The war of terror against Ukraine continues, as Russia launches another deadly barrage, including its Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile — used for the third time during the war.
On the battlefield, however, Russia has been unable to achieve meaningful progress, while Ukraine continues targeting its logistical lines and setting the goal of killing more Russian soldiers than Moscow can mobilize.
In this edition:
Russia Attacks Ukraine With Oreshnik Missile for Third Time;
Everyone Is Building Interceptor Drones. This is Not Enough;
Lean-Flow Model of Drone Production: Vyriy;
Ukraine’s Defence Industry Lacks Skilled Workers;
and 10+ additional developments in Ukraine and Russia.
This edition is heavy on drone-related developments because, due to my busy schedule this month, I have merged my two newsletters.
I will be attending the CANSEC defence exhibition in Ottawa later this week. If you are around, let me know.
Thank you for reading and supporting my work!
Russia Attacks Ukraine With Oreshnik Missile for Third Time
On the night of May 24, Russia launched another massive attack on Ukraine, firing around 600 drones and 90 missiles of various types (36 of them were ballistic), with Kyiv taking the main blow.
During the assault, Russia used an intermediate-range ballistic missile Oreshnik for the third time, Yurii Ihnat, head of communications for the Ukrainian Air Force Command, said. It was launched from the Kapustin Yar test range in Russia’s Astrakhan region.
Videos appeared on social media showing several warheads striking the city of Bila Tserkva, 80 km from Kyiv. Local authorities reported damage to a garage cooperative.
BBC reported that the nature of the strike resembled the reported mechanism of the Oreshnik missile: the descent of six separate re-entry vehicles, each carrying six strike elements. In other words, 36 warheads/submunitions hit the target almost simultaneously.
Since they did not carry nuclear warheads, the damage from the strike was effectively caused by the kinetic energy of empty metal “slugs” falling to the ground at extremely high speed.
It is unclear what the intended target of the Oreshnik missile was.
Defence Express writes that the Oreshnik poses a serious danger to civilians. Above all, it is a tool of terror, especially given that a missile whose primary purpose is to deliver a nuclear warhead is unlikely to have a particularly high level of accuracy.
Russia first used this missile on November 21, 2024, in a strike on the Pivdenmash/Yuzhmash plant in Dnipro. The Russian army carried out the second known Oreshnik strike on January 8, 2026, targeting the outskirts of Lviv.
A Russian milblogger criticized the lack of public evidence after Oreshnik strikes, arguing that each launch creates a major information moment but then “ultimately amounts to zero” because Russia provides no battle-damage footage or clear explanation of what was hit. He complained that after three reported uses, Russia’s audience still knows only that the first strike hit Yuzhmash, while the second and third targets remain unclear.
This information vacuum, he argued, allows Ukraine to frame the latest Oreshnik strike as having damaged only “three garages,” while Russia offers only the usual claim that “all assigned targets were hit.” The milblogger speculated that the strike may have targeted the 148th Aircraft Repair Plant in Bila Tserkva, although this has not been independently confirmed.
Ukrainian military technology expert and advisor to the Defence Minister, Serhiy FLASH Beskrestnov, summarized the attack as follows:
Most of the damage was once again caused by missiles. There were too many missiles for Ukraine’s available air defence resources.
As for the Shaheds, Ukraine’s Defence Forces demonstrated better results than the average over the past six months.
This time, interceptor drones accounted for more than 40% of all downed Shaheds.
As in the previous attack, the Shaheds used a mass-attack tactic, flying along the same routes in an attempt to overload Ukraine’s air defences.
A small number of jet-powered Shaheds attempted to attack Kyiv from the north, with both Geran-3 and Geran-4 drones reportedly used.
There were few guided Shaheds in this attack. The enemy relied on mass rather than effectiveness.
No attempts to control Shaheds from Belarus were recorded this time. This may be because the entire strike was directed at Kyiv rather than western Ukraine, as was the case last time.
The targets in Kyiv were selected by the enemy merely as a pretext for striking the city.
According to ArmyInform, the cost of Russia’s massive aerial attack on Kyiv on May 24 was around $361.2 million. This is the estimated cost of the missiles and drones used in the attack.
According to Ukraine’s counterintelligence, as of January 2026, Russia had a critically low number of Oreshnik missiles in its arsenal — no more than three or four units. Russia’s MoD plans to launch serial production of the Oreshnik in 2026, producing five or more such missiles per year.
Everyone Is Building Interceptor Drones. This is Not Enough
Oleksandr Yarmak, commander of the Darknode Battalion within Ukraine’s 412th Nemesis Brigade, recently shared several important lessons from Ukraine’s counter-Shahed experience. Here is my summary of his presentation at the event organized by DOU.