade, such issues are avoided because points are accumulated not individually, but for the entire brigade and then allocated according to brigade-level needs.

“We want our people to come back from the war as human beings, not as killing machines,” said Gyunduz Mamedov, a former Ukrainian prosecutor and current advisor on the ethics of drone warfare.

“What is inhumane is starting a full-scale war in the 21st century,” commented the Minister of Digitalization, Mikhailo Fedorov, regarding the impacts of this system on military personnel. And it’s difficult to disagree with him.

When I approached my contact in the unmanned systems forces, he commented on the issue in the following way: “I always tell my guys — keep things separate. Points are an additional, secondary element that goes alongside the real work, like a shadow. We are here to win the war, not to earn points. Points are just an extra feature. We understand that this is not a game, not gambling".

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User Reviews

The decentralised systems of defence procurement, together with innovations such as the marketplace and e-points, offer many lessons for Ukraine’s partners. As Yuliia Myrna from Brave1 noted, most countries today are investing in their defence technologies. So creating a similar catalogue of producers and products would be an excellent first step toward supporting domestic ecosystems.

At the same time, Oleksandr Yakovenko, founder and CEO of TAF Industries (whom I recently interviewed for the article “We Can Produce 150,000 FPVs per Month”: Ukrainian TAF Industries”), shared on his social media about the challenges of Ukraine’s decentralized procurement for the producers, but also underscored the absolute necessity of it in times of warfare: “In the past, there was a single centralized buyer (the Ministry of Defence or the Defense Procurement Agency) placing six-month orders. Now there are hundreds of military “bodies,” each with its own requirements. And these very requirements give our forces an advantage on the battlefield, because pilots on the ground know best what they need to accomplish their missions.

But at the same time, this is an extremely demanding challenge for suppliers. Instead of producing a lineup of ten drone configurations, manufacturers now have to produce two hundred—each tailored to the specific needs of a particular unit, in a particular sector of the front, right now. And they must have these systems in stock, ready for deployment.

With every new trip I make to the front, I understand even more deeply how important individualized solutions are. It is a real challenge—and we are adapting our product approach accordingly”.

While Ukraine is often criticized for having a “zoo of drones,” this diversity remains a key factor in its current success under active wartime conditions. For Russian forces, it would be far easier to adapt to three or five standardized drone types than to hundreds of systems, each with its own configuration.

Regarding the importance of the Brave1 market, Yaroslav Sherstiuk, developer of military combat control systems and software, like MyGun, TacticMap, MilChat, and UkropSoft, wrote on his social media the following, “Personally, I see this as an opportunity to give our products new momentum and take another step in their development... For me, this is not just another platform — it is a new communication channel, a chance to hear users’ needs, involve more units, and show how digital solutions truly help on the battlefield.”

Ihor Berehovenko, co-founder and CPO of Air3F, a company that produces ground drones Varkhan and components already available on Brave1 Market, shared that they see value in having an additional communication channel and expanding their market presence. “The attention we received from the Brave1 community during the launch of our new development — the NRK VARKHAN — was extremely important for us. It is nice that manufacturers receive media coverage and community engagement, as this greatly accelerates product development and opens new opportunities. For us, this is highly meaningful, as it allows us to move forward faster and with greater confidence,” he added.

A personal contact from an infantry battalion of the AFU told me that his unit decided to participate in the Army of Drones Bonus program and collect e-points to receive additional drones. They have just started, so they have been experiencing some issues with verification, especially in harsh weather conditions, but overall, the system seems to work well.

That said, all specialised unmanned forces units in Ukraine have already been participating in this program for quite a long time.

Another contact in the military — this time from an unmanned forces unit — shared his experience of how quickly Brave1 responded to their request to change the verification system. Previously, to earn points, units had to upload both drone footage of the strike and a second video from an observer platform—typically a Mavic. However, with Mavics now in short supply in Ukraine, many units were unable to meet this requirement and therefore could not receive points, even for successful operations.

Once this issue was raised with Brave1, the system was promptly adjusted to reflect battlefield realities. “We are being heard, and there is a real feedback loop,” he said.

For military units, collecting these points is important, as they affect the overall ranking of the unit. A higher ranking not only determines access to additional equipment earned through points but also shapes how requests are treated in general: “When we ask for equipment, the attitude toward us is completely different if we have a strong ranking.”

As a conclusion, I want to emphasize the importance of the human factor in this work. Brave1 is a team of dedicated people who no longer remember what a “9–5 job” is and who do everything possible to bring Ukraine’s victory closer under conditions most of us can hardly imagine. As Yuliia noted in her closing remarks, “Our team is in constant daily communication with both manufacturers and military units. Each direction has a dedicated manager who is always on call, often sacrificing personal time to stay connected with dozens of stakeholders. This intense workload allows us to serve as a direct bridge between the front line and industry — we don’t wait to collect or consolidate information, we respond immediately. That is the only way to keep innovation moving at the pace the war demands.”

This level of dedication and professionalism is something we could all aspire to in our personal lives — and organizations like Brave1 demonstrate it under extremely harsh conditions.

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Read my recent articles:

• CEO of Swarmer on $15M Investments and Drone Autonomy: summary of the interview;

• Ukraine Starts Mass Production of Domestic Mavics;

• “Digital Warfare” — a New Reality: Russian Perspective;

• How Ukraine is Developing “Middlestrike” Drones.

Brave1 is a unique government platform that has helped Ukraine’s defence industry reach its current level of development. Its core value lies in uniting manufacturers, creating a transparent grant-distribution mechanism, and building an ecosystem that evolves together with the market.

I’ve spoken with the Brave1 team to learn more about their philosophy and initiatives — grant program, Test in Ukraine, Defence Tech Valley, and especially their acclaimed marketplace, which will be the focus of a separate publication.

Additionally, I interviewed several Ukrainian manufacturers and investors working closely with Brave1 to understand how they have been able to benefit from this platform.

Just a reminder: my publications are not sponsored. This digest is supported only by private individuals — readers and subscribers like you.

Thank you for supporting my work!

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What is Brave1?

Brave1 is a coordination platform that unites all players in the defence tech sector of Ukraine, providing organizational, informational, and financial support to accelerate the development of innovative defense projects in Ukraine. It was established in April 2023 and co-founded by the Ministry of Digital Transformation, the Ministry of Defence, the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the National Security and Defense Council, the Ministry of Strategic Industries, and the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine

The mission of Brave1 is to position Ukraine as a global leader in defence technology.

It is a centralized hub for collaboration between defence tech companies, security and defense forces, the government, investors, volunteer foundations, and the media.

The platform focuses on critical technological solutions, including:

• missiles

• anti-Shahed solutions

• lasers

• sea drones

• swarm drones

• autonomous strike drones

• drone-carriers

• anti-KAB solutions

• Ukrainian Mavics

• guided munitions.

Brave1’s work includes several key directions, including the Brave1 Marketplace; the Test in Ukraine program; the Defense Tech Valley dual-use technology investment summit; its grant program, and recently launched international defence partnerships, such as Brave–Norway, or the BraveTech EU initiative

The Philosophy Behind Brave1

Brave1 emerged as a response to Ukraine’s urgent need to rapidly develop its own defence technologies during the full-scale war. It is a government initiative personally championed by First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov.

The role of Fedorov was particularly emphasized by one of the leading Ukrainian reconnaissance drone producers, Airlogix, which told me in a private comment that the success of Brave1 is closely tied to the leadership of the Minister: “It was Fedorov who initiated the creation of Brave1 and brought in specialists capable of building an effective and dynamic defence-tech ecosystem. The Brave1 team is genuinely exceptional — strong, fast, creative, and results-driven. They are producing solutions that are transforming the industry.”

The goal was to unite the efforts of the state, the military, and the private sector to create a single platform where developers can access funding, expertise, and opportunities to test their solutions in real combat conditions.

When building Brave1, the team studied the experience of leading international institutions such as DARPA and the Defense Innovation Unit in the United States, as well as NATO’s DIANA. These structures inspired the model of cooperation between the government, the armed forces, and innovative businesses.

At the same time, the Ukrainian approach has its own unique feature — an ultra-fast R&D cycle.

“While in the U.S. or Europe, the path from idea to field deployment may take years, in Ukraine, thanks to direct interaction with the frontline, this process can take only a few months — and sometimes even weeks,” a representative of Brave1 told Ukraine’s Arms Monitor in an exclusive commentary.

A vivid example is when developers immediately upgrade their drones or communication systems after combat testing, incorporating feedback from soldiers on the front lines. This continuous “frontline–development–frontline” cycle has become the foundation of the success of Ukraine’s defence innovation ecosystem.

Ukraine has accumulated one of the deepest practical expertise in drone warfare among democratic countries. Therefore, Brave1 not only addresses current operational needs but also anticipates what will be required five to ten years from now.

“They see all the problems that exist within the niche. For example, the Ukrainian UAV sector faced a serious challenge with communications. To raise the quality to a new level, Brave1 organized a closed event where manufacturers were invited to demonstrate how their solutions actually work”, added Airlogix.

Similar events are held for long-range strike drones and other capabilities. Brave1 creates spaces where everyone can find the counterparts they need: manufacturers find partners, engineers find technical solutions, and the military finds systems that truly work on the battlefield.

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Test in Ukraine

The Test in Ukraine initiative was launched on July 17, 2025, during the LANDEURO Conference in Wiesbaden. Its goal is to provide foreign companies with the opportunity to test their defence technologies in real battlefield conditions and receive direct feedback from Ukrainian soldiers.

As of November 2025, 126 foreign companies from 17 countries have applied to participate in the program.

The largest number comes from the United States, but the project’s geography is quite broad — it includes EU countries, as well as South Korea, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Australia, and even Greenland.

One notable example was the test of a ground robotic system developed by the German company Diehl (best known for its IRIS-T air defence systems), conducted at the base of the 3rd Assault Brigade. The trials took place under conditions closely resembling actual combat, allowing the developers to receive detailed recommendations from the military on how to adapt the system to frontline needs.

Most frequently, manufacturers seek to test UAVs, artificial intelligence systems, interceptors, and communication equipment. Companies can conduct tests in person—making real-time adjustments on site—or delegate the process to the Brave1 team, which organizes the testing after an online briefing and provides a comprehensive report with recommendations.

The program allows participants to receive immediate, practical feedback from Ukrainian soldiers who work with similar technologies on a daily basis, as well as access to training grounds that closely replicate combat environments. It is an ecosystem where innovations are tested faster than anywhere else in the world.

“During the initial evaluation of the application, we assess whether a product aligns with the priority areas of Test in Ukraine. Key factors include reasonable pricing, high-quality photo and video materials, clear technical specifications, a description of the product’s advantages, and the company’s readiness to either come to Ukraine or send its system or prototype for testing," Brave1 told.

Brave1 Grant Program

Over its first two years, the Brave1 cluster has awarded over 540 grants totaling over UAH 2 billion (USD 50 million). The 2025 state budget earmarks nearly UAH 3 billion (USD 75 million) for defense tech grants, with priorities including missiles, lasers, drone swarms, CRPA antennas, unmanned surface (water) drones, counter-Shahed and counter-guided aerial bomb systems, a “mother drone” platform, a Ukrainian “Mavic” analogue, and guided munitions.

Since the beginning of 2025, Brave1 has awarded 240 grants to Ukrainian manufacturers.

One of the grant recipients is Oko Camera, which is a Ukrainian product company founded in 2022 that designs and manufactures ultra-sensitive thermal imaging cameras for unmanned systems, including UAS, UGV, and navigation systems.

Thy company representative shared with Ukraine’s Arms Monitor that they received a $25,000 grant from Brave1 in 2023, and “it became a true booster for our company’s development. Thanks to this support, we were able to significantly accelerate our R&D, release the first batch of cameras, and launch serial production. Brave1 also helped us organize both testing-ground and field trials together with Defence Forces units — our product passed them quickly”.

