.jpg){kind=link}
With all the chaos in the world right now, drones might not seem like the most urgent topic. However, they remain a decisive factor for Ukraine—according to RUSI, tactical drones are inflicting roughly two-thirds of Russian losses.
This week, I’ll start with an overview of key tactical developments in the third year of the war, focusing on the UAV-related chapters of RUSI’s latest report. Then, we’ll dive into an exclusive story from the Quantum-Systems drone factory in Ukraine, followed by an update on how Russia has modernized its Shahed and Geran drones. And, we’ll wrap up with some additional developments from the past week!
If you're in North America, don’t forget to register for the Ottawa Conference on Security and Defence (March 5-6). The event will feature a wide range of Canadian and international top-level policymakers, experts, and the business community. Since I’m not currently affiliated with any institution in Canada, I may have to miss it—but if you know of anyone who could assist or sponsor my attendance, I’d greatly appreciate any leads!
Without further ado, let's dive into the latest edition of Drone Warfare in Ukraine!
Tactical Developments During the Third Year of the Russo–Ukrainian War (Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds for RUSI).
According to a new report from the UK defense think tank RUSI, tactical drones are inflicting roughly two-thirds of Russian losses. In other words, they are twice as effective as every other weapon in the Ukrainian arsenal put together.
The authors state that the third year of the war was highly attritional, with the focus of both parties being the infliction of maximum damage on one another, rather than a breakthrough. The available technology with which the war has been waged has also evolved over this period.
Key points regarding UAVs:
In Ukraine most brigades have a UAV company or battalion, and dedicated UAV units are allocated to support sections of front between 40 and 70 km wide.
Generally, FPV and bomber operations are cued with intelligence and by quadcopter spotter drones, or by longer-range fixed-wing reconnaissance UAVs. FPV fire missions tend to be coordinated from battalion and brigade command posts. Different systems are optimised for different targets and times of the day. Bomber drones tend to deliver a heavier payload and so reliably do more damage to targets. However, their slow speed and need to hover above the target means they are predominantly employed at night.
Tactical UAVs have significant limitations. Between 60 and 80% of Ukrainian FPVs fail to reach their target, depending on the part of the front and the skill of the operators. Of those that do strike their targets, a majority fail to destroy the target system when striking armoured vehicles. The success rate in wounding infantry is high.
Despite limitations, tactical UAVs currently account for 60–70% of damaged and destroyed Russian systems.
Military officers contacted by RUSI emphasised that UAVs alone were inadequate and that they were most effective when used in combination with artillery. For example, artillery was effective at suppressing or displacing EW and air defences or suppressing infantry protecting key targets from bomber UAVs. Artillery was also able to defend the front in poor weather and was generally more responsive.
The conduct of reconnaissance for both Russian and Ukrainian forces has been almost exclusively conducted by UAVs. The command and control of the reconnaissance screen has centralised at the battalion and brigade/regimental level in both Russian and Ukrainian forces.
Generally, each UAV orbit will maintain a satellite uplink and stream its footage to the battalion and brigade command posts, where the intelligence officer, fires officer, and the commander’s representative will assess what is observed, determine options and authorise actions to be taken in response to what is observed. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces, for reasons of doctrine and culture, do not generally use fire controllers in combat units.
It is recommended that international partners support the increased scaling of UAV production; and the development of UGVs for casualty evacuation.
As for recommendations for NATO, the authors say that counter-UAS capabilities are an all-arms requirement for survivability, and appropriate equipment and doctrine must be issued throughout NATO forces. Without counter-UAS capabilities, NATO militaries risk seeing high quality troops and equipment rapidly suffering losses for want of protection, when such effective protection is eminently achievable. For infantry, for example, counter-drone nets and other simple stocks should be available alongside traditional stores like corrugated-iron or timber that can be used for augmentations to fortifications.
Russia’s Primary Target: A Report from the Quantum Systems Drone Factory in Kyiv
Correspondents from the magazine loyal gained access to a secret drone factory in Kyiv, operated by the Bavarian manufacturer Quantum Systems.