Last week was crazy. Is it already possible to say that Russia has a new ally, or not yet?
Focusing on Russia’s military affairs, I’ve gathered key insights from reports by two reputable organizations—RAND and the Center for Strategic & International Studies. The RAND report analyzes four potential pathways for the postwar reconstruction of the Russian Armed Forces, while the CSIS report examines Russia’s missile attacks on Ukraine and how Ukraine is countering them. I wrap it up with a timely ACLED report, illustrating Russia’s relentless targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine.
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Let’s dive in!
Breaking Down Russian Missile Salvos: What Drives Neutralization? (Yasir Atalan and Benjamin Jensen for Center for Strategic & International Studies).
Russia relies on a mixed group of expensive, high-precision missiles, as well as legacy systems and cheaper models that allow for constant daily pressure on Ukraine. While these legacy systems and cheaper drone models are not successful in hitting targets, they allow Russia to increase the intensity of the firepower during the offensives.
On average, Russia has fired 24.3 missiles and drones at Ukraine a day since the start of the war.
Over time, Russia diversified its missiles used to attack Ukraine, and included ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, kamikaze drones, and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In certain months, over 25 unique missile and drone models were launched, with a daily maximum of 14 unique models.
In 2024, Shahed-131/136 drones alongside Kh-101 and X-555 air-launched cruise missiles, accounted for 75% of all launched missiles. Kalibr missile use has fallen dramatically, shrinking to just one-fifth of its previous level in the 2022–2023 period.
Across the entire study period from September 28, 2022, to October 6, 2024, the overall intercept rate by Ukrainian forces stands at 84.1%. Approximately 4 out of every 5 missiles or UAVs launched by Russian forces were intercepted by Ukrainian defense systems or went missing, likely due to electronic warfare capabilities.
Authors pose a question: what determines the rate at which Ukrainian defenders neutralize Russian missiles? Research shows that it is not simply the mass of missiles fired that matters but rather their make and model.
A notable number of missile types, including Lancet, ZALA, Orlan-10, Supercam, Merlin-VR, Orion, and various UAVs, were intercepted entirely, demonstrating the robustness of Ukrainian defense systems against these specific reconnaissance UAVs. However, models such as the X-22 and certain iterations of the Iskander series exhibited lower intercept rates, indicating significant vulnerabilities against ballistic missiles.
The study reveals that short-range, ballistic missiles remain the deadliest weapon in the Russian arsenal.
U.S. and European policymakers should bolster Ukraine’s ballistic missile defenses by integrating rapid detection, high-speed interceptors, and improved resource allocation. Ukraine, in turn, should expand its arsenal of advanced Western interceptors (e.g., Patriot and SAMP/T), invest in real-time intelligence sharing, and ensure sufficient interceptor stockpiles to sustain high-intensity salvos.
Russia’s Military After Ukraine. Potential Pathways For the Postwar Reconstruction of the Russian Armed Forces (Michelle Grisé, Mark Cozad, Anna M. Dowd, and others for RAND)
In this report, authors distinguish conceptually between Russia’s efforts to equip and sustain its armed forces in the war in Ukraine and the strategic decisions that Moscow will have to make following the war to address Russia’s postwar strategic environment.
The process of reconstitution is already underway: Former Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu has outlined Russia’s future force structure; Russia’s economy and defense industries have been adapted to meet the demands of the war; and Russia’s military is larger and has more combat experience than at any point since the end of the Cold War.
Although the Russian armed forces have made significant tactical and operational adaptations in the past year, the war has led to the deaths of tens of thousands of Russian service members and the loss of trillions of rubles in cutting-edge materiel.
Military losses: According to the data, Russia has lost roughly half of all tanks that were in active military service at the start of the. The VKS (Russian Aerospace Forces) has lost nearly one-third of the prewar inventory of its most advanced attack helicopter, the Ka-52 Alligator. Despite its overwhelming naval power relative to Ukraine, Russia has lost a nontrivial number of maritime vessels, mainly due to Kyiv’s innovative use of unmanned and long-range strike systems.
Authors present four possible reconstitution pathways, each of which Russia might follow in the months and years after the end of the Ukraine conflict.
The first pathway, The Shoigu Plan, is designed to reflect statements that were made in 2023 by Shoigu and other Russian military leaders about their ongoing planning for reconstitution. Russia would pursue quantitative increases and selective qualitative investments. It would seek to increase the armed forces’ overall personnel and equipment numbers to reflect the evolution of the threat environment—in particular, Finland’s and Sweden’s admittance to NATO.
A second potential reconstitution pathway, Revisiting Old Models, would entail a regression to a Soviet operational model, including a heavy reliance on mass and minimal qualitative investments. Under this pathway, Russia would primarily rely on the technology it can produce domestically, making up for any technological gaps through quantity or asymmetry rather than sourcing technology from its foreign partners.