The Brave1 grant program is valued by manufacturers for its transparency, the mentors who are willing to share valuable expertise, and the speed of decision-making. One of the cluster’s strongest strengths is its focus on practical application and real impact on the country’s defence capability, as well as its ability to rapidly turn engineering ideas into ready-to-use solutions.

Ukrainian company Airlogix shared from its experience that, in its early phase, Brave1 operated almost like a government “angel investor.” Small grants were issued for new projects, startups, and early-stage R&D — a venture-like innovation model rather than one focused on commercial return.

Within the first months, Brave1 succeeded in forming a community of manufacturers and organizing events where businesses could speak directly with the government, the military, and one another.

As the market expanded, Brave1 transformed into a broad, open community accessible to any Ukrainian manufacturer. The platform helps companies find international investors, build partnerships, and solve technical challenges.

In essence, Brave1 has become a free state accelerator. “If you need, for example, a pneumatic catapult, Brave1 has a comprehensive catalog of solutions and a team that will help you locate the right manufacturer,” Viktor Lokotkov, Chief Marketing Officer at Airlogix, said.

Microgrants are now a thing of the past. Today, support is measured not in hundreds but in tens and hundreds of thousands of dollars, with the government backing more complex and strategically important projects.

However, the competitions have become far more rigorous:
— you cannot apply with a “raw” project;
— you need a competent team and engineering capacity;
— an expert commission must confirm that your solution will genuinely strengthen the Defence Forces.

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Brave1 commented that each application goes through several stages of evaluation.

First, experts assess the technical component — determining whether the development aligns with the program’s technological priorities and objectives.

This is followed by a preliminary review by the Supervisory Board and a full verification of the applicant’s documentation for compliance with all requirements.

The final decision is made by the Fund's Supervisory Board by a majority vote.

For the special grant program, a multi-level expert review is applied, involving specialized engineers and military professionals. The final decision is again made by the Supervisory Board.

Brave1 launched four new Brave Competitions, offering producers up to 150 million UAH (3.75 million USD) to develop and scale projects in priority areas. Participants work under specific technical requirements and must deliver solutions ready for immediate frontline deployment.

The four priority areas include:

• Explosives: scaling up domestic production of high-explosive and initiating compounds, as well as nitrocellulose.

• Tactical ballistic missiles: developing a Ukrainian equivalent of HIMARS.

• Surface-to-air missile systems for countering UAVs: creating new, effective tools for air defence.

• Artificial intelligence: advancing battlefield autonomy through the development of autonomous drones, targeting modules for interceptor drones, and AI solutions for countering guided aerial bombs (KABs), among others.

In August 2025, the Supervisory Board of the Innovation Development Fund approved an updated Brave1 grant program aimed at accelerating the deployment of technologies capable of influencing the course of the war. The program has a clear focus — 70 technological priorities, an accelerated decision-making process (1.5 months instead of 3), and greater flexibility in determining grant amounts.

According to Oko Camera, “it’s important to understand that applying for a grant is not only about receiving funding. It is also about getting your idea or project validated by experts from Brave1 and the General Staff. In addition, Brave1 has created the Brave1 Club — an opportunity for companies to receive support beyond grants.”

Defense Tech Valley Summit

Viktor Lokotkov from Airlogix said that just two years ago, Brave1 events drew 100–200 participants. The most recent Defence Tech Valley in Lviv attracted more than 5,000. “And that’s despite the fact that the event is closed, tickets are expensive, and preregistration is strict — with many applications rejected,” he emphasized.

Currently, Defense Tech Valley is considered one of the world’s largest investment summits focused on defense technologies.

Defense Tech Valley 2025 was the second flagship investment summit hosted by Brave1 on September 16–17 in Lviv. Brave1 brought together more than 230 Ukrainian and international companies. They showcased technologies already operating on the frontlines, as well as innovations shaping the future of warfare — from AI-powered missiles and drones to laser systems, electronic warfare (EW) solutions, autonomous ground platforms, and counter-Shahed systems.

Over two days, the forum gathered more than 5,000 visitors — government officials, military officers, venture capital representatives, and investors from Ukraine, Europe, the United States, the Middle East, and Asia — as well as leading manufacturers and startups.

“We are witnessing a smart consolidation within Ukraine’s defence-tech ecosystem. Engineering teams are increasingly merging into larger, more capable structures, focusing not on standalone products but on integrated, system-level solutions. This approach enhances competitiveness and enables entry into global markets,” commented Brave1.

International investors’ interest in Ukrainian defence technology continues to grow steadily, according to Brave1. What attracts them is not only the immediate wartime relevance but also the long-term potential of the sector. Ukrainian companies are already entering global markets, forming joint ventures with foreign partners, and actively presenting their products at international exhibitions.

Pär Lager, CEO and co-founder of the Swedish investment fund Varangians, told Ukraine’s Arms Monitor that this year’s event has been very successful for them: “We’ve secured two new investments in Ukrainian defence-tech companies and launched two new joint ventures. Another investment is close to completion. We also brought on seven new investment partners from Ukraine, the EU, and the US, and held 25 follow-up meetings with companies. Four projects are now our top priority moving forward.”

Co-founder and CEO of MITS Capital, Perry Boyle, shared that Brave1 is a tremendous resource to Ukraine’s defense tech ecosystem. “MITS Capital has a specific set of capabilities we target for investment. We like it when companies have Brave1 investment because it is a useful demand signal and technology confirmation. We can take a company seeded by Brave1 that hits our investment screen and help that company sort itself out to be ready for institutional investment,” he added.

Ukraine’s allies should definitely take note of Brave1’s outstanding experience in addressing urgent battlefield needs and overcoming bureaucratic inertia.

Brave1’s mission resonates deeply with my own values: to facilitate rather than obstruct, and to strengthen cooperation across Ukraine’s defence-tech ecosystem — ultimately bringing Ukraine’s victory closer.

In my next publication, planned for sometime next week, I will focus on the Brave1 Marketplace — a platform through which I myself discovered many of the contacts I’ve interviewed for Ukraine’s Arms Monitor. This alone stands as a testament to Brave1’s purpose and impact.

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Read some of my related articles:

• GOR: Top-Rated Reconnaissance Drone by Airlogix;

• FPV Drone Localization in Ukraine;

• Ukraine’s Pursuit of Drone Autonomy: NORDA Dynamics;

• Is Ukraine Leading Drone Swarm Warfare?

• Osa FPV Drones and Operation Spiderweb.

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At least 80% of a drone mission’s success depends on the skills of a pilot. Yet when we hear that NATO allies plan to acquire thousands of super-modern drones, much less is said about their plans to train the people who will pilot and service them. It’s not a one-day task — in Ukraine, training a drone pilot takes an average of three months. Each type of unmanned system — whether an ordinary FPV drone, a fiber-optic model, an interceptor, or a reconnaissance platform (not mentioning others, more complex UAVs)— requires a distinct set of skills.

I always try to emphasize the human factor in “unmanned warfare” — how we keep forgetting to include the cost of labor to produce these drones, the cost of training crews, and the need to build the infrastructure that enables such training.

Governments may provide their forces with thousands of advanced drones, but without trained personnel to operate them, the equipment becomes useless. NATO allies should not only acquire technologies but also start training their crews as quickly as possible.

For the article below, I’ve gathered exclusive comments from Ukraine- and US-based experts and industry representatives, which appear in italics.

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Both Russia and Ukraine treat drone crews as the most valuable targets on the battlefield. Yet while NATO countries focus on acquiring fleets of unmanned hardware, they should prioritise just as much training thousands of pilots, mission planners, and engineers — people capable of performing defensive and offensive operations and adapting to multiple types of drone threats.

With Russian drone incursions becoming routine for NATO states, several countries have unveiled their drone-centric defence strategies. In September, European Union members discussed plans for a “drone wall” along their borders with Russia and Ukraine to detect, track, and intercept airspace violations. Earlier, the US unveiled its Unleashing American Drone Dominance doctrine, centred on expendable FPV drones and the rapid fielding of up to 10,000 low-cost air vehicles within 12 months. And, the UK is restructuring its military capabilities, with 80% focusing on unmanned systems.

Less attention, however, is paid to training. Professional operators can reduce shoot-downs and electronic-warfare losses while maximising drones’ utility for reconnaissance, artillery adjustment, and the destruction of enemy assets.

Dr. Paul Schwennesen, the US-based military affairs analyst who recently returned from his volunteer duty in Ukraine, says that, despite rumors that operational training programs are “imminent,” he has yet to see any systematic adoption of UAV training for small, tactical FPV drones in any of the services or at NATO: the U.S. Air Force Academy, for example, does not even field a drone team. Drone crew training may be happening in some quarters, but certainly not to the degree of institutional adoption like he witnessed in Ukraine.

Poland is beginning to acknowledge the gap. Under a memorandum signed in September 2025, Ukraine will directly train Polish soldiers in aspects of drone warfare. “We are talking about training engineers and soldiers who will be able to defend the air domain,” said Ukraine’s defence minister, Denys Shmyhal.

Ukraine’s own experience underlines why training matters. According to the veteran of the Russo-Ukrainian war and head of the Victory Drones project, Maria Berlinska, some 85–90% of drone success depends on people, not only the operator, but also the driver, the sapper, the mechanic. Only 10–15% is everything else. “A drone on its own, without the coordinated work of its team, delivers nothing,” Maria added in an exclusive comment to Ukraine’s Arms Monitor.

When it comes to FPV drones, skills and the physical ability of pilots to handle this technology matter even more. Oleksandr Yakovenko, the CEO of TAF Industries, one of Ukraine’s leading FPV manufacturers, says that Ukrainian producers are now making drones of broadly comparable quality, so the operator’s skill is what can make it or break it. It determines system effectiveness, so even a technically excellent platform will underperform without a qualified pilot.

Ukraine has its own “drone wall” project, known as the Drone Line, announced by President Zelensky in February 2025. Among the five elite units chosen for this initiative was the 429th Unmanned Systems Regiment, known as Achilles, which has destroyed or damaged more than 43,000 Russian targets since 2022. The regiment’s commander, Yuriy Fedorenko (codename “Achilles”), said that turning a recruit into a soldier ready for battlefield missions takes at least three months. “It’s like learning to drive,” he explained. “You may get a licence, but every vehicle demands different skills depending on where and how it’s used. The base is the same, but each platform requires its own preparation.”

Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces make up just 2.2% of the Armed Forces — around 20,000 personnel out of Ukraine’s 900,000. The current aim of its Commander, Robert Brovdi, is to raise that to 5%, or 45,000, enough to cover the entire frontline at tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Following these calculations, and taking 2% as the benchmark, while bearing in mind that none of these states are engaged in active armed conflict, the US would require roughly 26,000 personnel specialised in unmanned systems; Germany and the United Kingdom, about 3,600 each; and Poland, over 4,300.

Austin Gray, co-founder and CEO of the U.S.-based Blue Water Autonomy, believes it would be justified for the United States to allocate such a large number of personnel to unmanned systems, and even said that 26,000 is too low a number. “This number will grow. If we measure the “penetration” of unmanned systems in the U.S. military, I bet only 10% of U.S. units have drones, and this penetration rate needs to rise to 30-50%,” Austin added.

Pilots are only part of the equation. Engineers are also crucial. “An engineer is 50% of a drone’s success,” argues Tetiana Chornovol, a former MP now serving in Ukraine’s armed forces. “Pilots can’t master a single platform because they constantly fly different airframes. It’s the engineer who ensures each new machine won’t fail…We test frequencies against jamming, calibrate video channels for peak antenna power. You won’t learn this without obsessive hands-on engineering.”

The challenge grows as the number of platforms rises. More than 400 types of drones are now used on the battlefield in Ukraine. Among them are interceptors — cost-effective unmanned systems against Shahed-type drones, integrated into Ukraine’s layered air defence. Priced at around $5,000 each, they downed a fifth of the record 810-drone Russian salvo on September 7th.

Experts say drone interceptors are Europe’s best answer to the growing Russian drone threat. So far, Europe has neither the systems nor the human resources needed to operate them.

Britain has recently launched Project Octopus, a joint programme with Ukraine to develop interceptor drones for both the frontline and Europe’s eastern borders. Ukraine plans to produce 1,000 per day for its own needs — but training crews is proving harder to scale.

Currently, each interceptor drone requires its own operator. When Russian drones fill the skies, Ukraine’s units cannot field enough personnel. Ukraine currently has over 33 licensed drone training schools, but it’s still not enough, and the quality of training varies.

“Having enough qualified instructors is critical. The load on top volunteer training centres like Boryviter and Victory Drones is enormous right now,” says Anton Melnyk from the MITS Capital investment fund. Another option is to train pilots in the internal training centres of military units, for example, K-2, the “Killhouse” at the 3rd Assault Brigade, Achilles, and so on. Anton added that training for any drone operator usually starts with the Mavic: it’s relevant for everyone, even for tank crews who can simultaneously operate drones for aerial reconnaissance. But the more systems an operator masters, the better a specialist they become. It’s a huge advantage, both for the operator and for the team they work with.

One Ukrainian drone school, Dronarium Academy, has recently launched counter-drone training courses in Poland that will open later this year for military officers as well as civilians preparing to enlist.

Operating unmanned systems in modern warfare is not just about the ability to “fly a drone.” It’s a complex competency, including understanding electronic warfare, working in a jammed environment, and coordinating with other elements of a multilayered air defence system. “These are precisely the kinds of knowledge and practical experience our partners still lack. This became obvious after we reviewed their training materials and curricula: it’s clear that the people who prepared them had no real combat experience in using drones,” said Anastasia Sobova, CBDO of Dronarium to Ukraine’s Arms Monitor.

Technology is beginning to ease this constraint. Systems already exist that allow one operator to launch multiple interceptors, each programmed to fly to set coordinates and autonomously engage targets. Such semi-autonomous solutions boost effectiveness against manoeuvring threats, though they are not yet widely deployed. Ukraine has also introduced AI-enabled swarms that cut crew requirements from nine to three: a planner, an operator, and a navigator.

Yet autonomy will not fully replace people on the battlefield. NATO doctrine insists on a “human in the loop” concept: at some point, a human must decide what to attack and whether the target is legitimate. That means that men and women will remain the decisive element of drone warfare.

On the other side of the battlefield, Russia is investing heavily in cultivating its next generation of drone pilots. Russian schools are being equipped with specialised classes to teach drone operation, and the minimum age for drone-piloting competitions has been lowered to just seven. There is no doubt that NATO countries will be facing drone threats for many years to come.

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Here is the list of some of my most recent and relevant articles:

• Is Ukraine Leading Drone Swarm Warfare?

• Osa FPV Drones and Operation Spiderweb

• “We Can Produce 150,000 FPVs per Month”: Ukrainian TAF Industries

• TerMIT Drone and the Future of Unmanned Ground Vehicles in Ukraine

• Kids with Drones: Russia Militarizes Education at Record Pace in 2025

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When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine barely had a navy. Over the past three years, Ukraine has disabled a third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and forced the rest to retreat hundreds of miles to safer harbors.

Instead of relying on traditional, costly naval capabilities that require years to develop, Ukraine focused on building an unmanned fleet, which is now ready for export to countries in need of such systems.

When I met with Rui Costa, a former Portuguese Navy officer, board member of the Royal Netherlands Society of Marine Engineers, and host & co-founder of UNMANNED_X, I intended to focus on Ukraine’s naval drone exports. However, our conversation soon shifted toward the growing threats posed by Russia. In the end, we reached a shared conclusion: NATO countries must prepare not only for aerial threats but also for those emerging from the sea.

This article is based almost entirely on my interview with Mr. Costa (featured in block quotes), with only occasional additions of updated data and figures here and there.

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On Ukraine’s Naval Drones and Export Opportunities

Ukraine has developed several types of naval drones, including the most famous unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) — such as Magura and SeaBaby — and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) like Toloka.

In addition to that, there are a few less public innovations, such as Mamai, developed in 2023, and called the fastest vessel in the Black Sea, capable of reaching speeds of up to 110 km/h. Also, at the DEFEA 2025 defense exhibition, company Nordex unveiled its Seawolf – a modular USV platform. Additionally, there is another impressive innovation - the naval drone Katran built for multi-domain warfare. These USVs are modular “motherships” capable of engaging targets in the air, on the surface, and deep behind enemy lines. Katran can accommodate a wide range of armaments — from missile systems to swarms of FPV drones. The platform also uses artificial intelligence for precision targeting.

“Ukraine’s geopolitical context is truly unique; the naval systems in Ukraine were born out of evolutionary pressures — they emerged from the realities of war, not from theory,” says Rui Costa.

Ukrainian developers built what worked in their environment. We often read about Taiwan shifting toward a ‘porcupine strategy’ — Ukraine is already living it. The idea is to field systems that leverage the economics of war in your favour — low-cost, adaptable platforms that can deliver outsized effects.

For instance, the cost of Magura is around $270,000 per complex. In December 2024, Magura drones disabled two Russian Mi-8 helicopters and heavily damaged another — the first case in history where a naval drone successfully attacked airborne targets. The operation involved the use of R-73 air-to-air missiles (labeled Sea Dragon). One Russian Mi-8 helicopter is reported to cost up to $16 million.

On May 2, 2025, a Magura naval drone operated by HUR for the first time shot down a Russian Su-30 multirole fighter jet. The aircraft was destroyed by an AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile launched from the drone (costing $200,000 to $600,000 per unit). Su-30, estimated to be worth around $50 million, burst into flames in the air and fell into the sea.

We can easily imagine that more countries with limited budgets would be interested in acquiring such capabilities to shift the economics of war in their favor.

When I asked which countries might be most interested, Rui explained that while these systems thrive in Ukraine’s unique context, you can’t simply copy and paste them elsewhere.

In North America, these systems may not directly translate due to different political and geographic realities. The U.S. is primarily concerned with a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan. This particular operational scenario will demand maritime drones designed for reliability, long range, and extended endurance for blue water operations.

That said, elements of Ukraine’s approach - low-cost, adaptable platforms for ISR and coastal or littoral operations - could still provide value in specific scenarios, such as monitoring and providing effective deterrence within chokepoints, ports, or island chains.

There are other regions where Ukraine’s technologies are likely to gain even more traction. “I’d first look at Asia — states with small navies and limited defence budgets where inexpensive, smart naval systems can become credible deterrence tools as part of a ‘porcupine’ strategy. Think of the Philippines, Taiwan, even Singapore — Singapore is already ahead of the curve, but for others, these kinds of systems would improve their ability to deter or complicate aggression and to monitor and protect maritime approaches,” Rui said.

It seems that something has already been underway in the region. For several months, reports have suggested that the Philippines and Ukraine plan to sign an agreement on defense technology cooperation, potentially including drone production. According to Chester Cabalza, founder and president of the Manila-based think tank International Development and Security Cooperation, drone co-production with Ukraine could focus on creating systems tailored for Southeast Asia’s climate, incorporating heat-resistant batteries, corrosion-resistant casings, and humidity-tolerant sensors.

In Europe, however, Ukraine’s approach is far more directly applicable — particularly systems that are designed for maritime ISR in the region’s own unique environmental and contested operational context; expendable assets used to create a sustained asymmetric threat towards expensive conventional naval platforms or infrastructure; or even to counter other USVs.

Countries like Portugal are obvious candidates: they have one of the world’s largest maritime responsibility areas but relatively small defence budgets, so low-cost USVs and autonomous sensors make a lot of sense for monitoring their vast EEZ and protecting offshore infrastructure. However, to be effective in this context, such systems would still need improvements in reliability, autonomy, and endurance compared with Ukraine’s designs.

In September 2025, Ukraine took part in the Portugal-led military exercise, REPMUS 2025, dedicated to testing hundreds of autonomous systems for naval applications. For the first time in NATO’s history, Ukraine’s Navy led and coordinated the Opposing Force (OPFOR). The training highlighted modern maritime warfare trends, particularly the use of unmanned systems for coordinated strikes and rapid threat response.

Based on its vast experience, Ukraine can offer not only unmanned naval capabilities but also practical expertise in countering Russian naval drones.

“Ironically, the same systems that work so well for Ukraine also work for Russia,” warned Costa. “There are still very few effective countermeasures against similar platforms, and that’s something we worry about,” he added.

On Russia’s Naval Drones

The Russian Navy began forming specialized regiments to integrate unmanned boats and underwater vehicles across its fleets in May 2025. In August 2025, for the first time, a Russian naval drone struck a Ukrainian reconnaissance vessel while it was moored near the mouth of the Danube River. Two Ukrainian crew members were killed.

Allegedly, Russia already has seven types of naval drones, each designed for different operational roles. Russia has drawn on Ukrainian drone expertise to develop its own capabilities to regain its position in the Black Sea.

On naval drones, Russia is still behind Ukraine, believes Costa. The designs coming out of Russia are generally more “primitive” than what Ukraine is developing. Russians are tending to often attempt to reproduce what Ukrainians have been developing before the start of the invasion - albeit much less competently.

In Europe, Navies often push forward toward integrated, complex architectures where USVs operate as part of a wider manned–unmanned “system of systems”. By contrast, much of what we see from Russia has been stand-alone systems that aren’t integrated into broader networks. Their approach looks more like a series of independent experiments than a coherent force-multiplying architecture.

In September 2025, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet began testing new jamming-resistant naval drones guided by fiber-optic cables. Russian authorities said that these systems can be used for one-way attacks, as an aircraft carrier for aerial drones, and to fight Ukraine’s own naval drones. By using an optical cable, the Russians are trying to compensate for their lack of sufficient and powerful satellite communication antennas.

While the Russian “Katran” (whose concept and name they stole from the Ukrainian Katran) that uses a radio channel for control, could be countered with electronic warfare systems, that will no longer be the case for the system with a fiber-optic cable.

Rui Costa is skeptical about the use of fiber-optic technologies in the maritime domain. He commented that fiber-optic-guided USVs reduce the risk of jamming, but that comes at a cost: range and flexibility. Tethered systems are typically limited to tens of kilometres between the control station and the drone. Unlike small FPV drones, USVs can’t be easily or covertly transported, and generally require vehicles to do so: placing operators at very high risk when deploying these solutions.

While this technology is still raw, experts warn that Russians might use these fiber-optic naval drones to transport several FPVs for striking Ukraine’s Mykolaiv, Odesa, or Kherson regions from the shores of the temporarily occupied Kherson region.

Russians’ ultimate goal with their unmanned naval systems appears to be creating asymmetric, disruptive threats — tools capable of menacing critical offshore infrastructure, ports and isolated ships in transit — rather than systems intended to augment a conventional navy.

That is especially worrying, because these platforms are perfectly suited to disrupt energy and maritime logistics, which are vital for Europe.

Thus, underestimating Russia’s naval unmanned capabilities would be highly unwise and undervalues these systems’ operational logic.

“Although their autonomous naval systems seem to appear relatively basic, they embody a central principle of Russian military strategy: rapidly developing simple, low-cost, and easily mass-produced assets designed to exploit key weaknesses in enemy defenses,” says Costa.

On Naval Drone Threats to NATO

According to Costa, Europe is generally regarded as holding naval superiority over Russia. Yet Russia has proven to be a flexible and adaptive adversary, continuously learning from its wartime experience and refining its capabilities in response.