A third potential reconstitution pathway, A New, New Look, would emphasize qualitative investments in lieu of an emphasis on mass. Under this pathway, Russia would rebuild a smaller, yet qualitatively superior, force. This approach would entail a serious attempt to pursue personnel reforms and prioritize the development and use of asymmetric means of warfare.
A fourth potential pathway, A New Operational Model, would entail qualitative investments in lieu of an emphasis on mass. Under this pathway, Russia would reject the Soviet and Russian operational models of the past and implement major institutional reforms within the defense establishment. Russia would seek outside expertise to improve its operational art and tactics and would leverage key external relationships (especially with Iran, North Korea, and China) to support the acquisition of new technologies and strategic partnerships.
Key conclusions from the report:
The way in which the Ukraine war ends will inform the lessons that Russia learns from the conflict and, by extension, the decisions that Russia makes about reconstitution.
Russia’s relationships with its key partners—including, notably, China, Iran, Belarus, and North Korea—will play an especially influential role in shaping the reconstitution process.
Russia’s decision to restructure the country’s economy for wartime has created dependencies within the defense industrial base that will be difficult to reverse.
Although U.S. allies are closely tracking Russia’s reconstitution efforts, their focus is on the speed of reconstitution rather than the nature of the reconstituted Russian military.
A partially reconstituted Russian military will still pose a significant threat to U.S. and Western interests in the European theater.
Bombing into submission: Russian targeting of civilians and infrastructure in Ukraine (Olha Polishchuk, Nichita Gurcov for ACLED).
Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilians reached an all-time high in 2024, with an over 30% increase in the total number of remote attacks leading to civilian casualties amid Russia’s steamroller offensive. ACLED estimates that over 1,600 civilians have died as a result of these attacks in 2024 — 16% more than in 2023. In 2024, the number of aerial attacks against civilians more than tripled, of which over a quarter were combined with shelling.
A little under 5,500 events (out of a total of over 140,000 conflict events recorded between February 2022 and December 2024) explicitly list damage to residential properties (over 4,200 events), schools (over 650 events), health care facilities (over 350 events), and energy infrastructure (almost 1,000 events). An additional 4,500 events are based on reports that mention damage to civilian infrastructure but provide few details.
The extent of destruction is likely greater than reports suggest, especially in settlements that have been turned into battlegrounds and reduced to rubble as a result.
Russia has also been explicitly targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The campaign in late March 2024 marked a shift toward the destruction of power generation itself. By September, Ukraine lost 80% of its thermal power generation capacity and about half of its overall power generation capacity.
Other developments:
According to Janes, in combat operations against the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Russia is using a total of 95 Mi-24 and Mi-35 helicopters, 75 Ka-52 helicopters, and 55 Mi-28 units, totaling 225 attack helicopters. These figures account for the fact that at least 30% of Russia’s available helicopter fleet is unusable due to various technical issues (translated from the article in Ukrainian by Defense Express).
Russia will resume production of the Soviet TVD-10 aircraft engine for An-2 Kukuruznik aircraft. As part of the modernization, it is proposed to install a TVD-10B engine on the aircraft.
Russia started striking Ukraine with unknown drones. The police reported that this fixed-wing drone is painted gray, has two wings arranged in a "biplane" configuration, and is equipped with an electric motor with a pusher propeller at the tail. It is equipped with a nearly 3-kilogram warhead in the nose section. Due to its small size and low-noise electric motor, the drone is difficult to detect from a distance.
Russia's outreach to American adversaries continues despite Russian President Putin's efforts at rapprochement with the Trump administration. Russian officials met with Iranian and North Korean officials on February 25. Putin spoke with China President Xi Jinping on February 24, the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
North Korea has sent more soldiers to Russia and re-deployed others to the frontline in the western Kursk region, according to South Korea's intelligence agency.
North Korea’s Special Missile Vehicles Roll Into Battle (David Axe for Forbes). A Ukrainian drone recently registered the first hit on a North Korean M1989 howitzer near Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine, and recent releases by Russian channels indicate North Korean Bulsae-4 missile vehicles are active in Kursk.
North Korea carried out a test launch of strategic cruise missiles to showcase its nuclear deterrence capabilities.
The Kremlin is intensifying a campaign launched in late 2022 and early 2023 to prevent the emergence of an independent veterans-based civil society and an influx of alienated veterans in Russia, likely because it perceives the demobilization of Russian veterans as a potential threat to regime stability - Institute for the Study of War.
The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) detained two Russia’s intelligence services' spies, directing missile strikes on airfields and air defense systems.
Excellent analysis from all involved. Thank you. SlavaUkrayini
Excellent detail Olena, thank you