This capacity for adaptation is a strategic capability in itself. The Russian military has continuously shown an ability to absorb battlefield lessons, reconfigure tactics and technology, and develop simple yet relatively effective solutions that both cover its own capability gaps as well as exploit its adversaries’.

If a war ever spilled over into direct confrontation with NATO, one clear aim would be to threaten critical infrastructure — to use naval drones and USVs to damage energy networks and disrupt shipping. Those are the kinds of targets that impose outsized economic and political costs: offshore gas and oil platforms, port terminals, LNG facilities, ferry and cargo lanes, and the choke-points that commercial traffic depends on.

So the obvious question is: what’s the tastiest target? Anything that’s hard to defend, hugely consequential if taken offline, and difficult to reroute quickly — large energy hubs, major ports, and critical maritime logistics nodes fit that description. Damage there paralyzes whole supply chains and creates leverage far beyond the cost of the attack.

The heart of Europe’s economy sits at sea: gas, oil, and maritime logistics are critical nodes that make tempting, high-impact targets. Offshore energy companies are commercial actors, not militaries, so their infrastructure is inherently vulnerable and difficult to defend.

Protecting this infrastructure can’t be left to chance — it requires coordinated state action, novel technological solutions, and deep organizational and doctrinal reform. There are efforts underway to address these threats, but current capabilities are still critically insufficient; in wartime tempo, defending Europe’s sea-based lifelines will be extremely challenging.

Ultimately, if Europe fails to prepare to meet its adversary, it may discover that victory at sea is lost long before the first shot is fired.

Seen in that light, it’s logical for Moscow to focus on systems that either create those asymmetric threats or that counter the very USVs Ukraine fields.

Even if Russia’s programmes today look experimental or stand-alone, the incentives to develop both offensive and defensive tools against Ukrainian unmanned surface systems are clear: protect your own maritime approaches, deny the adversary freedom of action, and retain the ability to threaten high-value civilian and military maritime infrastructure if escalation occurs.

Some European countries are beginning to grasp the seriousness of this challenge. According to reports from early October 2025, naval drones were integrated for the first time into the Wildfire exercises conducted by the French Navy in the Atlantic. The drills involved two multi-purpose frigates, a coastal patrol vessel, and an NH-90 helicopter.

During the exercise, these ships faced a massive simulated attack by unmanned systems deployed by the French Defence Procurement Agency (DGA). Working together with the private operator SeaOwl, which supplied surface drones capable of operating in swarms, the DGA launched 80 targets in total, with underwater drones also taking part in the drills.

On Jamming

Yes — naval drones can be jammed.

For instance, there have been cases when Ukraine lost control of its naval drones. Recently, a Magura drone was washed ashore in Türkiye, about 900 miles from Ukraine.

Electronic-warfare systems aboard ships, shore-based EW sites can disrupt their links. Developers try to mitigate that by pushing autonomy into guidance systems, but higher autonomy creates another problem: in the maritime domain, it becomes much harder to confirm a target was actually struck, and commanders need positive battle-damage assessment.

Ukraine has developed an interesting combination — using an unmanned surface vessel (USV) as a “mothership” drone capable of carrying several unjammable fiber-optic drones in retractable compartments built into its hull. This innovation was employed during attacks on the Tuapse and Novorossiysk ports in Russia, marking the first time fiber-optic drones were launched from the sea.

Undoubtedly, we will see this tactic adopted by Russia as well.

On Russia’s Shadow Fleet

Recently, it became known that Russia is using its illicit “shadow fleet” of oil tankers for intelligence gathering and sabotage operations, including launching drones. Ukrainian experts share this assessment, linking the appearance of “unidentified drones” over various European cities to Russian ships.

“Sabotage operations are often conducted not by conventional military assets, but rather by the Shadow fleet - fundamentally altering the strategic balance at sea,” says Costa.

The maritime domain is vast, expensive to monitor, and inherently complex. Unlike on land, continuous surveillance is impossible, which makes it an appealing environment for actors seeking to conceal movement and strike under the cover of plausible deniability.

While the rules of war remain an important framework, recent Russian behavior demonstrates a willingness to disregard them.

The question that follows is whether Europe is prepared to confront a contested maritime battlespace under these conditions.

As we can see, it is not only Ukraine that is emerging from this war as adaptable and technologically capable — unfortunately, the same applies to Russia. While Europe is still undecided about how to deal with the growing number of drones in the air, it should already be preparing for future attacks coming from the sea.

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If you’re new to my digest, here’s a quick disclosure: neither this nor any of my publications is sponsored. This digest is supported entirely by private individuals — readers and subscribers like you.

Recently, my newsletter became a bestseller, reaching over 100 paid subscribers. That’s a huge milestone for me!

Thank you to everyone who has chosen to show their support and appreciation!

Also, I’m continuing my fundraising campaign to buy fiber-optic equipment for my university friend serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. If you can, please help: PayPal.

My previous reports on naval drones:

• Naval Drone Export: What Ukraine Can Offer;

• Russian Fibre-Optic Naval Drone: What We Know So Far;

• Alligator-9: Ukraine’s naval drone destroys enemy robot drones with laser fire;

• Seawolf naval drone for multi-role operations in asymmetric warfare: an introduction.

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Türkiye, with its 3,000 defence producers, has an impressive defence industrial base that should not be overlooked. Despite its strategic balancing, Türkiye’s support for Ukraine in this war has been substantial. Often delivered in a low-key manner, Türkiye’s military assistance so far has included Bayraktar TB2 drones, heavy machine guns, laser-guided missiles, electronic warfare systems, armoured vehicles, and protective gear.

I’ve summarized an informative report on this strategic partnership and spoke with several Turkish experts who shared their views on the most promising areas of defence cooperation between the two sides and the challenges they face.

On a personal note, Türkiye holds a special place in my heart, as it was my second home for nine years. I earned my PhD at a Turkish university, and many of my professional and personal milestones took place in this country.

I hope you’ll find this publication useful 🇹🇷 🇺🇦

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Ukraine-Türkiye Defence Cooperation

• Ukraine and Türkiye define each other as strategic partners, with security and defence being a key pillar of their relationship, writes Maryna Vorotnyuk, an associate fellow at RUSI (read her report “Ukraine-Turkey Strategic Partnership in Security and Defence. Navigating the Disruption of the European Security Order”).

• Kyiv sees Ankara’s role as a potential security guarantor, mediator, and contributor to Ukraine’s peace plan; however, the differences in foreign policy and threat perceptions are apparent.

• Since Ukraine-Türkiye relations were established in 1992, the prevailing sentiment has been that the Black Sea unites, rather than divides, these two nations.

• Before Russia’s invasion in 2014, Ukraine’s foreign policy was bipolar, oscillating between Russia and the West, while the potential for collaboration with Türkiye was infrequently addressed and mostly declarative. As a result, the Black Sea dimension of Ukraine’s diplomacy remained largely unexplored.

• Relations between Ukraine and Türkiye have been strengthened through the High-Level Strategic Council, which was established in 2011 and has facilitated discussions at the presidential level across various sectors of mutual interest, such as increased trade turnover, the signing of the Free Trade Agreement (2022), energy cooperation, investments, and other areas of interest.

• In 2020, on the government level, the “Quadriga” format was introduced. The format includes the foreign and defence ministers from both countries and is meant to facilitate regular discussions and enable the coordination of Kyiv’s and Ankara’s actions on regional security issues.

• During the same period, Ankara has established similar high-level formats with countries such as Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.

• The relations between Ukraine and Türkiye began to change following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014. After that, Türkiye emerged as a crucial player in Black Sea security, and its strategic weight for Ukraine increased.

• Türkiye expressed and maintained its strong stance on not recognizing the annexation of Crimea by Russia and voiced support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine.

• The country provided assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine – particularly concerning the rehabilitation of Ukrainian servicemen and their families – support in the professional training of Ukrainian military personnel in Turkish educational institutions, as well as material and technical assistance to strengthen Ukraine’s defence capabilities.

• Türkiye, which was facing sanctions from its Western partners due to its operations in Syria and the purchase of Russian S-400 systems, needed alternative sources for technologies and components. This made Ukraine a natural partner, particularly in the areas of aviation engines and radar systems.

• More than 30 joint defence and industrial cooperation projects were underway in 2020. For instance, Ukraine’s state-run design bureau Luch collaborated with Türkiye’s Aselsan to develop the first Ukrainian-Turkish anti-tank missile launching system, “SERDAR”, while Ukraine’s state-owned enterprise SpetsTechnoExport signed a memorandum with Turkish Aselsan for the production of radio communication equipment in Ukraine.

• In 2018, Ukrainian companies secured a $40 million contract to repair and upgrade Turkish Mi-17 helicopters.

• Additionally, Türkiye built two Ada-class corvettes for the Ukrainian navy. “Personnel training for the first of them is now underway,” stated Ukraine’s Minister of Defence in September 2025.

• “It’s notable that these corvettes can launch American, Italian, and French missiles, along with Turkish missiles, therefore providing an opportunity to Ukrainian decision-makers to flexibly choose their procurement sources both in the short and long terms. Given the importance of a large stockpile

  of ammunition and weapon systems, Ukraine would procure its needs from several different sources,” Rıfat Öncel, Senior Defence Researcher at SETA Foundation, told Ukraine’s Arms Monitor.

• Ukrainian companies are now supplying engines for Türkiye’s KAAN fighter jet; Kızılelma, Akıncı, and Anka III combat drones; and the Atak II helicopter.

• The Kızılelma combat drone has even been called a “Turkish bird with a Ukrainian heart.”

• In 2023, Ukraine sent two engines to the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) for the company’s T929 ATAK-II attack helicopter; Ukraine has committed to sending twelve more by 2025.

• Since Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Türkiye’s military assistance to Ukraine has been substantial.

• Although Türkiye may not have been the leading provider in terms of aid volume, its supply of combat drones to Ukraine was particularly timely. The systems arrived in Ukraine before the 2022 invasion, when no other Western partners were willing to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine.

• In addition to Bayraktar drones, which will be addressed in a separate section below, Türkiye has also provided laser-guided missiles, protective gear, Kirpi armoured vehicles, and Canik M2 heavy machine guns.

• This June, Türkiye joined the International Drone Capability Coalition, an initiative by international partners to bolster Ukraine’s defence capabilities.

• Russia is unhappy with these developments. Russian FM Lavrov said he was "surprised" that Türkiye is continuing to supply weapons to Ukraine while offering to act as mediator in the conflict.

• In an exclusive commentary to Ukraine’s Arms Monitor, Dr. Sertaç Canalp Korkmaz, an independent analyst on defence & security affairs, said that defence cooperation between Ukraine and Türkiye is significant and strategic. It should mainly be seen as a collaboration between two nations that experienced Russian revisionism and aggression in history.

• The recent momentum between the two countries in the defence sector could develop even more. There is already strong cooperation in the engine sector between Baykar and Ivchenko-Progress. Türkiye’s expanding maritime capabilities allow Ukraine to work together on areas like corvettes, assault boats, and unmanned surface vehicles needed in the Black Sea.

• “Türkiye’s ongoing submarine projects could boost Ukraine's naval strength. Likewise, Türkiye’s recent project called “Steel Dome” is a multi-layered air defence system that, during the war, underscored the importance of layered air defence capabilities for Ukraine. Selling these systems to Ukraine could open significant opportunities for Türkiye, and both sides can benefit,” Dr Korkmaz emphasized.

• Rıfat Öncel highlights the prospects for cooperation in unmanned naval systems. Türkiye is well known for its work on unmanned systems across all domains of warfare. Turkish maritime drones with electronic warfare capabilities have begun participating in NATO exercises, while Ukrainian systems have played a crucial role in damaging and restraining Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.

• When it comes to the challenges of further deepening defence cooperation, Maryna Vorotnyuk notes in her report that Ukraine’s traditional stance—similar to that of its neighbours on NATO’s eastern flank—has been to support NATO and the United States as the central pillars of European defence. In contrast, Türkiye’s pursuit of strategic autonomy from the West, its emphasis on limiting external actors in the Black Sea, as well as its strategic partnership with Russia are seen by Ukraine as the main obstacles to fully leveraging their strategic ties.

• Still, since the beginning of the 2014 war, Türkiye’s stance has shown a notable duality, often described as the so-called balancing act. Ankara asserted its right to remain neutral in the West/NATO-Russia confrontation after 2014, positioning itself as a “bridge” for communication between the two sides.

• The country did not join the Western sanctions against Russia after 2014, and helped to facilitate Russia’s economy. In Ukraine, the dualism of Türkiye’s foreign policy has been seen as a key obstacle to deepening the strategic dialogue.

• At the same time, Ukraine’s growing cooperation with NATO — and the desire to involve the alliance in the Black Sea region — is not always viewed positively in Türkiye.

• Dr Korkmaz noted that since the second half of the 2000s, there has been a growing pro-Eurasianist ideology within Türkiye’s defence and security bureaucracy. Those who support this view are uncomfortable with Türkiye’s current support for Ukraine and its cooperation with NATO. Every problem Türkiye faces with Western countries is empowering this ideology in Türkiye.

• Also, Türkiye’s reliance on Russia for energy limits its ability to act completely independently in its relations with Ukraine. According to the analyst, if the second nuclear power plant is awarded to the Russians, it will maintain Türkiye’s dependence on Russia for energy for many years.

  For the context: in 2010, Turkey and Russia signed a bilateral agreement that paved the way for the construction and operation of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu. The project is being carried out by Russia’s Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation.

  Reportedly, Russia supplies about 40% of Turkey’s gas and over 70% of its crude oil.

• Nevertheless, defence researcher Rıfat Öncel expects a deeper defence-industrial cooperation between Türkiye and Ukraine in the coming period. The rapid evolution of the battlefield further incentivizes such cooperation, as Ukraine needs to persistently innovate, and Türkiye seeks to shape emerging military technologies.

• Overall, the Türkiye-Ukraine defence partnership plays a stabilizing role in the region and functions as an important pillar in the regional security architecture surrounding the Black Sea.

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Bayraktar TB-2 Drones

• “The most promising area of defence cooperation between the two countries seems to be unmanned systems. Türkiye, in recent years become a global player in this sector, while Ukraine has become the leader of drone innovation,” believes Öncel.

• The Bayraktar TB2, a medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle, gained global attention for its role in the Nagorno-Karabakh war when Türkiye supported Azerbaijan.

• Armed with laser-guided bombs, the TB2 can loiter for up to 27 hours, striking targets with precision from altitudes exceeding 25,000 feet.

• Its successor, the TB3, builds on this foundation with enhanced features: larger dimensions, a higher payload capacity, and foldable wings designed for deployment from naval vessels like aircraft carriers or amphibious assault ships.

• In 2021, Ukraine purchased dozens of Bayraktar TB2 drones, integrating them into its air force with devastating effect against Russian armor and supply lines.

• By the end of 2022, Ukraine had received an estimated total of 77 Bayraktar TB2s, combining pre-war purchases, wartime acquisitions, and international donations.

• The TB-2 would go on to play a big role for Ukraine in the early part of the full-on war as an unmanned platform able to conduct both strike and reconnaissance missions.

• During the sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva on April 13, 2022, reports suggested TB2s may have played a role by distracting the ship’s radar or providing targeting data for Neptune missiles.

• However, these drones had receded from the front lines due to their vulnerability to Russian air defence and electronic warfare. Ukrainian officials acknowledged that TB2s had become highly vulnerable to Russian systems like Pantsir-S1, Buk, and Tor.

• In summer 2025, after a long pause, Bayraktar TB2 drones reappeared in the sky as Ukrainian forces struck a Russian boat and troops on the Black Sea coast.

• Russia’s air defence coverage in southern Ukraine has likely been degraded by months of targeted strikes on S-300 and S-400 batteries.

  The Bayraktar’s recent use aligns with a broader Ukrainian strategy of suppressing and exploiting gaps in Russian air defences. When paired with naval forces or used in semi-permissive environments, TB2s remain a viable strike platform.

• In 2019, the creation of a joint venture in the field of high-precision weapons and aerospace technologies between Ukrspecexport and the Turkish company Baykar Defence was announced. One of the first projects of the JV was to develop a new generation of UAVs that can conduct detailed reconnaissance flights at high altitudes, fly long hours, have significant acceleration capabilities, and attack a wide range of high-precision weapons.

• Despite ongoing hostilities, construction of the Baykar Makina factory in Ukraine began in 2023, with completion expected in 2025. The firm committed to a $100 million investment in Ukraine.

• According to estimates, the factory will be able to produce up to 120 combat drones annually once operational. In March 2025, Baykar began training future employees for a drone manufacturing plant under construction.

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Türkiye’s Defence Industrial Complex: Key Numbers

• Türkiye’s rapidly developing defence industry has been seen as a model that is entirely applicable to Ukraine. This model includes effective state policies and successful reforms, as well as a productive collaboration between the state and private businesses.

• In the 2010s, the country switched focus to domestic design, resulting in a huge increase in domestic defence production.

• In 2024, Türkiye’s defence exports skyrocketed, rising to over $7.1 billion (compared to $5.5 billion in 2023), ranking it as the 11th largest arms exporter globally. Analysts and officials agree that Türkiye is a compelling alternative for European nations scrambling to boost their capabilities and diversify suppliers.

• Prof. Dr. Haluk Görgün stated that the latest export growth involved almost 300 different defence systems, with the latest export figures reflecting Türkiye’s “self-written vision of independence in the defence industry” and the building of its “ground-breaking ecosystem in technology exports for the future”.

• In 2024, Turkiye’s exports reached 178 countries, marking a 103 percent increase compared with 2015-2019. Its main customers in the 2020-2024 period were the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and Qatar.

• One of the most high-profile Turkish defence exports has been the Bayraktar TB2 UAV. In February 2025, Baykar stated that 90% of its 2024 revenues, or USD 1.8 billion, had been generated from exports.

• So far, the Bayraktar TB2 and Bayraktar Akinci UAVs have been delivered to 35 countries in total, with the TB2 entering the inventories of 34, and the Akinci, ten of those.

• Bayraktar TB2s have now been supplied to six NATO Allies and four EU member states, including Albania, Croatia, Poland, and Romania. Other Baykar UAV exports include Akinci systems exported to the UAE at the start of 2024, and unspecified Bayraktar platforms sent to Azerbaijan, Kenya, the Maldives, Mali, Morocco, and Pakistan during the same year.

• Türkiye has several other important unmanned innovations, including the medium-altitude long-endurance Anka-S, which has a payload of 200kg (441lb), and the Vestel Karayel tactical UAV with a 70kg (154lb) payload.

• The country is developing a “Steel Dome” (Çelik Kubbe) — an AI-enhanced system intended to detect and intercept airborne threats.

• Work is also underway on Türkiye’s first domestically built fifth-generation fighter, the KAAN, which is meant to replace ageing F-16s in the Turkish Air Force.

• Today, there are about 3,000 weapons companies in Türkiye.

Türkiye and Russia’s S-400

• In 2017, Türkiye signed a contract with Russia for the supply of S-400 air-defence systems and missiles.

• The contract was valued at approximately $2.5 billion and consisted of two systems along with at least 120 long-range 48N6 missiles. The systems were delivered to Türkiye in 2019.

• Following that, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on Türkiye and banned it from the F-35 fıghter jet programme. The S-400 is said to pose a risk to the NATO alliance as well as the F-35, America’s most expensive weapons platform at the time.

• Before the 2019 ban, Ankara sought 100 F-35As. Today, it seeks 40 as it has since invested in developing its domestic stealth fighter, the TF Kaan.

• In the summer of 2025, Russia offered to buy back the S-400 systems. It’s unclear if Russia is willing to repurchase the missiles for that price or if Türkiye is even willing to sell them.

• Such a move could have major implications for Ankara’s prospects of re-entering the F-35 programme and for its broader arms relationships across the Middle East.

• Türkiye never fully commissioned the S-400s despite insisting it would; as of last year, reports said it was considering placing them in storage under U.S. inspection.

Important note: The country formally changed its international name from Turkey to Türkiye in June 2022, following the United Nations’ recognition of its request.

While we may sometimes use the old name out of habit, let’s make an effort to switch to the official one, out of respect for our partner country.

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FPV drones have a significant impact on the battlefield. With this article, I aim to assess Ukraine’s FPV drone production dependency on Chinese components and whether substitutes are available. I spoke with several Ukrainian manufacturers, and found that the level of dependency on China remains high—particularly for motors, microelectronics, and cameras. Additionally, China holds a global monopoly on several critical metals and minerals, including neodymium, germanium, and carbon.

Ukrainian manufacturers are working hard to replace these imports wherever possible, but significant financial support is needed.

In a world where components from China might suddenly become unavailable, the Western alliance must start developing more efficient solutions. And the best time for this is right now.

Thank you for reading and supporting my work!

In April 2025, China suspended exports of a broad range of critical minerals and magnets, putting at risk the supply of key components for automakers, aerospace manufacturers, semiconductor companies, and military contractors worldwide. As of the end of June, China’s rare earth exports resumed, but not without restrictions. European suppliers are receiving enough licenses to avoid disruptions, yet many permits remain pending. Overall, China’s export controls have caused a 75% drop in rare earth magnet exports.

In May 2025, Zelensky stated that China stopped supplying Mavic drones to Ukraine and other European countries. Ukraine’s former Minister of Defence, Umerov, commented that Ukraine faced procurement challenges through various channels and across different countries. In response to that, “we launched a program to localize drones, which we achieved within a few months,” he said.

Ukraine is currently one of the largest producers of FPV drones in the world, and these drones have a significant impact on the battlefield, making their continued production essential.

Ukraine’s government identified localization of weapons production, equipment manufacturing, and repair as one of the priorities for 2024.

In March 2025, it was announced that Ukrainian UAV manufacturers who increase localized production share will gain advantages in public procurement. According to a new policy, drones with over 50% localization of components can secure guaranteed long-term government contracts of three, five, or ten years under the “Weapons of Victory” program.

However, full localization is considered challenging due to specialized components sourced internationally and the need for frequent drone design updates amid ongoing combat.

I spoke with four Ukrainian manufacturers to get their opinion on Ukraine’s dependency on Chinese components and the extent to which Ukraine needs to localize the production of certain parts. I would like to thank the investment fund MITS Capital for helping me establish these contacts (earlier, I wrote a large article about MITS). I also appreciate the support of the Brave Inventors national platform for providing me with valuable connections.

• Reportedly, the largest share of component localization among drone producers in Ukraine is currently at 70%.

• First Contact, the well-known Ukrainian FPV drone manufacturer whose drones were used in the famous Operation Spiderweb, which destroyed a third of the Russian strategic bomber fleet, told Ukraine’s Arms Monitor that it has almost achieved 70% localization of FPV production.

• In November 2024, Ukrainian FPV manufacturer Vyriy Drone presented the first fully localized FPV drone. “Some components have been quickly localized — for example, frames and propellers, i.e., parts that don’t involve electronics. As for electronics, Ukrainian manufacturers are also capable of supplying the market with stacks and ELRS systems, but this potential is currently hindered by the VAT taxation system,” Vyriy Drone, told Aeronaut.

• Full localization in Ukraine increases the production cost of drones by Vyriy by around 70 USD, so this model was not yet planned for mass production. Vyriy’s mass-produced model, which offers a competitive price, consists of 65–70% Ukrainian components.

• In March 2025, Vyriy Drone delivered a batch of 1,000 locally assembled 8-inch thermal imaging FPV drones made entirely from Ukrainian components.

• According to Ukrainian journalist Bohdan Miroshnychenko, the company produces some components in-house, while others come from Ukrainian contractors. Vyriy Drone has independently localized the production of frames, initiation boards, flight controllers, and radio control systems. At the same time, video transmitters are manufactured by the Ukrainian company DEC-1, engines by Realgold LLC, Motor-G, Enei, and UAV Technology, and cameras by Odd Systems.

  “The basic electronics are imported, so in a purist sense, it’s not a 100% Ukrainian-made drone. However, this isn’t critical, as basic components are easy to source on the market, while setting up their production in Ukraine would be difficult and perhaps not particularly practical,” he added.

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Component Dependency on China

China is currently the main supplier of components for drones and unmanned aviation in general. While Ukraine has managed to find substitutes or localize production in some areas, it remains dependent on China in others.

“Ukraine’s dependency on China remains significant, especially for motors, controllers, programmable chips, and cameras, including affordable night-vision devices. Ukraine has successfully established production of frames, propellers, and batteries,” said Valeriy Borovyk, founder of the First Contact company, in an exclusive comment to Ukraine’s Arms Monitor.

Much worse is the situation with Ukrainian small enterprises. A representative from the Ukrainian drone manufacturing startup, SkyForce, commented that the company depends on China for about 95% of its components. “A similar situation exists for most relatively small-scale manufacturers — all are heavily reliant on Chinese parts. The only items we don’t purchase from China are the printed circuit boards, as we work with a Ukrainian manufacturer, and antennas, which we also source domestically — these are actually better than their Chinese counterparts. We are also currently working with locally produced aluminum frames, which are of good quality. Everything else, however, comes from China. At the moment, there are no issues with purchasing and delivering components from there,” he added.

Among the biggest dependencies, SkyForce highlighted cameras — especially thermal cameras, which are in high demand by the military. The second is video transmitters, which relay the image from the camera to the pilot; these are complex components. “While I’ve heard of Ukrainian manufacturers attempting to produce them, as far as I know, there are no competitive options in terms of quality and price,” they noted. The third key dependency is flight controllers, according to SkyForce.

Electronics

• As of December 2024, five Ukrainian companies were able to produce electronic components of the required size and purpose - Militarnyi reported.

• They used Chinese microchips and other simple elements like transistors as semi-finished products. According to manufacturers, there was no need to get rid of Chinese components in this niche because these parts are widespread in civilian use and are of sufficient quality, making their sale impossible to ban.

• In December 2023, Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation presented a strategy for digital innovation development. One of its key points was the construction of a chip manufacturing plant by 2030. On January 14, 2025, the government approved this strategy.

• Minister Fedorov stated that the factory would be able to produce up to 50,000 chips per month.

• Currently, Ukraine urgently needs a plant that would produce 110–180 nm chips. Specifically, chips manufactured using this technology are optimal for military and industrial electronics, as well as aerospace applications. Building a plant for 110–180 nm chip production is significantly simpler and more cost-effective.

• Ukrainian developer of thermal vision cameras Oko Camera estimated the cost of building such a factory at $1 billion: “One billion is just the start. Five billion seems more realistic”.

  The Ministry of Digital Transformation noted that, according to their preliminary estimates, the total amount may range from $1 to $3 billion.

• Building an average semiconductor manufacturing plant typically takes 2–3 years in peacetime. However, given the situation in Ukraine, the timeline may be adjusted.

• “Whoever controls microelectronics can win the war,” summarized the CTO of Oko Camera for DOU.UA.

Motors

• “Today, the dependency on China in motors is almost absolute,” said the Ukrainian manufacturer AeroMotors in a commentary to Ukraine’s Arms Monitor.

• The vast majority of motors for FPV drones are supplied from China. This applies to both complete motors and key components. Ukrainian manufacturers either assemble motors from Chinese parts or import them fully assembled. China has well-established production lines, mass production capabilities, and pricing that are difficult to compete with without significant investment in Ukraine.

• The Ukrainian manufacturer and pioneer in the field of motor production, Motor-G’s production is approaching 100,000 motors a month, mostly for FPV drones, reports Kyiv Independent. This means they can equip 25,000 FPV drones per month.

• “These motors are designed and manufactured in Ukraine. The local content is about 70%, with the rest imported. The main Chinese component remains the neodymium magnets, over which China holds a global monopoly. However, this is not critical since these magnets are widely used in civilian industries,” the company CEO told Militarnyi back in December 2024.

• According to AeroMotors, Ukraine’s potential in this sector is very high: “We have engineers, a manufacturing base, and geologically confirmed deposits of rare-earth elements, including neodymium—a key component for producing magnets. These resources are not yet being developed, and starting extraction and building a magnet production plant will take years, but it is a strategic direction worth initiating now”.

• In Ukraine, FPV motor production is only beginning to develop, so its market share is currently non-competitive. To understand the scale of demand: in 2024, approximately 2.2 million FPV drones were produced in Ukraine (according to open sources), creating a demand for roughly 8.8 million motors per year—that is, over 730,000 motors per month.

• If production reaches 10 million drones per year, the demand would rise to more than 3.3 million motors per month. Currently, almost this entire demand is met by Chinese suppliers.

  Scaling up local production requires funding to purchase and install machinery—this is a key condition for achieving mass production and competitive quality.

• In the United States, a magnet production plant will soon be completed, and the Ukrainian company has already been in contact with them. The Americans work only with large orders (around 500 tons) and at a higher price, but the main advantage is independence from China.

• In Ukraine, AeroMotors is already launching domestic motor production to capture a significant share of the local market and expand into Europe. Interest in partnerships has already been confirmed by companies from Denmark, the UK, and France, all of which are also looking to reduce dependence on Chinese suppliers.

  ---

Cameras

• Ukraine has several manufacturers of thermal imaging modules, such as SeekUAV, Odd Systems, and Oko Camera.

• Oko Camera is a Ukrainian company founded in 2022 that designs and manufactures thermal imaging cameras for unmanned systems. In a commentary to Ukraine’s Arms Monitor, the team of Oko Camera shared that at present, according to their estimates, the production of FPV drones in Ukraine depends on the import of thermal imaging cameras from China for approximately 90% or more (possibly even up to 95%). In fact, there is very little data available, and it is difficult to measure accurately.

  For FPV drones, the most critical factor has been and remains the price. There is currently no country or supplier in the world that can offer components of the same quality at a lower or even comparable price than China.

• “We have conducted an in-depth study on the localization of thermal imaging camera components and can state with certainty that it is impossible to produce a competitive product without Chinese components—particularly the sensor and optics—of the same quality and at the same price as those from China. Competing with China on price is simply not possible,” said Oko Camera.

  There are several reasons for this, including state support from the PRC and a targeted development program—the so-called Optics Valley—which has been operating for decades, as well as other factors. Notably, China controls over 80% of the world’s germanium production. As a result, there are two different prices for germanium in the world: the global price and the Chinese price, and the difference between them is significant.

• In the context of thermal imagers for drones, Ukraine currently does not manufacture its critical components, particularly sensors. In fact, globally, thermal imaging sensors (arrays) are produced by only a few countries.

Frames

• Frames, along with propellers, are considered among the ‘simplest components,’ and Ukraine has successfully localized their production.

• Their production is straightforward and was carried out at one of the many Ukrainian plastic goods manufacturers using injection molding machines—automated equipment that shapes plastics into specific forms.

  “The process is not complicated, as it involves a very simple two-component mold. There are some specific requirements, though, since the propeller’s shape must be precise and perfectly centered. Currently, there are more than a dozen, if not several dozen, such manufacturers in Ukraine,” Oleksiy Babenko, the founder of Vyriy Drone, told Militarnyi.

• The cost of carbon frames in Ukraine turns out to be even lower than in China, allowing local producers to compete with foreign manufacturers.

• The Chinese use a complex system for cutting carbon frames and do not economize on carbon. They design the frame separately and then arrange the parts on the carbon sheet without concern for compactness.

• The Ukrainian project, from the start, aimed to minimize waste, so engineers planned the layout on the carbon sheet in such a way that only minimal gaps for the milling cutter remained between parts.

• Carbon is not produced in Ukraine, so the raw material problem still exists. There is no healthy competition in this sector on the global market—if carbon is produced in other countries, its quality is lower and its price higher than in China.

Defective Chinese Components

Multiple sources prove that Chinese components often have defects and unnecessary elements, while Ukrainian components are optimized for the specific needs of the Armed Forces.

• Fiber-optic cable: Defects are often found in spools of fiber-optic cable from China, causing the cable to break during a drone’s flight. Detecting these defects before shipment is impossible—the spools look fine and measurements are normal. However, small bends hidden inside the winding can cause the cable to snap mid-flight, preventing the drone from reaching its target.

  “That’s why we have recalled all batches with Chinese spools and are replacing them with ones we produce ourselves,” the CEO of Ukrainian company 3DTech told Ukrinform. 3DTech, which has five approved by MoD models of its fiber-optic drone series, Predator REBOFF, produces its own spools in-house, achieving near-complete localization of its production cycle, excluding the raw materials, as the company, like others, still relies on imported fiber-optic cables from China.

  Fiber-optic cable is not produced in Ukraine, and attempts to secure supplies from several other countries have failed. With about 80% of global fiber-optic production coming from China, there is virtually no alternative.

• Motors: The motor manufacturer said that when ordering components from China or other countries, it’s not possible to thoroughly control every stage of manufacturing. This is critical, as even the slightest deviation can affect the engine’s performance.

  Ukrainian team uses advanced aluminum processing methods to manufacture rotors: “By developing a new type of rotor that speeds up motor production, we have reduced defects and made the motors more resistant to impacts.”

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Localization Challenges

• Ukrainian legislation exempts imports of drone components from VAT and customs duties. However, Ukrainian manufacturers of components become uncompetitive because they still have to pay those fees. The next logical step for the government would be to extend VAT exemptions to local companies producing components in Ukraine.

• The production of some key technical components in Ukraine is currently very challenging, if not impossible, due to complexity and huge investment needs, so the focus is on quality final assembly and developing proprietary software to better realize system potential and meet military needs.

• “The manufacturer is also looking ahead — tomorrow the war will end, and then there will be no state orders. For instance, investing in chip production is unlikely to happen unless the war lasts for a long time or there are guaranteed consumers outside the country,” explained the founder of First Contact to Ukraine’s Arms Monitor.

Component Library

In April 2025, Ukraine launched the “Component Library” initiative, which will now operate under the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. This is a secure digital platform where Ukrainian companies producing finished products—such as UAVs, MLRS, and EW/ESM systems—can easily find component manufacturers, establish partnerships, and thus reduce dependence on imports and expand local production.

Currently, the Library has nearly 180 registered users and features over 130 product listings.

“All initiatives that support the localization of production and help Ukrainian manufacturers cooperate more closely and unite are very important and beneficial,” commented Oko Camera.

To be fair, Russia also depends heavily on continued Chinese support not only for FPV drone production, but also for Shahed/Geran drones and other military capabilities. As The Insider has found, Russia depends on Chinese electric motors for drones. There is no known Russian production of drone motors at a comparable scale. Russia imports over $100 million worth of drone motors annually.

If Russia were to drop out of the production process for a year to a year and a half—and it is unlikely it could establish domestic production of electric motors at this scale any faster—this would have an immediate and significant impact on the situation at the front, where drones have become a key type of weapon.

I would like to conclude with a quote from the founder of First Contact, who wisely noted that the world is moving away from globalization toward local alliances with their own production.

So far, it appears that the Russia–China alliance holds the upper hand, given their abundant natural resources and deepening military cooperation. In contrast, the Western alliance remains unprepared and relatively weak in the face of potential conflict.

It is entirely understandable that we do not have the full picture of their preparations and considerations, but through this material, I aim to highlight the seriousness of the issue—the significant asymmetry between the militarization of autocratic states and the Western bloc—and hope that stakeholders draw the right conclusions.

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While I focus on monitoring defense tech developments in Ukraine, I always try to look at what Ukraine can offer to other countries—and it turns out, quite a lot. My research shows that procurement systems in many NATO countries, including Canada, are painfully slow and not adapted to rapidly evolving threats. The understanding of modern warfare is often far removed from the current battlefield realities. That’s where Ukraine has valuable insights—and it’s ready to share them.

I’ve been working on this piece for about a month. It all started with impressions shared by several Ukrainian drone manufacturers I met at CANSEC—and from there, it evolved into something deeper. I had the chance to gather interviews and insights from Canadian defence industry professionals, and connect the dots between Ukraine’s battlefield experience and Canada’s evolving approach to drone warfare.

Feel free to read and share!

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When a Ukrainian drone-maker walked into CANSEC, Canada’s top defence trade show this May, his reaction wasn’t subtle: “It seems that Canada is completely unprepared for any war. Most Canadian military personnel have not seen the latest technologies — they haven’t seen FPV drones, reconnaissance drones, unmanned surface vessels, or ground robotic systems. That could cost them dearly down the line”.

Canada is not at war, and a major military conflict doesn’t appear imminent. But tensions are real. Verbal threats from the US administration to Canadian sovereignty persist, and both Russia and China continue to stage military exercises in the Arctic region. Reports suggest that hybrid provocations targeting NATO countries, including Canada, are expected to increase in the coming years.

As the United States moves toward drone dominance by 2026, planning to mass-produce low-cost systems, reduce oversight delays, and hand procurement authority directly to combat units, Canada risks falling further behind unless it develops a clear, responsive strategy for unmanned systems of its own.

Now, Canada is also part of a global military buildup race, having pledged to “rebuild, rearm, and reinvest” in its Armed Forces. In June, Prime Minister Carney announced the long-awaited increase in defence spending to 2% of GDP, but hitting that target is only part of the story. While Ottawa mentions new radar drones and Arctic sensors, details remain vague, raising questions about whether the government truly understands what’s needed.

Unmanned systems are widely used in Canada and around the world for various civilian purposes, such as crop monitoring, delivering cargo to remote locations, rapid transport of blood and organs, or unmanned evacuations from danger zones.

But the real difference lies in their military applications, an area where Canada may be missing opportunities and could learn from its ally, Ukraine, which has emerged as a global leader in drone warfare.

Ukraine’s more than 500 drone manufacturers offer a shocking array of systems. Naval drones are used to disable enemy fleets and attack bridges. Ground drones perform remote mining, cargo transport, and frontline evacuations. Fiber-optic drones can withstand extreme electronic warfare conditions. Interceptor drones fly faster than the enemy’s and neutralize them — a cost-effective alternative to air defence missiles.

That said, what works in Ukraine might not work in Canada, and vice versa. While small attack UAVs have revolutionized warfare in Ukraine—responsible for 75% of combat losses in personnel and equipment—they may not fit Canada’s conditions. “Ukrainian Armed Forces rely on FPV drones because of real shortages in manpower and artillery needed on the frontline. FPVs are 100% important, but the question is, is that the right balance of capabilities we should be aiming for?” commented Richard Shimooka, Senior Fellow of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.

Instead, Canada has committed to purchasing 11 large MQ-9B drones, known as Reapers, from the US-based General Atomics, for $2.5 billion CAD, intended for polar reconnaissance and maritime patrol. These drones have shown limited effectiveness in conflict zones like Ukraine and Yemen, where several have been shot down. “In case of any confrontation or provocation in the Arctic, the cost of losing even one is substantial,” according to Ukrainian reconnaissance drone producer Airlogix.

Researching the market and identifying which capabilities are truly needed among the hundreds of drone types available is the best policy advice anyone can offer. And ultimately, the military must determine those needs. “Instead of chasing off-the-shelf solutions, we need to define what capabilities we actually require — is it short-range FPV drones, or long-range platforms with heavy payload capacity? Do we need logistics support, autonomous flight in contested environments, or advanced mapping and target identification? Those answers lie with military commanders,” says Brian D. Fentiman, CEO of British Columbia–based BlueForce UAV Consulting.

Unlike its adversary, Ukraine has decentralized the production and procurement of unmanned systems, tailoring them to real-time feedback from military units on the ground, rather than relying on top-down decisions from Kyiv.

It has recently created a military marketplace dubbed the “Amazon for the Military,” where units can directly browse products offered by the industry and place orders based on their specific needs.

This is an advantage even Russian forces would like to have, but (luckily for Ukraine) it remains out of reach due to their rigid, state-controlled system.

In addition to strategically identifying operational needs, Canadian companies should aim to localize drone production, with strong government support behind that effort.

As Nicolas Breidi from the Montreal-based start-up L'aube étoilée puts it: “Like in many other countries, most drone components (motors, electronics) still come from China. So, the question is: should a drone company aim for full autonomy? I believe we must learn how to produce everything ourselves — motors, electronics, and even processors.”

While this is a difficult task, it offers significant benefits once achieved: independence from unpredictable geopolitical risks and unstable partnerships.

Ukraine is facing the same challenge. While many of its drones still depend on imported electronics, fiber-optic cables, and optics from China, Israel, and beyond, the country is making strides toward localization. In March, Ukrainian firm Vyriy Drones presented 1,000 fully domestically produced FPV drones — a milestone that proved self-reliance is possible. The Ukrainian government now offers incentives and long-term contracts for companies that achieve 50% or greater localization.

There are several opportunities for both the Canadian public and private sectors to learn from Ukraine’s approach to the production, procurement, and deployment of unmanned systems.

Recently, Ukrainian President Zelensky announced plans to open Ukraine’s defence production facilities abroad, noting that talks are underway with countries including Denmark, Norway, the UK, and Canada. Just days later, Ukraine and the UK reached a landmark agreement: Ukraine will share frontline data with British firms to accelerate the mass production of drones. As the UK Ministry of Defence put it, “Technology data sets from Ukraine’s front line are set to be plugged into UK production lines, allowing British defence firms to rapidly design and build, at scale, cutting-edge military equipment available nowhere else in the world.” We may learn more about the upcoming Ukraine–Canada partnership agreement(s) in the coming weeks, but the process needs to accelerate.

The two countries share a longstanding military relationship, particularly through Operation UNIFIER, Canada’s mission to train Ukrainian military personnel. But times have changed, and now Canada has much to learn from its Ukrainian counterparts, especially when it comes to drone warfare. This is not without precedent: in April, Denmark announced it would send unarmed military personnel to Ukraine for short-term drone warfare training. A similar initiative by Canada could deepen its understanding of the urgency surrounding unmanned systems and help clarify what is truly needed for Canada’s own defence priorities.

The main lesson Canada can take from Ukraine is the ability to adapt quickly. Not to get bogged down in bureaucracy, but to restructure government programs and institutions in a way that allows rapid investment in private companies capable of delivering fast, effective solutions within the country, rather than looking abroad for ready-made fixes that may not fully meet national needs. “Canada could learn from how Ukraine handled the first year of the war: how it launched grant programs, reformed its state apparatus, and streamlined the standardization and certification of UAVs. That’s the direction to take now—so that more drones can be produced and used more effectively,” commented a representative from the Ukrainian Airlogix.

Ukraine’s experience shows that even under extreme pressure, it’s possible to build a dynamic, decentralized drone industry and rethink what modern defence looks like.

While Canada is not currently involved in an armed conflict—and hopefully won’t be anytime soon—the increasing global militarization and geopolitical tensions demand attention. According to Jared Burns, CEO and co-founder of Arctic Horizons, one of only three Canadian firms named to Defense Post’s Top 100 Drone Defense Companies for 2025, the absence of an immediate conflict provides an opportunity for Canada to thoroughly study lessons from contemporary battlefields and to build a robust industrial base and skilled workforce prepared to meet future challenges.

Canada has the talent, the tech base, and the strategic need. What it lacks is urgency. In today’s world, sovereignty isn’t just about geography: it’s about who controls the technologies. Canada faces a critical choice: to take the lead in innovation and defence modernization or risk falling further behind.

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Interceptor drones or mobile fire groups? Electronic warfare or aviation? There are at least seven different ways of countering Shahed-type drones that Ukraine has demonstrated over the last year. All were born from the urgent need to protect the civilian population, the lack of traditional air defense systems, and overall, the large number of kamikaze drones launched by Russia. All solutions applied by Ukraine are a part of its multi-layered defense, and make sense under certain conditions; they have their advantages and disadvantages, which I will be discussing in this post.

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Russia’s Kamikaze Drones and Their Improved Modifications

The Shahed drone is an Iranian-made loitering ammunition, also called a suicide or kamikaze drone, developed and manufactured by Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA).

The term “loitering munition” refers to a class of UAVs equipped with an integrated warhead. After launch, they can remain airborne for some time while searching for a target, and once the target is detected, they strike and explode. They can operate either under the control of an operator or autonomously by executing pre-programmed tasks.

Over time, the Russians established their own production of Shaheds. This became evident as early as 2023, when they built their first factory in the “Alabuga” Special Economic Zone in the city of Yelabuga (Republic of Tatarstan), located 1,200 km from the front line. These drones are also being produced at the Kupol plant in the city of Izhevsk.

C4ADS estimated that Russia paid Iran $1.75 billion for the Shahed technology, equipment, source code, and 6,000 drones. This way, Russia was able to manage its own supply chain and expand the scale and frequency of its attacks (read more here).

At first, Russians used two types of loitering munitions in Ukraine: the Shahed-131 and the Shahed-136. The Russians gave them their own designations — Geran-1 and Geran-2. According to Ukrainian experts, the Russian drones are fundamentally no different from earlier Iranian models, and the observed differences are of a "cosmetic" nature, driven by the desire to reduce production costs.

Drones with markings beginning with “Ъ” and “Э” are associated with Alabuga, while those labeled “К,” “КБ,” and “КЦ” are produced at the Kupol plant.

These drones are largely ineffective against the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ military positions, which is why the occupiers more often use them to strike civilian infrastructure. “They set targets on fire and disable them not through an explosion, but through fire. That’s why they try to use the drone against infrastructure sites — because its strike is not as effective against concentrations of personnel,” said the spokesperson for the Southern Operational Command's press center.

The Shahed is based on a delta-wing shape design with stabilizing rudders at the tips. The engine is located at the rear of the fuselage. The design also incorporates a rear-facing pusher-prop arrangement. It has a length of 3.5 m with a wingspan of 2.5 m and a weight of around 200 kg.

The nose section of the Shahed-136 contains a high-explosive fragmentation warhead estimated to weigh 30–50 kilograms

The drone can fly at a speed of 185 km and has an estimated range from 1,000 to 2,500 km. It can fly at an altitude from 60 to 4,000 m. In 2023, one Shahed-type drone cost Russia approximately $200,000, and according to experts, the current price is even higher.

The drone’s body is made from inexpensive paper-based composite material. It is powered by a two-cylinder gasoline engine and propelled by a wooden propeller.

The updated version of the Shahed — the Shahed-238, which the Russians call Geran-3 — allegedly began production as early as 2023. This type of drone has been given its own name — Italmas.

Since 2024, alongside the Shaheds, the occupiers have also started using another type of long-range drone — the Molniya. This is a cheaper UAV capable of striking targets at distances up to 40 kilometers. It is often launched simultaneously with Shaheds to overwhelm the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ air defense systems. The warhead of the Molniya is 10 times smaller than that of the Shaheds, weighing up to 5 kg.

The Molniya features a simple construction made from plywood, plastic, polyethylene, and inexpensive components — including Chinese engines and electronics.

The Russians are continuously working on modernizing and improving their Shahed-type drones.

According to the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, in 2025, Russia established production of the Geran-3 equipped with a compact Tolou-10/13 twin-circuit turbojet engine. With this engine, the drone can fly at speeds of up to 550–600 km/h and has a range of up to 2,500 km. This creates additional challenges for Ukraine’s air defences.

In June 2025, Russian forces began using an upgraded version of the Iranian Shahed drones equipped with cameras, radio control modules, and artificial intelligence components. Ukrainian military radio technology expert Serhii FLASH Beskrestnov reported the first recorded use of Russian Shahed attack drones equipped with video guidance systems at a distance of at least 150 km inside Ukraine (read more here).

Another change has been in drone tactics. Now:

• They can fly at altitudes up to 4 km and glide down onto targets at speeds of 400 km/h, making timely interception more difficult;

• Drones fly in pairs at different altitudes simultaneously, complicating their detection;

• They are equipped with improved electronics for protection against electronic warfare (EW);

• Alongside Shaheds, Lancet kamikaze drones are launched, which target mobile fire groups and “clear” the way for the “mopeds”;

• Alongside its strike drones, Russia uses large numbers of decoy drones that do not carry an explosive payload and are launched in significant numbers to divert and exhaust Ukrainian air defense resources. As of May 2025, “approximately 60% of the drones were strike-capable, while the remaining 40% were decoys”.

Ukrainian expert Serhii FLASH Beskrestonov wrote that so far, no sensors or evasive maneuvering systems have been found on Shahed drones.
Everything observed is the result of pre-programmed flight routes. Although the drones’ maneuvers may appear deliberate, they are based on intelligence data factored in during the programming phase by Russian forces. Additional clarification, Shaheds are currently NOT controlled via mobile networks.

As of May 2025, Russia reached a daily production rate of approximately 170 Shahed loitering munitions and decoy drones, with plans to increase output to 190 per day by the end of the year.

On July 9, 2025, Russia fired a record number of more than 700 attack and decoy drones at Ukraine overnight, topping previous nightly barrages.

The head of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, Kyrylo Budanov, stated that Russia is incapable of launching 450–500 drones daily, although it can do so on occasion.

Sometimes, 100 “Shaheds” target 20 different spots; at other times, 100 attack just three. Even if 80% are intercepted, the ones that reach their targets still do serious damage to Odesa, Kyiv, Dnipro, or other cities.

Ukrainian air defenses aim to intercept or neutralize all incoming targets.

Ukrainian Countermeasures

Over time, Ukraine has developed multiple ways of countering Shahed-type drones. They can be summarized into seven types.

1. Mobile Fire Groups

• Currently 40-20% efficiency

• Challenges: Shaheds often fly too high or in swarms; targeting is imprecise

Mobile fire groups are a Ukrainian innovation developed to counter the large-scale use of attack drones. At their peak, they were responsible for up to 80% of successful Shahed interceptions.

Equipped with machine guns, MANPADS such as Igla or Stinger, thermal imagers, laser target designators, and advanced optics, these teams play an important role in Ukraine’s layered air defense.

However, many admit that mobile fire groups are currently of limited effectiveness. Despite nearly a thousand crews, they account for less than 1% of confirmed drone kills—most successful interceptions are credited to MANPADS or radar-guided anti-aircraft systems like the German Gepard. For a machine gunner to hit a Shahed drone, they must be in the drone’s exact path, which is a rare scenario.

Crews are often deployed based on estimated azimuths, but if a drone shifts even a few kilometers, the ambush can fail completely. Even when visible, Shaheds are hard to hit, and disabling them requires striking critical components like the engine or electronics, which is extremely difficult.

When Russian Shaheds fly above 2 km, machine guns are no longer effective. Today, the effectiveness of mobile fire groups is estimated at around 40% according to Ukraine’s officials. However, according to experts, it even drops to 20%.

2. Surface-to-Air Defense Systems

• Effective but too costly and limited in number

• Prioritized for defending against missiles, not drones

So far, such systems as IRIS-T and NASAMS have been used to shoot down Shaheds. Patriot air defense systems are not used for this purpose.

Systems like the IRIS‑T are highly effective but extremely expensive; a single missile costs around half a million dollars. As a result, they are primarily used to protect critical infrastructure rather than to intercept every drone.

Ukraine also employs short-range air defense systems like the Ground Forces' SHORAD and anti-aircraft guns, including the Gepard. These systems operate within a limited range—Gepard’s effective radius is about 4.5 km. While it's impossible to cover the entire country with them, they are effective for protecting specific high-value targets.

On July 12, the Rheinmetall-developed short-range Skynex system demonstrated impressive effectiveness by reportedly destroying seven Russian UAVs. The cost per engagement is estimated at approximately €4,000, which is significantly lower than missile-based air defense systems such as IRIS-T.

While this solution seems promising, Ukraine still depends heavily on its partners to provide both the systems and missiles for its ground-based air defenses.

3. Electronic Warfare (EW)

• Widely deployed across the country

• Plays a major role in disrupting drone signals

• Limited: short-to-medium range, not efficient for swarms

One of the main countermeasures against Russian Shahed drones is electronic warfare. These systems disrupt the drone’s ability to hit its target. EW is used to protect specific objects targeted by Russia, and by jamming the drone’s signal, it becomes more vulnerable to other means of destruction, such as mobile strike groups.

But EW also has limitations. Jammers work best at short-to-medium range, and Russia has started hardening some drones against GPS interference or programming them with pre-loaded coordinates. When swarms of drones are launched simultaneously from multiple angles, EW alone can’t cover every approach.

Ukrainian expert and representatives of an EW production company emphasized that the growing difficulty in intercepting Shahed drones is due to their increasing numbers, not engineering improvements. He stressed the need to scale up detection and interception systems, as well as expand and enhance electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. Local governments should work with manufacturers to build a layered defense system that can disrupt Russia’s ability to launch and coordinate drone attacks. This would significantly reduce drone accuracy.

Over 140 Ukrainian companies are currently producing EW systems. Ukraine’s best-known system, the Bukovel-AD, can detect drones at distances of up to 100 km and jam their signals within a 20 km radius.

4. Interceptor Drones

• They need to be faster than Shaheds and capable of flying at high altitudes

• Inexpensive systems, can be produced locally

• Performance drops in poor weather

• Require extensive personnel training and better radar coverage

Experimental Ukrainian interceptor drones began successfully shooting down Russia’s Shahed-type attack drones starting in March 2025. Before, they were mostly used against significantly slower reconnaissance drones.

In June, the Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi stated that interceptor drones used against Shaheds have an effectiveness rate of 70%—almost twice that of mobile fire groups.

Interceptor drone needs to be capable of flying at least along diagonal routes at a speed of around 300 km/h. It should have a wing with powerful engines that can quickly close in on a Shahed along such a trajectory.

The interceptor drone is inexpensive, costing $5,000 to $10,000—several times cheaper than a Shahed.

This year, Ukraine plans to produce hundreds of thousands of interceptor drones. On July 3, Ukraine and the American company Swift Beat signed a memorandum to expand drone production. Under this agreement, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will receive drones designed to destroy missiles (read here).

However, the main challenge to their effective use remains the critical shortage of radar systems within the Air Force. Reportedly, only a few units are currently available, while hundreds are needed.

Radar systems are an essential component for the effective operation of interceptor drone crews. “The enemy is actively hunting our radar stations. Sometimes they succeed, and sometimes they don’t,” says the consultant of Come Back Alive Foundation (it’s a famous Ukrainian charity organization - you can donate here).

Ukraine has radars from large surface-to-air missile systems that can detect these drones, but many areas remain invisible to them, for example, zones along riverbeds. These blind spots need to be covered with smaller radars, such as the Israeli RADA systems.

There is currently a very high demand for Ukrainian radar systems, which are highly praised by the military. The waiting time for one domestic model has more than doubled—from 6 months six months ago to 13 months now. Demand is growing faster than production capacity can keep up.

Ukraine has already approved at least five types of interceptor drones for operational use, and procurement of such systems is ongoing.

However, interceptor drones are not a silver bullet. They can’t operate in poor weather conditions like fog or thunderstorms. In such cases, Ukraine must rely on other means of defense, particularly surface-to-air missiles.

The use of interceptor drones needs to be scaled up, but it's not just about the number of drones; it's also about having enough trained crews to operate them. “The interceptor drone is just the tip of the iceberg. Behind it are dozens of crews training every week. The response is becoming automated, faster, and less dependent on the human factor”.

5. Aviation

• Useful at high altitudes

• Limited in areas protected by Ukrainian air-defense systems (risk of friendly fire or collision)

Russia started launching drones at altitudes of 2–4 kilometers, making it difficult for ground units to shoot them down. However, this makes it easier for Ukrainian aviation—especially helicopters and light sport aircraft—to engage them.

Helicopters are very effective at detecting and engaging Shahed drones, but Ukraine doesn’t have enough of them. Light sport aircraft like the Yak-40 in Odesa also show good results—it’s not a perfect solution, but it works. Typically, one person pilots while another shoots the drones from the cabin with a machine gun or rifle, explained expert Serhiy FLASH.

Jet fighters, however, struggle to combat drones due to the large speed difference. Shaheds fly at 180–200 km/h, while fighters are 3 to 5 times faster, making it especially difficult to engage drones flying as low as 200 meters above ground.

Where ground-based air defense is active, aviation cannot operate to avoid friendly fire risks. In regions without such systems—particularly in central and western Ukraine—helicopters and fighter jets can be deployed to counter threats like Shahed drones.

6. Laser Systems

• Potentially one of the most efficient systems against drones

• No confirmed large-scale use so far

Combat lasers concentrate intense light and direct it at enemy equipment. The concept behind laser air defense systems is to burn through the body of an enemy aircraft within seconds, damage it, or trigger an explosion.

Ukraine’s defense sector is actively engaged in research and development projects aimed at advancing innovative military technologies, as reported by Defence Blog in February 2025. One key focus has been countering enemy aircraft and unmanned aerial systems (UAS), including Iranian-made Shahed drones. “Laser technologies are already striking certain targets at certain altitudes,” said (now former) Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, Colonel Sukharevskyi. According to him, Ukraine’s laser system, called Tryzub, can down aircraft at altitudes exceeding 2 kilometers. Read more about the Tryzub system here.

In March 2025, Forbes Ukraine published an interview, according to which “details of this project remain classified”.

7. AI-turrets

• Fully autonomous

• Scalable potential, but real-world performance is still limited

Recently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces received their first fully autonomous Ukrainian-made Sky Sentinel turret, equipped with an M2 "Ma Deuce" heavy machine gun.

Its key feature is full autonomy: it detects targets, calculates the trajectory of Shahed drones, and opens fire—all without a human operator, relying entirely on artificial intelligence.

Ukrainian developers are moving ahead with implementing the AI-based OCDSS system, which enables swarm drone mission planning based on simulations of thousands of combat scenarios. While these systems have only been tested so far, they promise fewer losses, higher accuracy, and better airspace control. Their real-world performance remains to be seen.

According to developers, it can take down aerial objects flying at a rate of up to 800 kilometers (497 miles) per hour, including cruise missiles, loitering munitions, and other types of drones. The system can defend both sprawling urban centers and frontlines. 10 to 30 systems (each costing $150,000) are required to protect a city.

A Sky Sentinel prototype has already downed four Shahed drones on the battlefield. Further details have not been disclosed due to security concerns.

Read more about SkySentinel in my recent newsletter here.

To summarize, currently, there is no single solution to counter Shahed-type drones. Instead, Ukraine employs a multi-layered defense system, ranging from small arms to advanced surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs) and aviation. Promising solutions are in development, but details are classified, and their effectiveness remains to be seen.

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